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Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations

Author: L Brahimi
Date: 2000
Size: 74 pages (244 KB)

Summary

The United Nations (UN) was founded to save communities and nations from the scourge of war. Yet, over the last decade, the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and can do no better today. Why has the UN failed? What can be done to accomplish the UN’s mission?

The report commissioned by the UN Secretary-General assesses the shortcomings of the existing peacekeeping system and makes recommendations for change. Force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Member states have to summon the political will to support the UN politically, financially and operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace. There is an urgent need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention and peacekeeping, in both the long and short terms.

Findings from the report include:

Some UN operations in the past did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them.
Factors that should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping include the consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only for self-defence.
Reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor has deeply damaged the standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping.
The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new operation. Opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain.
The current approach to funding and staff for peacekeeping seems to confuse the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operations activities.
Gaps in strategy, policy and practice impede the effective use of modern information technology in missions.

Policy pointers to strengthen the permanent capacity of the UN to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies include:

Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force UN contingents to cede the initiative of their attackers. Mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force to stop violence against civilians.
A new information-gathering and analysis entity should be created to support the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-General and the members of the ECPS.
The leadership of a new mission has to be assembled as early as possible at the UN Headquarters, to participate in shaping the mission’s concept of operation, support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance.
Traditional peacekeeping operations should be rapidly and effectively deployed. On-call lists of experts, military officers and police officers should be created, and mechanisms to rapidly recruit civilian field personnel should be put in place.
Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the UN, and therefore the majority of its resource requirements should be funded through the regular budget of the Organisation.
Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF) has to be created to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment. Information technology has to be well utilised to achieve the objectives.

Access full text: available online

Source: Brahimi, L. et al 2000, 'Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations', United Nations, New York
Author: United Nations (UN), http://www.un.org