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The Political Economy of Accountability in Timor-Leste: Implications for Public Policy

Author: Peter Blunt
Date: 2009
Size: 12 pages (113 KB)

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Summary

What conditions facilitate corruption in Timor-Leste and what measures should be taken to address it? This article from Public Administration and Development examines the social, economic, political and governance context of Timor-Leste and suggests that it is conducive to state capture and systemic grand and petty corruption. It is also resistant to conventional short-term technocratic anticorruption remedies. Anticorruption progress is a long-term endeavour that requires sustained impartial service delivery, the emergence of leaders of integrity and a middle class, and the establishment of the rule of law.

Questions of accountability and corruption are critical in Timor-Leste and pose serious threats to political stability and to development. Proposed high levels of government spending on infrastructure, food imports and subsidies will increase substantially the incentives for state capture. At present, the major assets of state capture and patronage are likely to be jobs in the public sector, procurement, and natural resource concessions. Petty corruption is highly likely in government and may be systemic.

Patronage-based forms of social exchange and obligation are deeply entrenched. These and factors such as weak loyalty to the state, high levels of poverty and inequality, and incentives for ruling elites make it very likely that patronage-based systems of governance will be strongly defended. Short-term technocratic reform is therefore unlikely to be effective.

Establishing the rule of law, hastening the emergence of leaders of integrity and the growth of a middle class, broadening the base of the economy and undermining beliefs in patronage through increased spending on impartial service delivery are all long-term strategies. They acknowledge:

• The deep-seated nature of the values and beliefs held by Timorese about patronage and social obligation.
• Underdeveloped notions of the state and weak loyalty to it among ordinary people.
• The unlikelihood of sudden conversions of ruling elites inclined to put self-interest before the general good.
• The general nature of governance systems in fragile states and their insusceptibility to rapid reform.
• The need to maintain elements of patronage-based governance in the medium-term in the interests of political stability and the prevention of violence, which is easily incited in Timor-Leste because of a culture of impunity.
• The doubling of the government’s budget, which will increase opportunities for corruption.

The establishment of governance institutions will be relatively straightforward. However, making them work effectively will be much more difficult. These conditions suggest that:

• Institutional anticorruption capability should be strengthened, primarily because the public relations benefits to government of being seen to be combating corruption may contribute to the maintenance of political stability.
• Increased support should be given to impartial service delivery as a means of undermining beliefs in patronage.
• Support to education generally should be increased.
• The legal environment of business should be strengthened. 

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Source: Blunt P., 2009, 'The Political Economy of Accountability in Timor-Leste: Implications for Public Policy', Public Administration and Development, vol. 29, pp. 89-100
Author: Peter Blunt , pblunt[at]worldbank.org