Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Sudan

Rapid Literature Review
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About this report

This report is based on 15 days of desk-based research. It was written by Anna Louise Strachan, a GSDRC researcher at the Institute of Development Studies, UK. It was prepared for the European Commission’s Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, © European Union 2016. The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of GSDRC, its partner agencies or the European Commission.

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This paper is one of a series of fragility and migration assessments. Others in the series are:


See [http://www.gsdrc.org/gsdrc_pub_type/literature-reviews/](http://www.gsdrc.org/gsdrc_pub_type/literature-reviews/)

Suggested citation


Key websites

- International Organisation for Migration: [http://www.iom.int/countries/sudan/features](http://www.iom.int/countries/sudan/features)
- Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat: [http://www.regionalmms.org](http://www.regionalmms.org)
- UNHCR: [http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483b76&submit=GO](http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483b76&submit=GO)

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Executive summary

Key facts

- According to the UNHCR, there are 366,970 refugees and asylum seekers in Sudan (2015e).
- There are an estimated 3.1 million Internally Displaced Persons in Sudan (UNHCR, 2015e). The majority of these are in conflict-affected parts of the country, with an estimated 2.5 million in Darfur (ICG, 2015b, p. 4), 222,000 in South Kordofan and 176,000 in Blue Nile state.¹
- There were 5,891 Sudanese refugees in the EU in 2014. The majority of these were in the UK, France, Norway, Sweden, and Italy.² In comparison there were 244,042 Sudanese refugees in South Sudan, 299,799 persons of concern of Sudanese origin in Chad, 37,113 persons of concern in Ethiopia, and 10,040 refugees in Kenya in 2015 (UNHCR, 2015h,f,g,d).
- Remittances to the value of US$ 424 million flowed into Sudan in 2013, constituting 0.6 per cent of GDP for that year.³
- In 2013, Sudan received US$ 1,163,120,000 in development aid and assistance.⁴

Sudan is a source, transit, and destination country for migrants.⁵ Sudanese migrants are a mixed group of refugees and asylum seekers, economic migrants and, to a lesser extent, foreign students. The majority are men aged 25–40, and they come from a wide range of socioeconomic and educational backgrounds.

The majority of refugees and asylum seekers are in neighbouring countries, while somewhere in the region of 500,000 economic migrants are working in the Gulf States. There are also smaller numbers of Sudanese migrants in Western countries, with 16,901 residence permit holders in the EU28 by the end of 2014.

Given the important role of remittances for individuals in Sudan, and for the Sudanese economy, the state is generally supportive of migration.

There has been state collusion in people smuggling and trafficking of migrants, with members of the Sudanese military, border patrols, police and refugee camp guards reportedly involved.

There is general consensus that Sudan suffers from brain drain, at least in some sectors. Most notable among these is the health sector.

The majority of migrants to Sudan tend to be migrants transiting through Sudan on their way to Libya and Egypt, and possibly on to Europe. They generally travel through Sudan with people smugglers. The

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⁵ Where the term 'migrant' is used in this report it refers to all types of migrants, including refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, economic migrants and foreign students. It does not refer to economic migrants alone.
journey through Sudan is extremely dangerous owing to the risk of kidnapping, extortion, torture and sexual and physical violence perpetrated by migrant smugglers.

There are some migrants from neighbouring countries who choose to remain in Sudan, although accurate figures are not available. In addition, Sudan hosts a small number of qualified migrant workers from Asian countries.

Sudan is affected by multiple conflicts and forms of violence. The conflict in Darfur has been responsible for mass displacement within Sudan and across borders in recent years, with the current IDP population in the region standing at 2.5 million (ICG, 2015b, p. 4). Moreover, the Two Areas conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states has also resulted in significant displacement, with 222,000 IDPs in South Kordofan in 2013 and 176,000 IDPs in Blue Nile state. While there is anecdotal evidence to suggest IDPs subsequently migrate out of Sudan, there is no concrete evidence to support these claims. Violence against civilians is widespread, as is sexual violence against women and girls. In addition, Sudan is involved in the conflict in South Sudan through its support to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO). The literature on conflict in Sudan suggests violence in the country is increasing.

Sudan has experienced serious economic challenges since the secession of South Sudan in 2011, when it lost around 75 per cent of its oil revenue. However, the economy is showing some signs of recovery. Despite this, almost 50 per cent of the country’s population live in poverty.

Political freedom is severely curtailed and human rights abuses perpetrated by the state and its affiliates and by non-state actors are widespread.

There is very little evidence on the links between inward and outward migration and development. However, internal migrants have generally performed more poorly than the remainder of the Sudanese population on the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) indicators. Moreover, rural–urban migration has resulted in a significant increase in urban poverty in Sudan.

Sudan received $1,163,120,000 in aid in 2013, but it does not always reach those most in need. Poor donor coordination, reduced funding for NGOs and government restrictions on NGO and INGO activities are some of the factors responsible for this. Moreover, Western donors’ influence in Sudan is limited. This makes it difficult for them to leverage political change in the country, which would improve the lives of its citizens.

There is a large body of literature on the sources of fragility in Sudan, consisting both of grey literature and of academic journal articles. There is also a significant body of literature on migration in Sudan, but much of the material is out of date, as it pre-dates South Sudan’s secession from Sudan in 2011. Much of the data available therefore includes the South Sudanese population and does not accurately reflect the current situation in Sudan, not only with regard to migration but also in other areas, such as the employment structure of the country. This report therefore relies on the most recent data available, noting when this data pre-dates South Sudan’s independence. Other challenges associated with migration data include the use of different definitions for different categories of migrants and the fact that irregular migrants may not be registered. All of the above make it difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the migration situation in Sudan today.

Gaps in the literature include information on income by occupation, and its trajectory, the wealth profile of migrants, ethnic/tribal/regional breakdowns of migrants, details of legal alternatives to the migrant journey from Sudan, the development dimensions of migration, and information on the benefits that Sudan might obtain or forgo from reduced out-migration.

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6 http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/sudan/2014/conflict-and-disaster-induced-internal-displacement-for-2013-in-sudan-
1. Recent history

1.1 Colonial history

Sudan was ruled by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium from 1899 until its independence in 1956.\(^7\) Development during the Condominium period was heavily concentrated in the largely Arab Muslim Nile River Valley, with non-Arab Darfur, Kordofan and Southern Sudan remaining undeveloped (Natsios, 2012, pp. 33–34).\(^8\)

1.2 Economy

Sudan’s economy experienced a period of crisis following the secession of South Sudan in 2011, which caused multiple economic shocks.\(^9\) Sudan lost around 75 per cent of its oil revenue, half of its fiscal payments capacity and two thirds of its international payments capacity (IMF, 2014, p. 5). According to the World Bank, this left the country facing significant macroeconomic and fiscal challenges, much reduced economic growth and double-digit consumer price inflation. Inflation and increased fuel prices owing to the lifting of fuel subsidies caused violent protests in September 2013.\(^10\) Moreover, Sudan’s external debt at the end of 2013 stood at an estimated $45 billion (78 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)) (ibid.). Most of this debt is in arrears (ibid.).

However, the economy showed signs of recovery in 2014, with growth in the gold, agriculture and livestock sectors, as well as in trade, manufacturing and services (IMF, 2014). Rain-fed agriculture accounted for 32 per cent of GDP that year. Gold production increased in 2014, with 83 per cent of this taking the form of small-scale mining (Darbo, 2015, p. 3). Oil production for 2015 was forecast at 155,144 barrels per day (ibid., p. 4). In 2014, Sudan’s GDP stood at $73.81 billion.\(^11\) According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), economic growth is forecast to be 1.9 per cent in 2016, down on 2015 when it was estimated to be 2.5 per cent (EIU, 2015.\(^12\) The African Economic Outlook’s estimates for growth are more optimistic. GDP growth for 2015 and 2016 was estimated at 3.1 per cent and 3.7 per cent, respectively (Darbo, 2015, p. 2). Sudan’s main trade partners in 2014 were Macao, UAE, the EU28, India and Malaysia for imports, and Macao, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the EU28 for exports.\(^13\)

The poverty rate in Sudan is 46.5 per cent, with significant variation between rural and urban areas, which have poverty rates of 57.6 per cent and 26.5 per cent, respectively (Darbo, 2015, p. 12). Sudan ranks 167th in the world on the Human Development Index (0.479).\(^14\)

1.3 Fragility and conflict

Sudan has a long history of military rule and civil conflict, which is responsible for large-scale displacement both within and outside of the country. The conflict in the east of the country ended in

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\(^7\) Egypt’s control over Sudan actually began in the early to mid-1800s. However, Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 and subsequently lost control over Sudan to the Mahdi in 1883. General Kitchener and his forces defeated the Mahdi in 1889, restoring control over Britain to Britain and Egypt.

\(^8\) For more information on the colonial history of Sudan, see Natsios (2012) and Wills (2011).


\(^12\) An EIU growth forecast for the next five years is provided in Appendix 2.


2006, with the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, although tensions remain. The longstanding conflict between the north and the south of the country, which began in 1983, officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The CPA paved the way for a referendum on southern independence in 2011, which resulted in the independence of South Sudan. Despite this, armed groups in the two countries remain interconnected (ICG, 2015a, p. 1). The Darfur region has also experienced conflict since 2003, and conflict in Blue Nile state and South Kordofan is also ongoing.

In addition, violence against civilians, communal violence, land disputes and cattle-rustling are all sources of fragility and conflict in Sudan. Sexual violence against women and girls is also prevalent. The literature suggests levels of violence and conflict are increasing. Section 2 provides more detail on the different conflicts and sources of fragility.

1.4 Political system

Historically, Sudan has experienced a large number of coups and attempted coups. In the period 1958–2001, there were four successful coups and 11 failed coup attempts (McGowan, 2003, p. 367). Omar al-Bashir took power in a coup in 1989. He subsequently became president in 1993, and was re-elected in 2015 with 94 per cent of the vote. Turnout was officially 46 per cent, although the actual figure may be lower. The dominant political party in Sudan is the National Congress Party (NCP).

Sudan is nominally a parliamentary democracy. It has a bicameral parliament, which consists of a 426-member National Assembly. Sixty per cent of the seats are elected through majority voting in geographical constituencies and 40 per cent through proportional representation. Twenty five per cent of seats are reserved for women. There is also a Council of States composed of two representatives elected by each state assembly.

The main opposition parties in Sudan are the National Umma Party (NUP), the Sudanese Congress Party and the Sudanese Communist Party. Members of opposition parties have been subjected to detention and harassment by security forces (FCO, 2015). In 2015, they boycotted the national elections, as a result of the government’s failure to meet their demands for an interim government, a new constitution and a neutral electoral commission prior to going to the polls (Bereketeab, 2015, p. 4).

As noted in Section 2, political instability has led to an increase in both internal and outward migration. The impact of the political system on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and migrants is discussed in Section 2.3.

1.5 Natural disasters and desertification

Desertification is a significant risk factor in Sudan. According to a 2007 report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the areas most at risk are the conflict-affected areas of Darfur, parts of North Kordofan and Khartoum states and Kassala (UNEP, 2007, p. 64). Sudan is prone to both severe drought and severe flooding (ibid., p. 58). In 2014, 159,000 people were displaced by rainy season floods (IDMC, 2015, p. 9). These affected Khartoum, Kassala, Gezira, Northern, Sennar, North Kordofan, South Kordofan, River Nile, West Darfur and White Nile states (ibid., p. 90).

2. The economics and politics underlying migration

According to di Bartolomeo, Jaulin, & Perrin (2012, p. 9), the deteriorating socioeconomic situation resulting from political instability has increased rural–urban migration and outward migration.

2.1 Economy

Overcoming economic challenges

According to the World Bank, political instability, corruption and economic uncertainty compromise the enabling environment for business development, growth, and employment. It highlights inadequate infrastructure services, access to finance, and taxation policies, as other constraints to economic development.19

The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014, pp. 19-20) recommends a number of policies to support inclusive growth and reduce unemployment. They include:

- improving the business climate
- increased investment in human and physical capital, including increasing public expenditure on health and education, improving infrastructure and strengthening regional connectivity
- investment in skill formation activities and ensuring these are equally accessible for both men and women
- reforms in the agriculture sector
- improving the efficiency of the social safety net.

Employment structure and income

In 2008, employment by sector was 48.56 per cent in agriculture, 31 per cent in services, 7.65 per cent in industry and 12.24 per cent in other sectors (Nour, 2014). Unemployment in 2014 was estimated to stand at 19.4 per cent (Darbo, 2015, p. 13). Hiring often takes place through family connections and personal networks (ibid.). The lack of formal jobs and the absence of unemployment insurance drive many of the unemployed into the informal sector, where wages are low (ibid.). Women’s participation in the labour market is low, with just 23.1 per cent of women and girls over the age of 15 being employed (ibid.). Women’s ability to participate in the labour market is reportedly restricted by family and societal norms, especially in urban areas (ibid., p. 14).

An International Labour Organization (ILO) policy paper suggests rural–urban migration in Sudan has resulted in rapid growth of the informal sector in Khartoum (Azim, 2013, p. 7). An example of the type of activity migrants from rural areas undertake is that of migrant women selling food in the markets in Khartoum (ibid., p. 4). However, it also notes there is no up-to-date data on the size of the informal sector in Khartoum state, or in Sudan (ibid., p. 7). It finds that one of the challenges associated with migrants working in the informal sector in urban areas is the absence of informal social security systems, which in rural areas were provided by migrants’ families (ibid., p. 4).

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According to one working paper, conflict has contributed to unemployment in Sudan, not only because displacement means people have to leave their jobs but also because the government has prioritised defence spending over spending on social development and job creation (Nour, 2014, p. 8).

The paper identifies a number of short-comings of the Sudanese labour market. These include (Nour, 2014, p. 9):

- the dominance of the public sector over the private sector
- weak and inefficient regulations and institutional settings
- rigidity and lack of dynamism
- lack of skills upgrading
- high youth unemployment
- prevalence of child labour
- low women’s participation
- a mismatch between educational output and labour market requirements

Reasons for this include high population and labour force growth rates, macroeconomic fluctuations caused by oil price instability, the role of the state in economic activity and rural–urban migration (Nour, 2014, p. 9).

No up-to-date information on earnings in Sudan was found during the course of the research for this report. However, one study states that, in 2011, individuals working in the health sector received an average monthly income of 500 Sudanese pounds, with the exception of those in Khartoum state (Abu-Agla et al., 2013, p. 15). Moreover, according to the 2015 African Economic Outlook for Sudan, surging inflation has resulted in wage erosion (Darbo, 2015).

**Economic costs and benefits of inward migration**

According to one study, the exploration and production of oil in Sudan arguably led to an increase in employment opportunities initially (Nour, 2014, p. 8). However, the resulting influx of foreign direct investment and increased wealth led to an increase in the number of migrant workers in Sudan, and perhaps an increase in unemployment (ibid., p. 8). The same paper also argues that the large numbers of refugees coming from neighbouring countries have also contributed to high levels of unemployment in Sudan (ibid., p. 18). Focusing specifically on Sudan’s cities, one study finds that, in Khartoum, migrant labourers from Egypt and Ethiopia provide competition for poor Sudanese workers (Pantuliano et al., 2011, p. 7). The influx of skilled workers, such as plumbers, carpenters and construction workers, from Egypt has also had an impact on the livelihoods of the urban poor in Khartoum (ibid., p. 7). However, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the presence of irregular migrants, who find it easy to enter the labour market as low-skilled labourers, waitresses and cleaners, is ‘functional to the labour market needs’. This is reportedly because they undertake menial jobs, which Sudanese may not want to do (IOM, 2011, p. 47).

One journal article focuses specifically on the growing number of female Ethiopian economic migrants to Sudan. Growing demand for domestic workers is met by these Ethiopian women, who generally have low levels of education and have often entered the country illegally (Jamie, 2012, p. 191). In addition to domestic work, Ethiopian women also work in restaurants and shops (ibid., p. 190). According to the article, many of these women consider Sudan a transit destination (ibid.).
2.2 Politics

Political freedom

According to Freedom House’s 2016 Freedom in the World report, Sudan is ‘not free’ in terms of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2016, p. 23). The same report also provides 2015 rankings for freedom of the press and freedom of the net. Sudan ranks as ‘not free’ in both categories (Freedom House, 2016, p. 23). Freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly are restricted in Darfur (UNGA, 2015, p. 6). Moreover, the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) report on Sudan finds that, in 2014, civil society organisations were restricted by the government and faced harassment by security forces, including raids on offices, confiscation of equipment and forced closure (FCO, 2015).

Prospects for change in leadership and governance

According to the EIU Sudan Country Report, significant challenges to Omar Bashir and his NCP are possible in the longer term, despite their continuing dominance (EIU, 2015). The report suggests the length of the president’s rule, combined with local grievances, such as water shortages in Khartoum, is likely to lead to periodic anti-government protests. It also suggests there will be some calls for regime change. In the short term, these protests are unlikely to gain traction and are likely to be suppressed (ibid.). However, the report notes that Bashir is 71 and does not have a family member to succeed him and therefore that leadership change may involve the army when it comes.

Rule of law

Sudanese criminal law is based on Sharia law. It allows extreme punishments such as flogging and cross-amputation (removal of the right hand and left foot). In 2013, Sudan’s deputy chief justice confirmed that 16 cases of amputation had been carried out since 2001. The death penalty is used as a punishment for murder, adultery, sodomy and alleged political crimes. It has also been used for other crimes such as apostasy (FCO, 2015).

Social norms

While the right to freedom of religion is enshrined in the interim national constitution of Sudan, there have been reports of Christians being arrested and of other restrictions on their freedom of religion (UNGA, 2015, p. 7).

Sharia law is disproportionately applied to women and girls, for ‘crimes’ like adultery or violations of morality codes. For example, women convicted of adultery can face the death penalty. Moreover, homosexual acts are illegal, although, according to Freedom House, the law does not appear to be applied. However, according to the FCO (2015), homosexual acts are punishable by fines, flogging, stoning, prison sentences and in some cases death. The LGB&T community in Sudan also faces social stigma (ibid.).

22 Meriam Ibrahim was sentenced to death for apostasy, on the basis that she refused to renounce Christianity. Her sentence was overturned on appeal (FCO, 2015).
23 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/sudan#f29a0a
2.3 Political and economic exclusion

There are more than 150 ethnic groups in Sudan, speaking 400 different languages and dialects. In the central parts of Sudan, most people identify as belonging to one of the Arab tribal groups. They practise Islam, claim Arab descent and speak Arabic (Ryle, 2011, p. 34). In the far north, in the east and in Darfur, non-Arab identities are maintained and non-Arabic languages are spoken (ibid., p. 34). There are also nomadic Arab camel and cattle pastoralists in Kordofan and Darfur (ibid., p. 35). According to Ryle (2011, p. 31), ‘Sudanese people differentiate themselves – or have been differentiated by others – using a range of overlapping criteria: lines of descent, common language, place of origin, mode of livelihood, physical characteristics, and political or religious affiliation’. However, he argues that this does not always serve to ‘perpetuate difference’ (ibid.).

As discussed in Section 2.1, ethnicity is an important aspect of all the conflicts currently being waged within Sudan. Following independence, Sudanese governments pursued a policy of Arabisation and Islamisation. This served to increase divisions within the country. Moreover, the concentration of power among Arab elites ‘encouraged the growth of an idea of Arab racial supremacy’ (Ryle, 2011, p. 36). This contributed to the outbreak of numerous conflicts in the country, which in turn have been a major driver of both internal and outward migration. Government use of tribal militias, as described in Section 2.1 has exacerbated some of these tensions.

There are significant disparities between states in terms of economic, social and cultural rights (UN ECOSOC, 2015, p. 5). States in the eastern Sudan, Darfur and Kordofan regions are particularly disadvantaged. Access to safe drinking water and basic services in these regions is limited, and extreme poverty is widespread. Moreover, these states do not receive federal resources proportionate to their needs (ibid., p. 5).

According to the FCO, individuals from Darfur, Blue Nile State, and South Kordofan often face discrimination, especially in terms of access to education (FCO, 2015). Moreover, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from Darfur are often unable to leave Sudan legally because the authorities do not issue travel documents to everyone from there (NAMTF, 2015, p. 41). The births of some migrants from Darfur and to a lesser extent northern Sudan have never been registered (ibid., p. 41). Travelling without documents makes migrants particularly vulnerable (ibid., p. 55).

IDPs in Darfur also face discrimination and harassment. For example, IDPs have been subjected to access restrictions and harassment while farming and carrying out other livelihood activities in recent months (UNSC, 2015, p. 4). Moreover, there have been reports of forced evictions of IDPs in urban areas (UN ECOSOC, 2015, p. 5). IDPs in Sudan have limited access to basic services (ibid., 2015, p. 5). Similarly, asylum seekers and refugees experience difficulties trying to access health care and education (ibid., 2015, p. 5). In December 2015, Second Vice-President Hassabo Abdelrahman announced that all IDP camps in Darfur would be closed by 2017. IDPs in Darfur were told they would be given the choice of resettlement or returning to their place of origin. However, the Darfur Displaced and Refugees Association reportedly described the government’s plans as ‘a violation of international humanitarian laws and human rights charters’. 27

Exclusion and discrimination are also discussed in the context of the conflicts in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and in the context of the different forms of violence perpetrated by state and non-state actors in Sudan covered in Section 2.4.

26 http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/darfur-displaced-categorically-reject-dismantling-camps
27 http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/darfur-displaced-categorically-reject-dismantling-camps
2.4 Conflict

According to a paper published by the Migration Policy Centre, conflict is the main source of outward, inward and internal migration in Sudan (di Bartolomeo et al., 2012, p. 9). Similarly, an Overseas Development Institute (ODI) study on urbanisation in Sudan finds that conflict is the most significant push factor for rural–urban migration (Pantuliano et al., 2011). This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.

Internal armed conflicts

Conflicts in Sudan are extremely fluid and complex, with alliances between conflict actors shifting frequently. This section provides a broad overview of the conflicts currently affecting Sudan.

Darfur

Conflict in Darfur began in 2003. Rebels mainly belonged to non-Arab communities. The government’s counter-insurgency response involved the mobilisation of the Janjawid (Arab militias) (ICG, 2015b, p. 3). In 2003–2005, violence in Darfur largely consisted of attacks by the Janjawid against non-Arab communities accused of supporting the rebels (ibid., p. 4). This type of violence continues, although the Janjawid have been replaced by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); this is discussed in more detail in the section on violence against civilians in Sudan. However, the nature of violence in Darfur has evolved to include other types of violence and conflict (ibid., p. 4). In addition to factional fighting between rebel groups, these include:

- **Intra-Arab violence:** Conflicts between Arab communities are largely over land and power (ICG, 2015b, p. 6). There has also been conflict between Arab communities over the Jebel Amir gold mine in North Darfur (ibid., p. 6). Increasing tribalisation by the government has also increased intra-Arab conflict (ibid., p. 6).

- **Arab militias against the government:** There are an estimated 200,000 Arab militia members in Darfur. They are partly integrated into official paramilitary forces like the Border Guard, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), the Central Reserve Police (CRP) and the RSF (ICG, 2015b, p. 10). For political and economic reasons, the government decided to stop paying some of them, and to stop food and ammunition deliveries. This resulted in a growing sense of abandonment, and some militias turning against the government (ibid., pp. 10-11).

- **Non-Arab conflict with the Zaghawa:** In the Eastern Darfur lowlands, the Berti, Bergid, Mima and Tunjur tribes were attacked by both Arab militias and rebel groups (ICG, 2015b, p. 13). Locally recruited militias have carried out retaliatory attacks against the Zaghawa, who are viewed as ‘newcomers’ and who are the most prominent tribe in the rebel groups (ibid., p. 13).

In addition, UN–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) personnel faced a growing number of attacks in the last three months of 2015 (UNSC, 2015, p. 8).

Two areas (Blue Nile state and South Kordofan)

The root causes of the conflict in Blue Nile state relate to the concentration of power and resources at Sudan’s centre, at the expense of the peripheries (ICG, 2013a, p. i). Similarly, political marginalisation is one of the root causes of conflict in South Kordofan, as is land dispossession (ICG, 2013b, p. i). Both conflicts also have ethnic dimensions. In general terms, the rebels in Blue Nile state are largely recruited from non-Arab tribes like the Ingessana, Uduk and Jumjum (ICG, 2013a, p. 5). The more ‘Arabised’ tribes
are generally believed to be siding with the government (ibid.). In South Kordofan, the ethnic dynamics have changed in recent years, with Arab tribes like the Misseriya, and to some extent the Hawazma, increasingly joining the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North (SPLM/A-N) (ICG, 2013b, pp. 9–10). The conflicts in Blue Nile state and South Kordofan are between the SPLM/A-N and its allies and the government of Sudan.

Following the collapse of peace talks between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A-N in April 2013, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) pushed forward, reaching North Kordofan and the main roads to Khartoum and the Nile Valley (ICG, 2015a, p. 2). In November 2013, the government of Sudan launched its seif as-sakhan campaign to resolve the conflicts in South Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile state militarily (ibid.). The campaign succeeded in preventing further territorial gains by the SRF, and in recapturing some territory, but it did not penetrate the Nuba Mountains, where the SPLM/A-N is based (ibid., p. 2).

As part of the military campaign, the RSF recruited from the camel herding component of the Rizeigat Arab tribe in South Darfur, who also made up the ‘Janjawid’ militias, were deployed (ICG, 2015a, p. 2). The second phase of the seif as-sakhan campaign was launched in January 2015 (ICG, 2015a, p. 3). Fighting continues in South Kordofan and Blue Nile State.

**Abyei**

Abyei is a small territory located between Eastern Darfur, South Kordofan and South Sudan (Craze, 2013, p. 73). The territory is strategically important because of its use by different pastoralist groups and its oil resources. It is contested by Sudan and South Sudan. In addition to the conflict over the territory between Sudan and South Sudan, there is also communal conflict between the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka (Craze, 2013).

**Eastern Sudan**

The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the Eastern Front insurgents was signed in 2006. However, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), this peace is increasingly fragile, given failure to implement many of the peace agreement’s provisions and to address the root causes of the conflict (ICG, 2013c, p. 3).

**South Sudan**

The SPLM-A, which fought the central government in Khartoum during the 1983–2005 civil war in Sudan, now effectively controls independent South Sudan. In 2013, there was a leadership split in South Sudan between President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Riek Machar, which led to the outbreak of civil war in the country in December 2013. Riek Machar subsequently established the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) as a military and political opposition movement in South Sudan (ICG, 2015a, p. 29).

South Sudan continues to provide support to the SRF. Because of historical ties from when the SPLM/A was one movement, the SPLM/A-N has received cars, fuel and ammunition from South Sudan, which were reportedly supposed to be shared with other members of the SRF (ICG, 2015a, p. 5). The Darfur

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29 For more information about the SPLM/A and its different factions, see Appendix 1.

30 Composed of the SPLM/A-N, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the SLA-MM led by Minni Arku Minawi (SLA-MM) and the SLA-AW, led by Abdelwahid Mohammed Ahmed Nur (SLA-AW). For information see Appendix 1.


32 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=145&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa

33 Prior to the secession of South Sudan in 2011.
rebels have also received aid from South Sudan. Moreover, they have bases in South Sudan’s Unity, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal states (ICG, 2015a, p. 5). Sudan, on the other hand, is providing support to the SPLM-IO (ICG, 2015a, p. 21). The SPLM-IO reportedly has bases in Sudan, along the border with Unity, Upper Nile and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states (ibid., p. 22). Sudan is also reportedly providing training and weapons to the SPLM-IO (ibid., p. 22). Moreover, there are reports that the SPLM-IO has obtained weapons, ammunition and vehicles in West Kordofan, although these may have been sold independently by local officers and Arab militias (ibid., p. 23).

The SRF was actively involved in conflict in South Sudan in 2013 and 2014. It was responsible for abuses against Nuer civilians, which prompted revenge attacks against Sudanese civilians living in South Sudan (ICG, 2015a, p. 18). Uganda also reportedly supports the SRF (ibid., p. 21). This is reportedly Sudan’s reason for supporting the SPLM-IO (ibid., p. 23). An ICG report highlights that the ‘drift toward a Uganda-Sudan proxy war risks regional stability and peace’ (ibid., p. 22).

**Violence against civilians**

In 2014, 60 per cent of conflict events took the form of violence against civilians (ACLED, 2015, p. 3). The majority of these conflict events took place in Darfur (ibid., p. 4). One report highlights the prevalence of targeted attacks against civilians by armed groups (ibid.). Both local militia groups and state forces are largely responsible for violence against civilians (ibid.). It is used ‘to “punish” communities believed to support rebel forces, or as part of cycles of inter-communal reprisal attacks’ (ibid.). It is also used ‘to reinforce the presence and control of particular armed groups within a given region’ (ibid.). Violence against civilians frequently involves looting of civilian or humanitarian property (ibid.).

The RSF, under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), government forces, and pro-government militias, has subjected IDPs to abductions, sexual violence and killing (ACLED, 2015, p. 4). Moreover, in Darfur, it has attacked non-Arabs accused of disloyalty (ICG, 2015a, p. 3). In just a few days in February 2015, its activities resulted in the displacement of 30,000 people (ibid.). It subsequently returned to South Kordofan. The RSF reportedly carried out abuses against Misseriya Arab civilians in January 2014 (ibid.). It also participated in government repression of protests in September 2013. In addition, its recruits in training fought with, and killed, locals in villages north of Khartoum in December 2014 (ICG, 2015b, p. 6). Additional RSF regiments have been created, one from South Kordofan and one from outside the conflict-affected areas (ICG, 2015a, p. 3).

**Communal violence**

Sudan has had the highest number of communal violence-related fatalities in Africa since 2005 (ACLED, 2015, p. 7). There are close to 70 active communal militias in Sudan (ibid.). Communal violence is largely concentrated in Darfur, and has mainly involved the Misseriya, Abala, Rizaygat, Salamat and Maaliya groups (ibid., p. 8). The government has armed and mobilised ethnic militias to fight rebel groups in Darfur and South Kordofan (ibid.). These militias are often motivated by local objectives like securing material resources, natural resource control, border demarcation and local administrative power under future governance arrangements, rather than by national conflict objectives. They may also be reacting to ethnically targeted killings of civilians by other armed groups (ibid.).


**Land disputes, access to farmland and cattle-rustling**

According to one research report, violence in Sudan is generally concentrated in pastoral or agri-pastoral areas (Helland, & Sørbsø, 2014, p. 21). On occasion, tribal militias that have received weapons from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and its affiliates have armed local pastoralist communities ‘to advance their quest for land and resources in competition with their neighbours’ (LeBrun, & Leff, 2014, p. 238). There were a number of cases of land dispute-related fighting in Western and Central Darfur in the last three months of 2015 (UNSC, 2015, p. 3). In addition, cattle-rustling resulted in several deaths in Darfur in the period September–December 2015 (ibid.).

**Conflict-related sexual violence**

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is widespread throughout Darfur. This violence includes acts of rape and sodomy, gang rape, attempted rape, harmful traditional practices and domestic violence (UNGA, 2015, p. 10). Most victims of SGBV are displaced women and girls attacked while engaging in livelihood activities outside their camp (UNGA, 2015, p. 10). Others are attacked inside the camps, or when fleeing for safety from their villages (ibid.). In September–December 2015, a number of new cases of sexual violence and rape occurred in North Darfur, particularly in the Tawilla, Shangil, Tobaya and Kutum localities (ibid., p. 12).

**Future trends**

In 2014, President Omar al-Bashir announced a national dialogue with the aim of addressing the multiple challenges facing Sudan: conflict, poverty, political reform and national identity (FCO, 2015). However, progress on the national dialogue has been limited (FCO, 2015). Similarly, talks facilitated by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel have made little progress. As such, the UN states that ‘a political solution to the conflict in Darfur remains elusive’ (UNSC, 2015, p. 16). One journal article goes further, arguing that ‘the Sudanese people’s attempt to establish a central state has failed, and in doing so weakened their sense of loyalty to the nation’ (Ali, 2014, p. 397). It goes on to argue that, as a result, the chance of Sudan breaking up further is high.

**3. Migration**

**3.1 Outward migration**

There were an estimated 1.2–1.7 million people of Sudanese origin living abroad in 2010 (IOM, 2011, p. 19). Migration levels were particularly high during Sudan’s two civil wars (1955–1972 and 1983–2005) (di Bartolomeo et al., 2012, p. 1). The ongoing conflict in Darfur has also caused high levels of internal and outward migration (ibid.). According to the IOM, a lack of sustainable livelihoods for IDPs may push them to migrate to other countries (IOM, 2011, p. 38). There is some anecdotal evidence to support this theory (expert comment).

Sudan’s net migration rate for the period 2010–2015 was -4.3 migrants/1,000 population. Outward migration for the period 2010-2014 is estimated to stand at 270,000 (Darbo, 2015, p. 13). According to data for the period 2007–2013, 29 per cent of the population would move permanently given the

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34 https://www.iom.int/countries/sudan/facts-and-figures
opportunity to do so (OECD, 2015, p. 349). Of these, 30 per cent were planning on moving within the next 12 months (ibid., p. 349). Forty per cent of those wishing to migrate were highly educated (ibid., p. 349).

Desired destination countries for the period 2007–2013 were Saudi Arabia (23 per cent), the US (21 per cent) and the UAE (13 per cent) (ibid., p. 349).

According to the IOM, Sudanese migrants are equally likely to reside in countries with low and medium human development as they are in countries with high or very high human development (IOM, 2011, p. 19). This is because migration from Sudan is mixed, consisting of refugees and asylum seekers who tend to go to neighbouring countries, as well as of temporary labour migrants to the Gulf States and more permanent migrants to Western countries (ibid., p. 68).

The number of labour migrants in the Gulf States in 2013 was 234,564 in Saudi Arabia, 154,968 in the UAE and 39,693 in Kuwait (UN DESA & UNICEF, 2014). There are more recent figures for refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries. In 2015, there were 244,042 Sudanese refugees in South Sudan, 299,799 persons of concern of Sudanese origin in Chad, 37,113 persons of concern in Ethiopia and 10,040 refugees in Kenya in 2015 (UNHCR, 2015d, f, g, h).

The main destinations for legal migrants to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in 2012 were the U (2,471), Canada (495), Norway (493), Italy (459), Australia (407), France (338), Japan (210), Sweden (206), Austria (81) and the Netherlands (75). For all these countries, Sudanese migrants represented less than 1 per cent of total legal migrant flows to the country (OECD, 2015, p. 349). Around 2,900 Sudanese travel to Western countries, as well as countries like Malaysia, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, India and Pakistan for tertiary education (IOM, 2011, p. 20).

According to the IOM, it is difficult to establish the size of Sudanese diasporas in Western countries. This is reportedly because of different national definitions and the prevalence of dual nationals and those who have been naturalised. This is particularly the case for ‘older’ destination countries like the UK and the US (IOM, 2011, p. 19).

There are reports of Sudanese women and girls being trafficked into domestic servitude both within Sudan and in Middle Eastern countries, such as Bahrain and Qatar (IOM, 2011, p. 61). There are also reports of Sudanese children being forced into begging in Saudi Arabia (ibid.). Other forms of international trafficking, including sexual exploitation and recruitment of child soldiers, have also been reported (ibid.). The extent of these problems is unclear, owing to a lack of available data (ibid.).

It is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the total number of Sudanese migrants (both legal and irregular) in different countries, given the lack of accurate and comparable data. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that irregular migrants often remain unregistered.

### 3.2 Inward migration

According to the UN Population Fund, the foreign-born population living in Sudan stands at around 750,000 (UNFPA, 2013, p. 3). Of these, 366,970 are refugees and asylum seekers, the majority of whom are from Eritrea and South Sudan (UNHCR, 2015e). There were reportedly 108,075 persons of concern from Eritrea in Sudan, 189,809 from South Sudan, 42,333 from Chad and 18,335 from Ethiopia in September 2015 (ibid.). In addition, there are an estimated 60,000 Syrian refugees in Sudan.\(^{35}\)

In the last few months of 2015, an estimated 5,000–7,000 refugees, Sudanese returnees and other refugees and asylum seekers arrived in Sudan from Yemen (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 59). Arrivals from Yemen are projected to continue in 2016 (ibid., p. 58). Moreover, according to the North Africa Mixed Migration Task Force (NAMTF), the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Sudan is expected to increase exponentially as the humanitarian situation in the Greater Horn of Africa region deteriorates (NAMTF, 2015, p. 14).

In addition, there were 6,463 foreign students in Sudan in 2010 (IOM, 2011, p. 46). Twenty five per cent of these were Somali, 12 per cent Nigerian, 35 per cent other African (mainly Kenyan and Ethiopian) and 30 per cent Asian (ibid.).

### 3.3 Internal migration

**Internally displaced persons**

There are an estimated 3.1 million IDPs in Sudan (UNHCR, 2015e). Around 2.5 million of these are in conflict-affected Darfur (ICG, 2015b, p. 4). Moreover, conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states has resulted in 222,000 and 176,000 IDPs, respectively. People displaced in and from the disputed Abyei region face a particular predicament, as it is impossible to determine whether or not they have crossed an international border (IDMC, 2014, p. 3).

**Rural–urban migration**

According to a World Bank report, Khartoum has experienced an ‘urban population explosion’ owing to IDPs moving to the city (UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, p. 35). The report cites greater security, anonymity, better access to services and greater economic opportunities as pull factors for refugees and IDPs moving to urban areas (ibid.). An ODI study of urbanisation in Sudan, based on fieldwork in the country, finds that economic incentives were pull factors for rural migrants prior to the 1970s, and that since then the push factors for rural–urban migration have been drought and conflict, both of which have devastated many rural areas (Pantuliano et al, 2011, p. 2). Of these two push factors, conflict has been the most significant (ibid.). For example, during the second civil war (1983–2005), over 2 million people fled to Khartoum (ibid.). While there are no accurate figures available, around half of these are believed to have returned home after the signing of the CPA (ibid.). According to the African Economic Outlook for Sudan, the urban population is expected to increase by 74 per cent by 2020 (Darbo, 2015, p. 14).

### 3.4 Demographic, socioeconomic and educational profile of migrants

According to the UNFPA, the majority of migrants from Sudan are men aged 25-40 (UNFPA, 2013, p. 3). Of migrants in OECD countries in 2010/11, 27.5 per cent were low educated and 36.5 per cent were highly educated (OECD, 2015, p. 348). However, their relatively small number means this data is not very helpful in building an accurate picture of the educational qualifications of Sudanese migrants. However, some indication is provided by the African Economic Outlook for Sudan, which states that half of those migrating from Sudan between 2010 and 2014 were professional medical staff, engineers and university lecturers (Darbo, 2015, p. 13). It is, however, unclear whether this statistic refers to legal migrants or to

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all types of migrants. Among those migrating to Sudan, the number who are highly educated is very low (OECD, 2015, p. 348).

The research undertaken for this report did not find any information on the wealth profile of migrants from Sudan. However, according to one report, outward migration among Sudanese gold miners working in the disputed Halayeb Triangle is increasing. They generally seek more stable and less dangerous livelihoods (NAMTF, 2015, p. 31).

The research undertaken for this study did not uncover any literature on the ethnic/tribal/regional breakdown of migrants from Sudan. However, a peer-reviewed journal article looking specifically at Sudanese migrants in Cairo, based on a household survey of 565 households from 14 districts in the city, finds that 60 per cent of those interviewed came from the Nuba, Fur, Beni, Amer, Dinka, Masalit and Gaalin ethnic groups. These are among the largest ethnic groups in Sudan (Jacobsen et al., 2014, p. 151). The remaining 40 per cent represented over 75 ethnic groups and sub-groups (ibid.). Seventy-five per cent of respondents spoke Arabic as a first language, 10 per cent spoke Fur as a first language and 9 per cent spoke another Sudanese language as their first language (ibid.). A quarter of respondents were born in Darfur, 13.5 per cent in what is now South Sudan, 18 per cent in South Kordofan, 22 per cent in Khartoum and 20 per cent in northern and eastern Sudan (ibid.).

### 3.5 Can specific support packages be designed to meet migrants’ needs in-country?

The available literature shows Sudanese migrants are diverse, coming from a range of different socioeconomic backgrounds. With one exception, it does not identify specific groups for which support packages could be designed in-country. However, there is consensus in the literature on the large-scale migration of those working in the health sector (e.g. IOM, 2011, pp. 63–64). A study published by the World Health Organization (WHO) suggests bilateral agreements with recipient countries and the management, regulation and governance of the emigration process as a means of resolving this (Abu-Agla et al., 2013, p. 17). It also emphasises the importance of improving remuneration packages for health care professionals (ibid.).

More broadly, there is also consensus in the literature on the problem of rapid urbanisation. As discussed in Section 2, one of the problems associated with rural–urban migration is the rapid growth of the informal sector. A policy paper published by ILO advocates a focus on development and stabilisation at the local and state levels in order to address this problem, arguing that it would encourage internal migrants to return to their state of origin (Azim, 2013, p. 32).

### 4. The migrant journey

#### 4.1 Migrant journeys

Almost all migrants and refugees coming from Sudan, or passing through it, engage with people smugglers at some stage in their journeys. There are reports of migrants undergoing a transition from being smuggled to being trafficked at some point *en route* (NAMTF, 2015, p.38). Migrants are aware of the dangers involved in undertaking the journey through Sudan, and onwards to Europe. They have access to a wide range of information sources, including returnees’ stories, information from family and friends who have undertaken the journey and access to international television channels like the BBC.
inside refugee camps. Despite this, they feel this is the only feasible way to improve their lives (ibid., p. 44).

**Arriving in Sudan**

Refugees with social networks in Sudan are sometimes able to bypass government regulations and acquire citizenship, ID cards and travel permits. They are also sometimes able to live in towns rather than camps, and to gain access to higher education (Humphris, 2013, p. 8). There are a number of entry points for migrants arriving from Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan and Somaliland.

**Eritrea**

On arrival in Sudan, the majority of Eritrean refugees are hosted in Shagarab refugee camp, near the town of Kassala in eastern Sudan (Humphris, 2013, p. 8). Some, such as journalists, high-ranking officers and political opponents, may decide to move again because of the proximity of the camp to the Eritrean border and the anxiety this causes (ibid.). According to a study by NAMTF, Eritreans are more likely to be trafficked than Ethiopian or Sudanese migrants, because traffickers believe they are more likely to have family in the diaspora who can pay more ransom money (NAMTF, 2015, p. 28). A UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) research paper suggests safety concerns in Shagarab camp and reports of human rights violations in Sudan may be reasons behind eastern Sudan increasingly becoming a transit region rather than a final destination for migrants from Eritrea (Humphris, 2013, p. 8).

As a result, more than 75 per cent of Eritrean refugees remain in Shagarab camp for only a few weeks. Once they have received refugee documentation from the Commissioner for Refugees (COR), they turn to smugglers for onward transportation. This is because Sudan’s encampment policy prevents them from travelling freely within the country (Humphris, 2013, p. 9). Another study, published by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS), finds fear of abduction has led Eritreans to travel directly to Khartoum with the help of smugglers rather than registering at Shagarab camp first (RMSS, 2014a, p. 18).

**Ethiopia**

Ethiopians enter Sudan at Metema, or via Wollega province to the towns of Gambela or Assossa (RMSS, 2014a, p. 26). The Metema route is the most commonly used. The main risks associated with the journey from Metema to Khartoum are exhaustion from long strenuous walks and detention and deportation (NAMTF, 2015, pp.26-27).

Another route is via Humera, which is 5 km from the Sudanese border (NAMTF, 2015, p.26). The principal risk associated with this route is crossing the Tekeze River, which is done with ropes or with groups of people holding hands (ibid.). On the Sudanese side, migrants then use the town of Hamlayt as a transit point to reach Shagarab camp, Kassala, Khartoum or Port Sudan (ibid.).

Ethiopia is also a transit country for migrants from Somaliland, who generally travel via Jijiga and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, then on to Sudan on their way to Libya (RMMS, 2014a, p. 30).

**Crossing Sudan**

The journey through Sudan is extremely dangerous (RMMS, 2014a, p. 37). The majority of migrants from Eritrea and Ethiopia head to the towns of Kassala and El-Gedaref on arrival in Sudan (ibid., p. 34). There

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37 For further information on migration in the Eritrean context see GSDRC (2016).  
38 For further information on migration in the Ethiopian context see Carter and Rohwerder (2016).
Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Sudan

...are approximately 11 checkpoints on the main route from Kassala to Khartoum, so migrants need smugglers to pay bribes to officials to enable them to pass (ibid.). The journey costs between $100 and $300 (NAMTF, 2015, p.28).

When traveling from Shagarab camp, migrants first have to cross the Atbara River (NAMTF, 2015, p. 28). Migrants generally travel by pick-up truck, although lorries are also used. Sometimes, migrants are piled on top of each other in these vehicles. Migrants often fall off the back of these trucks when they descend sand dunes. The drivers do not always stop for those who have fallen out. In addition, migrants often face starvation and thirst, which can result in death. Moreover, some smugglers steal from their clients or abandon them (RMSS, 2014a, p. 37).

Other dangers include kidnapping, extortion, torture and sexual and physical violence perpetrated by migrant smugglers. There have also been reports that these smugglers may be undertaking human organ trafficking (RMMS, 2014a, p. 37). Smuggling and trafficking in eastern Sudan is largely carried out by border tribes, although in recent years Al Shukria and Al Habab tribes have also become involved (NAMTF, 2015, p. 28). Ransoms for kidnapped migrants in East Sudan range from $15,000 to $50,000 per migrant (RMMS, 2014a, p. 39). When released, victims may be transferred to another smuggler and forced to pay a further ransom (ibid.).

The journey through Sudan takes an average of 10 days (RMMS, 2014a, p. 37). Migrants are usually offloaded near the town of Um Dawamban, which lies south-east of Khartoum. From there they take buses to Khartoum (NAMTF, 2015, p.28).

While the majority of migrants do not intend to remain in Sudan, many remain in Khartoum for months or even years, either working or trying to find employment (RMMS, 2014a, p. 34). In Khartoum, they mainly stay in the areas of Al Jereif, Al Daim and Al Haj Yousif (NAMTF, 2015, p. 29). The main transport hubs in Khartoum for those leaving the city are Souq Libya and Al Haj Yousif (ibid.).

Smugglers actively recruit people to travel to Europe, especially targeting young people, including minors (NAMTF, 2015, p. 38). They sometimes offer potential migrants the possibility to travel first and pay later, but some of those who choose to pay later find themselves being held to ransom (ibid.). Those introducing potential migrants to smugglers charge around 1,000 Sudanese pounds ($66) per person for the introduction (ibid.).

**Travelling to Libya**

Sudanese migrants with the financial means try to reach Libya by plane. Non-Sudanese who have permanent residency in Sudan also have the possibility of travelling in by plane (NAMTF, 2015, p.34). There are brokers who sell employment contracts to those seeking to travel to Libya. One report provides the example of an individual obtaining a contract for a job in Benghazi for around $1,300 (ibid.).

There are reportedly three main routes for migrants passing through Sudan on their way to Libya by road. The most frequently used route passes through Dongola in northern Sudan. Another route passes through Darfur, and another through Chad (RMMS, 2014a, p. 34). When they do make the journey onwards to Libya, migrants pass through Dongola and Selima (ibid.). Those travelling via Chad pass through Tine, which is on the border between Darfur and Chad (ibid., p. 35). In 2014, the trip from Sudan to Europe via Libya cost around $3,000 (NAMTF, 2015, p.30).
The journey to Egypt

A third of respondents in the study on refugees in Cairo had begun their journey in Khartoum, whereas 64 per cent named Khartoum as their second stop on the journey to Cairo. From Khartoum, the majority had travelled by train or bus to Halfa, on the Sudan–Egypt border, and Aswan (Jacobsen et al., 2014, p. 152).

However, not all migrants traveling to Egypt pass through Khartoum. Some travel directly from eastern Sudan to Halayeb, a disputed border area between Sudan and Egypt (NAMTF, 2015, p. 29). This route is at present used primarily by Sudanese refugees and migrants (ibid., p. 31). However, increased security along the Egypt–Israel border has reportedly led to a reduction in the number of people using this route (ibid., p. 29).

Sailing to Saudi Arabia

There are also reports of some migrants transiting through Sudan and sailing from the Sudanese coast to Saudi Arabia (RMMS, 2014a, p. 35). The extent to which this route is used remains unclear (ibid.).

4.2 Legal alternatives to migrant journey

There have been some reports of resettlement, both of refugees from other countries being resettled from Sudan and of Sudanese refugees being resettled from other countries. The research undertaken for this study did not uncover any further details about such programmes.

5. The state and migration

Sudan has separate policies for Arab and non-Arab asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 60). Sudan made a reservation to Article 26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which provides for refugees to choose their place of residence and to have full freedom of movement within the state. It is therefore not bound by this article (RMMS, 2015, p. 118). Refugees in Sudan therefore do not have freedom of movement (Humphris, 2013, p. 8). However, according to Sudan’s Asylum Act, they do have the right to work in any job not related to security and defence. While work permits have traditionally been difficult to obtain for refugees, the government of Sudan agreed to issue 30,000 work permits to refugees in Kassala state in 2013. 39

Controls on Eritrean refugees have become stricter since South Sudan became independent, and as a result of improved relations between Sudan and Eritrea and increased efforts to prevent trafficking and smuggling (Humphris, 2013, p. 8). Improved relations between Sudan and Eritrea have also resulted in an increase in the number of Eritreans being deported (ibid.). Sudan has also signed agreements with Eritrea and Ethiopia in a bid to combat smuggling and trafficking, and has established joint border controls with Chad. In addition, Sudan is part of the EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum process) (NAMTF, 2015, p. 54).

The Sudanese military, border patrols, police and refugee camp guards are reportedly involved in smuggling and trafficking migrants (RMMS, 2014a, p. 38). However, according to UNHCR, Sudan has been

39 http://www.unhcr.org/524bec189.html
proactive in combating human trafficking.\textsuperscript{40} In March 2014, anti-trafficking legislation was signed into law. According to this legislation, the punishment for acts of trafficking is three to 10 years’ imprisonment, between five and 20 years’ imprisonment for aggravated trafficking and capital punishment if a trafficking victim dies or other serious crimes, such as rape, are committed. A National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking was also established in 2014 (NAMTF, 2015, p. 22). In addition, Sudan acceded in September 2014 to the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (UNHCR & IOM, 2014, p. 4).

Both Gederef state and Kassala have passed laws on immigration and human trafficking in recent years (NAMTF, 2015, p.22). However, while the number of kidnappings in the vicinity of the Shagarab camp has reportedly reduced, kidnapping has reportedly increased in other areas, most notably in the ‘no man’s land’ between Eritrea and Sudan, and in Khartoum (ibid., p. 37). According to the US Department of State’s 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, the government of Sudan does not clearly differentiate between trafficking and smuggling. There is no anti-smuggling legislation that is distinct from anti-trafficking legislation.

In Sudan, the 2009 National Policy on Internal Displacement established the right to freedom of movement for IDPs (UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, p. 26). However, it favours return over other options, such as integration or resettlement (ibid., p. 72). According to one expert, return is often unfeasible (expert comment). The policy also includes provisions on property rights, access to livelihoods and access to services (UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, p. 26).

\section*{6. Development impacts of migration}

\subsection*{6.1 Development dimensions of migration}

It is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the development impact of migration on migrants, given the lack of socioeconomic indicators for migrants (IOM, 2011, pp. 68–69). However, by looking at progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) among IDPs in Southern Kordofan, returnees in Southern Kordofan and Sudanese in Cairo, in comparison with progress in Northern Sudan,\textsuperscript{41} the IOM finds the three migrant categories generally fare significantly worse than Northern Sudan (ibid., p. 69).

More broadly, rapid urbanisation has resulted in a significant increase in the number of urban poor, who struggle to access livelihoods, basic services and land (Pantuliano et al., 2011, p 1). They also face high levels of insecurity, and are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse (ibid., p. 2). The economic and social pressures associated with urbanisation have resulted in an increase in divorce rates, and in the abandonment of women and children, as well as in a growing gang culture among disaffected youths (ibid.). Rural–urban migration has also reportedly resulted in seasonal labour shortages, which have increased the cost of agricultural production (Darbo, 2015, p. 14). However, levels of ethnic tension in urban centres are low, and in some cases women’s status has improved and their opportunities have increased in the city (Pantuliano et al., 2011, p. 2).

\textsuperscript{40} \url{http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html}

\textsuperscript{41} The report was published before the secession of South Sudan.
6.2 Remittances

In 2013, $424 million flowed into Sudan, constituting 0.6 per cent of GDP for that year. Remittances are an important source of foreign exchange for Sudan, as well an important source of income for families (Suliman et al., 2014, pp. 171–172). A household survey covering a sample of 500 respondents in Al Gazeira, Northern and Khartoum states found families with a member abroad had a higher income than those from which nobody had migrated (ibid., p. 204). Most families in both rural and urban areas received a considerable proportion of their income from relatives working abroad (ibid.). A growing number of expatriates also own investment projects, so remittances also make a contribution to investment and capital accumulation (ibid., p. 172).

According to IOM, there is no country-representative information available for the use of remittances sent to or within Sudan (IOM, 2011, p. 67). Possible uses are daily consumption, housing and land, education and health, as well as for weddings, burials and migration (ibid.). However, according to the findings of the aforementioned household survey, the majority of respondents spent a significant proportion of the remittances they received on consumption expenditure (Suleiman et al., 2014, p. 195). Remittances are also used to pay for education, although to a much lesser degree than for consumption (ibid.). In addition, remittances are used to pay for health care. A small proportion of remittances is invested. It is argued that this may owe to the majority of the income from remittances being spent on consumption, leaving little income to spare for investment (ibid., p. 196).

Sudan is also a source of remittances. While 9 per cent of respondents in a study of Sudanese refugees in Cairo had sent remittances to Sudan, 10 per cent had received remittances from Sudan (Jacobsen et al., 2014, p. 155).

6.3 Brain drain

Both the African Economic Outlook for Sudan and IOM raise concerns about brain drain, owing to the increase in the number of professionals migrating from Sudan in the period 2010–2014 (Darbo, 2015, p. 13; IOM, 2011, p. 19). Abu-Agla, Yousif, & Badr (2013) focus on health care professionals, arguing that brain drain as a result of large-scale migration is a problem across the health sector. Contradicting these reports, a 2010 study argues that brain drain is a problem only among medical specialists and pharmacists, given the severe shortage in these professions in Sudan (Assal, 2010, p. 6). It argues that highly skilled migration from Sudan does not constitute brain drain in other sectors, as universities and other higher education institutions produce more graduates than the Sudanese labour market can absorb (ibid., p. 9).

6.4 Return

According to a study published by WHO, Sudanese tend to view migration as a temporary experience, maintaining close ties with family and with their country (Abu-Agla et al, 2013, p. 5). The study argues that Sudanese tend to migrate to improve their knowledge and income (ibid.). In the period 2006–2009, 435 qualified Sudanese returned to Sudan with their dependants (IOM, 2011, p. 65). A further 111 returned temporarily through the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme and through a similar IOM programme (ibid.). The majority

returning through IOM programmes did so to make contributions in the field of education, with the number of those returning to contribute in the health and infrastructure sectors significantly lower (ibid.).

Not all returns are voluntary. An estimated 3,800 returnees arrived in Sudan from Yemen in the last few months of 2015. Many of them were working in Yemen when the conflict there escalated. Among these, some of those who had been in Yemen for a prolonged period of time had lost their ties with Sudan and arrived with no means of supporting themselves. They need assistance to reintegrate with their communities (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 59). Moreover, in 2013, there were reports of mass deportations of Sudanese migrants living in Saudi Arabia. There were also reports of significant voluntary returns during an amnesty period in the same year (RMMS, 2014a, pp. 73-74). In 2012, Israel carried out deportations ‘to remove African migrants’ (RMSS & IMI, 2012, p. 36).

6.5 Aid portfolio

In 2013, Sudan received $1,163,120,000 in development aid and assistance. Sudan’s performance on the World Bank’s aid effectiveness indicators is provided in a table in Appendix 6. According to a study on urbanisation in Sudan by ODI, international aid has failed to meet the needs of the urban population, focusing instead on rural areas, despite the acute needs and vulnerabilities of those living in Sudan’s urban areas (Pantuliano et al., 2011, p. 2). This is attributed to a lack of understanding and analysis of the extent and nature of urban poverty and urban development on the part of the international aid community, and its failure to keep pace with changing settlement patterns and their implications (ibid., p. 13). Other contributing factors cited include limited development aid from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, and the expulsion of international NGOs from Sudan in 2009, which reduced international capacity in the country (ibid.).

Reduced donor funding has also resulted in a focus on emergency assistance, rather than tackling the root causes of fragility and migration (expert comment). All forms of assistance are at present reportedly almost entirely limited to the health, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sectors (expert comment). A lack of available data, in part because of the need for any surveys to be cleared by national security in Sudan before they can be undertaken, also makes it difficult for NGOs and international organisations to ensure they are targeting those most in need. The activities of NGOs operating in Sudan are severely curtailed by the government, which also serves as an obstacle to aid effectiveness, especially when providing assistance to IDPs (expert comment). For example, NGOs are not permitted to build any permanent structures in IDP camps (expert comment). Poor donor coordination also limits aid effectiveness in Sudan (expert comment).

According to the ICG, Western donors’ influence in Sudan is ‘much reduced’ (ICG, 2015c, p. 2). This is attributed to the freezing of the International Criminal Court’s Darfur investigations, Sudan’s improved regional diplomatic position and slight improvements in the country’s economic situation (ibid., p. 8). The report argues that those with the influence to engage in conflict mediation and the promotion of inclusive dialogue are the African Union, Sudan’s immediate African neighbours, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and China (ibid., p. 2). However, while these countries desire stability, they are unlikely to push for reform (ibid., p. 8).

43 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD
6.6 Impact of reduced migration

The research undertaken for this paper did not uncover any information on the potential benefits or costs of reduced migration from Sudan. However, one study notes that reduced demand for Sudanese migrant workers in the Gulf States, owing to nationalisation policies in the region, has resulted in the return of thousands of workers in recent years (Nour, 2014, p. 18). The paper argues that such large-scale returns have contributed to unemployment in Sudan (ibid.). Moreover, one expert notes that interventions to stem the brain drain from Sudan would have a positive impact, as it would significantly increase the skill level of professionals working in Sudan (expert comment).
References


Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Sudan


Appendix 1 – Principal armed groups operating in Sudan and South Sudan

Sudan is home to a plethora of armed groups, organised along political, ethnic or tribal lines.

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
A Darfur-based rebel group (ICG, 2015a, p. 29).

Popular Defence Forces (PDF)
A ‘semi-military’ force aligned with Khartoum. The PDF plays an important role in the Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile conflicts (ICG, 2015a, p. 29).

Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
Sudanese government paramilitary forces (ICG, 2015a, p. 29).

Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)
The SLA was formed by non-Arab Darfurians in 2011. It has broken up into a number of factions, which include the SLA-MM led by Minni Arku Minawi (Zaghawa) and the SLA-AW led by Abdelwahid Mohammed Ahmed Nur (Fur) (ICG, 2015a, p. 29).

SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army)
The SPLM/A led the southern rebellion during the 1983–2005 civil war. It is now in power in South Sudan.

SPLM/A-IO (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition)
The SPLM/A-IO is a military and political opposition movement in South Sudan, which was formed in 2014. It is led by the country’s Vice-President Riek Machar (ICG, 2015a, p. 29).

SPLM/A-N (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North)
This was previously the SPLM/A’s northern branch, but it became a separate movement after South Sudan became independent. It has been involved in fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The SPLM/A-N is part of the SRF (ICG, 2015a, p. 30).

Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)
The SRF, founded in 2011, consists of SPLM/A-N, JEM, SLA-MM, SLA-AW and a number of small unarmed groups. It opposes the Sudanese government, and coordinates politically and militarily. Its ‘joint force’ has only fought once, in the Kordofans in 2013 (ICG, 2015a, p. 30).
## Appendix 2 – Economic growth

### Economic growth projections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2016&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2017&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2018&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2019&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2020&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government consumption</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gross fixed investment</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of goods &amp; services</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>-2.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

## Appendix 3 – Destination countries for outward migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Why</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>299,799 persons of concern (UNHCR, 2015f)</td>
<td>Conflict in Darfur (di Bartolomeo et al., 2012, p. 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2,662 in 2006 (di Bartolomeo et al., 2012, p. 3)</td>
<td>Cairo: Cheap/convenient: 33 per cent To join family/friends or because a relative had arranged the trip: 14 per cent Desire to be resettled: 7 per cent Presence of UNHCR office: 3 per cent (Jacobsen et al., 2014, p. 153).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia(^{44})</td>
<td>37,113 persons of concern (UNHCR, 2015g)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 28</td>
<td>16,901 residency permit holders in December 2014(^{45})</td>
<td>Family: 4,957 Education: 837 Remunerated activities: 1,224 Refugee status: 5,891 Subsidiary protection: 1,489 Other reasons: 1,772(^{47})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2,400 (OECD, 2015, p. 348).</td>
<td>Possibly refugee protests in Cairo in 2006 First or second choice of country in which to seek asylum for Sudanese (RMMS &amp; IMI, 2012, p. 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3,480 refugees (UNCHR, 2015b, p. 1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>10,040 refugees(^{46}) (UNHCR, 2015d, p. 2); 15,400 (OECD, 2015, p. 348).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>39,693 (UN DESA &amp; UNICEF, 2014)</td>
<td>There is a growing number of migrant domestic workers from Sudan in the Gulf countries (RMMS, 2014b, p. 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2,123 refugees and asylum seekers (UNCHR, 2015c, p. 1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>234,564 (UN DESA &amp; UNICEF, 2014)</td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>244,042 refugees (UNHCR, 2015h); 407,925 (UN DESA &amp; UNICEF, 2014)</td>
<td>There are reportedly 200,000 Sudanese refugees in Unity and Upper Nile states in South Sudan (ICG, 2015a, p. 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>154,968 (UN DESA &amp; UNICEF, 2014)</td>
<td>There are a growing number of migrant domestic workers from Sudan in the Gulf countries (RMMS, 2014b, p. 15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{44}\) Sudanese refugees mainly fleeing the Blue Nile region live in camps in the Assosa area in Benishangul Gumuz region (World Bank, 2015, p. 20).  
\(^{46}\) Refugee status and subsidiary protection; humanitarian reasons; unaccompanied minors; victims of trafficking in human beings; residence only; other reasons not specified.  
\(^{48}\) 9,785 live in Kakuma camp, 189 are in Nairobi and 66 are in Dabaab camp (UNHCR, 2015d, p. 2).
## Appendix 4 – Countries of origin of inward migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>5,273 persons of concern (UNHCR, 2015e)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>42,333 persons of concern (UNHCR, 2015e)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>990 asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2015e)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea$^{50}$</td>
<td>108,075 (UNHCR, 2015e)</td>
<td>97 per cent of those seeking asylum are granted refugee status and the remainder are generally granted permission to remain on humanitarian grounds (Humphris, 2013, p. 8). The majority of Eritreans coming to Sudan now are young, Christian, Tigrinya from urban areas. They are unwilling to stay in enclosed camps without access to higher education or employment. However, they may not have social networks in Sudan, increasing the chances of them risking onward migration (Humphris, 2013, p. 8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia$^{51}$</td>
<td>18,335 persons of concern (UNHCR, 2015e)</td>
<td>Ethiopians often use Sudan as a transit point, entering the country on a one-month visa, and then use traffickers and smugglers to reach Libya and then Europe (RMMS, 2014, p. 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia$^{52}$</td>
<td>1,276 foreign students in 2010 (IOM, 2011, p. 46)</td>
<td>Unemployed but educated youth from Somaliland are reportedly increasingly trying to reach Europe via Sudan and Libya (RMMS, 2014a, p. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>189,809 persons of concern (UNHCR, 2015e)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html
51 For further information on migration in the Eritrean context see GSDRC (2016).
52 For further information on migration in the Somali context see Avis & Herbert (forthcoming 2016).
Syria | 60,000$^53$ | Refugees | Syrians reportedly do not require a visa to enter Sudan, and are entitled to the same rights and services as locals.$^54$

Yemen | In the last few months of 2015, an estimated 5,000–7,000 refugees, Sudanese returnees and other refugees and asylum seekers arrived in Sudan from Yemen (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 59) | Many Yemeni nationals reportedly chose Sudan as a destination, as it is one of the few countries for which they do not require a visa (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 59). The government of Sudan has provided *prima facie* refugee status to all Yemeni asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 60). | The majority of Yemeni refugees have settled in the Khartoum area, particularly in areas such as Khartoum East, Arkawiet East and West and Sahafa/Imtidad (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 59). They have generally integrated well into their urban host communities, helped by the presence of older Yemeni communities who arrived in the country in the 1950s and 1990s to engage in business (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 59).

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## Appendix 5 – Sudanese holders of residency permits by country of immigration in Europe and migration status (purpose of stay) (31 December 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Family reasons</th>
<th>Education reasons</th>
<th>Remunerated activities reasons</th>
<th>Refugee status</th>
<th>Subsidiary protection</th>
<th>Other reasons</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>423</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>731</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>1.537</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>611</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>267</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>802</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
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<td>:</td>
</tr>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.360</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (28 countries)</td>
<td>4.957</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>5.891</td>
<td>1.489</td>
<td>1.772</td>
<td>16.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (27 countries)</td>
<td>4.952</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>5.890</td>
<td>1.489</td>
<td>1.772</td>
<td>16.895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 6 – Aid effectiveness

The following table includes the World Bank’s aid effectiveness indicators for which there are data for Sudan post-2011. It also provides data for Sub-Saharan Africa, and low-income countries for comparative purposes. Migration figures, and the amount of official development assistance and development aid received are not included here, as they are discussed in other parts of the report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Low-income countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment ratio, primary and secondary, gender parity index (2013)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) (2014)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) (2014)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, female (years) (2013)</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, male (years) (2013)</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (modelled estimate, per 100,000 live births) (2015)</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) (2014)</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, under-five children (per 1,000) (2015)</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, female (% of total) (2014)</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15–49) (2014)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of underweight, weight for age (% of under-five children) (2014)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary completion rate, both sexes (%) (2012)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) (2015)</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 7 – Political violence in Sudan in 2014 and 2015