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Key Text Politics and the PRSP Approach: Synthesis Paper

Author: L-H Piron and A Evans
Date: 2004
Size: 44 pages (222KB)

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Summary

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are often seen as purely technical instruments of development assistance, with a negligible political dimension. A working paper from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) argues that it is impossible to disentangle development assistance and PRSPs from their political contexts. But do PRSPs contribute to or hinder political development and pro-poor reform?

Does the consultative approach of a PRSP improve the quality of poverty-reduction strategies? Does it increase governmental accountability and commitment to pro-poor reform? Or, since PRSP approval still lies with donors, are external concerns given priority and local accountability undermined? Four country case studies were undertaken to assess the political dimensions of the PRSP approach. The strongest conclusion is that the transformative political effect of PRSPs depends heavily on the political and historical context of each case. Pro-poor change is possible, but generally incremental; while the negative effects on local accountability are no worse, and perhaps better, than previous approaches.

The case study countries were chosen for their diverse political and poverty contexts. Uganda has widespread poverty, while Georgia has more concentrated pockets of poverty. In Bolivia democracy is multiparty (though patronage-based), and civil society is vigorous, whereas Vietnam has virtually no civil society outside of the single-party state apparatus. There are however some common findings:

Political structures such as the balance of executive and parliamentary power and state-society relations affect the quality of consultation and effectiveness of poverty reduction.
State commitment depends on the political capital it might return. In Uganda, the need for post-conflict unity encourages a political focus on poverty reduction, whereas in Georgia projects such as those on corruption were prioritised.
Timing is critical: the PRSP process is most effective when national planning or consultation exercises are already in motion; conversely, a change of government can stall the process.
Some benefits of the PRSP process include: decentralised policymaking, involving new, non-state actors, and better intra-governmental cooperation.

It is hoped that PRSPs may also transform donor behaviour, in two ways: (1) shifting governmental accountability back to domestic populations; and (2) providing a framework around which to coordinate efforts, thus reducing transaction costs. Analysts should consider the international as well as national context:

International commitment is as critical to success as domestic factors. Georgia's PRSP suffered from weak international interest; donors then over-compensated, delaying the process and undermining local credibility.
The conjunction of international and national interests, as in Uganda, affects outcomes; in Bolivia, a divergence of interests over issues such as IMF conditionality and coca eradication have weakened cooperation.
There is an unresolved tension between "ownership" and "quality": a PRSP based on existing domestic strategies may fall short of an ideal PRSP, but may nevertheless be stronger for being country-owned.
For example, Vietnam's PRSP process and outcome diverged from international norms, but the hands-off approach allowed reformers to establish a more open space within national politics.
Dialogue on political issues such as conflict and human rights, of central concern to development, is limited in the PRSP approach. Donors should acknowledge the possibilities and the limits of engagement on this.

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Source: Piron, L-H. and Evans, A., 2004, ‘Politics and the PRSP Approach: Synthesis Paper’, ODI Working Paper 237, Overseas Development Institute, London.
Author: Overseas Development Institute (ODI), http://www.odi.org.uk/