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Key Text The Debate on Warlordism: The Importance of Military Legitimacy

Author: A Giustozzi
Date: 2005
Size: 25 pages (386 KB)

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Summary

The terms 'warlord' and 'warlordism' have become increasingly popular amongst academics, but a definition for the social sciences is not agreed. This paper by the Crisis States Research Centre aims at reconciling different perspectives, consistent with emerging evidence from the field. Agreeing how to define a warlord is important, since from this different theoretical conclusions will be drawn. The temptation to describe every leader of militia as a warlord should be resisted.

The recent popularity of the term does not necessarily reflect an upsurge in warlordism in conflict areas. The phenomenon predates globalisation, although admittedly warlords need to act financially and politically in the international system without state interference. The current stress on the 1990s revival may be due to scarce efforts to trace warlordism in the conflicts of 1960-1990. The assumption that warlords fund their armies through criminal or commercial activities also ignores earlier instances funded by foreign powers.

There is substantial agreement that a warlord has autonomous control over a military force, operates at sub-state level, benefits from state disorder and uses violent coercion. Beyond a hard core of supporters, most troops are forcibly recruited. He is neopatrimonialist (primarily concerned with his own benefit) and lacks interest in changing the nature of the state. The following are more contentious points:

Whether warlords are predominantly motivated by financial greed. The interest in economic profit might be due to the need to maintain armies and reward followers.
Whether warlords are necessarily predatory and parasitic. Emerging evidence suggests looting may be transformed into taxation, and warlords may be no worse predators than the state.
Whether warlords have no legitimacy or conversely might often have a genuine local constituency.
Whether a warlord necessarily controls a clear territorial base or can be roaming. It is unlikely that an organised military force can be maintained without such a stable base.
Whether a warlord does not aim to conquer the state but instead to perpetuate war and state desegregation. In fact, many warlords are apt at transforming into politicians. The troops' lack of ideological commitment is more important in explaining failure.

The main concern of this paper is to isolate legitimate military leaders from other non-state, non-ideological politico-military leaders. Legitimate leaders have the support of at least one established social group. Warlords are more susceptible to playing a role in political development, possibly evolving into statemakers.

We could define a warlord as a non-state politico-military actor who has military legitimacy, but little or no political legitimacy.
This leaves aside other types of 'entrepreneur' who owe their position to their political skills in emerging as local representatives. They are manipulators with limited autonomous power and fade more easily.
Warlords are more resilient since they are able to provide at least one service to at least one part of the population, namely security. They also have a social base of support including military commanders and militia leaders.
Warlords provide military leadership which includes personal qualities and the ability to manage operations including logistics and supply.
Warlords most commonly arise in the disintegration of the security and political institutions of a state, typically when the military forces survive. Alternatively, warlords can emerge after state has collapsed, in a longer process of consolidation which might ultimately lead to state formation.

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Source: Giustozzi, A., 2005, 'The Debate on Warlordism: The Importance of Military Legitimacy', Crisis States Research Centre Discussion Paper, No. 13 (September 2005), London School of Economics (LSE), London