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Key Text Neopatrimonial Rule in Africa

Author: M Bratton and N van de Walle
Date: 1997
Size: 35 pages (4.45 MB)

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Summary

To what extent does the neopatrimonial nature of regimes in Africa affect the process of democratisation? How does it influence whether transitions ever begin, and how do they subsequently unfold? This book chapter from researchers at Michigan State University reviews the nature of informal and formal political institutions in African countries and compares their political regimes with each other and with those in other regions of the world. Finally, it discusses the commonalities and variations in transition dynamics and outcomes.

Although neopatrimonial practices can be found in all polities, they have been the core feature of post-colonial politics in Africa. Neopatrimonial rule is a master concept that embraces a variety of subsidiary regime types. Its characteristic feature is the incorporation of patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions. The right to rule is ascribed to an individual rather than an office, and personalised exchanges, systemic clientelism and the use of state resources for political legitimation are the norm. Nonetheless, there is significant variation in the political institutions that have evolved in different African states as well as the degree of political competition and participation which is permitted.

Political transitions from neopatrimonial regimes depart from the model scenario of democratisation (based on experiences in Latin America and Europe) in major respects:

They originate in political protest (usually spontaneous, sporadic, disorganised and unsustained) in response to shrinking economic opportunities and exclusionary rewards.
Their outcome hinges on the fate of the dictator; his overthrow or flight becomes the primary objective of the opposition, but he is likely to fight hard for survival.
Elites fracture over access to patronage (this type of regime tends to simultaneously create a defensively cohesive state elite and a potential pool of alternative leaders outside the state).
Elite political pacts are unlikely because of polarisation and the lack of formal political institutionalisation.
Transitions are struggles to establish legal rules; the law is one of the more potent weapons the opposition has at its disposal, though part of its objective is to gain access to previously monopolised resources.
Middle-class elements align with the opposition; the weak national bourgeoisie of Africa is frustrated by state ownership, overregulation and official corruption and wants to see property rights included in the new rules of the political game.

Even if regime transitions are characterised by considerable uncertainty and some serendipity, the outcome of political struggles depends critically on the way that power was exercised by the rules of previous regimes.

Personal rulers are unlikely to initiate political liberalisation or relinquish power without a struggle; they have to be forced out.
The underdevelopment of civil society in neopatrimonial regimes means not only a weakened foundation for anti-system change but also the likelihood of problems in the consolidation of any subsequent democratic regime.
The willingness of leaders to step down often depends on whether they fear prosecution for having abused state powers and privileges.
The prospect of compromise depends mainly on the personality, management skills, and governing institutions of the incumbent ruler.
In transitions from neopatrimonial rule, the threat of backlash comes mainly from the military acting alone.

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Source: Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N., 1997, ‘Neopatrimonial Rule in Africa’, Chapter 2 in eds. Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. ‘Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Author: Nicolas van der Walle , nv38@cornell.edu
Office of International Development, Michigan State University, http://www.oid.msu.edu/index.htm