Document Library

Political Connections and Social Networks in Targeted Transfer Programmes: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia

Author: Bet Caeyers and Stefan Dercon
Date: 2008
Size: 32 pages (159 KB)

Access full text: available online

Summary

Is the targeting carried out by community-based transfer programmes influenced by beneficiaries' political and social connections? This paper investigates how targeted transfers are allocated in Ethiopia under a highly bureaucratised and decentralised administrative system. It finds strong evidence of favouritism and the influence of political connections; families in need without connections to local political elites are significantly less likely to receive food aid transfers. This illustrates the importance of political economy in the delivery of even basic aid.

In many developing countries, the beneficiaries of transfer programmes are determined by community-based processes, based on some general targeting rules related to needs. When only limited systematic information for targeting is available to central bureaucracies, decentralised community-based systems for transfer delivery as used in Ethiopia may offer a mechanism to ensure that the poor are served. This opens the door for local social and political processes to influence who gets access, however.

A large part of the Ethiopian population continues to regularly rely on transfers in the form of food aid, delivered via donors and the government. Little is known about how the local political economy and networks affect their allocation, even though targeting is largely administratively-based and implemented by the local political leadership. These leaders are in principle elected but in practice are typically closely linked to regional and national power-holders.

The study used data from a household panel data survey on food aid transfers during and after a serious drought in 2002. The study found that households in 'vertical' networks, (having close associates holding official positions), have over 10 percent higher probability of obtaining food aid than households that are not well-connected with powerful households. Other findings include the following:

• Households with larger social networks for informal insurance have less access to food aid. On average, for each additional person the household can rely on, the probability of obtaining food aid decreases with almost one percentage point.
• No evidence was found for the hypothesis that other social networks in the community influence the food aid allocation process.
• In terms of reverse causality, no evidence was found that social and political networks are affected by the food aid transfer system. Participating in the food aid programme did not seem to systematically influence households' informal social safety net.

There are many ways in which vertical relationships can be understood. It could be that connections with those holding official positions may improve information flows, such as in terms of signalling need or availability of support. Favouritism, irrespective of whether the selected households actually need the extra food, is the most plausible explanation however, and this explanation is supported by the results of the study. Such situations in the Ethiopian context may benefit from:

• Increased political competition: In principle, Ethiopia's leadership is elected using some official procedures for free and fair elections, but in practice, political manipulation and historical political control by those in power at the national or regional level may cast doubt on the extent of local political competition.
• Improved accountability of local government committees: Lack of objectively verifiable information on households' needs means that effective targeting requires the needy to be able to effectively communicate their situation or enforce their rights. However, voters tend to perceive the ruling party as agents of the state, and would be reluctant to upset them, as they are dependent on them for many benefits. This often leads the rural population to be first and foremost concerned to vote for the winning side, since to do otherwise carries intense risks to their welfare.

Access full text: available online

Source: Caeyers B. and Dercon S., 2008, 'Political Connections and Social Networks in Targeted Transfer Programmes: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia', Working Paper 313, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford
Organisation: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford, http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/