Research in Focus with Alan Bryden (April 2007)

In April 2007, the GSDRC examined the paper 'Security Sector Governance in West Africa: Turning Principles to Practice' with Alan Bryden, Deputy Head of Research at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The interview examines the security sector reform (SSR) in a regional context and suggests that local ownership, participatory approaches and fostering a culture of positive opportunism can lead towards effective SSR.

Alan Bryden

 

GSDRC:

Your paper, co-authored with Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin examines West African security sector reform and discusses that although democratisation processes can provide greater opportunities for security sector reform (SSR), democratisation does not necessarily lead to the democratic governance of the security sector. The article was based on findings from a research project - perhaps you could tell us a bit about this research project and provide a brief outline of your article.

 

Alan:

The rationale for the research, the article and the broader projects that it underlined lies very much in the development of the organisation I work for, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Essentially the organisation is a Swiss based foundation which works in policy research and operational activity in security sector reform and in particular the promotion of democratic governance of the security sector. When the centre was founded in 2000 the initial focus was very much on the Euro Atlantic region, notably the Balkans and the former Soviet states, however it became quickly apparent that there was a need to expand, as appropriate, to other geographical regions. So this work was about understanding the context for SSR in West Africa, the challenges to identify entry points for SSR within states and also where external actors like ourselves could potentially play a role. The research reflected in the paper therefore reflects not only a very practical goal but also reflects very important values as well. The first of these is an emphasis on democratic governance. A very clear message throughout all the case studies is that focussing on the effectiveness of security actors without emphasis on oversight and accountability isn’t SSR and is unlikely to be sustainable. A related point to this is that the level of the state is the wrong optic to understand complex borderless security challenges and the way to address them; this is the reason why the paper and the project take a regional perspective as well as looking at the level of the state, and crucially sub-state actors in security sector reform processes.

A second key issue is the importance of local ownership. It would have been fairly easy to find a few acknowledged Europe-based experts to write about African SSR and to talk wisely about the problems of the region. However the purpose of this project is to hear from West Africans and their experience of security governance and I'm happy that amongst 16 country case authors and 3 co-editors, I'm the only non-African involved in the project. It made for hard work in developing the project but local ownership is not meant to be easy, and hopefully the result is a picture that reflects the voices of a range of people including academics, civil society members, people from within power ministries and parliamentarians as well.

A third critical point was to examine the whole region particularly with regard to the francophone context which is largely unexplored. Perhaps this reflects the Anglo-Saxon roots of the SSR discourse, but it seems to unhelpfully perpetuate the notion of a divide in the region. It also contributes to the contested nature of the SSR concept, and it ignores the important regional dynamics of conflict, and therefore the means of addressing it. So, better understanding these francophone contexts was absolutely critical. A final point, as I've mentioned already, is policy relevance. The goal of the work has been to understand gaps and entry points for SSR. In the case of our own work it has helped DCAF to shape a very strong partnership with ECOWAS as well as assisting our facilitating role in a number of different national contexts. So it's already had a positive output for us, and I hope very much that it can be useful in informing policy and practice more broadly, not least through a deepening appreciation of context.

 

GSDRC:

The article discusses the transformation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from an almost exclusively economic focused institution to an organisation whose emphasis extended to include security and good governance. This broadening remit has resulted in the introduction of security led treaties and particularly interesting the participation of civil society in ministerial meetings.  Perhaps you could tell us a little more about these activities and how successful the transformation of ECOWAS has been with regard to security issues?

 

Alan:

We wanted to focus from a governance perspective on something that perhaps hadn’t been the focus of much attention with regard to ECOWAS’ work. The transformation of ECOWAS and its role with varying levels of success in mediation and peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau has been relatively well-documented, however less attention has been paid to the role of ECOWAS in setting norms or standards and in terms of promoting democratic governance which is actually a highly significant role. In the paper we draw attention to the 2001 protocol on democracy in good governance which supplemented the 1999 mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security. This is a very comprehensive document from a security governance perspective: it covers the role of the armed forces, police, and security forces in democracy, it looks at elections, rule of law, rights issues. Most recently -- and this is work we’ve been supporting ECOWAS in – the organisation has made a commitment to develop of a code of conduct for armed and security forces in West Africa. This initiative has been founded on a wide consulting process among Africans, and if implemented at national level, it should serve as an important confidence building measure and provide a basis of minimal behavioural requirements for West African security forces.

Now, in saying that, and in talking about these norms and standards, we are very aware in looking at the different contexts in West Africa the openings for change at national level are limited. But it's for exactly that reason that these regional efforts are important because norm setting at this level can provide an enabling framework for reform, and in many cases it can help the work of local actors, notably civil society actors, in pressurising governments in very difficult circumstances. It also provides a focus and the rationale for measures from a range of actors to promote reform of the security sector. In this regard, one initiative which is fascinating is the emergence of regional networks on these issues; the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) for example, which focuses on security sector reform. This is a very interesting way of building networks of networks, and of giving a voice to actors in a sub-regional framework who can't necessarily express themselves freely at home. So I think that’s a significant development. ECOWAS has also benefited from opening itself up to civil society actors as well; it's an additional voice of expertise for the organisation and in return it gives ECOWAS additional legitimacy which is very significant.

 

GSDRC:

Your case study of Sierra Leone was overall a positive example of reform, however, with some reservations.  The significant contribution of external actors has lead to concerns about the sustainability of the changes.  Could you talk us through this example and what impact this might have on future donor support

 

Alan:

I think Sierra Leone is a very powerful ongoing example, where the lead role in security sector reform has been taken by the UK, the ‘market leader’ in SSR. In this case study there has been timely effective military intervention followed by a core focus on security sector reform, backed up by sustained, significant resources as part of a broader peace building and development agenda.  I think personally that there have been clear successes in developing a more professional armed forces and a new civilian and military ministry of defence, the Office of National Security and indeed the development of the Defence White Paper.  I would also say in terms of some of the concerns, the long term financial commitment by the UK to this process has actually dispelled a number of fears surrounding the sustainability of those reforms, and yet I think there has needed to be learning over a time, and two areas that are particularly key are effective oversight mechanisms for the security sector and ownership of these processes by local actors.

I think in terms of developing more effective security actors in Sierra Leone there's been, to an extent, a lack of focus on oversight, the role of parliament, select committees and civil society.  I think this is absolutely critical in order to build trust amongst wider constituencies in societies as participation and oversight are absolutely essential in order to change a perception of security sectors working against the population to one that has their own security at heart.  I think the issue of ownership, really cuts to the heart of all security sector reform and contexts: that is, how to manage the tension between external intervention and local ownership of reform processes.  Without downplaying or disregarding the very real difficulties on the ground, there is a case -- and it's not a case that I make, it's more important that it's made by Sierra Leoneans -- that perhaps delays were too long in handing responsibility back to local civilians and military leaders. This lead to a sense of leadership gaps, and also a sense that initial reforms and policy frameworks paid little attention to Sierra Leonean capacities and needs. In contrast a process that I think has been hugely helpful is the process to develop the Defence White Paper for Sierra Leone which was developed through a process of wide consultation. It starts by looking at the threats, the priorities, the regional context in which Sierra Leone is situated, the challenges it faces, and only then does it look at the old security actors, the new ones and where the international presence fits into that. I think that’s a helpful holistic way to look at the security needs of Sierra Leone and it provides a very good basis for reform in all sorts of issues including restructuring the security actors, but also key issues such as budget management and expenditure, how to tie in with related issues such as HIV AIDS and the armed forces.  The underlying point though was that it wasn’t imposed by an external actor, it was a process, and the participative journey was most important.  This nuanced picture doesn’t seek to downplay the very clear achievements and where Sierra Leone’s come in the last six years, but it's actually very useful for other contexts to show the challenges even in a contained geographical area with a dedicated approach by a market leader involving significant resources. 

Maybe one thing that we don’t touch on or develop, but is absolutely key, is the need for coordination between external actors involved in SSR. This will become very much a focus now that Sierra Leone has been identified as a priority by the peace building commission, in order to ensure that the long standing ongoing work there to fits in with those efforts emanating from the UN.  So I think coordination between external actors and the nature of the relationship between external actors and local stakeholders are the two key lessons that can be applied in other contexts.

 

GSDRC:

Finally, the paper draws up criteria and activities for successful security sector reform within West African States.  Could you tell us a bit more about these guidelines, how you drew them up, and whether they could be applied as a blueprint for all security sector reform, or are they in fact only really relevant to Western Africa?

 

Alan:

We identified a number of guidelines, or criteria, for reform and those found in the paper are reflected in the broader project.  They reflect key principles for management and oversight of the security sector that are found in the roles of different governance actors, the need for participation and transparency in the development of security policy and its articulation (a road map for managing change as in the Sierra Leone case), and a number of indicators for progress such as capacity building, human resource issues, re-professionalisation and in fact orientation of security access to new roles such as peacekeeping, or AIDS in the civilian community. On the one hand these were useful as an analytical map for our country experts in order to base their experience on, but it is important to underline that these aren’t new and can be found in a range of state of the art analysis of SSR including the OECD DAC guidelines on SSR. The focus shouldn’t be on the guidelines though, the main point is that there’s a wide gap between understanding such concepts in and actually implementing them in practice.  So I think in this regard the point made earlier about the de-linkage between democratisation and reform of the security sector is quite telling. It's self-evident that closed states, that use the security sector to protect the regime and its leadership, are not going to change unless forced to; the 2005 coup in Mauritania, the protests in Guinea or, in another mechanism for change, the aftermath to the death of President Eyadema in Togo show that prospects for positive change may be fairly dim. In Togo, ECOWAS had a very positive role in enforcing elections rather than the military imposing Eyadema’s son as leader, but there were elections which failed a number of basic tests of democratic governance and the end result was the same.

I think it's unfortunate to say that externally supported re-building offers the best opportunities for security sector reform. However, where there is not a context of post-conflict peacebuilding, but where there are encouraging signs of democratisation often the security situation, the resource issues, the capacity deficits and conflicting priorities, and actually in some cases a culture of not questioning the security sector, means that little progress has been achieved. So whilst these guidelines are important, it is also vital to get across the context and specific challenges that each country faces. So to briefly answer the question, no, I don’t believe there are blueprints for SSR in West Africa or anywhere else.  Each context is highly specific and has its own peculiar framing conditions. I do think though that there are a number of things that fall out of the work in West Africa that are much more generally applicable. 

One is the importance of local ownership which needs to be reflected top to bottom in the approaches of external actors now.  This has very significant implications. Second is that participation is fundamental. Civil society is paramount in the means of achieving this, it's not an end in itself, but it's a key means of doing that.  And again, as we discussed earlier, regional organisations and approaches offer a way to support reformers in these more closed societies, and also regional organisations can be much closer to their needs than international organisations.  Finally we talk in the paper about the importance of positive opportunism.  State collapse can't be the most promising context of meaningful SSR and there’s a real need to build creatively on democratic conditions, to promote peer emulation in a region where steps are being taken, (the evolution in Mali, for one, provides a very positive example), and also to assist in reassessment in the development of defence and security strategies.  This broader work that we’re bringing out on the 16 countries hopefully will contribute to this broader goal of finding entry points for this kind of positive opportunism.