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The Right Road to Sovereignty in Iraq

Author: M Ottaway and T Carothers
Date: 2003
Size: 8 pages (410 KB)

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Summary

The US government pressed for an Iraqi constitution to be written and approved by spring 2004, and for elections to follow as soon as possible. But what impact could such a hurried timetable have on prospects for democracy? This policy brief, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that early elections could produce unstable results and favour radical groups.

While technically possible, rushed elections in post-conflict situations can create more problems than they solve. It would be risky to bypass the negotiation and consensus-building that should accompany the crafting of a new Iraqi political system. The result could be political institutions and processes that are far removed from many Iraqis and command little respect among political actors. Early elections could even provoke civil conflict. Delaying them is unrealistic, however, because the US has made elections a condition of transferring sovereignty back to Iraq – and is under pressure to do so quickly. The solution proposed here is to produce a temporary constitution allowing the election of an interim government. Sovereignty could then be handed over, and work proceed on creating permanent democratic institutions.

Accelerated election timetables are dangerous for any post-conflict country, but especially so in Iraq. Its history of political strife contained by authoritarian rule is a poor starting point for democracy, and increases the importance of not rushing. The major risks of premature elections are that:

They prevent the necessary process of negotiation over the basic rules and substance for a new democratic system.
A lack of consensus can lead some political forces to feel that their interests are threatened. If they lose, they may refuse to accept the results.
The power of radical, uncompromising groups may increase. They tend to organise swiftly in post-conflict states and do well because citizens believe they can protect identity-based interests.
In Iraq, the most visible political groups have clear ethnic or regional identities, including the Kurdish parties and Shia clerics. More moderate groups are only just forming a base, and could struggle in early elections.

In building a new political system, Iraqis will have to consider many difficult, divisive issues. In constitutional terms, these include whether and how to devise a federal state, whether to opt for a presidential or parliamentary system, and the role of Islamic law. Tough decisions must also be made about the nature of the electoral system and the registration of political parties and voters. Reaching agreement on these issues will require more time. In the intervening period:

Constitution-writing should be limited to an interim document containing broad commitments to democratic principles and respect for human rights.
This constitution should establish a unitary system, not because it is best, but because the contentious issues of federalism cannot be quickly solved.
It should provide a basic, temporary framework for the election of an interim government that would rule for three years, as well as an assembly that would produce a permanent constitution in that period.
To begin with, Iraq should have a parliamentary system with proportional representation, making government as inclusive as possible.
The US could then transfer sovereignty, but without many of the risks of early elections. The nascent institutions would have the legitimacy and time needed to build a permanent democratic system.

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Source: Ottaway, M. and Carothers, T., 2003, 'The Right Road to Sovereignty in Iraq', CEIP Policy Brief, no.27, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.
Author: Marina Ottaway , mottaway@ceip.org
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), http://www.ceip.org