Document Library

Key Text Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas

Author: A Matveeva and J Verhoeven
Date: 2006
Size: 66 pages ( 2.6 MB )

Access full text: available online

Summary

How can early warning and response systems be improved? This study from the European Centre for Conflict Prevention suggests that although a rich literature exists on how early warning and response should be carried out, little is known about how early warning actually happens. There needs to be a community of practice where the issues and dilemmas of early warning and response can be refined, experiences shared and empirical theory built from practice.

The value of early warning is still unproven. This is because predictions have not been accurate in the past (or important events were not foreseen) and operational responses have been inadequately linked to warnings. Moreover, early warning methods have not demonstrated how they can engage with current high profile threats such as organised crime, drugs or terrorism.

From a civil society perspective, early warning and early response presents a number of challenges. Firstly, attracting attention to low-profile conflicts is problematic. Secondly, shifting from macro-level political early warning to micro citizen-based warning and response systems has been too slow. Thirdly, civil society organisations at times find themselves in a position of both warners and implementers of response measures. This can create tensions and pose questions with regards to the legitimacy of their mandate.

The process of early warning involves developing recommendations and sharing the warning message. How this is done depends on whether the purpose is to effect structural or operational prevention.

The process of elaborating recommendations requires a good insight into the capacities and constraints of the target agencies.
The role of civil society lies in drawing conclusions from warning information and the development of recommendations for further action rather than gathering information per se.
Although a widespread aspiration is that early warning information should be publicly available, in reality this may not always be possible or desirable.
Different early warning systems - from local to global - can deliver different levels and types of analysis and recommendations. Outsiders have to be realistic about what a particular system can deliver.
It is a myth that early warning is apolitical.
Political considerations also determine whether a warning will be heard by governments and international actors.

The ultimate goal of early warning is not to predict conflicts but to prevent them. The record on this score has not been promising.

Early warning actors should either become better at prediction or redefine the rules of the game and put more emphasis on early action.
Civil society needs to think through what kind of conflicts it is trying to act upon and not claim a role that it is unable to fulfil.
Prevention requires both the capacity and the local credibility of any intervening organisation that is given a mandate to act.
The strengths of civil society-based early warning are considerable, however, it is vital to be realistic about the remit of civil society whose capacities for action are exaggerated at times and vary greatly from region to region.
Building alliances among local civil society, governments, the United Nations, regional organisations and global civil society can help to bridge strategic weaknesses and create enough critical mass to move from an operational warning to the response.

Access full text: available online

Source: Matveeva, A., 2006, 'Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas', Issue Paper, no. 1, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The Hague
Author: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, http://www.conflict-prevention.net/