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Key Text Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State and the ‘Post-Conflict’ Challenge in Afghanistan

Author: C Cramer and J Goodhand
Date: 2002
Size: 25 pages (178 KB)

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Summary

Peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan require a significant expansion of institutionalised economic interdependence. This must build on existing patterns of interdependence, despite these being forged in a war economy. The article argues that an effective, centralised state, with a clear monopoly of violence, is necessary. This argument challenges standard international policy paradigms of reconstruction and points to an alternative basis for international engagement in Afghanistan.

The article is part of a special issue of the journal Development and Change, entitled State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction. Engaging the dynamics of war economies is an important part of post-conflict reconstruction. There is a common belief that in modern post-conflict situations appropriate economic development policies can consolidate peace, based in part on the enhanced economic interdependence amongst states in Europe after World War II. Underlying issues of structural change and capital accumulation are often neglected, although war is the most common form of contemporary capital accumulation: a centralised state is required to protect the poor and structurally transform this primitive form of accumulation. While liberal interpretations of war assume that its effects are always negative, other alternatives emphasise the vibrancy of wartime entrepreneurship and spawning of new economic sectors. In analysing contemporary conflict, it is useful to remember that state formation in Europe involved periods of protracted violence.

The article explores the role of centralised authority and state in the history of Afghanistan, from the tribal confederacy of 1747 to present day, including the incorporation of parts of Afghanistan in a ‘regional conflict complex’: three themes stand out:

The history of statehood reveals a non-linear trajectory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’.
Various state-builders have failed to sustain a monopoly of violence, to develop wealth and welfare, to develop forms of representation and to develop legitimacy (whether through tribalism, Islam or nationalism).
International aid has played an ambiguous or detrimental role with respect to Afghan state formation.

The article appeals to international interveners to reflect on the history of state formation in Afghanistan to avoid actions that lead to the repetition of existing patterns:

A minimal liberal state is an inappropriate model, as is the common compromise policy of promoting decentralised local governance structures.
The creation of a centralised, credible and effective state in Afghanistan is a political, not a technical or capacity-building activity. The state must have control over violence, and be able to make fiscal, regulatory and allocation decisions.
Governance institutions must reflect and manage conflicting Afghan political incentives. Political legitimacy is crucial: a key source of this is economic growth, through an institutionalised expansion of economic interdependence.
A new role for the international community as international guarantor for the Afghan state in the context of regionalised conflict, via strong United States backing for the United Nations.
International aid must avoid discouraging the establishment of reciprocal relations between the new state and its various interest groups.

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Source: Cramer, C. and Goodhand, J., 2002, 'Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State and the "Post-Conflict" Challenge in Afghanistan', Development and Change, vol. 33, no. 5, pp.885-909.
Author: Jonathan Goodhand , jonathangoodhand@aol.com
Institute of Social Studies, http://www.iss.nl/