

# Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Somalia

Rapid Literature Review  
February 2016

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## About this report

This report is based on 24 days of desk-based research and provides a short synthesis of the literature on fragility and migration in Somalia. It was prepared for the European Commission's Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, © European Union 2016. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, and do not represent the opinions or views of the European Union, GSDRC or the partner agencies of GSDRC.

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### Key websites:

- Freedom House: <http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/>
- IOM: <http://ronairobi.iom.int/somalia>
- IDMC: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/>
- North Africa Mixed Migration Hub: <http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/>
- RMMS: <http://www.regionalmms.org>
- UN data: <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=somalia>
- UNHCR: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483ad6.html>
- World Bank Data (Somalia): <http://data.worldbank.org/country/somalia>

This paper is one of a series of fragility and migration assessments. The others are:

- Carter, B. & Rohwerder, B. (2016). *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Ethiopia*. (Rapid Literature Review). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- GSDRC. (2016). *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Eritrea*. (Rapid Literature Review). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Strachan, A.L. (2016). *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Sudan*. (Rapid Literature Review). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

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# Executive summary

## Key facts

It is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the migration situation in Somalia. Limitations with the data include varying definitions for different categories of migrants; lack of documentation, particularly for irregular migration; inconsistencies across sources; and limited disaggregation by region.

### *Outward migration*

There are currently 1.1 million Somali refugees and 0.5 million asylum seekers worldwide.

- Combining these numbers with the domestic population of 10.5 million suggests 13.2 per cent of the population are refugees and asylum seekers.
- Most Somali refugees and migrants are in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. The top three destination countries for refugees are Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia.
- The top three EU member states that Somali first-time asylum seekers applied to in 2014 were Germany, Sweden and Austria.

### *Inward migration*

Somalia is estimated to host 1.1 million internally displaced persons, 6,900 refugees, 9,800 asylum seekers and 25,300 migrants. A total of 19,000 Somali refugees returned to Somalia in the first half of 2015. Large numbers of migrants and refugees transit through Somalia, particularly Somaliland and Puntland, but no data captures this movement.

### *Other facts*

- Freedom House designates Somalia as “not free”, with an aggregate score for political rights and civil liberties of 2 out of 40. Somalia is considered a fragile state and ranks second out of 178 countries, with only South Sudan considered more fragile. The average score across indicators measured is 9.5 out of 10.
- Somalia is heavily dependent on remittances. The diaspora is estimated to remit \$1.3–\$2.3 billion annually to families in Somalia, constituting up to 40 per cent of household incomes for some. In some areas of Somalia, remittances are estimated to have accounted for more than 70 per cent of GDP in 2006. Other estimates indicate that remittances in 2012 accounted for 35 per cent of GDP and are among the highest in the world.
- Development partners have continued to support Somalia’s reconstruction and humanitarian activities, with reported total aid amounting to about \$1.3 billion in 2014. This comprised nearly \$700 million in aid for development, about \$253 million humanitarian aid and about \$439 million in support to peacekeeping forces.

Somalia is a country of origin, destination, transit and return for a large number of people moving across the Horn of Africa region and beyond. Somalis have fled the country in large numbers since the late 1960s as a result of war, poverty and a lack of freedom. Protracted conflict and the absence of a functioning government have produced a diaspora of between 1 and 1.5 million people, mostly based in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen, the UK, the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Saudi

Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and South Africa. The return of migrants is expected to follow the establishment of a fragile stability and the return of moderate economic growth.

The Somali civil war (1987–1991) resulted in the mass displacement of Somalis both within the country (100,000) and within the region (500,000 in Ethiopia). With increased stability resulting from the UN intervention from 1992 to 1995, an estimated 200,000 returned during that period. Subsequently, between 2009 and 2011, Al-Shabaab operations and widespread drought in southern Somalia have seen an estimated 297,000 Somalis flee to neighbouring countries. The establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have led to a degree of stability.

Despite recent developments, though, an estimated 65 per cent of young Somalis consider migration a viable option, given the lack of employment and livelihood opportunities. Although pockets of stability are developing and moderate growth has returned, this has yet to translate into betterment for the population. Moderate growth witnessed since 2011 is not considered enough to address poverty or inequality.

Migration trends from Somalia are unlikely to change in the short and medium term. Migration from the country is driven by limited employment and livelihood opportunities; conflict; the suppression of political, economic and social rights; and climatic events. Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland are considered to be making some progress towards constitutional democracy, although elections in Somaliland scheduled for 2015 have been postponed (they are expected to take place in 2017) and in Puntland democratisation is stalling. Somalia (Mogadishu) elections scheduled for August 2016 will not be based on universal suffrage as planned when the current government's term started in 2012. Somalia continues to be considered one of the world's most violent countries, with the dynamics of conflict and insecurity varying geographically. Communal conflicts are common in Somaliland and Puntland, with Al-Shabaab operating primarily in southern Somalia.

All regions experience outmigration of refugees and migrants, although more leave south central Somalia. Puntland and Somaliland also experience large transit migration flows of Ethiopians and others crossing from the Horn of Africa to Yemen. People from south central Somalia are usually granted some form of protection, such as refugee status or subsidiary protection.

Migrants tend to be young (under 25 years). There are refugees of all ages, but UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data show most are aged 18–59. Other studies report much larger numbers of child refugees, and many travel unaccompanied. It appears slightly more men make up migration flows, although data vary. Nomadic and semi-nomadic cross-border movement has long been a survival strategy for pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Minority clans are more likely to experience forced displacement.

With the historic absence of central authority within Somalia, attempts to limit migration have been isolated. This will remain particularly challenging given weak state capacity and a scarcity of resources.

There is limited evidence that state interventions can affect structural change, ensure economic growth or encourage improvements to political and civil liberties. Unless the root causes of migration are addressed—namely, limited employment opportunities and persistent conflict—migration flows from Somalia are not likely to decrease in the near future.

Development assistance focused on the rehabilitation of public institutions that can generate public goods and services will be an enabler of long-term economic development. Meeting Somalia's socioeconomic challenges is difficult and will take time, given the legacy of weak institutions and regulatory frameworks, weak governance and limited public services delivery.

Continued international engagement with Somalia, both financially and diplomatically, appears essential to address economic decline and regional instability. Prolonged support from regional and international actors is required to buttress fragile stability.

## ***Evidence***

This rapid review found a fairly large development practitioner and a medium amount of academic literature on the sources of fragility in Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. Given the fluid and rapidly changing context, as well as the existence of autonomous and semi-autonomous territorial administrations, it is challenging to make definitive statements that reflect the complexity of Somalia as a whole. Figures on Somali migration remain limited in quantity and quality. Some challenges include difficulties in monitoring the huge, diverse and changeable migration flows; limited data on irregular migration because of its illicit nature; reports often relying on unverifiable information; and security risks limiting the ability to conduct research in Somalia. An attempt is made in this report to document a range of data when significant discrepancies arise.

The literature on migration is focused on those travelling to Horn of Africa countries, Yemen and the Middle East. Within the literature there is a strong focus on youth migration.

Key evidence gaps include:

- accurate data on the state of the Somali economy, including prospects for future growth as well as accurate population projections. The weak state of the Somali statistical system and the existence of autonomous and semi-autonomous regions and political entities exacerbate issues of data reliability and consistency for Somalia as a whole
- exploration of the impact of climate change, population pressure on natural resources and its influence on current and future internal and international migration
- data on migration – especially informal but also formal
- up-to-date information on migrant profiles, motivations and routes, taking into account the impact of the new global migration context
- information about human smuggling and trafficking networks
- the regional dynamics of internal displacement and its relationship with international migration
- the high rates of youth migration and its correlation with limited livelihood opportunities (recent studies are addressing this gap)
- the potential impact of migrant return on Somalia socially, politically and economically
- the role development aid has played in relation to migration pressures
- the impacts of internal displacement and conflict on pastoral communities
- the interrelationship of clan dynamics, exclusion and migration.

# 1. Recent history

## 1.1 Colonial and post-colonial history

Somalia is at a crossroads, tentatively emerging from decades of complex and protracted conflict (UNDP, 2012). Conflict has seen the country fragment along geographic lines, with the south central region<sup>1</sup> continuing to experience instability and lawlessness while the north west and north east<sup>2</sup> have achieved a degree of peace and stability—though sporadic communal violence punctuates this (ACLED, 2013).

The conflict has its roots in Great Britain and Italy's 19th century colonial projects (Ciisa-Salwe, 1996). Through a succession of treaties with regional kingdoms, the British and the Italians gained control of adjoining coastal regions and established British and Italian Somaliland (Besteman, 1999). In 1960, the regions united to form the independent Somali Republic under a civilian government (Menkhaus, 2006).

However, the north and south effectively remained two separate countries, with different administrative, legal and education systems. The respective elites also had divergent interests, which contributed to the Somali civil war (Forti, 2011). Somalia's post-colonial history can be broadly delineated into four phases (Forti, 2011; Menkhaus, 2006):

**1960–1969:** In 1960, British and Italian Somaliland gained independence and merged as the independent Somali Republic, with Abdullahi Issa and Muhammad Egal forming a government.

**1969–1991:** In 1969, Major-General Mohammed Siad Barre overthrew the civilian government in a military coup, going on to establish the Somali Democratic Republic. For the next two decades, a military regime governed the country, exploiting clan-based politics as a means of control. During the 1980s, opposition manifested itself as a multifaceted power struggle between various factions.

**1991–2000:** Barre's military government was overthrown in January 1991, triggering violent upheavals. In south central Somalia, clan-based militias competed to control resources and engaged in looting, contributing to the famine of 1991–1992. The Somali civil war culminated in the collapse of the state and the breakup of state institutions (ICG, 2008). Somalia was designated a "fragile state" and considered one of the longest-running instances of state collapse in post-colonial history (Menkhaus, 2006: 74).

In 1991, Somaliland seceded from Somalia and declared independence, with the government regarding itself as the successor state to the former British Somaliland protectorate. Puntland was established in 1998 as an autonomous state, not pursuing sovereignty.

**2000–present:** The Transitional National Government (TNG), formed in 2000, failed to establish itself in Mogadishu. A conference in 2002 then led to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 and the creation of the interim federal administration. By 2007, the TFG, with assistance from Ethiopian troops, had assumed control from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)<sup>3</sup> of much of the southern conflict zones. The ICU has subsequently splintered into more radical groups, such as Al-Shabaab, which continues to battle against the TFG and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for control of the region.

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<sup>1</sup> Including the following states/ regions: South West State, Galmudug, Himan, Heeb, Jubaland and Central Regions State.

<sup>2</sup> Somaliland and Puntland, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> The ICU is a group of Sharia courts that united to form a rival administration to the TFG, with Sharif Sheikh Ahmed at its head.

## 1.2 Economic and human development status

### *Economic development*

A detailed assessment of the economic and human development status of Somalia is problematic, given the dearth of economic and social statistics, two decades of conflict and the collapse of many of the country's institutions.

The existence of autonomous and semi-autonomous regions and political entities exacerbates data reliability and consistency for Somalia as a whole. The Somali statistical system is considered weak,<sup>4</sup> and comprehensive source data on the national accounts, the fiscal and external sectors and the banking system are limited (IMF, 2015). Sources cited reflect the most recent figures available. These sources are at times based on estimates and updates of existing figures, and should be read as rough indicators rather than evidence-based data.

**Table 1: Somali key statistics**

Population (2014)	12.31 million*	Human Development Index score (2012)	0.285
Urban (2014)	42.4%	Human Development Index ranking (2012)	165/170
Rural (2014)	22.7%	Poverty rate	73%
Nomadic (2014)	25.9%	Unemployment rate (Youth)	67%
Internally displaced persons (2014)	9%	Annual official development assistance (2014)	\$1.3 billion

Note: \* This figure (from UNFPA, 2014) is considered the total population of the 18 pre-war regions. This is larger than World Bank population estimates for 2013 of 10.5 million.

Sources: OECD;<sup>5</sup> UN Data Somalia country profile;<sup>6</sup> UNDP (2012); UNFPA (2014).

It is difficult to quantify Somalia's GDP; the African Development Bank (AfDB) estimated it in 2010 at close to \$5.8 billion, with a per capita GDP of \$600 (AfDB, 2013: 2). World Bank estimates of GDP per capita for 2014 were \$542.6.<sup>7</sup> Estimates of Somalia per capita GDP are considered significantly low when compared with the Sub-Saharan African average of \$1,300 per capita.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 2: GDP per capita (current US\$)**

Somalia (2014)	Eritrea (2011)	Sudan (2014)	South Sudan (2014)	Ethiopia (2014)
542.6	544.5	1,875.80	1,115.10	573.6

Source: World Bank Development Indicators.<sup>9</sup>

The country's economic base is narrow, with an estimated 60 per cent of the population engaged in pastoral-based livestock production. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates that in 2015, of a total labour force of 4.55 million, 2.87 million were involved in agriculture - approximately 63 per cent of the population (FAO, 2015). Estimates of the sectoral split of employment are difficult to ascertain for Somalia as a whole. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) Somalia makes an attempt, reporting that the main employment sectors in south central Somalia are agriculture (65 per cent, including fishing and forestry/mining), industry (11 per cent, including construction and utilities) and

<sup>4</sup> The World Bank rates Somalia's statistical capacity at 20, worse than the Sub-Saharan average of 59.9 (2015).

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.SCI.OVRL/countries/SO-ZF?display=graph>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=625&cr1=oe&lg=en&page=1>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo.html>

<sup>7</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>

<sup>9</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>



services (24 per cent) (UNDP, n.d.a.). In urban areas, recent survey data suggest greater diversity, with a sizable service sector (17.9 per cent) (Altai Consulting, 2016: 36).

AfDB (2013: 2) estimates that livestock accounts for around 40 per cent of GDP and more than 50 per cent of export earnings. Other main export products include fish, charcoal, bananas, sugar, sorghum and corn. Trade consists mostly of exports of livestock to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and imports of foodstuffs from neighbouring countries and the Indian subcontinent. The Somali livestock sector is vulnerable to periodic quarantine by Gulf State importers, triggered by outbreaks of animal disease in Somalia/East Africa (e.g. Rift Valley Fever) (Masjid, 2011). Livestock is exported year round, though the seasonal Hajj represents a peak in exports.

According to the Central Bank of Somalia (cited in AfDB, 2013: 2), in 2012 aggregate imports averaged \$460 million. As exports are at \$270 million annually, this resulted in a trade deficit of \$190 million.

The collapse of the state in the 1990s led to the privatisation of economic activities and dependence on foreign assistance and remittances. Growth in the economy owes primarily to initiatives by entrepreneurs, who, within an insecure environment, have often acted in concert with militia leaders (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014: 4). A lack of internal revenue and weak public financial management has imposed constraints on the national budget, leaving the country almost entirely dependent on foreign assistance (World Bank, 2015). In 2014, development partners provided a reported \$1.3 billion in aid to support Somalia's reconstruction and humanitarian activities (see Section 8).

Given the fragile nature of the economy and the paucity of livelihood opportunities, increasing numbers are operating in the informal sector or turning to illicit activities. Since 2005, an estimated \$304–317 million illicit income has been made annually from piracy; the extent to which this money remains in the country is unknown. The cost of piracy (ransom and rescue) for Somalia and the international community is estimated to be about \$350 million per year.<sup>10</sup> Piracy is reported to have dropped sharply since 2013 because of the presence of international navies, the use of private armed security and the stabilising influence of Somalia's central government.<sup>11</sup>

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has cautiously welcomed modest progress, with economic activity expanding. The Somali diaspora is driving growth, largely in communications, construction and money transfers.<sup>12</sup> Economic activity is estimated to have expanded by 3.7 per cent in 2014, driven by growth in agriculture, construction and telecommunications (IMF, 2015: 3). For 2015, growth is projected at 2.7 per cent and inflation is expected to remain subdued at 4 per cent (ibid.). With some progress on the security front, and the absence of drought (though recent reports indicate the onset of drought conditions), modest growth is expected. The IMF comments, though, that growth will remain inadequate to redress poverty and gender disparities. Should security worsen or drought return, growth will be at risk.

## ***Human development***

Prolonged conflict and protracted crisis in Somalia has caused enormous damage to the country's social indicators. The provision of social services such as those related to health, education, water, sanitation,

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>

<sup>11</sup> <https://icc-ccs.org/news/904-somali-pirate-clampdown-caused-drop-in-global-piracy-imb-reveals>

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15360.htm>

food and nutrition has deteriorated. Food security and the displacement of a large proportion of the population has led to a continuing humanitarian crisis that has spilled into neighbouring countries.<sup>13</sup>

Somalia's Human Development Index (HDI) value in 2012 was 0.285, with the country ranking 165 out of 170 countries. Given levels of inequality in the distribution of income, education and health, Somalia's inequality-adjusted HDI is considered even worse, with an average loss of 42 per cent (UNDP, 2012: xviii). Gender inequality is high at 0.776 (out of a value of 1, being complete inequality), with Somalia in the fourth lowest position globally on the Gender Inequality Index (GII) in 2012 (UNDP, 2012: 29).

**Table 3: Human Development Index values**

Somalia (2012)	Eritrea (2014)	Sudan (2014)	South Sudan (2014)	Ethiopia (2014)
0.285	0.391	0.479	0.467	0.442


Sources: UNDP (2012); UNDP HDI.<sup>14</sup>

Formal education is considered non-existent in Somalia, with schooling delivered primarily through private providers, including a proliferation of madrasahs (Qur'anic schools) (USAID, 2003). With an adult literacy rate of 31.8 per cent,<sup>15</sup> Somalia ranks among the lowest levels of adult literacy worldwide.

Health indicators are among the worst in Africa, with life expectancy estimated at around 55 years and high levels of child and maternal mortality. Infant and child mortality rates stand at 108.4 and 178 per 1,000 live births, against 84 and 135 for Africa. The maternal mortality rate is high, at 14 per 1,000 live births, compared with an average of 6.83 for Africa (AfDB, 2013: 3). Only 29 per cent of the population has access to improved water sources (9 per cent in rural areas) and 23 per cent to improved sanitation facilities (6 per cent in rural areas) (ibid.).

An estimated 82 per cent of Somalis are considered poor across multiple dimensions (UNDP, 2012). Even so, the difference between urban and rural populations is significant (61 per cent and 94 per cent, respectively). In south central Somalia, 89 per cent of people are poor; the figure is 75 per cent in Puntland and 72 per cent in Somaliland (ibid.).

**Figure 1: Incidence of poverty and average intensity of deprivation by region**



Source: UNDP (2012).

Given the absence of a functioning state (or, in the case of Somaliland and Puntland, the resource-poor nature of the states), extended families and clan networks have emerged as social safety nets. Remittances received from Somalis abroad have assumed increased importance. Remittances are estimated to provide up to 40 per cent of household income (Hammond, 2011: 132). Adeso (2013) estimates that remittances from overseas annually amount to \$1.3 billion. The Somali remittance pipeline

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>

<sup>14</sup> <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo.html>

is under threat, however. Somali-American remittance companies (which transfer 16 per cent of total funds) face a challenging regulatory environment with respect to anti-money laundering legislation and efforts to combat the financing of terrorism (Adeso, 2013: 6).

### **1.3 Environmental degradation, natural disaster and climate change**

Environmental degradation, natural disaster and climate change are major challenges, affecting livelihoods, food security, peace and stability. Recurrent floods and droughts are a cause of displacement, exacerbating the vulnerability of those already displaced and affected by conflict. Given the high number of Somalis dependent on agriculture and nomadic pastoralism (estimated at around 60 per cent of the population) the country is highly sensitive to weather events and climate change (IDMC, 2015).<sup>16</sup>

During the second half of 2011, the UN described the situation in Somalia as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.<sup>17</sup> Drought and conflict had left 4 million people at risk of starvation and 2.34 still face food insecurity, with the most vulnerable in the south (FAO, 2011). Regular flooding around the Juba and Shabelle Rivers contributes to severe food scarcity and food insecurity (IOM, 2014a).

Even though famine in the south was declared over in December 2011, a third of the population remains in crisis, unable to meet essential food and non-food needs. Given harvest trends, acute malnutrition levels are likely to remain at “serious to critical” levels (IOM, 2014a). The region is currently experiencing drought conditions related to the El Niño weather pattern, with food security predicted to be at risk.<sup>18</sup>

Climate change and population pressure on natural resources are accelerating the destruction of environmental assets, which will have impacts on the livelihoods of nomads and agro-pastoralists. Overstocking and grazing have led to resource depletion (IIED, 2008). There is no institutional framework for environmental protection and water resource management. This has contributed to desertification and the destruction of valuable grazing habitats and fertile soil (AfDB, 2013). The growing scarcity of land and acute water shortages are significant sources of conflict among communities in Somalia.

## **2. The economics and politics underlying migration**

### **2.1 Livelihoods and employment**

Years of conflict have affected livelihood opportunities, prompting both rural–urban as well as international migration. Discussions of migration often differentiate between forced migration (applied to people who flee from conflict or natural disasters) and economic migration (when migration is considered voluntary), but this distinction is more opaque in the Somali context. The economic situation is such that economic migration has emerged as a coping strategy and is considered, by some, forced (IOM, 2014a; UNDP, 2012).

The UN puts Somalia’s gross national income per capita in 2013 at \$127.9.<sup>19</sup> This can be compared with Ethiopia (\$488.0), Eritrea (\$537.9) and Sudan (\$1498.0). More recent research has recorded average levels of income for youth (in the urban areas of Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa) at \$190 per month (Altai Consulting, 2016).

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<sup>16</sup> <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2014/11/21/enhancing-climate-resilience-of-the-vulnerable-communities-and-ecosystems-in-somalia.html>

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/07/20117114319179235.html>

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.fews.net/east-africa/somalia/food-security-outlook/july-2015>

<sup>19</sup> <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=somalia>

The employment to population ratio (15+ years) has remained static at around 52 per cent since 1991 (modelled on International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates) (World Development Indicators). The World Bank reports employment rates for males aged 15+ at 70.8 per cent and those for females at 34.3 per cent. Limited employment and livelihood opportunities are considered to have disproportionate impacts on certain groups, particularly pastoralists, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and women.


The unemployment rate for youth (aged 14–29) is estimated at 67 per cent and is considered one of the highest in the world (UNDP, 2012: xix). Youth unemployment is particularly concerning given Somalia’s demographic profile: 70 per cent of the population are below the age of 30. Their lack of education and skills, coupled with limited livelihood opportunities, is seen as a driver of migration, radicalisation and membership of criminal and other armed groups (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2014).

Insufficient economic growth is regarded as a fundamental barrier to tackling youth underemployment and unemployment. In turn, a lack of adequate skills in Somalia’s labour markets is considered a major hindrance to economic growth (Samuel Hall, 2015). Samuel Hall identifies internal migration from rural to urban areas as a precursor to international migration (ibid.).

Somali youth, especially young women, face difficulties in securing employment opportunities. UNDP estimates that over 60 per cent of youth have intentions to leave the country in search of better employment prospects (UNDP, 2012: 65).

The proportion of those willing to leave the country is highest in south central Somalia (87 per cent). For 64 per cent, securing a well-paid job abroad is the main incentive to leave. About 17 per cent of those surveyed by UNDP mentioned better educational opportunities and escaping from conflict (UNDP, 2012: 65). Similarly, recent surveys conducted by Atlai Consulting (2016) consider economic factors the main driver of youth migration, with “finding a better job” a primary motivation for nearly half of respondents. The second most cited factor was insecurity. Despite this, respondents report a high level of optimism for the future of Somalia. This has the potential to encourage them to stay in the country—although some said that, if these expectations for the future were not met, they would leave.

**Figure 2: Respondents willing to migrate (%)**



Source: UNDP (2012).

Ethnic conflict has affected pastoralist communities, which has restricted herd mobility. Displaced pastoralists have been separated from traditional resource bases and forced to settle near sources of security (IDMC, 2014; IOM, 2014a).

IDP communities are also disproportionately affected by limited employment and livelihood opportunities. In some IDP settlements, most people rely on humanitarian aid as their main source of survival (ACLED, 2013). Long distances and insecurity in moving between IDP settlements and local markets often hinder their ability to establish sustainable income-generating activities (UNDP, 2012).

## 2.2 Economic prospects and challenges

Conflict and state collapse have afflicted the Somali economy, yet it has continued to function, albeit in a limited form, with the private sector emerging as the primary provider of most basic goods and services (IRIN, 2014).

Although many have welcomed political transition and the return of modest growth (estimated at 2.7 per cent in 2015), opportunistic investors are looking to cash in on the rebuilding process and exploit natural resources in areas such as agriculture, livestock, fisheries, oil and gas. Commentators have also cautioned that Somalia will in the future face the economic challenges that accompany political recovery and transition. A number of issues persist, related to the weakness of government institutions, including (IRIN, 2014):

- **Certification:** Somalia's government lacks the capacity to participate in certification schemes or provide documentation that would enable businesses to sell goods globally.
- **Trade difficulties:** Somalia is not an active member of the most functional regional economic blocs and has few formal trade agreements with other nations.
- **Currency reform:** Restoring the credibility of Somalia's currency is critical to economic development. The Central Bank has identified "the introduction of new and unified currency" as one of its strategic goals for the next five years.
- **Managing oil deals and revenue:** Lack of legislation and political wrangling at regional and national level have impeded development in this sector.
- **Social engagement:** There is a need to ensure economic growth benefits the people, especially as foreign direct investment grows.

Further to this, Samuel Hall (2015: 66) comments that initiatives to promote the return of Somali migrants must be accompanied by sustainable, coordinated and ambitious employment and livelihood generation programmes.

## 2.3 Political system

Since establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012, the terms "federalism" and "constitutionality" have framed much of the deliberation over the country's future. However, neither term has been consistently defined. Mosely (2015) comments that this inconsistency allows competing elites to make technical and morally framed cases in favour of their agendas. Political and social challenges to the consolidation of the federal structure remain.

Tensions persist in regions contested by Somaliland and Puntland and where autonomous political movements are gaining ground (e.g. the autonomous Khaatumo State). In these regions, minimal governance focuses on the maintenance of public security (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014).

## ***Breakdown by region/state***

### ***South central Somalia***

Somalia is not considered to be an electoral democracy. The selection of members for the TFG and the federal parliament is based on the 4.5 formula, which allocates an equal number of seats to the four major clans and then half that number to smaller clans and minority groups (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). Following a fragile, but positive, transition mid-2012, Somalia has a federal government in Mogadishu committed to inclusiveness, reconciliation and peace. A provisional constitution was adopted in August 2012 and 135 traditional elders from across Somalia elected a 275-member federal parliament. In September 2012, the parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president, leading to the formation of a government in October that year. Many observers hailed the transition as a break with the past and the best opportunity for stability.<sup>20</sup> The president has published the Somali Compact, which sets out the critical priorities for stability and sustainable economic development in the country (the Federal Republic of Somalia, n.d.). A New Deal for Somalia was agreed in 2013 (EU, 2013).

In 2013, the government developed Vision 2016 (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013), establishing a roadmap for a national political settlement. This comprises three interwoven strands, relating to reviewing and adopting a federal constitution, instituting federalism and preparing for national elections in 2016. Despite some progress, Somalia faces continued instability as new stresses emerge (Bryden & Thomas, 2015).

The country has its third Prime Minister (Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke) and cabinet in two years, following a standoff between the president and two successive Prime Ministers (AfDB, 2015). High levels of turnover in the executive branch reflect tensions within the federal government over the influence of President Mahmoud and those related to his administration—the so-called Damul Jadid network (Mosely, 2015).

A high degree of hybridity marks the political system, with governance and security provided by a mix of traditional institutions, modern governmental authorities, religious bodies, private militia and transnational enterprises supported by international organisations (Bryden, 2013).

Continuing violence in Puntland and Somaliland illustrates that tensions persist between the central government and autonomous regions. These are difficult to resolve (IMF, 2015; Mosley, 2015). The regional administrations, which have varying degrees of independence, provide enclaves of relative stability and governance. Internationally, these regions continue to be considered a part of Somalia.

### ***Somaliland***

Although it is not recognised internationally, the Somaliland government considers itself a successor to British Somaliland. It comprises an executive president, a cabinet and a bicameral parliament composed of a house of elders and a house of representatives. A constitution, adopted in 2001 through a public referendum, began the transformation of a “clan democracy” system into a multiparty democracy (Bradbury et al., 2003). This established the judiciary as an independent branch of the government and stipulated the formation of regional and local governments. The Somaliland election of 2010 saw opposition leader Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo win the presidency with around 50 per cent of the vote (Interpeace, 2015). International observers considered the poll free and fair.<sup>21</sup> Elections scheduled for 2015 have been delayed to 2017, with the National Election Commission recommending a one-year extension to prepare and distribute voter registration and citizenship identity cards.

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<sup>20</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.panapress.com/int-l-observers-say-Somaliland-presidential-poll-free,-fair--12-538056-32-lang2-index.html>

### ***Puntland***

August 1998 saw the creation of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. This was the outcome of a consultative conference, involving both political and clan leaders. Constitutionally, Puntland is part of Somalia, and its government is working towards rebuilding a unified Somali state. It has a parliament; clan representatives—who either are members of parliament or convene as traditional authorities—take the major political decisions. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland advocates for a federal Somalia and formally endorsed the transitional federal process. However, it has its own constitution and armed forces and conducts its own foreign and trade policies (UNDP, 2012). Since the end of 2012, with the introduction of political parties, public debate has been increasing (US State Department, 2014). Abdirahman Farole stepped down as president of Puntland in January 2014; Abdiweli Gaas is now president.

### ***Clan politics***

Somalis share a common ethnicity, language and religion that traverse national borders. Despite this homogeneity, clan affiliations are considered a deep and divisive component of identity. The major clans are the Hawiye, Darood, Dir/Isaaq and Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle). The Haarti (a subset of the Darood) are located in the east (Puntland) and the Isaaq clan primarily in the north west (Somaliland). Each of these is a “super clans”, consisting of sub-clans and extended family networks (IOM, 2014a: 9).

The Rahanweyn speak a separate dialect of Somali, which, alongside their agro-pastoral livelihoods, has disadvantaged them in elite politics. The Bantu, Benadir, Gaboye and Bajuni groups form part of Somalia’s ethnic minorities. Prior to the conflict, they were “largely isolated and immobile and had little interaction with major clans” (except the coastal urban Benadir communities) (IOM, 2014a: 9). Minority groups have experienced discrimination and have been socially and politically excluded, though the Rahanweyn have benefited from the 4.5 power-sharing formula (IOM, 2014a).

### ***Political freedom***

According to Freedom House (2016: 23), Somalia is “not free” in terms of political rights and civil liberties, with frequent reports of harassment and intimidation of the media. Of the 50 countries and territories categorised “not free”, Somalia ranks third lowest. Somalia also is “not free” in terms of freedom of the press and freedom of the internet (ibid.).

There are continuing reports of harassment, intimidation and arbitrary killing of journalists and threats directed at the media. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2014) and the US State Department (2014) cite limited progress on human rights issues, cataloguing abuses in detail. Civilians continue to suffer from conflict-related abuses, including killings, displacement and the diversion of humanitarian assistance by armed groups, principally Al-Shabaab, and in camps in areas notionally under government control.

Other major human rights abuses include poor prison conditions; arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention; denial of a fair trial; diversion of humanitarian assistance; forced relocation of IDPs; corruption; people trafficking; abuse of and discrimination against minority clans; lack of access for persons with disabilities; social stigmatisation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) individuals; restrictions on workers’ rights; and forced and child labour (US State Department, 2014).

In Somaliland, the constitution guarantees freedom of association and assembly. In Puntland, President Farole (replaced by Abdiweli Gaas in 2014) restricted civic freedoms.

## ***Prospects for change in leadership and governance***

Some consider Somalia to be at a “turning point” in terms of political and security developments, with the international community strongly committed to a sustainable resolution to the protracted crisis. However, the situation remains extremely fragile, with significant variations in stability from one area to another (IMF, 2015; World Bank, 2015). The World Bank (2015) comments that the federal government has embarked on a process of structural, legislative and institutional reform, and that the economy is starting to respond. Somalis are returning from abroad to invest, businesses are being established and the property market is improving. World Bank comments about Somalia’s overall trajectory should be tempered, though, given that federal state influence is limited to south and central Somalia.

On the security front, government forces and AMISOM have registered some progress. The first phase of an offensive against Al-Shabaab has seen gains in terms of recovered territory. However, Al-Shabaab continues to engage in attacks, including on government installations and public offices (AfDB, 2015: 5). There have been a number of attacks on AMISOM bases in the past six months. Despite being pushed out of Somalia’s major cities and towns, Al-Shabaab continues to operate across the Horn of Africa, sporadically overrunning AMISOM bases. There are also concerns that planned elections will lead to an upsurge of violence.

Despite these challenges, the state continues in its efforts to establish a federal system. The Interim Juba Administration based in Kismayo has been established; the federal government and the UN have recognised the new South West State based in Baidoa; and Galmudug state has been established in central Somalia. However, dialogue with Somaliland has stalled and relations with Puntland are fraught.

In the short term, challenges to the consolidation of the federal structure may present obstacles to the achievement of durable solutions. However, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is more optimistic that, in the medium and long term, increasing stability and an established federal structure could provide an opportunity for implementing solutions (IDMC, 2015).

Despite the signing of an agreement to support returning migrants between Kenya, Somalia and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), conditions in much of Somalia are not conducive to returns (OCHA, 2014). Limited services and disrupted livelihoods pose additional challenges (Samuel Hall, 2014). The recovery of land, property and livestock, as well as competition over scarce resources and limited employment opportunities, may trigger further clan conflict and tensions.

## ***Rule of law***

Despite conflict, Somalia should not be considered entirely lawless and ungoverned. IDMC (2015) notes that three systems of law coexist: secular, sharia and customary (*xeer*). *Xeer* and sharia laws are dominant in rural areas where access to the formal system is limited. A lack of harmonisation in how the systems interact, address crimes and resolve disputes prevents consistent and transparent delivery of justice. The UN claims it will be difficult to rebuild a coherent and nationally applied judicial system, given the multiple, overlapping and sometimes contradictory legal systems (UN Women, 2015).

Rule of law issues affect certain groups disproportionately, including IDPs, minorities and women. IDPs face discrimination because of their socioeconomic status. They often lack awareness of legal rights and the means to afford justice-related costs. Abuses of IDPs take place in a general context of impunity.

Minorities, including smaller clans, have also been affected. The number of clan-based expulsions, particularly those carried out against minorities, is high. Further to this, a consequence of the non-unified judicial system is denial of the right to equality, equal protection and access to justice by all, under



conditions of equality before an independent judiciary. These rights are guaranteed not only in Somalia's provisional constitution but also by international human rights law (HRW, 2014).

## 2.4 Fragility and conflict

Somalia is considered a fragile state emerging from a protracted civil war that has witnessed the collapse of central government and devolution of power to administrative regions. Research has identified "clannism", poor governance, resource competition, militarisation, regional disputes, colonialism and international involvement as key drivers of fragility and conflict (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2008; Mbugua, 2013; World Bank, 2005). Given the protracted nature of the instability and violence and the prolonged absence of central authority, Somalia topped the Fragile States Index (FSI) in 2008–2013 (Messner, 2015).

The dynamics of violence are not static and have evolved over time—see, for example, the emergence of Al-Shabaab in south central Somalia, emerging regimes in central and south central Somalia and communal violence in Puntland and Somaliland (ACLED, 2013). Somalia is considered one of the most violent countries globally when measured on the number of violent events and the ninth "most fatal" country when measured in terms of conflict-related fatalities (ibid.).

The involvement of neighbouring countries in Somalia has also provoked tensions, particularly Ethiopian military operations 2006–2009,<sup>22</sup> Kenyan interventions from 2011<sup>23</sup> and reported Eritrean and Yemeni support for Islamic insurgents. Kenya and Ethiopia have both joined AMISOM.<sup>24</sup>

### *Internal armed conflicts*

Widespread conflict, violence and human rights violations have contributed to repeated waves of large- and small-scale internal displacement. A multitude of actors, including clan-based and political militias and external military forces, have used forced displacement as a tactic of warfare (IDMC, 2015).

#### *South central Somalia*

Despite sustained military operations, Al-Shabaab remains a threat to peace and security.<sup>25</sup> In 2014, the Somali National Armed Forces and AMISOM launched a military operation to reduce Al-Shabaab control in rural areas. Notwithstanding its territorial losses, Al-Shabaab continues to present a threat to peace and security in Somalia and in neighbouring countries (OCHA, 2014). During recent AMISOM operations, around 73,000 people fled their homes in Hiraan, Bay, Bakool and Shabelle regions. Nearly 7,500 people were displaced during a second phase, mostly in Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions (OCHA, 2014).

Recent reports suggest Al-Shabaab is launching a renewed offensive aimed at disrupting national elections, undermining public confidence in international peacekeepers and bringing down Somalia's weak federal government. In February 2016, Baidoa was rocked by car bomb and suicide attacks that killed at least 30. This appeared to mark an upsurge in attacks by Al-Shabaab.

#### *Somaliland and Puntland*

While these areas experience lower levels of violence than the central and south central regions, communal violence makes up a higher proportion of their share of violence (16.5 per cent of conflict events in 2013), compared with the national average of 8.4 per cent. Puntland and Somaliland's

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<sup>22</sup> The TFG in Somalia invited Ethiopians to intervene, which was an "unpopular decision" (ACLED, 2013).

<sup>23</sup> Operation Linda Nchi, the codename for coordinated operations between the Kenyan and Somali military that began in October 2011, when troops from Kenya entered the conflict zones of southern Somalia.

<sup>24</sup> AMISOM numbered around 17,000 troops in 2012.

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.issafrica.org/pscreport/situation-analysis/a-long-road-ahead-to-achieve-somalias-vision-2016>

proportion of communal violence is higher than that of neighbouring countries. Communal violence constitutes 19.3 per cent of all conflict-related fatalities (ACLED, 2013: 6). Communal conflict has a seasonal profile, being highest during the rainy seasons (FEWSNET, 2010). Communal violence is relatively contained and linked only indirectly to regional instability (ACLED, 2013). However, it illustrates the depth and persistence of societal divisions over and above governmental/Islamist divides, on which most attention is focused.

Because of its oil reserves, the north eastern region of Sool is particularly prone to conflict, with competing claims by Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo (a political organisation pursuing the creation of a regional state within Somalia and separation from Somaliland) (DDG, 2015; IDMC, 2015).

### ***Clans***

Clans are considered a source of both conflict and stability. They often form alliances for protection, access to water or political power. Though unstable, these alliances are considered of primary importance to many Somalis and can outweigh their allegiance to Somalia.

### ***Gender-based violence***

GBV, early marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM) are considered common in Somalia. The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports that, between January and October 2012, there were more than 3,753 reported cases of GBV. According to a UNICEF survey, these are not considered violations in a culture that does not consider the rights of women. FGM is considered a social convention, with girls facing social pressure from both family and friends to conform, and is often linked to virginity, fidelity and dowries.<sup>26</sup>

The federal government has acknowledged the extent of the problem of sexual violence and in 2013 pledged to address the issue. However, HRW (2014) reports that little has been done to address the rape and sexual assault of women and girls, particularly among vulnerable displaced communities. Fearful of stigmatisation, imprisonment, forced marriage to the perpetrator or retaliation, women often prefer not to report cases of sexual and gender-based violence (ibid.).

### ***Influence of external actors***

The federal government in Somalia faces challenges establishing local administrations in a context of multiple competing claims from proxy and aligned militias and countervailing pressures from international interests, including Kenya and Ethiopia (ACLED, 2013).

#### ***Ethiopia***

Ethiopia has a history of intervention in Somalia dating back to the Ogaden War (1977–1978) and military incursions in 2006–2009. Although the country withdrew its forces from Somalia in January 2009, it has continued to exert an influence in border areas, supporting various local militias (ACLED, 2013: 5). It is reported that, in north central Somalia, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a receives training from Ethiopia (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). Ethiopia formally joined AMISOM in 2014. Given widespread resentment of Ethiopian influence, coupled with the poor treatment of Somalis living in Ethiopia, tensions persist.

#### ***Kenya***

Kenyan involvement in Somalia is considered more ambivalent (ACLED, 2013). Kenya entered the conflict in response to deteriorating security along its border, but integration into AMISOM has legitimised the

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<sup>26</sup> <http://www.unicef.org/somalia/children.html>

intervention. Many are sceptical about Kenya's intentions and willingness to withdraw. Kenyan interests revolve around the establishment of a "buffer zone" and the creation of a semi-autonomous regime in Jubaland (ibid.). This interest may aggravate cleavages with local militias, regional political interests and the federal government in Mogadishu (ACLED, 2013: 5).

Recent research conducted by Journalists for Justice (2015: 1) implicates Kenyan forces in human rights abuses, military strikes targeting livestock and wells and engagement in corrupt business practices with the Jubaland administration and Al-Shabaab, particularly in the illicit trade of sugar and charcoal.

### ***Future prospects***

In 2014, Somalia was dislodged from the top of the FSI and dropped to second place. International stakeholders and analysts have begun to describe the country as a fragile state that is making some progress towards stability (AfDB, 2013; IMF, 2015; World Bank, 2015).

Somalia continues to experience violence and droughts (e.g. 2010/11 and 2015/16), Al-Shabaab attacks and sporadic clan violence. The AMISOM campaign against Al-Shabaab led by international and national forces and the selection of a federal parliament and federal government raised hopes for a political breakthrough and broad-based reconciliation and reconstruction, but recent upsurges in Al-Shabaab attacks and the worsening security situation in Puntland and Somaliland have reduced optimism (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014; IOM, 2014a).

Violence between competing political interests within the framework of the federal project also remains a threat.<sup>27</sup> The widespread return of migrants may also become a source of tension for inter-clan relations as well as the country's political, socioeconomic and environmental landscape (IOM, 2014a: 9).

Tensions persist regarding political representation and are encapsulated by clashes between clan militias in the divided city of Galkayo. Galkayo is divided between two federal states, the Galmudug Interim Administration, established in 2015, and Puntland, formed in 1998. Its local divisions mirror the larger divide between two rival clans, the Darood and the Hawiye (Yusuf & Khalif, 2015). There has allegedly been a failure to reconcile top-down establishment of interim federal administrations without parallel reconciliation processes between clans at a local and national level (ibid.).

## **3. Political and economic exclusion**

Somalia has been characterised as one of the most ethnically and culturally homogenous countries in Africa (Putnam & Noor, 1999). Somalis, the dominant ethnic group, make up 85 per cent of the population, sharing a uniform language, religion and culture. Somalis have historically been defined as those who, by origin, language and tradition, belong to the Somali nation. In legal terms, minority groups such as the Bantu and some Arabic minorities are seen as citizens (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). Groups at most risk of political or economic exclusion include females, the young, minority clans and IDPs.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> For example, continued violence between federal state-backed and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a militia in Galgudud, or fighting between militia associated with the Galmudug administration and the Puntland state forces in Galkayo in late 2015.

<sup>28</sup> Other groups also face systematic exclusion (including those with disabilities and the LGBT community) but, given space constraints, we focus on gender, youth, IDPs and clan minorities.

## ***Gender***

Somalia has extremely high maternal mortality, rape, FGM and child marriage rates, with violence against women and girls common. Somali patriarchal culture often shapes the application of law (particularly sharia and *xeer*), leading to gender discrimination and denial of women's rights to justice, including land and inheritance entitlements. The participation and role of women in politics and decision-making is limited, perpetuating narrow gender based roles and inequalities (UNDP, 2012). The federal government has committed itself to a 30 per cent quota for women in the next parliament.

## ***Youth***

The political and cultural exclusion of the young from decision-making has taken root in Somalia's political culture. Those aspiring to leadership or political positions are confronted by discrimination based on age, including legal barriers. The Somaliland constitution, for example, requires candidates running for the house of representatives to be at least 35 years old and those holding seats for the house of elders to be at least 45 (UNDP, 2012: 66). Recently, the federal government adopted a constitutional amendment to reduce the minimum age limit for contesting local council elections from 35 to 25. Youth are also excluded in candidate selection processes through the clan system, which is biased against them.

## ***Internally displaced persons***

IDMC (2015) reports that IDPs face exclusion, exploitation and abuse, lack access to justice and basic services and are more at risk of GBV, forced recruitment and the withholding of access to humanitarian assistance. Restricted access to clean water, combined with poor sanitation and hygiene facilities, puts them at increased risk of disease. Customary law based on negotiation among clan elders is often the domain of dominant local clans, disadvantaging IDPs from minority groups (Lindley, 2013).

## ***Minority clans***

Clan affiliations are a deep and divisive component of cultural identity, both prompting conflict (see Somaliland and Puntland) and contributing to political and economic exclusion. Minority clans have traditionally experienced varying levels of discrimination by the major clans and have been generally socially and politically excluded based on traditional occupations (IOM, 2014a: 9).

## ***Future trends***

Fragility continues to define the Somali political and economic landscape. Meanwhile, Bryden and Thomas (2015) highlight political infighting and lack of political will as impediments to lasting solutions to Somalia's multiple challenges.

While the constitutions of Somalia and Somaliland legislate against gender- and clan-based exclusion from economic opportunities and political decision-making processes, exclusion remains pervasive. The IMF (2015) claims growth will remain inadequate to redress many of the disparities currently in force.

## 4. Migration flows and destinations<sup>29</sup>

Somalia is a country of origin, destination, transit and return for a large number of people moving across the Horn of Africa region and beyond. Data on Somali migration<sup>30</sup> are extremely limited and should be understood as illustrative estimates only. UNHCR generates information on refugees and IDPs but there is much less on migrants, especially irregular migrants. Overall, it is not clear how the numbers add up—for example whether migrants are included in diaspora figures, how returned refugee figures relate to IDP numbers or how repeat migrants are counted. The figures used are also inconsistent across sources. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) has launched a new project to collect and analyse data on mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa. This is rich with multimedia and interactive maps, with information collected through an innovative system including text messages, etc.

Migration has been a feature within the Somali territories for centuries. Historically, large numbers of nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists have moved within the region in response to seasons and climate scarcity. Somali migrants began settling in the UK from the 1880s (Hammond, 2011). Before the 1991 civil war, international migration from Somalia was made up predominantly of a small number of seamen who settled in the UK and students and professionals settling in diverse places (Lindley, 2009).

In the 1970s and 1980s, larger numbers of people moved to work in the Gulf States (Lindley, 2009). The first recorded big wave of migration accompanied the Ethio-Somali war (1977–1978), when a million Ethiopian refugees were displaced to Somalia. After the war, the majority returned to Ethiopia. The 1991 civil war prompted a bigger movement of people, from all demographic groups. The first phase of the war (1987–1991) displaced 500,000 Somali refugees to Ethiopian camps and 100,000 IDPs. Another 500,000 Somali refugees were displaced to Ethiopia and Djibouti around 1991–1992, when the military government was ousted. In 2011, a prolonged drought, famine, conflict and governance deficits displaced 297,000 Somali refugees to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Yemen (IOM, 2014a), plus more to Yemen, south towards Southern Africa and internally from south central Somalia to Somaliland and Puntland.<sup>31</sup> See Appendix 3, Figure 3.1, for a detailed timeline.

During the past five years, irregular migration (IOM, 2016b), transit and levels of returnees to Somalia have increased. There is significant regional variation of migration flows.<sup>32</sup> An expert consulted for this report explained that **south central** sees outmigration of refugees and migrants into Kenya (the southern route), Ethiopia and other areas of Somalia. In addition to outmigration, **Puntland** and **Somaliland** experience large transit migration flows of Ethiopians and others crossing to Yemen. All three regions currently have an influx of refugees returning from Kenya and Yemen. People moving from Somaliland and Puntland are typically classified as migrants moving with economic or personal motivations (van Hear et al., 2012). People moving from south central are more likely to be defined as refugees. The wider **Horn of Africa region** experiences huge migration flows. In 2011–2012 there was a large outflow of Eritreans,

<sup>29</sup> Mixed migration flows vary in scale and direction. For a clear graphic representation of the recent situation, see the map in Figure 3.3 in Appendix 3.

<sup>30</sup> Migration is understood as the movement of people from one place to another. While the definitions and practical use of terms like “refugee” and “migrant” are highly contested and politicised, we do not have space to explore these issues and use the definitions provided by UNHCR: a refugee is a person who has fled his or her own country and cannot return for fear of persecution and has been given refugee status (<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html>). A migrant is someone who voluntarily chooses to leave his or her own country and make a new life in another country (<http://www.unhcr.org/55df0e556.html>). An asylum seeker is a person who has fled from his or her own country for fear of persecution and has applied for (legal and physical) protection in another country but has not yet had their claim for protection assessed (<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html>). An IDP is someone who is living inside the borders of their own country but is unable to safely live in their own home or region ([www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html](http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html)).

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexa9bc.html?id=19>

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexa9bc.html?id=19>; <http://www.regionalmms.org/index190a.html?id=17> and <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexe371.html?id=18>

Somalis and Ethiopians, whereas 2013–2014 saw overall fewer people on the move (RMMS, 2015). See Appendix 3, Figure 3.3, for a map of migration flows and routes.

## 4.1 Intentions and scenarios

There is limited information about Somalis' intentions to migrate – the few surveys that exist have comprehensive methodologies but contradictory findings. A survey of 1,200 people and interviews with 190 people under 30 in three Somali cities (Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa) found respondents had a “high level of optimism for the future of Somalia, which has the potential to encourage them to stay in the country. However, if these expectations for the future are not fulfilled, some reported that they would leave” (Altai Consulting, 2016).

An intention survey of Somali refugees in Kenyan refugee camp Dadaab found only 2.6 per cent of respondents intended to return to Somalia within the next 24 months (9,627 individuals) (IOM and UNHCR, 2014: 9). The survey was based on 7,448 Somali families living in the Kenyan refugee camp Dadaab, selected according to rigorous criteria (ibid.: 8). Refugees who had arrived in the two most recent time periods (2002–2007, 2008–2013) were more likely to intend to return, whereas those who had arrived earlier (1991–2001) were the least likely (ibid.: 9). The most common reasons people do not intend to return include lack of security (the main reason for 80,529 households); lack of employment (1,421 households); lack of shelter and housing (631 households); and lack of access to education (321 households) (ibid.: 10). This seems to contradict the findings of the 2012/13 UNHCR verification exercise, which found 82.3 per cent (10,000) of the population “would return if peace prevailed” in Somalia (in IOM and UNHCR, 2014: 16).<sup>33</sup>

Another study, based on 40+ interviews, focus groups of refugees and key informants and a literature review, found 6 per cent of interviewees in Kenya were “prepared to return home immediately”; 63 per cent considered Somalia home and were “willing to return if conditions continue to improve, and more regions are recovered from Al-Shabaab fighters” and 20 per cent said they were not willing to return to Somalia because “the conditions under which they fled remain” (Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013: 19).

Quantitative analysis of national survey data (from 2015/16) from 10 large immigrant groups in Norway (including Somalis) found intention to **return** was “most prevalent among migrants with strong transnational ties and weak socio-cultural integration” (Carling & Pettersen, 2014: 26). A total of 13 per cent of Somali respondents said a clear “no” to returning, whereas 57 per cent said they did not know if they would want to return (ibid.: 17). This reflects similar findings for other refugee-dominated groups, with uncertainty within their country of origin complicating return (ibid.: 17). The article also warns that studies of migration intentions “are sometimes dismissed because they are poor predictors of actual behaviour” (ibid.: 15).

Somalia's net **migration rate** for the period 2010–2015 was -3.4 migrants/1,000 population.<sup>34</sup> A UNICEF (n.d.a) newsletter with population data (1985–2015) makes **projections for future** trends (2015–2050). This shows the crude net migration rate has decreased significantly since the data point for 1985–1990 and remained relatively stable since the 1995–2000 data collection point (see graphs in Appendix 3, Figure 3.2). It is projected to remain fairly stable, decreasingly gradually, until 2050 (UNICEF, n.d.a). The

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<sup>33</sup> Interestingly, the 82 per cent figure is noted in the 2015–2019 UNHCR repatriation strategy (see UNHCR, 2015b: 2), but the 2.6 per cent figure is not: presumably publication preceded the availability of these data.

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.iom.int/countries/somalia/facts-and-figures>

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2015) estimates 69,000 Somalis will return to Somalia in 2016.

## 4.2 Outward migration

### *Diaspora*

Estimates of the Somalia diaspora range from 1 million (UNDP, 2009) to 1.5 million (Hassan & Chalmer, 2008, in Hammond, 2011: 26). Based on UNDP's (2009: 6–10) figures, 14 per cent of the population lives in the diaspora, although the paper notes the huge challenges in calculating this. This 14 per cent figure is widely used. The diaspora estimates are compiled from numerous different data sources and therefore do not use a consistent definition of diaspora (UNDP, 2009). Figures for diaspora, migration and asylum seekers are also likely to overlap. Important diaspora communities are in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen, the UK, the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and South Africa (Hammond, 2011; RMMS, 2015).

### *Refugees, asylum seekers and resettlement*

Somalis are the third largest refugee group in the world (UNHCR, 2013, in Frouws, 2014: 29). UNHCR (2015a) identifies 1.1 million registered Somali refugees and 0.5 million asylum seekers in the world (see summary table in Appendix 3, Figure 3.4). The vast majority of Somali refugees are based in the Horn of Africa region. UNHCR (2015a) has registered 981,116 Somali refugees in Kenya (419,142); Yemen (253,215); Ethiopia (250,182); Uganda (35,893); Djibouti (12,363); Egypt (7,682); Eritrea (2,485); and Tanzania (154) (see summary table in Appendix 3, Figure 3.5). However, these numbers are expected to be much higher as there are many people unregistered (IOM, 2014b). South central Somalis qualify for *prima facie* refugee status, but those from Somaliland and Puntland do not necessarily (ibid.).

A total of 42,000 Somalis applied for **asylum** around the world in 2013, with 20,600 of cases filed in 44 industrialised countries (IOM, 2014a: 17). The number applying for asylum in EU member states was 16,470 in 2014—2.6 per cent of total EU asylum claims, making Somalis the 11th largest national group.<sup>35</sup> The top three EU member states that Somali first time asylum seekers applied to in 2014 were<sup>36</sup> Germany (37 per cent of applications, 5,530 people); Sweden (26 per cent, 3785 people); and Austria (8 per cent, 1,150 people). Between 2008 and 2010, the US registered 11,596 Somali asylum seekers—4-6 per cent of total refugee admissions (IOM, 2014a: 17).

Since 1991, 168,043 Somalis have been **resettled** through assistance programmes and an additional 27,994 have resettled independently (mainly through family reunification) (IOM, 2014a: 17). At least 15,393 were resettled or reunited with families in 23 industrialised countries in 2013. Since 1991, the countries with most resettlement/reunification places are the US (117,718 individuals); Canada (15,187); Sweden (15,184); Norway (8,994); Denmark (7,997); Finland (5,724); Australia (5,583); the UK (5,186); Italy (4,259); the Netherlands (4,228); New Zealand (2,047); and 40 other countries (3,930) (IOM, 2014a: 17).

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<sup>35</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Countries\\_of\\_origin\\_of\\_\(non-EU\)\\_asylum\\_seekers\\_in\\_the\\_EU-28\\_Member\\_States,\\_2013\\_and\\_2014\\_YB15\\_III.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Countries_of_origin_of_(non-EU)_asylum_seekers_in_the_EU-28_Member_States,_2013_and_2014_YB15_III.png)

<sup>36</sup> Data as of June 2015.



## **Migrants**

UNICEF (n.d.a: 2) reports the top five countries of destination for Somali **migrant stock** in 2013 as Kenya (517,666); Ethiopia (457,483); Yemen (219,888); Libya (102,305); and Djibouti (102,305). More than 200,000 Somali emigrants are estimated to live in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries – the fifth largest Sub-Saharan African national emigrant group (OECD, 2015a). Between 2000/01 and 2010/11, Somali emigrants increased by 157,000, as the third largest of Sub-Saharan African emigrant groups in OECD countries (ibid.). The emigration rate of Somalis to OECD countries is more than 10 per cent, increasing by +2.2 percentage points between 2000/01 and 2010/11 (OECD, 2015a: 364). The top five countries of destination for **tertiary students** in 2013 were the United Arab Emirates, India, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar (UNICEF, n.d.a: 2).

**Repeat migration** is common. Based on interviews with naturalised third-country nationals in the EU (including Somali-born migrants leaving the Netherlands) Ahrens, Kelly, and van Liempt (2016) find these new EU citizens often later migrate on to other member states as a result of discrimination and racism. The UK is a particularly attractive destination for onward migration within the EU—particularly for Dutch–Somali migration to the cities of Leicester, Birmingham, London, Bristol and Sheffield. The 2011 UK census recorded 207,337 naturalised third-country nationals had relocated to England, with most born in Africa (Office for National Statistics, 2011, in Ahrens et al., 2016).

**Irregular migration** increased in 2015 in Somalia and Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan (IOM, 2016b). Most Somali irregular migrants move within the region and Yemen. Eritreans, Somalis and Eritreans were the main nationalities from the Horn of Africa taking the central Mediterranean migration route (RMMS, 2016). In 2012, UNHCR estimated that 31,012 trafficking victims and smuggled migrants had boarded boats in the Puntland city of Bossaso (in Reitano, Shaw, & Hunter, forthcoming). In 2015, of those arriving in Europe from the Horn of Africa, 8 per cent were Somali (RMMS, 2016). Lack of accurate and comparable data makes migration statistics illustrative. In particular, in irregular migration there is no registration system, thus irregular migrants may be included in data about diaspora or IDPs (IOM, 2014a).

## **Kenya**

Kenya hosts the largest number of Somali refugees and migrants. The latest UNHCR statistics show the majority live in the Dadaab refugee camp (331,404 of the 419,142 total)—which was set up in 1991 and is the biggest refugee camp in the world. Some live in the Kakuma camp (55,050 of the 419,142 total), set up in 1992. And some live in Kenyan capital, Nairobi (32,688 of the 419,142 total).<sup>37</sup> There is a significant diaspora community in Eastleigh in the Kamakuji area of Nairobi (IOM, 2014a). Approximately 75 per cent of refugees in Kenya have come from Mogadishu and the surrounding area. In Dadaab camp, about half come from the Lower Juba and Middle Juba areas of Somalia (IOM, 2014a: 16). A 2013 Kenyan, Somali and UNHCR agreement established a legal framework for voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya. To date, fewer refugees have decided to repatriate than was envisioned. Following the 2011–2012 drought, the Kenyan government was careful to distinguish between long-term refugees displaced by conflict and people displaced by drought, “implicitly circumscribing its responsibilities under international law” (Lindley, 2014: 42).

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<sup>37</sup> <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/country.php?id=110>



## Yemen

Yemen hosts the second biggest number of Somali refugees and the third most Somali migrants. A total of 95 per cent of refugees in Yemen are from Somalia.<sup>38</sup> The RMMS website found in 2011–2012 the majority of Somalis in Yemen originated from south central. Somalis are given *prima facie* refugee status in Yemen, although the government has warned it may not continue this as many entering from Puntland are considered economic migrants (IOM, 2014a: 16–17). Somali refugees are under pressure to repatriate, especially because of the Yemeni conflict.

## Ethiopia

Ethiopia hosts the third most Somali refugees and the second most Somali migrants. The latest UNHCR statistics show the majority live in Dollo Ado district (211,369 of the 250,182 total), in the refugee camps set up in 2009: Melkadida camp, Hilaweyn camp, Kobe camp, Bokolmanyoo camp and Buramino camp. Some live in Jijiga city (38,016 of the 250,182 total), in the refugee camps: Kebribeyah camp, Aw-barre camp and Sheder camp. A total of 797 registered refugees live in the capital Addis Ababa.<sup>39</sup> The city of Dire Dawa hosts a large Somali non-refugee population and many urban Somali refugees (IOM, 2014a). Of the refugees in Dollo Ado, 80 per cent come from the Gedo region of Somalia (IOM, 2014a: 16). The Ethiopian government generally maintains open borders for refugees seeking protection in the country. Most asylum seekers from neighbouring countries are granted automatic refugee status (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016).

## 4.3 Inward migration

The latest UNHCR statistics reveal that Somalia is host to 1.1 million IDPs, 19,000 recently returned refugees, 6,900 refugees and 9,800 asylum seekers (see summary table in Appendix 3, Figure 3.4). The Somali migration situation changes rapidly. In recent years there has been an increase in inward migration and refugees returning to Somalia. Significantly, Somaliland and Puntland are increasingly being used as transit routes for migration in the region.

### *Internally displaced persons within Somalia*

Somalia is estimated to have 1.1 million IDPs (see map of IDP locations in Appendix 3, Figure 3.6). The number rose in 2015 because of forced evictions, armed conflict and cyclical natural disasters. For example, land tenure insecurity in Mogadishu led to the forcible eviction of 116,000 people in 2015. Military operations displaced over 42,000 people in the regions of Bakool, Bay, Gedo, Hiraan, Galgaduud and Lower Shabelle in July 2015. Gu and Deyr (October–January) rains displaced 76,000 people in 2015. Many people have gone through multiple displacements over decades (OCHA, 2015: 8–9). Rural to urban migration rates have been high, with large waves occurring around the 1991–1992 famine and 2010–2011 drought and conflict, particularly with people moving to Mogadishu (Lindley, 2014: 41).

**South central** Somalia is host to an estimated 920,000 IDPs (including 372,000 in Mogadishu) (IDMC, 2012, cited in IOM, 2014a). Most originate from south central and stay close to their home in the region (IOM, 2014). **Somaliland** is host to 84,000 IDPs; many come from Somaliland and south central Somalia,<sup>40</sup> and some are returned Somali refugees who have not been able to reclaim their home, land or livelihood

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486ba6.html>

<sup>39</sup> <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/country.php?id=65>

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexe371.html?id=18>

(IOM, 2014). Many live in the Mohammed Moge IDP camp. **Puntland** is host to 130,000 IDPs, most living in IDP settlements around the cities of Garowe, Bossaso and Galkayo.

### ***Returnees to Somalia***

In the first half of 2015, UNHCR statistics showed 19,004 Somali refugees had returned to their place of origin.<sup>41</sup> Many of Somalia's 1.1 million refugees are under pressure to repatriate (IOM, 2014a). Increased stability in Somalia has prompted some IDPs and refugees to return of their own accord.<sup>42</sup>

Significant numbers have returned from Kenya through a process organised under the Kenyan, Somali and UNHCR repatriation agreement. Figures vary, but the figure for 2015 is estimated at 5,000 (OCHA, 2015: 8). The conflict in Yemen has led many Somalis to return: an estimated 89 per cent of people fleeing Yemen for Somalia are Somali (OCHA, 2015). Meanwhile, between December 2013 and February 2014, the Saudi Arabian government clamped down on irregular migration and deported 22,148 Somalis (IOM, 2014a). Somali returnees returning from Kenya, Somaliland or Djibouti are expected to return to south central regions.<sup>43</sup> They are expected to prefer moving to urban centres (IOM, 2014a) and are likely to consider repeat migration if they feel do not reintegrate (IOM, 2016b).

### ***Migration into Somalia***

The number of migrants in Somalia in 2015 is estimated at 25,300, up from 20,100 in 2000, according to UN data from 2015 (see Appendix 3, Figure 3.7). This is 0.2 per cent of the population – one of the lowest percentages in Africa; where on average 1.7 per cent of populations are made up of migrants (UN, 2015). UNICEF (n.d.a: 2) reports the top five countries of origin of migrant stock in Somalia as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Bangladesh and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

There are no precise data on the numbers, origins or destinations of **irregular migrants** in Somalia. Somaliland and Puntland are particularly important areas in terms of irregular migrant flows in the region. IOM (2014a) reports that Bosasso has become known as a “smuggling boomtown”. RMMS (2015) notes that aid agencies in Somaliland estimate at least 20,000 undocumented migrants are in Somaliland, including many Ethiopians. Some seek refuge and employment; the rest transit to Puntland or Djibouti to go further on to Yemen or the Gulf States. In Somaliland in 2011, the authorities allegedly forcibly deported hundreds of illegal migrants, and IOM helped 1,000 Ethiopians return to Ethiopia.<sup>44</sup>

### ***Refugees and asylum seekers in Somalia***

The latest UNHCR figures register 6,900 refugees and almost 9,800 asylum seekers in Somalia. Most are Ethiopians, with an increasing amount of Yemenis since 2015. Others are from Bangladesh, DRC, Eritrea, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania and Uganda. Most live in Puntland in two dozen settlements in the city of Bossaso and in Somaliland.<sup>45</sup> Many Yemeni refugees move to Mogadishu, with a smaller amount in Kismayo (OCHA, 2015). There is no refugee and asylum framework and refugees cannot legally work (IOM, 2014a: 17).

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<sup>41</sup> Updated in June 2015. See <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483ad6&submit=GO#>

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483ad6&submit=GO>

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483ad6&submit=GO>

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexe371.html?id=18>

<sup>45</sup> <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexa9bc.html?id=19>

### ***Destination choice***

IOM (2016b) finds the choice of destination is often based on how much the trip costs, how dangerous the journey is and the expected length or objective of the migration. The Eurostat website finds influencing factors to be historical ties between the origin and destination countries; knowledge of the language; presence of established diaspora communities; and economic situation of the destination country. In addition, when related to asylum applications, Eurostat finds the perceived likelihood of protection status and the benefits of protection status to be influential.<sup>46</sup> Typically, a decision to migrate is made with the family, which contributes financially; although one expert comment indicates that some Somaliland/Puntland youth make the decision individually and leave without telling anyone.

## **5. Migration profiles**

With an estimated 14 per cent of Somalia's population currently displaced internally or abroad (UNDP, 2012), a large number of Somalis have first or second hand experience of migration. In IOM's study on youth, 28 per cent of those surveyed and interviewed had experienced some form of forced or voluntary internal migration (Altai Consulting, 2016: 76). It follows therefore that a large number of different types of people have engaged in migration.

### ***Age and sex***

**Migrants tend to be young.** Altai Consulting (2016) finds the typical Somali migrant to be under 25 years. This is reflected in another study of Somali migrants in Yemen, which found most migrants, were between 18 and 35 years (RMMS, in IOM, 2014b). Meanwhile, the UN Population Division (2016: 28) finds the median age of migrants in Somalia to be 27 years in 2015, up from 26 years in 2000. This is slightly younger than the average across African countries.

**Findings about the ages of refugees are mixed.** Some evidence indicates refugees have a larger spread of ages, with 46 per cent of UNHCR-registered Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa being adults aged 18–59; 24 per cent aged 5–11; 12 per cent aged 0–4; and 2 per cent aged 60+.<sup>47</sup> However, studies reported in IOM (2014a) found the largest numbers of arrivals to refugees camps were **children** under the age of 18, with 70 per cent of those arriving at Kenya's Dadaab in 2011 under 18 years and 85 per cent of daily arrivals to Ethiopian's Dollo Ado (IOM, 2014a: 16). Of Somalis arriving in Italy through irregular migration channels in 2015, 10 per cent were unaccompanied and separated children (UNHCR, 2015b: 12).

It appears **slightly more men** make up migration flows, although there are some mixed data. UNICEF (n.d.a) estimates Somali **migrants** in the world in 2013 to be 54 per cent male and 45 per cent female. However, Somali migrant data collected in Yemen typically 80 per cent of migrants to be male and 20 per cent to be female (RMMS, in IOM, 2014b). A total of 54 per cent of international migrants in Somalia in 2015 are male, next to 46 per cent female (UN Population Division, 2016: 28); 52 per cent of UNHCR-registered **refugees** in the Horn of Africa are male and 48 per cent are female (Appendix 3, Figure 3.7).<sup>48</sup>

### ***Education, income and employment***

There are limited and contradictory findings about the education, income and employment of those engaging in mixed migration. An expert consulted for this report noted that many Somalis leaving

<sup>46</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum\\_statistics](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics)

<sup>47</sup> <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php>

<sup>48</sup> <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php>

Somalia have a relatively good **education**, including university education, but leave because of a lack of opportunities. Meanwhile, the returning diaspora with foreign education often get the well-paid government and UN/NGO jobs, fuelling aspirations to migrate. Altai Consulting (2016: 76) finds youth with middle-level education are more likely to migrate than those with no education or those with high levels of education. This implies that, as education levels increase in Somalia, migration is also likely to increase, until people reach a higher education level (e.g. master's level) (Altai Consulting, 2016). However, other reports contradict this. For example, RMMS (2014, in EASO, 2014) found a large number of Somali migrants in Yemen had basic education and were farmers, herders, unskilled labourers or traders. OECD (2015a) statistics on higher education found that 24 per cent of the Somali immigrant population in Egypt was highly educated; 8 per cent of that in Norway; and 0 per cent of those in Kenya and Finland (see Appendix 3, Figure 3.9).<sup>49</sup>

Altai Consulting (2016: 76) finds youth with middle-level **incomes** are more likely to migrate than those unemployed or those with high-earning jobs. And underemployment has the potential to drive migration (Altai Consulting, 2016). This implies that, as income levels increase in Somalia, migration is also likely to increase until people reach a higher income (ibid.). Irregular migration is expensive, so only those who can generate the money are able to make the journey.

There is mixed and *ad hoc* information about **employment** profiles. UNHCR (2013) reports that, according to 2012 household survey and livelihoods mapping in Dollo Ado and nearby host communities, most Somalis have a background in agriculture and livestock, with few other skills and very little formal education. Meanwhile, nomadic and semi-nomadic cross-border movement and migration has long been a survival strategy for Somali pastoralists and agro-pastoralists who move to find pastures for their livestock and to trade according to the seasons (Lindley, 2014). In south central, there may be less mobility owing to general higher availability of water and farming land (IOM, 2014a: 10). The north and north eastern nomadic populations (mostly Hawiye, Darood and Dir/Isaaq) move more, including throughout an area crossing into Ethiopia (IOM, 2014a).

### ***Ethnicity and clans***

There is limited information about mixed migration flows with regard to ethnic minorities and clans. Somalia's ethnic minorities (including Bantu, Benadir, Gaboye and Bajuni groups) and smaller clans prior to 1991 were largely isolated from the major clans and immobile (IOM, 2014a: 9). However, since the conflict started, there has been increasing forced displacement of minority clans and migration to escape conflict, and the clans have generally mixed more (IOM, 2014a). There has been a high rate of expulsions by non-indigenous dominant clans of smaller clans, especially in south central Somalia (IOM, 2014a: 13). RMMS (2014, in EASO, 2014) found a large number of Somali migrants in Yemen in 2013 had originated mainly from Mogadishu, Merka, Wanla Weyn, Galkacyo, Bossaso, Hiiraan, Borama, Awdal and Hargeysa and were predominantly from the clans of Hawiye, Digil/Mirifle, Darood, Isaaq and Dir.

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<sup>49</sup> These were the only four countries with data in the paper.

## 6. Migration journeys

### *Routes*

Somalia's mixed migration flows mean refugees, migrants, asylum seekers and victims of trafficking and smuggling use the same routes. The lack of legal channels for migration leads to high levels of trafficking and smuggling. An **"eastern route"** sees Somalis travel to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern destinations overland and sea, and by air for the wealthier (Frouws, 2014: 15–16). People transit via Somaliland, Puntland or Djibouti before taking a dangerous boat journey to Yemen. With the recent Yemeni conflict, migration flows have increased backwards along this route, with many Somalis arriving in Somaliland and Puntland by boat and then intending to move onwards to south central (Mogadishu) overland (expert comment).

The **"northern route"** sees Somalis travel to Libya and sometimes on to Europe by land and sea (Frouws, 2014). This journey starts the same as the eastern route, transiting via Somaliland, Puntland or Djibouti, but then moves through Ethiopia to Sudan and on to Libya and Europe (ibid.; EASO, 2014).<sup>50</sup> The **"southern route"** sees Somalis travel to or towards South Africa overland. This route moves via Kenya (often Nairobi) down the east of Africa (via Mombasa) towards South Africa (ibid.) (see Appendix 3, Figure 3.3 for a map of the main mixed migration flows). Europe is reached by the **"central Mediterranean route"** (Malta and Italy) or the **"eastern Mediterranean route"** (Turkey and Greece). Italy is the primary destination for Somalis and other people from Sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR, 2015b: 3).

Important **transit routes within Somalia** are Mogadishu, Belet Weyne and Galkacyo for migrants moving north to Puntland, Somaliland and Djibouti; Galkacyo to Puntland, via Garoowe to Bossaso, or via Laascaanood; and flights from Mogadishu to Berbera or Hargeysa to avoid dangerous land routes (EASO, 2014: 115–16). Key transit towns where smuggling routes are present are the port city of Bossaso in Puntland and Hargeisa in Somaliland.<sup>51</sup> Trafficking routes have recently moved to transit more through Djibouti than Somalia (Reitano et al., forthcoming).

### *Costs and networks*

A literature review by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2014: 115-6) reports the following costs: 'Migrants travelling [2014] from Mogadishu via land over Galkacyo, Garoowe and Hargeysa to reach Lawya Caddo on the border with Djibouti were reported to have paid between US\$ 30 and US\$ 120 per person. They subsequently paid between US\$ 150 and US\$ 250 to move to the place of embarkation (Obock) and further to Yemen. Migrants travelling from Mogadishu to Berbera by plane and from there to Yemen paid between US\$ 350 and US\$ 450 for the entire journey. Journeys from Libya to Italy usually cost US\$ 800-1000, but the price fluctuates (RMMS, 2014: 49). An expert contributor highlights findings from a forthcoming study where smugglers offer youth a "go now, pay later" package, reducing the barriers to leave. In this study the average amount for migration to Europe was around US\$ 7,000 USD, often relatives have to contribute to pay for the release. The southern route is more expensive than the eastern route (Reitano, Shaw & Hunter, forthcoming).

Little is known about the characteristics of the smugglers involved in these journeys. Eritreans, Sudanese, Ethiopians and Libyans have been reported to facilitate these movements at different stages of the

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<sup>50</sup> <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexe371.html?id=18>

<sup>51</sup> <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexe371.html?id=18>

journey (RMMS, 2015).<sup>52</sup> In Somalia, employment agencies have been used as fronts for traffickers, especially for migration to the Gulf States (US State Department, 2008).

“The organized nature of the smuggling networks continued to suggest ‘loose affiliations’ and opportunistic alliances rather than international crime syndicates or hierarchical structures. Despite the smuggling economy being a multi-million dollar economy in the Horn (and possibly a billion dollar economy in the Mediterranean), indicators continued to suggest that a relatively small number of smugglers and criminals are directly engaged” (RMMS, 2015).

Irregular migration and smuggler networks are transregional phenomenon (RMMS, 2015). There are some reports of a rise in human trafficking incidents in recent years (in Reitano, Shaw & Hunter, forthcoming).

## **Safety**

Migrants’ status often changes during the journey, and a smuggled migrant may fall victim to traffickers (Frouws, 2014: 11). The US State Department (2008) reports that human smuggling and trafficking are widespread in Somalia, and evidence suggests traffickers use the same networks and methods as those smugglers use. Somali women are trafficked to the Middle East (e.g. Iraq, Lebanon and Syria) and South Africa, as domestic workers and for sexual exploitation. Somali men are trafficked to work as herdsmen or menial workers in Gulf States. Somali children are trafficked to Djibouti, Malawi and Tanzania for sexual exploitation and general work. Trafficking of Ethiopian for the Middle East transits Somalia (ibid.). Somalia is reported to be among the top 10 countries of origin for victims of trafficking (IOM, 2014a).

Somalis face huge risks during their journeys, given traffickers’ activities along the borders, the dangers associated with smugglers’ services and states’ border control activities. The dangers include kidnapping, extortion, torture, sexual and physical violence and death/injury through unsafe transport<sup>53</sup> and extremely hard travel conditions (Hamood, 2006).

## **7. State responses and incentives**

South central, Somaliland and Puntland have limited capacity to deliver many basic state functions, and conflict in south central limits state authority and legitimacy. Therefore, the potential of the state to respond to people trafficking, smuggling and migration is limited. For example, without specific laws, a unified police force or an authoritative legal system, there is no way to prosecute traffickers. Without border management, it is impossible to monitor or control migration that occurs outside of UNHCR channels (IOM, 2014a). A US State Department (2008) case study explains that laws in Somaliland prohibit forced labour, involuntary servitude and slavery, but there are no such laws for other parts of Somalia. Across the majority of the territory, no resources are allocated to preventing trafficking or to victim protection. Government officials may be involved in human trafficking: there are reports that smugglers in Puntland work with and are protected by influential officials within the administration (ibid.).

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<sup>52</sup> For further information on migration in the Sudan context, see Strachan (2016). For further information on migration in the Ethiopian context, see Carter and Rohwerder (2016).

<sup>53</sup> Deaths at sea in the Mediterranean increased in 2015 to 3,771, up from 3,279 in 2014. However, this occurred at the same time as the number of people making the journey increased, therefore the proportion of deaths per journey decreased from 1.5 per cent in 2014 to 0.37 per cent in 2015 (IOM, 2016b). “This indicates an extremely high aggregate ‘success rate’ for the large number of migrants who survived the sea-crossing and entered Europe” (IOM, 2016b). Deaths at sea in the Horn of Africa from irregular migration decreased in 2015 to 95, 61 per cent lower than the 246 deaths in 2014 (ibid.).

Somalia participates in the EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the “Khartoum Process”), which aims to combat human trafficking by establishing and managing reception centres; cooperating in identifying and prosecuting criminal networks; supporting and protecting the rights of victims; and promoting sustainable development to address the root causes of irregular migration.<sup>54</sup> National authorities are also developing a national legal framework for refugees and IDPs, while UNHCR has working arrangements with the different local administrations.<sup>55</sup>

An expert consulted for this report noted that Somaliland occasionally deports irregular migrants transiting or living in Somaliland. Unconfirmed reports suggest there could have been refoulement of the Oromo people who fled Ethiopia, possibly in cooperation with Ethiopian security.

There are various forms of support from international actors. For example, the EU has been funding IOM’s counter-trafficking project since February 2014, focusing on awareness-raising and capacity-building of the Puntland government in investigating/prosecuting traffickers and in victim protection.

State incentives around outward migration are not clear and appear diverse (expert comment). For example, the Somaliland government has publicly expressed concern about the dangers of irregular migration for young Somalilanders. However, remittances make up a crucial and substantial part of economic resources. Meanwhile, the 2013 Kenya–Somalia–UNHCR agreement shows state willingness for people to return, yet, as former Somali Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon explains, “While we view our returning people as an asset, not a liability, the fact is that my government does not have the capacity to provide housing and other needs for such a large number of people” (In IOM, 2014a).

## 8. Development impacts

The main development impacts of migration result from remittances, diaspora policies and projects, diaspora return and humanitarian assistance and participation in recovery and reconstruction efforts (RMMS, 2015; RMMS, 2016; UNDP, 2009). Diaspora and international support (i.e. financial and in-kind) are the two main sources of development assistance in Somalia. Examples of in-kind support from the diaspora include books, medical supplies, machinery and technical support (Hammond, 2011).

### 8.1 Remittances

Estimates of remittances vary but are typically forecast at \$1.3–\$2 billion (e.g. Hammond, 2011), going up to \$2.3 billion annually (UNDP, 2009). Somalia is one of the world’s largest recipients of remittances per person. In some areas, remittances are the only financial assistance provided (RMMS, 2015). A survey of 177 Somali remitters in the UK found recipients were mainly living in Somalia; 55 per cent female, 45 per cent male; and in over half of cases aged 50 or over. The commonest recipients of regular remittances are (in order) mothers, brothers, fathers, sisters and spouses, mainly wives (Lindley, 2009: 13–14).

Lindley (2009: 14) found remittances were often used for general household needs. They tend to go to female relatives, who buy and cook food, as some fear male relatives will not prioritise family needs. Hammond (2011) found most remittances go to relatives and others for basic household expenses (food, education, health care, housing costs, etc.). Remittances also fund travel (internal or external), start small businesses and act as compensation to settle clan disputes (ibid.). The RMMS website highlights that remittances help sustain some in their place of origin, but for many migration is the only viable option for

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<sup>54</sup> <http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/911-khartoum-process-eu-and-african-union-launch-initiative-against-smuggling-of-migrants.html>

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483ad6&submit=GO>



survival.<sup>56</sup> Financial contributions have supported clans during conflict and there is concern they could support groups like Al-Shabaab (Bariagaber, in IOM, 2014a).

## 8.2 Diaspora investments, policies and return

The Somali diaspora is widely credited with playing a central role in Somalia's development through skills transfer, investment and policy influence. UNDP (2009) finds the diaspora has been politically influential since 2000, with many in senior positions in political parties, cabinets, parliament and the civil service (including in Somaliland and Puntland). The diaspora is also Somalia's biggest investor (e.g. providing 80 per cent of start-up capital for small and medium enterprises); it directly supports local institutions delivering services (e.g. teacher and health worker salaries, support to orphanages) and has provided emergency relief during crises (ibid.). It actively raises awareness of and support for aid projects, and many of its number (particularly returnees) are employed in donor organisations or in capacity development projects in government and the civic and private sectors (Horst et al., 2010; IOM, 2014a).

As summarised in Section 4, displaced Somalis are unlikely to consider return an option if conditions do not improve in Somalia (Carling & Pettersen, 2014; Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013; IOM, 2016b). Other concerns include not wanting to disrupt family life and schooling and the fact that family in Somalia depend on remittances (Lindley, 2009). Many challenges accompany return migration. For example, independent returnees may not have official documentation, which complicates their reintegration and their access to services. Former pastoralists may not want to return to their livelihood after years in urban areas or refugee camps. Minority groups may be unsafe if returning to areas dominated by other clans. However, many do return in a more empowered position, bringing advantages—though also potential for tensions.

International actors have tended to focus efforts on refugee return—mostly permanent but also temporary (e.g. UNDP and IOM programmes). Lindley (2014) emphasises that this must be voluntary and, as many refugees will not return, organisations “should continue to push for gradual pathways to more positive participation in society” like ensuring rights to work, access services and participate politically. It is suggested that temporary return can be useful in capitalising on returnees' networks for those with citizenship but not for those without legal security in the country of settlement (Horst et al., 2010: 43–4).

## 8.3 Aid portfolio and impact

Somalia received \$992 million in **official development assistance** (ODA) in 2013, according to World Bank data.<sup>57</sup> OECD data report this as slightly higher, at \$1 billion in 2013.<sup>58</sup> The OECD records the biggest 10 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors/multilaterals in Somalia as (in order) the US, the UK, EU institutions, Norway, Japan, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, the Global Fund and Germany.<sup>59</sup> Most fund humanitarian aid (approximately \$425 million) and social infrastructure (approximately \$280 million).<sup>60</sup> Per capita aid is more than double the per capita average for other fragile states (IOM, 2014b: 12). International actors have also supported numerous peace processes and other peace and reconciliation efforts (UNDP, 2012).

Typically, **aid from non-DAC donors and foundations** is not officially tracked, although Global Humanitarian Assistance (2012: 7) records the 10 biggest humanitarian contributors (2009–2011) (in

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.regionalmms.org/indexa9bc.html?id=19>

<sup>57</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD>

<sup>58</sup> <http://www.compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=625&cr1=oe&lg=en&page=1>

<sup>59</sup> <http://www.compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=273&lg=en&page=21>

<sup>60</sup> <http://www.compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=273&lg=en&page=31>



order): the US, the UK, the EC, the Turkish Red Crescent Society Appeal, Saudi Arabia, Australia, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Turkey, Sweden and Japan.

Somalia receives a large amount of **non-ODA of funding for security** initiatives but much of this is not declared or tracked (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2012). This support includes “support to Somali security institutions (including those in Puntland and Somaliland); support to the UN-authorized, AU [African Union] peacekeeping mission, AMISOM, which has been deployed since 2007; anti-piracy operations permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008); and non-UN-authorized state-led military operations” (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2012: 13).

UNDP (2012: 1) finds Somalia has a “long history” of development and peacebuilding strategies with “limited success”. In terms of **peacebuilding**, the conflict in **south central** has continued to be intractable. The majority of peace agreements and reconciliation processes have not been implemented and “have never sufficiently addressed the real grievances that exist among Somali individuals and clans” (Saalax & Xildhiban, 2010: 33). Based on interviews and in-country observation, Phillips (2013) argues that the low levels of external assistance in Somaliland were beneficial to the emergence of the political settlement, the maintenance of peace and other political and developmental achievements. Somaliland’s success is compared with the continued fragility in neighbouring Somalia, where much external assistance was provided.

An independent evaluation of the **humanitarian** response to **south central** (2005–2010) for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee found the overall response was successful in some key areas: food distributions, health, nutrition, water and sanitation (Polastro et al., 2011). For example, there was no large-scale outbreak of disease, despite millions fleeing their homes in a very short period and increased drought and conflict. The Somali diaspora and populations in IDP influx areas played a major role in the response. In terms of weaknesses, “most assistance has focused on responding to short-term emergency relief needs of the affected populations and to a lesser extent, on recovery and mitigating interventions, such as sustainable livelihood programmes and disaster risk reduction” (ibid.: 9). A factor contributing to this is that funding cycles are “too short term” (ibid.: 10). And “while there have been some attempts to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development assistance, the divide has remained too wide and impeded effective interventions” (ibid.: 9). In terms of the distribution of aid, interviews with local communities found assistance was not perceived to be delivered equitably, particularly as humanitarian aid is commonly distributed according to clan lineage and not need (ibid.: 39). Conflict was triggered in a case where the host community did not benefit from aid compared with the IDPs (ibid.: 40). Lindley (2014) notes aid tends to focus on displaced people but not on what drives displacement.

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
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
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## Appendix 1: Map of Somalia—federal member state and interim regional administrations



Source: Mosely, 2015: 3

## Appendix 2: Conflict events and reported fatalities Somalia 2009–March 2013




Source: ACLED, 2013: 3




## Appendix 3: Migration flows, destinations and profiles

Figure 3.1 Timeline of events and large migration phases in Somalia




Source: IOM, 2014a: 15

Figure 3.2 Somalia population indicators



Source: UNICEF (n.d.a: 1)

Figure 3.3 Map of Somali migration routes



Source: IOM, 2014a: iii

**Figure 3.4 Migration statistics snapshot – Somalia**

<b>Originating from Somalia</b>	
Refugees**	1,105,618
Asylum Seekers**	49,990
<b>Residing in Somalia</b>	
Refugees*	6,900
Asylum Seekers*	9,800
Returned Refugees**	19,004
IDPs**	1,133,000

\* As of October 2015; \*\* In the first half of 2015, data as of June 2015.

Sources: UNHCR, 2015; 2015a

**Figure 3.5: Registered Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa<sup>61</sup>**


Host country	No. of Somali UNHCR registered refugees	Data updated
Kenya	419,142	5 February 2016
Yemen	253,215	31 December 2015
Ethiopia	250,182	31 January 2015
Uganda	35,893	9 Feb 2016
Djibouti	12,363	31 December 2015
Egypt	7,682	31 Dec 2015
Eritrea	2,485	31 December 2015
Tanzania	154	1 September 2015
TOTAL	981,116	

Source: UNHCR, 2015a

<sup>61</sup> All data is from UNCHR - <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php> Notably it only includes statistics for Horn of Africa countries.

**Figure 3.6: Internally displaced people in Somalia\***

### NUMBER OF IDPS BY REGION



\*As of November 2015


Source: UNOCHA, 2015: 5.

**Figure 3.7: International migrant stock in Somalia at mid-year**

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Total migrant stock	478,294	19,527	20,087	20,670	23,995	25,291
Percentage of domestic population	7.6 per cent	0.3 per cent	0.3 per cent	0.2 per cent	0.3 per cent	0.2 per cent
Female migrant stock	234,093	9,245	9,465	9,623	11,081	11,531
Migrant stock that are female	49 per cent	47 per cent	47 per cent	47 per cent	46 per cent	46 per cent
Male migrant stock	244,201	10,282	10,622	11,047	12,914	13,760
Migrant stock that are male	51 per cent	53 per cent	53 per cent	53 per cent	54 per cent	54 per cent

Source: Data extracted from UN (2015)

**Figure 3.8 Somali migrant stock in the world by age and sex, 2013**



Source: UNICEF (n.d.a.)


**Figure 3.9 Number of highly education Somalis in countries with large diaspora**

	Somali immigrant population aged 15+ (approx. number)	Highly educated Somali immigrant population (approx. number and per cent)	Page
Egypt	12,500	3000 (24 per cent)	p.328
Finland	8,000	0 (0 per cent)	p.206
Kenya	96,000	0 (0 per cent)	p.406
Norway	12,000	1000 (8 per cent)	p.236

Source: Data extracted from OECD (2015b)



Figure 3.10 ODA Somalia country profile



Source: OECD website, accessed 18 February 2016  
<http://www.compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=302&cr1=oeed&lg=en&page=1>