Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation
Author: P Evans
Date: 2004
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23 pages
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Why has the new focus on institutions had minimal positive impact on developmental outcomes in the global South? Could deliberative institutions funded on ordinary citizens' participation improve development performance? This article uses examples from Porto Alegre and Kerala to suggest that deliberative strategies improve governance, increase the supply of basic collective goods, and strengthen the citizens' democratic capabilities, while remaining growth neutral. Donors should work to reduce the current bias against deliberative solutions and actively support local actors interested in pursuing deliberative development.
The current development paradigm asserts that the quality of basic governance institutions is the key element in fostering economic growth. This has led to 'institutional monocropping'; the imposition of uniform blueprints based on idealised versions of Anglo-American institutions without regard to local context. The result has been persistence of weak governance, low levels of public participation, political paralysis and decline in economic growth rates among the supposed beneficiaries.
Theoretical support from Dani Rodrik and Amartya Sen forms the foundation for an alternative theory of institutions based on the inherent value of social choice. 'Deliberative institutions' founded on public discussion and exchange of ideas, information, and opinions offer the only way to adequately define desirable development goals. The potential benefits of deliberative development include:
Three problems must be overcome for deliberative democracy to function as a development strategy. Ordinary citizens must find it worthwhile to invest their time in participation so that the deliberative institutions are socially self-sustaining. Deliberative processes should not be economically inefficient. However, the biggest impediment is likely to be the 'political economy problem' of private elites and politicians who resist any reform that diminish their power. If monocropping is not a good solution, what other strategies should be explored? Recommendations to donors and policy makers include:
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Source:
Evans, P., 2004, ‘Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation,’ Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 30-52