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Key Text Game-theoretical Models, Social Mechanisms and Public Goods: A Methodological Discussion

Author: Tim Kelsall
Date: 2009
Size: 23 pages (205 KB)

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Summary

How can empirical research be used to build policy-relevant theory about governance and development? This paper reflects on the Africa Power and Politics Research Programme (APPP), arguing that contextually modified concepts from game theory can help explain development outcomes. There is little in the literature or initial fieldwork results to suggest that mix of governance modes itself is a key driver of better and worse public goods provision. The drivers seem instead to include: (1) game-like mechanisms; and (2) structural-institutional factors. Pre-fieldwork theoretical reflection should be combined with intense periods of empirical observation, analytical modelling and cross-case comparative theory building.

The APPP, concerned that the good governance agenda has not been producing sufficiently positive results, aims to use empirical research to build a body of middle-range, policy-relevant theory about governance and development. Such middle-level theory demands that the complexities of social life be reduced to a few key variables.

The APPP's initial proposals stressed the importance of informal institutions, hybrid states and 'going with the grain' of existing socio-cultural realities. De Sardan argued that going with the grain was inherently dangerous and proposed the APPP focus on the concept of practical norms. This is based on the idea that although in Africa official rules often are not followed, unofficial ones are.

Contextually modified gametheoretic concepts can help explain development outcomes in a way that the concept of practical norms, by itself, cannot. 'Practical norms' are descriptive, not explanatory. Many of the problems of development involve the supply of collective goods. Game theory prompts the questions: What kind of a (game) situation is this? Is it one in which it pays individuals to work for the collective benefit? Why, or why not? For example, if one person cannot be excluded from the benefits others provide, each person is motivated to 'free-ride' on the efforts of others.

Social conventions are also important: individual self-interest needs to be reshaped, usually via an external authority system, an internal monitoring and sanctions system, or strong group consciousness.
Monitoring and sanctions mechanisms are more likely to be effective when combined with other types of social mechanism - such as where public goods provision is underpinned by morality, ideology, or group consciousness. Some in a group or organisation who can apply leverage to others must have internalised an ideology.
The force with which these other social mechanisms operate will depend on context, such as history and demography.
Preferences for public goods are also context-sensitive. There are trade-offs among public goods, making it likely that successful solutions to collective action problems will emerge for some goods and not for others.

Enlightened self-interest, combined with adequate monitoring mechanisms, may therefore help explain better public goods outcomes. There is little in the background literature, or in the initial results of APPP fieldwork, to suggest that mix of governance modes itself is a key driver of better and worse public goods provision.

Drivers apparently include: (1) game-like mechanisms (such as free-rider, tragedy of the commons, principal-agent); and (2) structural-institutional factors (histories of institutional change, degrees of autonomy, social affinities).
In terms of the research agenda, awareness of socially modified game-theoretic mechanisms will help to: identify appropriate variables; and grasp how different variables perform a similar function in shaping mechanisms to produce better and worse development outcomes.

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Source: Kelsall T., 2009, 'Game-theoretical Models, Social Mechanisms and Public Goods: A Methodological Discussion', Africa Power and Politics Programme Discussion Paper 7, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London
Author: Tim Kelsall , tim.kelsall[at]gmail.com
Organisation: Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), http://www.institutions-africa.org/