'Fragile states' is one of many terms that have been used to describe states that are weak in their institutional capacity, control of territory and ability or willingness to provide services to their people. There is no clear consensus on which is the most appropriate term to use to categorise this wide range of states, although most multilateral and bilateral donors now tend to use the term 'fragile states'. The most commonly used terms and their definitions are listed below, with comments on their limitations and examples of their use.
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This term is increasingly used by the international donor community. DFID has defined 'fragile states' as "those countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor'. The term has been criticised for not differentiating between the different causes and unique problems of individual states. It is often confusingly applied to countries that are not weak or fragile in terms of capacity, but are unresponsive to their citizens and to international pressure for policy reform. The term also does not recognise that whilst a state may have a 'fragile' formal state system, it may have very strong informal governance systems.
Moreno-Torres, M. and Anderson, M., 2004, 'Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction', Department for International Development, UK.
Fragile states take many forms. What is the most useful way of defining them? This paper, by UK Government's Department for International Development (DFID), adopts a definition of ‘difficult environments’ grounded in the role of the state in development effectiveness. The definition is both linked to the wider debate about fragile states but at the same time focuses the challenge on donor-recipient relationships for poverty reduction.
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This term was used by OECD-DAC but has now been replaced by 'fragile states'. It has been criticised for being too broad and unspecific. It is a donor-centric term which does not take account of the different causes and unique problems of individual states. Also, the phrase excludes states that may have good relationships with donors but are still internally weak.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee, 2002, ‘Working for Development in Difficult Partnerships’, OECD-DAC, Paris
Traditional approaches to aid delivery fail to be effective in conflict prone countries. Specific and co-ordinated strategies have to be designed and implemented to bring about real changes. This report by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) discusses the importance of making donor strategies more coherent and complementary in countries with weak policies, institutions and governance.
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This is a popular term. It is criticised for being ambiguous, pejorative and donor-centric as it is based on assumptions about 'good performance' that reflect Western ideas of statehood.
Macrae et al, 2004, Executive Summary: Aid to Poorly Performing Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues, Overseas Development Institute.
What should donors do about countries that are not performing well? How can assistance be provided to protect poor people without reinforcing governments that show no commitment to development or human rights? This report by the Overseas Development Institute addresses these questions and reviews current debates on aid to poorly performing countries. It analyses performance criteria, identifies key constraints to aid engagement and develops a country-level approach for better understanding poor performance. It draws on case studies from India, Malawi, Rwanda, and Sudan.
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This term is used by the World Bank and describes countries that have very weak policies, institutions and governance. There is some recognition of the range of different causes and unique problems of states as LICUS has 4 categories: countries experiencing prolonged political crisis; LICUS in fragile transition; LICUS with weak governance / slow progress and LICUS with deteriorating governance. The literature describes a LICUS continuum in recognition that states are constantly changing and 'fragility' is not a permanent label. The approach has been criticised for arbitrarily placing states on the continuum and in artificial categories.
Collier P. and Okonjo-Iweala N., 2002, World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries Under Stress: A Task Force Report, World Bank, Washington D.C.
How can the world’s poorest countries get on to the path of sustained economic growth? And how can the development community best help them? This report by the World Bank suggests that the challenge of aid effectiveness in poor countries with ineffective governments is to use other instruments, supplemented by financial transfers where necessary, to promote change.
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These terms are very common. They have been criticised for being pejorative and for reflecting unclear assumptions as to what being a 'successful' state entails. 'Failed' is a particularly criticised term as it implies a final state rather than a temporary situation. Also the terms do not reflect that informal non-state power structures may be performing strongly. Again, the terms do not reflect states that are internally strong but are unresponsive to the international community and their citizens.
Maass, G., Siftung, F.E. and Mepham, D., 2004, ‘Promoting Effective States : A Progressive Policy Response to Failed and Failing States’, Institute for Public Policy Research, London
State failure is one of the biggest challenges facing the international community. How should it respond? This report, drawing on discussions from a symposium organised by the Institute for Public Policy Research and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung foundation, argues that developed countries should improve their policies so that they support poor countries in building more effective states.
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The main problem with this term is that it is often used to refer to states that are not weak in capacity but are unwilling or unresponsive. The term also does not recognise that when formal state structures are weak, informal governance systems are often very strong.
Reno, W., 1998, 'The Distinctive Political Logic of Weak States', in Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, London, UK.
Why is warlord politics so prevalent in Africa? Why do African rulers persistently give only lip-service to good governance, and weaken the organs of government? This first chapter of a book on warlord politics in Africa examines the political logic of weak states. Donor attempts to build strong African states fail because rulers' power rests on outside factors not on the citizenry. Attempts to impose good governance as conditions of loans or aid rest on flawed assumptions about rulers' interests, and are subverted by local politics.
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Many, but not all, fragile states either contain warlords or the state pursues a warlord style of politics. Warlords tend to emerge where state functions in a geographical area have broken down, creating a power vacuum. They frequently take over some functions of 'government', especially tax and infrastructure. Warlords fight for wealth and position, exploiting personal relationships and their access to arms and natural resources. Warlord politics typically leads to the formation of a 'shadow state' where virtually all power is channelled through a very real and highly organised (but not formally recognised) patronage system based on rulers' control over resources.
Giustozzi. A., 2005. 'The Debate on Warlordism: The Importance of Military Legitimacy' Crisis States Research Centre Discussion Paper, No. 13 (September 2005), London School of Economics (LSE), London
The terms ‘warlord’ and ‘warlordism’ have become increasingly popular amongst academics, even if some scholars object to their use. However, not every leader of a militia is a warlord. This paper by the Crisis States Research Centre aims at reconciling different perspectives and proposing a definition of warlordism for the social sciences. It differentiates between warlords and military-political entrepreneurs. Warlords have military legitimacy and are more likely to evolve into statemakers. Studying them can enhance the study of government.Full text available online
Jackson, P., 2005, 'Warlords and States in Africa', unpublished paper, International Development Department, University of Birmingham, UK.
What is the cause of the rise of warlords in Africa? What are the common conditions that lead to their creation and destruction? This book chapter from the International Development Department at the University of Birmingham analyses governance in pre-colonial African empires, illustrating characteristics that can be traced through the colonial and post-colonial periods. It explores approaches to conflict analysis and highlights the role of warlords in re-establishing stability.
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This term seeks to describe and to explain state weakness. In neo-patrimonial states, public resources are exploited by the ruling elite and are distributed to political followers in return for loyalty. Client/patron relationships are then replicated at all levels of administration. 'Neo-' refers to the fact that these patronage dynamics continue within the institutions of the modern state.
The term is useful as it considers both informal and formal politics. However, although neo-patrimonial states may be weak in terms of rule of law and institutional capacity, they are often characterised by a very strong leader at the top of a firmly established power pyramid. As political power is linked to the state's economic power, there is a strong likelihood of collapse once the state's resources are exhausted.
Van de Walle, N., 1997, 'Neopatrimonial Rule in Africa', in Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, eds. Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
To what extent does the neopatrimonial nature of regimes in Africa affect the process of democratisation? How does it influence whether transitions ever begin, and how do they subsequently unfold? This book chapter from researchers at Michigan State University reviews the nature of informal and formal political institutions in African countries and compares their political regimes with each other and with those in other regions of the world. Finally, it discusses the commonalities and variations in transition dynamics and outcomes.
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'Quasi states' are characterised by both external dependency and internal institutional weakness. The term aims to emphasise the international community's formal recognition of juridical sovereignty despite the fact that the state may be unwilling and incapable of providing basic services to its people.
Jackson, R., 1990, 'States and Quasi-States', in Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
How have notions of sovereignty changed in the post-colonial era? How do these changes affect the way development is done? This chapter from Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World explores these questions, using a distinction between “negative” and “positive” sovereignty. Quasi-states enjoy a right to exist and high prospects for survival, despite their weakness and illegitimacy. The author argues that this is a new constitutional mechanism. It has replaced colonial, military and diplomatic security arrangements, and is the basis of international aid.
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This term is often mistakenly used to refer to any weak or fragile state. Instead, state 'collapse' is a much rarer phenomenon than state fragility. It refers to a particular situation where the state has entirely ceased to function and therefore needs complete replacement. Somalia is often cited as a modern example.
Zartman, W., 1995, 'Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse' in Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, London, UK.
How do states collapse? What separates state collapse from conflicts and changes that occur without the state being destroyed? How can state collapse be forseen and prevented? This chapter from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University analyses examples of state collapse in African countries and identifies five signposts of proximity to state collapse.
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