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Key Text The East Timor Reconstruction Program: Successes, Problems and Tradeoffs

Author: K Rohland and S Cliffe
Date: 2002
Size: 42 pages (3 MB)

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Summary

What lessons in post-conflict reconstruction can be learned from experience in East Timor? This Working Paper from the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank draws preliminary lessons on aid-financed reconstruction in East Timor, with special reference to the Bank’s programmes. East Timor has shown a fast recovery, with main development indicators at or near pre-crisis levels. This largely successful reconstruction is linked to high internal security, fast aid disbursement, and close cooperation between donors and government.

East Timor differs from most other post-conflict countries in two respects. Firstly, despite suffering high physical destruction and the complete collapse of state structures in 1999, it has not witnessed the prolonged and divisive civil war typical of most post-conflict countries. Peace was restored rapidly after the violence and high internal security was maintained by the UN during transition, creating a favourable climate for reconstruction. Secondly, the United Nations’ Transitional Authority’s (UNTAET) remit was to support state reconstruction, rather than to play the more usual role of peace-keeping between feuding groups.

UNTAET was not able to support the formation of a Timorese-led public administration until late in the transition. No government existed during the peak reconstruction period, which hampered efforts to build national capacity. Donors faced trade-offs between the need for fast aid delivery and the goal of creating strong state institutions. The East Timor government now faces a backlog of legislative and capacity building work to establish key institutions. In particular, lack of capacity in the legislature is constraining all areas of government. Other key lessons include:

Community-based reconstruction and drawing on non-governmental and private sector capacities can achieve fast results. This also maintains public support and confidence.
Aid financing mechanisms are inappropriately complicated for post-conflict countries with low capacity.
Project preparation time can be significantly shortened without compromising quality. In this case, time was cut from a Bank-wide average of 15 months to three and a half months.

Reconstruction in East Timor has been largely successful. Key to this success is early engagement, together with clear roles and responsibilities within international institutions, and a joint planning approach between national counterparts and donors. These factors enabled flexibility, shared understanding between the East Timorese and donors, and clear reconstruction priorities. However, problems in capacity building are unavoidable in post-conflict emergencies. These problems can be tackled by:

The early and consistent involvement of national stakeholders, with unified sectoral programming and early attention to procurement and payment systems
Targeting training and information for political and military leadership
Using community-driven reconstruction and the capacities of private and NGO sectors. Care must be taken to strengthen rather than undermine nascent state capacities
Early institution building in central administrative functions. This is critical
Agreeing reconstruction benchmarks between government and donors. This can mitigate the complexity of aid financing mechanisms. These should cover the political transition, administrative handover, economic and social reconstruction, and public finances.

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Source: Rohland, K., 2002, 'The East Timor Reconstruction Program: Successes, Problems and Tradeoffs', Social Development Department, World Bank, Washington
Author: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank (CPR Unit), http://www.worldbank.org/conflict