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Key Text Strengthening Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Technical Reform or State-building?

Author: S Lister and A Wilder
Date: 2005
Size: 10 pages (88.4 KB)

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Summary

State-building efforts in post-conflict environments frequently emphasise the importance of building or restoring subnational administrative and fiscal structures. How is the functioning and reform of subnational administration affected by the broader political context and the distribution of power in Afghanistan? This paper, from Public Administration and Development, discusses aspects of subnational administration reform in Afghanistan and suggests that reform efforts should be seen as part of an overarching political strategy of state-building.

The functioning of subnational administration in Afghanistan both shapes and is shaped by complex political dynamics, forming part of the wider political process. The current political situation involves a multifaceted relationship between the de jure state which is recognised by the international community as a sovereign entity and the de facto state which actually administers control within the territory.

The fall of the Taliban and subsequent signing of the Bonn Agreement in 2001 marked the end of 23 years of civil conflict and laid down the framework for the establishment of a peaceful, democratic Afghanistan. First round presidential elections were eventually held in 2004, but many obstacles remain in terms of the state's ability to provide the core elements of security, representation and welfare. The weak de jure state is undermined in a number of ways by the de facto powers of regional warlords and local commanders:

The control of regional and district commanders over subnational administration is facilitated by their military control over the physical territory.
Security positions in the police and intelligence services are determined by dominant commanders and warlords, as are civil administration positions and mid- and upper-level government positions.
The authority of the de jure state is unlikely to be restored until disarmament of de facto commanders and their armed groups receives due attention.
The failure of central government to enforce its policies on the opium trade demonstrates the weakness of the de jure state and provides valuable financial resources to warlords and commanders to support their de facto power.

For as long as the functions of the state, if they are provided at all, lie within the domain of de facto individuals and groups who do not owe their allegiance to central government, the power of the de jure state will remain weak. The World Bank and other donors must, therefore, address a number of issues in supporting public administration reforms designed to increase central control of local government in Afghanistan:

Technocratic interventions that fail to consider the political context, including pay and pension reform and improving local infrastructure, could actually result in strengthening de facto powers rather than the de jure state.
The wresting of control from regional and local commanders through disarmament, security reform and reform of the political economy will weaken their ability to influence the structures of subnational administration and allow central structures to regain power.
Such measures will also provide revenues to contribute towards improving links between provinces and the centre and enable local government to carry out activities geared towards increasing influence and bolstering legitimacy.
Such an overarching political strategy to rebuild and strengthen the de jure state requires a long-term financial and military commitment from the donor community.

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Source: Lister, S. and Wilder, A., 2005, ‘Strengthening Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Technical Reform or State-building?’, Public Administration and Development, vol. 25, no 1., pp. 39-48