Political systems

Informal and customary political systems

Donors have tended to focus on formal political institutions and structures. Although these are important, it is essential to recognise that much political activity takes place according to informal norms and systems in developing countries. Whilst formal political systems are generally publicly announced, for example in laws, regulations and codes, informal systems are embedded in socio-cultural institutions, norms and standards. For this reason, informal political systems that can be negative for development, for example clientelism and patrimonialism, are extremely difficult to eradicate.

The literature has tended to presume that there is a clear dichotomy between formal and informal, traditional and modern, and democratic and non-democratic political systems. In reality, these distinctions are not so clear and formal and informal systems overlap and interrelate. This page considers why non-democratic political traditions continue to flourish in certain areas and how informal political institutions impact governance.

Page contents

Where is a good place to start?

Brinkerhoff, D. and Goldsmith, A., 2002, 'Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Planning', Report to United States Agency of International Development, Washington D.C.
Do informal systems of power, such as patrimonialism and clientelism, necessarily hinder democratisation? Are they bad for poor people? This paper written for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) explores the negative aspects and hidden positive effects of clientelism and patrimonialism; it then looks at evidence on liberalization, democratization, decentralisation and civil service reform as ways to good governance.
Access full text: available online

Traditional political systems

'Customary' or 'traditional' political institutions, for example, chiefdoms, religious organisations and local village councils, are often criticised for being undemocratic and non-participatory. In particular, they have been accused of perpetuating discrimination according to gender, caste or race. Are these political institutions changing? How do they interact with formal political structures and do they drive or block pro-poor development?

AnanthPur, K., 2004, 'Rivalry or Synergy? Formal and Informal Local Governance in Rural India', Working paper no. 226, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton
Informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) were not expected to withstand the advent of democracy and the forces of modernisation in rural India. How have ILGIs adapted to interact with their newer formal counterparts - the elected government institutions? This paper, compiled for the Institute of Development Studies, presents a holistic view of ILGIs that considers their progressive role in village governance and service delivery. It presents a framework to explain why ILGIs are more likely to survive in India than in other countries in the South.
Access full text: available online

Beall, J., 2005, 'Exit, Voice and Tradition: Loyalty to Chieftainship and Democracy in Metropolitan Durban, South Africa', Crisis States Programme Working Paper no. 59, Development Studies Institute, London
Strains on democratic governance in many parts of Africa have led to a resurgence of the salience of traditional authority. This paper, compiled for the Crisis States Research Centre, examines the challenges posed for democratic consolidation arising from the accommodation of traditional authorities in city government in Durban, South Africa. Is chieftaincy a retrograde step or does institutional pluralism offer greater political flexibility and stability? These questions are explored with reference to Albert Hirschman’s seminal thesis on exit, voice and loyalty.
Access full text: available online

Haynes, J., 2004, 'Religion and Democratization in Africa', Democratization, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 66-89
How have religious leaders contributed to democratisation in Africa? What is the political importance of popular religions on the African continent? This article argues that the overall pace of democratisation has been disappointing and that senior religious figures have failed to encourage a move from mere cosmetic changes to more substantial democratic reforms in Africa.
Full document: available via document delivery. Please see document summary.

Blom, A., 2002, 'Ambiguous Political Space: Chiefs, Land and the Poor in Rural Mozambique', chapter 5 in In the Name of the Poor: Contesting Political Space for Poverty Reduction, eds. N. Webster and L. Engberg-Pedersen, Zed Books, New York
Institutional channels through which poor people can influence policies and decision-making are often limited or absent in Africa. To what extent are chiefs being used to access political space for the interests of poor people? This book chapter examines this question in relation to Angonia, in rural Mozambique. It argues it is necessary to look beyond formal institutions to determine access to decision-making for and by the poor. Chiefs can protect the interests of the poor, but remain a weak channel for influencing political decisions at the national level.
Full document: available via document delivery. Please see document summary.

Patronage politics

'Clientelism' and 'patron-client' politics refer to contexts where strong personal relationships between politicians and their followers shape political decisions on the basis of mutual gain. For example, political patrons bestow jobs, money and opportunities on their clients in return for political support. Often, in clientelistic states, the distinction between private resources of political leaders and state resources breaks down, regardless of the presence of formal modern political institutions.

Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 'W(h)ither The State?', Chapter 1 in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument', African Issues, James Currey, Oxford
To what extent can existing conceptualisations of the state in sub-Saharan Africa contribute to an understanding of the exercise of power as it is empirically observed? This chapter from the book 'Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument' argues that the state in Africa was never properly institutionalised because it was never properly emancipated from society. This is due to both historical and cultural factors. It concludes that the weak character of the state in Africa may be more perennial that has hitherto been envisaged.
Full document: available via document delivery. Please see document summary.

Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. and Verdier, T., 2003, 'Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule', Paper presented at the European Economic Association Annual Meeting, Stockholm
How and why do kleptocracies (regimes based on personal rule) last so long in some developing countries, despite the lack of a significant support base? How can the study of policymaking in weakly-institutionalised societies help to understand the emergence of these regimes? This paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research proposes a model to describe the strategies of many kleptocratic regimes, and includes historical case studies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dominican Republic.
Access full text: available online

What other resources are available on the GSDRC?

Users of this page may also be interested in the GSDRC's topic guide on Fragile States.

Use the site search at the top of the page if you wish to look for wider resources on informal and customary political systems.

New additions