Fragile states

Causes and characteristics

This page explores some of the possible causes and characteristics of fragile states and discusses early warning systems. It is difficult to distinguish between causes of state fragility and the characteristics of fragile states. More research needs to be done to determine whether the attributes listed below are symptoms or causal factors. This is particularly difficult because fragile states are not homogenous and because fragility is not determined by state boundaries - it can affect whole states, parts of states or entire regions.

Page contents

Early warning

Much research has gone into developing early warning systems to indicate states which are likely to 'fail'. There has been criticism of these projects, arguing that state failure is too diverse a phenomenon to be tracked by objective indicators and computer models. Also, whilst it is not difficult to draw up a list of likely candidates for failure, it is difficult is to know what to do about their situations. Several authors argue that state failure is a 'long term degenerative disease' (Zartman) and so early warning mechanisms are unnecessary.

Goldstone, J et al., 2000, State Failure Task Force Report, Phase III Findings', Instability Task Force, University of Maryland
Can we identify measurable characteristics that affect the risk of state failure? Do changes in population or the environment directly affect it? Do some states have greater or lesser capacity to cope with the pressures that can lead to state failure? By producing models that correctly classified countries headed for state failure with 70 to 80 percent accuracy, this research identifies the underlying or structural conditions associated with the occurrence of state failure.
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Carment, D., 2003, 'Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy', Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no.3, pp.407-427
In anticipating state failure, effective response and accurate analysis are equally important. But does the international community have an analytical base for generating good response strategies? This paper by Carleton University argues that explanations of state failure are inadequate analytical tools for risk assessment and early warning. The disparate analytical approaches constitute a useful tool-kit but there is a gap in understanding between academics and practitioners. Future funding efforts should emphasise the integration of analytical findings and methodologies of various research programmes.
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Predatory political elites

Past research has emphasised the importance of natural and economic conditions as causes of state weakness. Recently, there has been more emphasis on political causes, for example, the endurance of predatory political elites and their role in perpetuating and benefiting from state fragility.

Jackson R., 2001, 'The State and Internal Conflict', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 1, pp.65-81
What are the causes of contemporary international conflicts? How does current perception of them affect international conflict resolution efforts? This paper by Manchester University suggests that internal conflict is a ‘normal’ aspect of weak state politics. It argues that conflict resolution must be focused on state reconstruction activities, rather than on saving failing states. It also suggests that there are likely to be many more internal conflicts which demand international action in the future.
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Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.P., 1999, 'Recycled Elites' in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (African Issues), James Currey, Oxford
Why have recent transitions to multi-party politics in Africa largely failed to sweep away established political elites? This chapter from the book 'Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument' discusses leadership and representation as key concepts for understanding contemporary African politics. It outlines a concrete approach to analysis, centred on the actual behaviour of leaders and other political actors in relation to the rest of the population.
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Rent-seeking and predatory politics (where the economic needs of the people become secondary to the looting by elites of public resources) undermine economic growth and poverty reduction, and lead to civil unrest.

Vayrynen, R., 2002, 'Weak States and Humanitarian Emergencies' in War, Hunger and Displacement: Vol. 2, eds. Nafziger, E., Stewart, F., and Vayrynen, R., Oxford University Press, Oxford
Are complex humanitarian emergencies the product of impersonal social or natural forces? How do political factors make them worse? This study of the origins of humanitarian emergencies for the Queen Elizabeth House centre for development studies at Oxford University (UK) and the United Nations University (Finland) argues that crises are caused by venal, predatory state characteristics as well as weakness. The devolution of military power to gang and militia leaders, and the spread of rent-seeking activities are identified as the two central factors in plunging society into humanitarian crisis.
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Patronage and neo-patrimonialism

Many fragile states are characterised by strong patronage networks and, despite the presence of modern political institutions, a cultural lack of distinction between the private possessions of rulers and the public resources they administer. Patrimonial dynamics both create and are created by weak civil society, poor democratic culture and institutions, and weak state capacity.

Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.P. 1999, 'W(h)ither The State?' in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (African Issues), James Currey, Oxford
To what extent can existing conceptualisations of the state in sub-Saharan Africa contribute to an understanding of the exercise of power as it is empirically observed? This chapter from the book 'Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument' argues that the state in Africa was never properly institutionalised because it was never properly emancipated from society. This is due to both historical and cultural factors. It concludes that the weak character of the state in Africa may be more perennial that has hitherto been envisaged.
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Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., Verdier, T., 2003, 'Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: a Model of Personal Rule', NBER working paper 10136, Paper presented at the European Economic Association Annual Meeting, Stockholm
How and why do kleptocracies (regimes based on personal rule) last so long in some developing countries, despite the lack of a significant support base? How can the study of policymaking in weakly-institutionalised societies help to understand the emergence of these regimes? This paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research proposes a model to describe the strategies of many kleptocratic regimes, and includes historical case studies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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Unearned state revenue

Several academics argue that when governments have access to unearned revenue, they do not have to raise money through taxation and therefore become independent of and unaccountable to their citizens. An example would be natural resources, such as oil or diamonds. Natural resources can also weaken the state by creating conflict as the presence of exploitable sources of wealth leads to increased competition for control over a given territory. The presence of natural resources also increases the risk of predatory politics (see above section on predatory political elites).

Ross, M., 2003, 'What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?', University of California, Los Angeles
What is the relationship between natural resources and violent conflict? What causal mechanisms produce these outcomes? This study by the University of California reviews recent cross-national econometric and qualitative studies. It suggests that collectively they imply four underlying regularities in the relationship between natural resources and civil war. There is a wealth of data on causal links in specific conflicts but it is difficult to generalise. There are plausible theories behind each of the patterns, though efforts to test them are still in their infancy.
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Aid can also be considered 'unearned state revenue' and can lead to aid dependence. Significant donor contributions take away the governments' incentive to build economic independence and state capacity. Aid dependent states are often more responsive to the demands of foreign donors than to those of their own citizens.

Moore, M., 1998, 'Death Without Taxes: Democracy, State Capacity and Aid Dependence in the Forth World' in The Democratic Developmental State: Political and Institutional Design, eds Robinson, M. and White, G.
What are the effects of high aid dependence on state-society relations? Can governments that obtain most of their income from overseas be accountable or responsive to their own citizens? This study, from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, concludes that aid has become a problem in some countries because of a conjunction of circumstances: high levels of dependence; an inheritance of weak states relatively independent of their citizens for political or fiscal support; modes of dispersing aid that fragment fiscal sovereignty and undermine budgetary accountability. However, aid does not necessarily undermine democracy.
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Warlords

Warlords are often seen as a response to state failure rather than a cause. Most academics argue that they arise to fill the power vacuum left by the state. However, once in power, they perpetuate state weakness.

Jackson, P., 2003, 'Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance Systems', Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 14, no. 2  
What can and should we do about warlords in the modern world? This paper from the International Development Department of the University of Birmingham argues that adopting a different mindset is the first step to finding a solution. Warlords are not a new phenomenon. Furthermore, they are primarily responses to instability. They respond to the fraying of state power to the point where the central state begins losing control. Ultimately they should be seen as embryonic governments.
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Sometimes rulers of weak states choose to pursue a strategy of warlord politics, where power is used to serve individual, rather than collective interests. The following chapter explores their motivations and strategies:

Reno, W.,1998, 'Introduction' in Warlord Politics and African States, Lynne Rienner Publications, London
Why has warlord politics developed in weak states? Which factors promote dissolution into factional struggle and which generally help weak-state rulers to reassert their political authority through warlord means? This chapter argues that in order to answer these questions, it is important to analyse not the formal role of institutions, but rulers & apos; efforts to manage external challenges and the reconfiguration of old patron-client politics.
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Lack of legitimacy

Many researchers argue that post-colonial states are Western constructs that do not have their roots in traditional non-Western political models. Several argue that the concept of the nation state is not applicable throughout the world, particularly in parts of Africa. The state is therefore destined to fail because it has no historical, social or political legitimacy.

Reno, W., 1998, 'The Distinctive Political Logic of Weak States', in Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, London, UK  
Why is warlord politics so prevalent in Africa? Why do African rulers persistently give only lip-service to good governance, and weaken the organs of government? This first chapter of a book on warlord politics in Africa examines the political logic of weak states. Donor attempts to build strong African states fail because rulers' power rests on outside factors not on the citizenry. Attempts to impose good governance as conditions of loans or aid rest on flawed assumptions about rulers' interests, and are subverted by local politics.
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Clapham, C., 2002, 'The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World', Development and Change, vol. 33, issue 5
State failure and collapse must be placed within a broader appreciation of the evolution of statehood within the international system. What impact has globalisation had on the development of states and their social and economic structure? This paper published by Development and Change traces the origins of the state and identifies the structural and contextual factors that enhance the vulnerability of states. It argues that state failure has to be understood in the context of a world in which maintaining states has become increasingly difficult.
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Milliken, J. and Krause, K., 2002, 'State Failure, State Collapse and State Re-construction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies', Development and Change, Vol. 33, no. 5
Why is today's international system less conducive to the maintenance of the state than it was during the Cold War? How can the phenomenon of state collapse be explained? This study by the Graduate Institute of International Studies sketches out some of the issues surrounding modern state formation and examines the phenomenon of state collapse. It gives an insight into recent and emerging cases of state collapse, and looks at the key conceptual and political issues surrounding the present and the future of the contemporary state.
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Weak civil society

In Western political theory, civil society is generally seen as a vital player in holding governments to account and ensuring that they perform in the interests of their people. Whilst some analysts focus on the strength and resilience of civil society in fragile states, the following papers explore how fragility erodes civil society and question whether, in a neo-patrimonialist context, it is even possible to distinguish civil society from the state.

Reno, 2002, 'The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States', Development and Change, vol. 33, no.5
When states fail, do mass-based social movements develop to address the ensuing social problems? This article by Northwestern University looks at the situation of Nigeria's Bakassi Boys and the Oodua People's Congress and suggests that, contrary to expectation, reformist insurgencies fail to develop in failed states. The cause of this failure is found in the legacy of patronage politics. Specifically, the ensuing popular movements favour those who pursue their own economic interests, marginalizing those with more ideological agendas.
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Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.P., 1999, 'The Illusions of Civil Society' in Africa works: Disorder as Political Instrument (African Issues), James Currey, Oxford
Current thinking on the post-colonial state in Africa stresses the need to cut back or bypass the state, which is seen as inefficient and predatory. Can civil society perform the role of reforming the political realm that is currently expected of it? This chapter from the book 'Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument', argues that the dichotomy between state and civil society, which is taken for granted, does not reflect realities in Africa.
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Geography and demography

Whilst the above resources discuss political and economic causes and characteristics of fragile states, the following study emphasises the impact of geography and demography in affecting the ability of the state to extend its rule and physical control of territory.

Herbst, J., 2000, 'The Challenge of State Building In Africa', in States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton University Press, New Jersey
How can we form a coherent view of African politics? This chapter argues that scholars have been unsuccessful in developing a view of African politics that takes the pre-colonial period seriously while acknowledging the traumas created by white rule. It suggests that there are broad continuities that become apparent when the approach of successive leaders to the same political geography is examined. As some African states break down, it becomes more important to understand the past in order to foresee a better future for Africa.
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Additional information resources

Political Instability Task Force
Formerly known as the State Failure Task Force, the Political Instability Task Force's website lists comparative information on total and partial state failures between 1955 and 2001.

Crisis States Programme
The Crisis States Programme at DESTIN's Development Research Centre aims to provide new understanding of the causes of crisis and the processes for avoiding and overcoming state breakdown.

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