Fragile states

Structural, economic and political causes and characteristics of fragility

This section introduces some of the key literature on the structural, economic, political, social and international drivers of fragility.

There are many theories about why states fail or experience fragility, the majority of which are highly contested. At a very broad level, fragility is the result of a dynamic interplay between internal factors (including violent conflict, poverty, economic and structural conditions, weak formal institutions), and external factors (including international political economy, regional and global insecurity). All of these are unique in any given context. Fragility is frequently associated (if not synonymous) with violent conflict and sustained poverty. Development agencies have largely adopted a functional understanding, often characterising fragility in terms of bad governance and weak state will or capacity. Increasingly, state fragility is also associated with weak state legitimacy.

Two key trends are discernible in the recent literature; firstly, the rise of the new institutionalism, prevalent among explanations of fragility by economists and some political scientists. These focus on individual actors and their incentives as the focus of analysis. A second trend is a, growing recognition that fragile states are not only the result of internal ‘malfunctions’ but are situated within an international system and international political economy which also determine their relative fragility or resilience. Recently, there has been increasing concern about the impact of exogenous ‘trigger’ factors, including the global economic downturn, and climate change, on fragile states.  

Page contents

• Overview of causes and characteristics of fragility
• Structural and economic factors
• Political and institutional factors

Overview of causes and characteristics of fragility

Although fragility is accepted to be multi-causal and multi-dimensional in any given context, some analysts place more importance on certain causal factors over others. The following groups of factors - which can be seen as both causes and characteristics of fragility - are among the more prevalent in the literature:

• Structural and economic factors: Poverty, low income and economic decline, violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents, natural resource wealth/lack of natural resource wealth, geography (‘bad neighbours’), demographic stress (including urbanisation).
• Political and institutional factors: Crises of state legitimacy and authority, bad governance, repression of political competition, weak (formal) institutions, hybrid political orders, institutional multiplicity, political transitions, succession and reform crises in authoritarian states, state predation, neo-patrimonial politics.
• Social factors: Horizontal inequalities, severe identity fragmentation, social exclusion, gender inequality, lack of social cohesion (including lack of social capital), weak civil society.
• International factors: Legacy of colonialism, international political economy, climate change, global economic shocks (including food prices).

These causes and characteristics are often described as self- and mutually-reinforcing. Some argue fragile states are caught in negative cycles or ‘traps’ of perpetual poverty and instability, prompting debate about the extent to which fragility is a long-term condition, and the likelihood of turnarounds.

European University Institute, 2009, ‘Fragility: Drivers and Consequences’, Chapter 2 in Development in a Context of Fragility: Focus on Africa, European Report on Development, European University Institute and the European Commission
How can fragility be described and understood? This chapter from the 2009 European Report on Development (ERD) reviews the literature on the main drivers and consequences of fragility, focusing on the relationship between fragility and conflict. In spite of the diversity of definitions of fragile states, there is consensus that they are characterised by authority, service entitlements and legitimacy failures. Previous armed conflict, poor governance and political instability, militarisation, ethnically and socially heterogeneous and polarised populations are key causes. The circular nature of these various factors is at the heart of the ‘fragility trap’ concept.
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Collier, P., 2007, ‘The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What can be Done about it’, Oxford University Press, London
This seminal book argues the real challenge of development is the small group of countries at the bottom that are falling behind and often falling apart. These countries, and the billion people who live in them, are caught in one or another of four traps: the conflict trap; the natural resources trap; the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbours; and the trap of bad governance in a small country. Whilst these traps are not inescapable, standard solutions will not work: aid has been ineffective, and globalisation has made things worse. A new mix of policy instruments is required, supported by a bold new plan of action for the G8.
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Di John, J., 2008, 'Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature', Working Paper No. 25, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE), London
What are the causes and consequences of state failure? This paper from the Crisis States Research Centre reviews the extensive literature on failed states, examining definitions, possible causes, and common consequences of state failure, particularly in Africa. It finds that functionalist or natural resource theories of state failure are based on a liberal view of the state that defines state failure by the degree to which a state deviates from 'best practice', as represented by Western developed economies. But late developers, particularly fragile states, require different analytical tools. A more sophisticated political economy of fragile states can be developed through the lenses of: institutional multiplicity (whereby different rules of the game coexist in the same territory); state capacity and capability; ‘influencing’ or rent-seeking; coalitional analysis (shifting constellations of power that underpin formal and informal institutional arrangements); and divisibility and boundary activation.
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Goldstone J., 2008, 'Pathways to State Failure', Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 285-296
How does state failure come about, and how can donors help to prevent it? This article from Conflict Management and Peace Science identifies five pathways to state failure: escalating ethnic conflicts, state predation, regional guerrilla rebellion, democratic collapse, and succession/reform crises in authoritarian states. States must possess legitimacy and effectiveness to remain stable. Donors should keep both factors in mind to avoid the problems that arise when states focus on one to the exclusion of the other. Goldstone finds that the two most influential variables for stability are the character of political competition and the extent of checks on the executive. Factionalised, restricted or repressed political competition is closely linked to instability.
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Structural and economic factors

Conflict

Some argue what distinguishes fragile states from other states experiencing ‘underdevelopment’ is violent conflict. Many states considered to be fragile have experienced conflict. The relationship is often described as circular: conflict both creates and is created by the weak authority and legitimacy of states. Much of the literature on the causes and characteristics of fragility is closely related to theories about the causes and characteristics of conflict.

Read more about the causes of conflict in the GSDRC conflict topic guide.

Natural resources and unearned state income

A good portion of the literature on fragility has been concerned with the impact of natural resource wealth on political governance and economic growth. The ‘rentier state’ model argues that natural resource wealth makes democracies malfunction because it removes the need for the state to make bargains or pacts in support of a social contract and encourages the politics of patronage. Some contend natural resource wealth also leads to conflict over control of those resources. Extensive research, thorough econometric analyses and case studies have been carried out on the relationship between natural resources, poor development and fragility, but the idea remains highly contested. Some call for a more nuanced understanding to better account for why some states with natural resource wealth are more stable than others. Furthermore, others argue not having natural resource endowments can actually lead to state failure because it reduces incentives to form a central authority.

DIIS, 2008, ‘Fragility and Natural Resources’, Policy Brief,  Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen
How can fragile states make the most of their resource endowments without falling victim to resource conflicts or authoritarianism? This policy brief from the Danish Institute for International Studies advocates a re-examination of the link between natural resource governance and state fragility in order to better understand why many states fall victim to the 'resource curse'. Donors can help fragile states make the most of their resource endowments by seeking to improve the internal governance environment through greater transparency and capacity and the external market environment through more incentives for foreign investment and more equitable trade conditions.
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DiJohn, J., 2003, 'Mineral-Resource Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assessment of the Rentier State Model', Crisis States Working Paper No. 20, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics (LSE), London
How useful is the idea of a 'resource curse' in understanding the causes of conflict in low and middle-income countries? This paper from the Crisis States Research Centre critically examines this argument on both methodological and empirical grounds. It finds little convincing evidence that mineral abundance in itself causes conflict. The most influential models of conflict offer only a superficial understanding of the causes of conflict in poor economies.
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Dibeh, G., 2008, ‘Resources and the Political Economy of State Fragility in Conflict States’, UNU-WIDER, Helsinki
How does resource availability affect governance incentives? This paper from the World Institute for Development Economics Research studies political and governance systems contributing to fragility in resource-rich states such as Iraq and resource-poor areas such as Somalia. In an ethnically divided or tribal society, a consociational democratic state will arise if resources are larger than a threshold value; the level of resources available influences groups’ desire to establish a central state authority. A consociational political system following war can strengthen rather than weaken rent-seeking coalitions.
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Cities and fragile states

New research is looking at how cities - as social, economic, political and spatial entities - can promote or prevent the unraveling of the state. Over the past two decades, many cities around the world have become characterised by rising forms of violence, insecurity and illegality. Increasingly, cities are considered to be constitutive of state fragility but also important sites for state reconstruction and development. Historically the relationship between cities and states has been recognised as important. City development and the growth of urban systems have played significant roles in state formation and transformation. Yet cities can develop a relative autonomy from states, particularly when they are ignored or bypassed by state resources and processes, with risks for state stability. For example, city economies might be animated by regional rather national markets that lie outside the reach of states and their fiscal capacity. National governments and elites often fail to invest in cities at the expense of local and national economic development. Ignoring the interests of the majority of urban citizens can increase the potential for urban conflict. Equally, state crisis and conflict can fuel urban conflict, further weakening state capacity and legitimacy in a vicious circle.

Esser D., 2009, 'Who governs Kabul? Explaining urban politics in a post-war capital city', Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE), London
Wars, particularly civil wars, are increasingly focused on cities. How can they best be tackled? This study from the Crisis States Research Centre reviews the history of city politics in Kabul and the processes of governance that occur at different levels. Multi-layered conflicts in capital cities can concentrate political attention and overload urban development and governance agendas. It should be understood that, in post-war capital cities, conflicts at the fault lines of local, national and international institutions shape political and economic agendas for the city.
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Rodgers, D., 2007, ‘Slum Wars of the 21st Century: The New Geography of Conflict in Central America’, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE), London
What impact has spatial context had on the nature of conflict in Central America? What is the nature of present day urban violence? This paper from the Crisis States Research Centre draws on the example of Nicaragua to examine changes in the geography of conflict in Central America. It argues that present-day urban violence in the region can be seen as a continuation of past, predominantly rural, struggles in a new spatial context. At the same time, the new urban geography of violence has led to a more intense form of conflict.
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Political and institutional factors

Institutional multiplicity

Fragile states are often described as places where diverse and competing claims to power and logics of order co-exist, namely ‘formal’ state and ‘informal’ institutions. Formal state institutions are often seen as weakened by, or operated according to, informal or competing rules of the game, including traditional authorities, warlords, patronage networks, and social norms and customs. Some argue that in order to achieve resilience, the state must achieve ‘institutional hegemony’, that is, it must be able to set the rules by which society is governed.

Reno, W.,1998, ‘Introduction’ in Warlord Politics and African States, Lynne Rienner Publications, London
Why has warlord politics developed in weak states? Which factors promote dissolution into factional struggle and which generally help weak-state rulers to reassert their political authority through warlord means? In order to answer these questions, it is important to analyse not the formal role of institutions, but rulers' efforts to manage external challenges and the reconfiguration of old patron-client politics.
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Neo-patrimonialism

Many have argued neo-patrimonialism has undermined the functioning and institutionalisation of formal political systems in fragile states, particularly in Africa. Chabal and Daloz (1999) describe the informalisation of politics and the neo-patrimonial nature of reciprocity and exchange in Africa as ‘the instrumentalisation of disorder’. But some dispute the assumption there is a negative relationship between neopatrimonialism and economic growth (Di John, 2007). Others controversially argue that patrimonialism does not necessarily preclude state-citizen accountability.

Chabal and Daloz, 1999, ‘W(h)ither The State?’, Chapter 1 in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument’, African Issues, James Currey, Oxford
This book chapter argues the state in Africa was never properly institutionalised because it was never properly emancipated from society. This is due to both historical and cultural factors. The weakness and inefficiency of the state has been profitable to African elites. The severity of the current economic crisis in Africa is unlikely to favour the institutionalisation of the state. Political elites, bereft of the means of their patrimonial legitimacy, urgently seek the resources that the informalisation of politics might generate. Such heightened competition is apt to bring about greater disorder, if not violence.
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Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. and Verdier, T., 2003, 'Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: a Model of Personal Rule', NBER working paper 10136, Paper presented at the European Economic Association Annual Meeting, Stockholm
How and why do kleptocracies (regimes based on personal rule) last so long in some developing countries, despite the lack of a significant support base? How can the study of policymaking in weakly-institutionalised societies help to understand the emergence of these regimes? This paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research proposes a model to describe the strategies of many kleptocratic regimes, and includes historical case studies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dominican Republic.
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Pitcher A., Moran M. and Johnston M., 2009, 'Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa', African Studies Review, Volume 52, Number , pp. 125–56
Is ‘patrimonialism’ really the source of Africa’s poor governance? This article from the African Studies Review argues that contemporary conceptions of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism as negative regime types associated with corruption, clientelism, and autocracy are based on a fundamental misreading of theory. Weber’s ‘patrimonialism’ is, rather, a specific form of authority derived from traditional sources of legitimacy and based on a mutual understanding of responsibilities between the ruler and the ruled. Casting aside these misconceptions will allow African scholars to better analyse the character of African states, without falling back on the notion of African exceptionalism.
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Elite incentives and elite predation

Some research focuses on the relationship between elite incentives and forms of political order created through them (e.g. elite bargains, and coalitions) as critical to understanding state fragility. Underlying this is the notion that states will be stable only if the incentives of rulers and citizens are to preserve order. The relationship between rewards from predation and incentives for violence is critical. New research is looking at whether inclusive, as opposed to exclusive, elite pacts may be more capable of maintaining political order than others because they help to accommodate social fragmentation and provide a disincentive for violent rebellion.

Bates, R., 2008, ‘The Logic of State Failure: Learning from Late Century Africa’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, pp. 297-314
Why did so many African states fail in the late 20th century? This article from Conflict Management and Peace Science emphasises the material and political needs of state elites, their failure to act in the public good and the short time horizons of and narrow resource base on offer to politicians. Political order is a choice. Recent history shows that African leaders can choose to behave as warlords or as statesmen and that citizens can choose to arm themselves or to live peacefully. Order prevails when both rules and citizens choose to employ their respective capabilities to the creation and maintenance of wealth. A state exists when these choices form equilibrium.
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Lindemann, S., 2008, ‘Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE), London
Sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s most conflict-intensive region. But why have some African states experienced civil war, while others have managed to maintain political stability? This discussion paper from the Crisis States Research Centre argues that the ability of post-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa to maintain political stability depends on the ability of the ruling political parties to overcome the historical legacy of social fragmentation. Inclusive elite bargains’ involve a ruling party that integrates a broad coalition of key elites by defining inclusive access to state structures (jobs) and state resources (rents). ‘Exclusionary elite bargains’ involve a narrow coalition of elites who define exclusionary access to state structures (jobs) and state resources (rents). ‘Inclusive elite bargains’ permit the maintenance of political stability, whereas ‘exclusionary elite bargains’ give rise to trajectories of civil war.
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Beall, J. with Ngonyama, M., 2009 ‘Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for Development: The case of Greater Durban, South Africa’ Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE), London
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Political transitions

Transitions between leaders can be destabilising in fragile situations. Uncertainty and collective fears of the future, stemming from transitions, may result in the emergence of nationalist, ethnic or other populist ideologies and the susceptibility to violent conflict. In this context, elections can become arenas of violent contestation and can trigger instability.

Mansfield, E.D. and Snyder, J., 2007, 'Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War in the Twenty-first Century', in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds., C. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, and P. All, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC, pp. 161-176
Is democratisation the best way to promote peace? This research from the United States Institute of Peace argues that the world would probably be safer if there were more mature democracies but, in the transition to democracy, countries become more aggressive and war prone. The international community should be realistic about the dangers of encouraging democratisation where the conditions are unripe. The risk of violence increases if democratic institutions are not in place when mass electoral politics are introduced.
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Branch, D. and Cheeseman N., 2008, 'Democratization, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya', African Affairs, Vol. 108, Issue 430, pp. 1–26
What were the origins of the crisis that grew out of the disputed Kenyan presidential election in December 2007? What lessons does the case of Kenya have for other states with regard to the debate on democratisation and sequencing? This article from African Affairs examines the wider lessons and implications of the Kenyan election crisis for other states undergoing political liberalisation. The case of Kenya shows that political liberalisation is a high-risk activity that can produce unintended side effects. The processes of democratisation and reform can be undertaken simultaneously, but require institutional reforms not yet undertaken by many African states.
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Sisk, T., 2008, 'Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence', Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Meeting San Francisco, California, March 24-28
What factors generate election-related violence in fragile states? How can the international community address these? This study from the University of Denver suggests that social structure, political competition, the competence of the electoral administration and the degree of professionalism in the security sector contribute to election-related violence. International influence at mid-rank levels among the perpetrators of violence is limited. Donors therefore need to take a pragmatic approach by working with parties to develop pre-election peace pledges and by tracking violent incidents.
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Further resources on the relationship between elections and fragility can be found in elections in post-conflict or fragile environments in the GSDRC’s political systems guide.

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