< Return to this month's Research in Focus
|
In April 2008, we examined Brazilian Perspectives on Human Security with Ilona Szabó de Carvalho from Viva Rio, an NGO based in Rio de Janeiro which promotes peace and development. Whilst Latin America has the lowest level of inter-state armed conflict worldwide, it also has the highest rates of gun-related deaths of any region in the world. Here Ilona explains how the human security concept can be used as a practical tool to address this epidemic of urban armed violence, with examples from Viva Rio’s own work. |
![]() Ilona Szabó de Carvalho |
Could you explain a little about your understanding of human security and why you think it is a useful concept to address armed urban violence?
Well, first of all, there’s a lot of controversy at the diplomatic level around the human security concept in countries such as Brazil because it is seen as posing a threat to national sovereignty. The overall goal of security is traditionally understood to be the protection of the state. But the state can only be secure if the physical, mental and social integrity of its own population is protected. This is where I think the concept of human security can be useful. It seeks a change of emphasis in national security objectives. Foreign enemies and traditional or formal armed conflicts are no longer the most serious threat. The concept of human security serves to remind governments that the goal of public policy should be to protect the population.
Why is this so important? Well, since the Second World War, the majority of victims of violence resulting from both formal and non-formal conflicts have been civilians. Whilst there is a lot of legislation - such as the Geneva Convention - to protect civilians in formal conflict, we don’t have the same laws for informal armed violence. The civilian population is really in the crossfire. The human security concept highlights the fact that individuals are very important to security and that the loss of life has many social and economic consequences.
In your paper, you mention what has been described as the ‘newest wars’. Can you explain what these are and how they differ from traditional conflicts?
The term ‘new wars’ was introduced by Mary Kaldor. These are generally private or informal wars over resources. Although they do have some of the characteristics of traditional wars, in practice the distinctions between public and private actors, informal and formal rules of war, and political and economic motivations are not always clear. These new wars fit the traditional definition insofar as they challenge state power, but they tend to be more intra-state than inter-state.
The concept of ‘newest wars’ was introduced by Tatiana Moura. There’s not much written about it in the field of international relations and indeed many academics would not recognise it, but these wars differ in one crucial way from traditional wars. They do invoke power, but it is a parallel power - one that does not aim to replace the state. These newest wars take place in micro-territories such as urban enclaves, but within a national context of formal institutionalised peace. Non-state armed groups, such as the drug dealers in Rio de Janeiro, have power over their community but they do not aim to take the place of the state.
Rather than seeing newest wars as isolated local or internal problems, we have to understand this new phenomenon as both a local and a global issue. Drug trafficking, for example, is closely linked to arms trafficking and a lot of expertise is exchanged between the different armed groups. Widespread corruption is another example of the wider consequences of these money-led ‘newest wars’.
You point out that Latin America has the lowest level of inter-state armed conflict and the lowest ratio of military spending to GDP in the world. Yet the statistics for gun violence in the region and in Brazil in particular are quite shocking. Why do you think this is a particular problem in Latin America?
Latin America has the very sad record of having the highest homicide rates in the world. The root of the problem lies in the way these societies were initially organised. In Brazil, during the period of colonialism and after the formation of the nation state, the practice of clientelism was widely accepted. This culture was strengthened by the dictatorship and contributed to huge inequality, with less than 10% of the population holding 42% of the wealth of the country. The transition to democracy led to the weakening of the state. One institution from the dictatorship which has remained, however, is the military police who are generally feared by the civilian population and continue to reinforce the culture of clientelism.
After the transition came rapid and uncontrolled urbanisation. The state did not build the necessary infrastructure to support this new urban population, leading to greater inequality in the public service distribution. Then Brazil had a period of slow economic growth and the government was dependant on international loans. During the 1980s, the level of drug-trafficking increased and with it, the demand for firearms. Brazil is the second biggest exporter of small arms in the Americas and the fifth largest exporter in the world. Research has shown that around 78% of the guns seized by the police in Rio are produced in Brazil.
You describe your NGO, Viva Rio, as taking a public health approach to addressing armed violence. Could you explain why this is and what the benefits of such an approach are?
90% of the deaths by firearms in Brazil are homicides. It’s an epidemic of violence. We use a public health lens because it allows us to isolate the different elements that have to be addressed to control this violence. So, for example, as with dengue fever where you control the vector - the mosquito - which transmits the disease, so with armed violence, small arms contribute to the crisis. We need policies to better control and ultimately remove arms from society.
Secondly, who is the target group of this epidemic of violence? In Brazil and many countries in Latin America, it is those young people between 15 and 24 who have not completed elementary education that are most at risk. So how can we address the causes of violence? Why are these groups so exposed, as victims and perpetrators? How can we design policies that offer them more opportunities and allow them a way out of this violence?
We also see that the violence is concentrated in specific territories. In Rio, for example, there are several communities which have been neglected by public policies for many years and where narco-traffickers now hold a kind of a parallel power. This is not to say that government forces can’t enter, but it would require a huge effort for the police to establish control and for the state to provide services and gain legitimacy. In order to control these epidemics, the public security forces in Brazil need to be better trained and better equipped, and there needs to be a change in culture in the way the military police engage with the public. By taking a public health approach, we can define the main targets and design policies and programmes to address them in an integrated way.
Could you describe in more detail some of the practical actions Viva Rio has taken to address urban armed violence in Brazil? To what extent have they been successful?
Viva Rio is structured around three areas. The first area is the human security programme, which includes all our activities around research, advocacy and training. In 1995, Viva Rio started raising the profile of small arms control. This was not a national priority at the time even through we already had very high rates of armed violence. We started to conduct research, raise awareness and organise public events. We participated in drawing up new legislation to better control armed violence in the country. This took a long time, but finally in 2003 the Disarmament Statute was approved. One of the articles called for a national buy-back campaign. Viva Rio opened civilian collection posts throughout the country. We found that many people were voluntarily handing in unregistered guns which they had bought from informal markets. Most were not criminal guns, but some were, with their serial numbers erased. We opened the first civilian post in the country in partnership with the police, and trained over 400 churches and other NGOs in the country to collect guns. The campaign was very successful, collecting around 460,000 guns around the country. The Disarmament Statute also prohibited civilians from carrying guns in public places unless they could prove they were being threatened. In 2004, one year after the campaign, there was a decrease in homicide rates by firearms in the country of 8.2%, after 13 years of constant increase. This trend has continued, and since 2004 there has been a further 12% decrease, which has helped to stimulate the public security debate and to push the government to do more buy-back campaigns and amnesties. Another national buy-back campaign is planned for the middle of this year.
Our second area of work involves implementing youth projects in local communities. We tend to target young people who are most at risk: young men who live in poor communities, have poor quality education and who don’t have access to a public space where they can hang out. But we also work with women, such as young mothers, who we see as the other, forgotten face of armed violence. We have a fast track educational programme which targets young men that drop out of school or who fall behind. We combine this fast-track with vocational training and run programmes that work with youths who are already involved in armed violence and want a way out.
We also work with the police. We co-ordinate the Latin-American Network of Policemen and Civil Society, which operates in ten countries in the region. Together with civil society partners, we support more senior level police officers to start or continue reform processes within their organisations. In Rio, we provide the police with training in human rights and citizenship - subjects that are not in their formal curriculum. One common problem is that salaries and self-esteem are very low, in a profession and a city where they should be much, much more valued. Higher salaries would help combat corruption and that’s one thing we try to address. We have facilitated an institutional diagnosis with the Rio police to find out what the main priorities for police reform would be. Some forces are making progress, others are not. There is still a lot of political will needed, which we continue to push for.
The third area we work in is communications. This includes a website called Comunidade Segura (www.comunidadsegura.org) which covers the themes of small arms control, armed violence and security sector reform, and which acts as a forum for keeping our networks alive.
Your paper calls for greater co-operation between civil society, government and the private sector in addressing armed violence and for more South-South collaboration. To what extent do you think this is now beginning to happen?
I think it has improved a lot, but we still lack co-ordination. Civil society is more advanced in this sense today than it was some years ago, sharing lessons learned in the South and the North through different networks. But we need to see more co-ordination because we often duplicate our efforts and waste resources. At the same time, many donors are slow to co-ordinate their own actions. The Paris Declaration is a step in the right direction but one of the biggest problems in international co-operation is that the agendas are not set at the local level. They are imposed from above. There needs to be a better understanding of the situation on the ground to implement the right policies more effectively. That’s why Viva Rio works in co-operation with the government rather than against it. We try to build relationships that go beyond the four-year cycle of government.
One potentially important partner, which is still very modest in its contribution to social change, is private business. There is a lot of talk of corporate social responsibility, but in many countries, including Brazil, this is mainly used as a marketing strategy. We need more partners in the private sector who not only finance, but also understand and help design better development strategies. Private business has a lot to offer NGOs and vice versa. Maybe they don’t quite know how yet, but we just need to push them in the right direction.