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Key Text Human Rights and Capabilities

Author: A Sen
Date: 2005
Size: 16 pages (964 KB)

Summary

Can human rights be understood as entitlements to capabilities? Should an overarching list of capabilities be compiled? How can we ascertain the content of human rights and capabilities when values diverge so much across borders and communities? This article from the Journal of Human Development discusses the relationship between human rights and capabilities and seeks to answer these questions. It argues that neither of these two concepts should be subsumed within the other.

The idea of human rights has tremendous appeal to many and plays a role in political debates in almost every country of the world. They are, however, seen by many as lacking in foundation, coherence and cogency. The concepts of human rights and human capabilities have a common motivation although they differ in several ways, and considering them together can aid the understanding of both.

Capabilities can broadly be seen as freedoms of particular kinds. Human rights can be seen as rights to certain specific freedoms, with corresponding duties centred around what others can do to safeguard such freedoms.

‘Capability’ means the opportunity to achieve certain combinations of functionings - what a person is able to do or be. The concept can help elucidate the opportunity aspect of freedoms.
For example it can help to distinguish between whether a person is actually able to do something, and whether they have the means to do it. This avoids an overconcentration on means that is found in some theories.
However, the concept is not so useful for analysing the process aspect of freedoms. Capabilities are characteristics of individual advantages, and do not tell us enough about the fairness or equity of the processes involved.

The second half of the article discusses the possibility of compiling a canonical list of capabilities, and the problem of how to assess claims to human rights in a diverse world.

A fixed list of capabilities derived entirely from theory would deny the possibility of public participation in deciding what should be included and why. Also, theory cannot make a list for all societies for all time to come: This would deny the possibility of progress in social understanding.
A static list also ignores that we use capabilities for different purposes. What we focus on cannot be independent from what we are doing and why. Some basic capabilities will figure on all lists, but the exact list should take account of the nature of the exercise.
The listing of capabilities must be subject to the test of public reasoning, so how can we proceed in a world of differing values and cultures? The status of such ethical claims must be dependent on their survival in unobstructed discussion.

The universalist nature of human rights means that discussion has to include views from other nations and cultures. This is so as to avoid parochial prejudices and to examine a wider range of counter-arguments.
The belief in uncrossable barriers between cultures is undermined by the fact that, contrary to stereotype, histories of different countries show considerable variation over time. There are also considerable variations within cultures. What are seen as ‘outside’ criticisms often mirror those of non-mainstream groups within the culture.
Being culturally non-partisan means respecting the participation of people from anywhere in the world. This is not the same as accepting the priorities of dominant groups in particular societies, especially when information is restricted and disagreements are not permitted.

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Source: Sen, A., 2005, "Human Rights and Capabilities", Journal of Human Development, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 151-166