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Key Text The Centralization/ Decentralization Paradox in Civil Service Reform: How Government Structure Affects Democratic Training of Civil Servants

Author: Eva Witesman, Charles Wise
Date: 2009
Size: 12 pages (129 KB)

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Summary

What effect does government structure have on the provision of democratic training to civil servants? This paper, published by Public Administration Review, finds that centralised government structure significantly increases the odds of receiving both anticorruption training and policy skills training. The paradox of civil service reform is that democratisation may be best achieved through the centralised structure which it will ultimately undermine. Proper ordering of the reform process will use the strong culture of centralised, hierarchical institutions to instill democratic training: democratisation should precede decentralisation.

In its accession criteria, the European Union focuses on two criteria of democratic reform: structural decentralisation and institutional democratisation. Most approaches have ignored the challenge of simultaneously pursuing both imperatives - a challenge that may already have sabotaged many reform efforts. A democratising Ukraine, with its inherited Soviet bureaucracy, presents a useful case study of centralised and decentralised civil service in the same cultural context. A survey administered to government officials in Ukraine in 2006, as part of ongoing civil service reform efforts, yielded data on training practices and needs.

The results of the Public Administration Education and Training Needs Assessment Survey quantitatively validate many of the hypotheses initially put forward. These include the following:

Government structure strongly impacts the likelihood that civil servants will receive training in democratic reform. Agencies that are part of the central government were 7.5 times more likely to provide anticorruption training than those belonging to a local government structure. Centralised agencies were three times as likely to provide policy skills.
On the other hand, no statistically significant relationship seems to exist between degree of centralisation and technical skills training. It is possible that an inverse correlation exists.
Assorted variables--especially larger agency size, a greater proportion of female civil servants and employee empowerment--also predict the receipt of anticorruption training.
Agencies which made use of training by Ukrainian NGOs were 5.5 times more likely to provide anticorruption training, but no less likely to have policy skills training. The provision of policy skills training was predicted by involvement with foreign agencies or specialised ministerial academies.
The effect of legal requirements that mandate anticorruption training is significant but nuanced. The goal of conforming to the law boosts training efforts, but the use of legal requirements to select training participants may in fact decrease the odds of training.
Technical skills training is tied to external grants. An agency’s use of such grants as a primary funding source increased by 6.3 times the likelihood of technical training being received. Employee self-payment resulted in a 3.2 times greater likelihood of technical training above the average.

Training in technical skills appears to be fundamentally different from democratic training, although the two are often conflated in civil service training research. Using traditional models of capacity training may actually hinder the instilling of democratic values and skills. Policy implications for civil service reform include the following:

Institutional democratisation should be separated from structural decentralisation. The ordering of these two processes may affect the nature of the developing nation’s government once it reaches a stabilised equilibrium.

Institutional democratisation should precede decentralisation. Otherwise, disparate governance units will display different degrees of democratisation.
If government structures are decentralised but not transparent and democratically responsive, citizens might instigate a backlash against the reform process, leading to re-centralisation.

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Source: Witesman E., Wise C., 2009, 'The Centralization/Decentralization Paradox in Civil Service Reform: How Government Structure Affects Democratic Training of Civil Servants', Public Administration Review, Volume 69, Number 1, pp. 116-127
Author: Eva Witesman , evawitesman[at]byu.edu