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Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention

Author: Vanda Felbab-Brown
Date: 2009
Size: 16 pages

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Summary

What have been the effects of counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan since 2001? Have eradication campaigns been successful? This article from the Journal of International Peacekeeping argues that aggressive opium poppy eradication programmes have been premature and counterproductive. They have not increased stability or undermined the counter-insurgency. The most important role peacekeeping forces can play is providing security.

Opium production continues to underlie much of Afghanistan’s economic and political life. It is estimated that between 20 and 40 per cent of the Taliban’s income comes from drugs. In January 2002, the United Kingdom was made the lead nation on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. It instituted a compensated eradication programme and increased the interdiction of traffickers. Both these measures failed to significantly curb cultivation. In 2004, the United States began a policy of eradicating poppy crops.

The eradication policy is premature and counterproductive. It has not bankrupted the Taliban or severely weakened any belligerent group because such groups adapt to changing circumstances. In fact, eradication has strengthened the Taliban physically because Afghans whose poppy crops have been destroyed look to the Taliban for support and protection.

• Eradication alienates the local population from the national government and local tribal elites who agree to the policy. This creates an opportunity for the Taliban to gain support.
• Eradication critically undermines the local population’s motivation to provide intelligence on the Taliban to peacekeepers and the Afghan National Army.
• Local eradicators are able to abuse their position and benefit personally from the narcotics trade.

The most important role that peacekeepers can play in reducing illicit economic activity, including the narcotics trade, is delivering security. (The term peacekeeping is used to refer not only to UN missions, but also to other international missions.) All counter-narcotics efforts will be ineffective unless firm security throughout the entire territory has been established first. In Afghanistan, peacekeeping and counter-insurgency forces, including NATO, should resist calls to engage in poppy eradication.

• If well-designed and implemented, interdiction could possibly reduce the political power of ex-warlords and corrupt officials. It is considerably less counterproductive than massive eradication.
• Corruption and poor governance must be addressed as necessary requisites to state strengthening, economic reconstruction and counter-narcotics.
• Regular police should be removed from counter-narcotics efforts. Police reform should be undertaken so that the population can develop trust in the police force as a legitimate state organ.
• In order to direct efforts to reduce illicit economies and corruption, international peacekeeping forces need to have a very detailed understanding of the local illicit economy.
• As a result, such missions need a robust information-gathering component that monitors the effect of its policies on stability, development and the distribution of power.
• The international community must scale down its expectations of how rapidly legal economies can replace illicit ones.

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Source: Felbab-Brown, V., 2009, 'Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention', International Peacekeeping, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp. 100-114