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Key Text Civil Society and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: A Preliminary Investigation

Author: M Caparini
Date: 2004
Size: 25 pages (220 KB)

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Summary

What does the concept of civil society bring to our understanding of security sector reform (SSR) and inversely, how does SSR further our understanding of civil society? This working paper, published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Force (DCAF), argues that an SSR perspective enables an understanding of the relationship between civil society actors and the various sectors of security policy. Inversely, an examination of SRR through the prism of civil society emphasises issues of accountability, participation, and ultimately, the legitimacy of governance.

The security sector comprises those state institutions and structures whose primary function is to protect society and the liberty of its citizens. The term security sector expands the scope of security from its traditional focus on the armed forces and the military to include the safety of the individual from threats of crime, disorder and violence. Security sector reform (SSR) is concerned with making the institutions that are responsible for protecting society more accountable to citizens and communities and more responsive to their security needs.

Civil society is often considered to be an important, albeit informal, mechanism of public oversight and accountability of security sector institutions. Civil society is a crucial agent for empowering people, enforcing political accountability and improving the quality and inclusiveness of governance. Civil society organisations (CSOs) can play a role in the democratic control of various security sectors, including:

  • The armed forces: CSOs have the potential to monitor military forces and provide input into the political debate on security policy.
  • The police: community policing has become the guiding principle of democratic policing and needs to be accountable to multiple audiences, including specialised NGOs and community consultation groups.
  • The intelligence services: some CSOs attempt to influence intelligence-related issues, including expert organisations that possess adequate technical expertise or specialised knowledge about the implications of security-related legislation, and public interest groups.
  • Technical expertise CSOs tend to play a greater role in the defence and even intelligence spheres, whereas representation and service delivery CSOs are more predominant in the policing domain.

Security sector institutions are essentially top-down institutions. SSR seeks to institutionalise a bottom-up dynamic whereby the concerns and needs of citizens are systematically incorporated into the policy and practice of security institutions. The link between SSR and civil society reaffirms that the individual is the primary focus of state security institutions, and that the reform of security sector institutions must be undertaken with a dual focus on efficacy and public accountability. Policy-makers should further strengthen the link between SSR and civil society by:

  • Recognising that the holding of consultations with CSOs serves a legitimising purpose for government decisions and policy in the security sector.
  • Acknowledging that the success of security sector reform depends on cooperation with governmental and non-governmental organisations, and ultimately on the sway of public opinion.
  • Understanding that the success of SSR relies on the ability to gain support from the public. This should be accomplished through an inclusive and participatory approach that brings civil society directly into the consultation and decision-making process through horizontal coordination.
  • Making information about security sector institutions, policies and practices widely available to the public and fostering an environment of transparency and openness wherever possible.
  • Taking account of unintended effects on CSOs. For example, CSOs risk being "co-opted" through an overly close association with the state or an over-dependence on the state for core financing, which may lead to a loss of independence.
  • Undertaking research to determine to what extent government outreach and public consultations with CSOs actually influence the formulation and implementation of government policy.
  • Carrying out empirical research to examine how civil society actors attempt to shift and influence power relations. DCAF’s Working Group on Civil Society aims to ‘map’ the CSO terrain in defence and security in specific national contexts.

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Source: Caparini, M. 2004, ‘Civil Society and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: A Preliminary Investigation’, Working paper no. 132, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva
Author: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), http://www.dcaf.ch


 
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