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Key Text Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality

Author: M Ottaway and A Lieven
Date: 2002
Size: 8 pages (358 KB)

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Summary

Can a Western reconstruction programme be successful in the context of an ethnically, tribally and religiously segmented society? What factors should be considered when designing strategies for intervention? This paper published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace examines approaches to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and argues that the over ambitious programme of democratic reconstruction cannot work. A more modest and realistic programme is required concentrating on creating peace and restoring economic functions, rather than rebuilding the entire state.

The international community has proposed ambitious plans to transform post-Taliban Afghanistan into a modern democratic state, as incorporated in the Bonn agreement of December 5th 2001. However, the chances of successfully imposing such modern state structures are extremely unlikely in a war ravaged and deeply divided country that is segmented along ethnic lines. Throughout Afghanistan's history its leaders have failed to stimulate development or provide effective state services. In addition, through alienating tribal and ethnic groups the state contributed to the formation of radical, extremist revolts.

The international community has previously either; supported strong men who can achieve order by force; given up in despair or embarked on an ambitious project to reconstruct the country in the image of a modern secular, multiethnic and democratic state. None of these approaches are suitable. There are a number of factors the international community should consider when developing a strategy for reconstructing Afghanistan:

A compromise approach needs to be applied, based on an awareness of Afghanistan's past and present conditions. Creating any unifying political structures will be extremely difficult.
Local tribal groups will not surrender their power, the international community has no choice but to work with them.
The democratic reconstruction model is both presently impossible and not representative of the majority of the population. Implementing such a strategy will cause conflict between the international force and powerful local groups.
The international community must initially accept a form of ordered anarchy and work to attenuate some of its shortcomings.

A strategy to assist Afghanistan should be based on the following:

The formation of a national mediation committee to function indefinitely. The committee should implement the minimal conditions for basic civilisation: avoidance of major conflict, security of trade routes and the safety and neutrality of the capital.
Aid should not be directed through the government but provided directly to regions, used as an instrument of peace keeping.
Focus should be placed on central administration tasks that allow a measure of normal life, economic activity and trade.
Working directly with regional leaders through liaison officers, who will also work with international and local NGOs. Realistic standards should be set for leaders to promote change that is more likely to be sustainable.
The creation of a substantial international force, mandated though the United Nations, to ensure the security and neutrality of Kabul.
Democratic measures, such as elections, should not be pursued as this will increase competition amongst different ethno-religious groups. Lastly, a certain amount of corruption is inevitable and should be expected when a country receives a large amount of aid.

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Source: Ottaway, M. and Lieven, A., 2002, ‘Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality’, CEIP Policy Brief 12, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Author: Marina Ottaway , mottaway@ceip.org
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), http://www.ceip.org