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Key Text Fragile States, Fractured Societies

Author: Seth Kaplan
Date: 2008
Size: 10 pages

Summary

What has caused the difficulties experienced by fragile states? This book chapter from Praeger Security International explores the roots of state fragility and the role of foreign aid in sustaining past dysfunction. Two structural problems – political identity fragmentation (often based on arbitrarily drawn state borders) and weak national institutions – reinforce each other. They undermine state legitimacy, interpersonal trust and the formation of robust governance systems and encourage neopatrimonialism. Fragile states’ formal institutions need to be reconnected with the local societies upon which they have been imposed.

The divided natures of fragile states have left them with no unifying identities, institutions or governance systems. With borders that ignore socio-political, geographical and economic conditions, the designs of these states devalue hundreds of years of institutional memory and social capital and make the incorporation of informal norms into formal bodies highly problematic. The histories of the few fragile states that were not the product of colonialism have yielded comparable societal divisions.

In fragile states there is therefore an enormous gap between a small cadre that manipulates or controls the state (and favours its perpetuation), and the general population who are at best highly ambivalent towards their government. Western aid has prevented any reorganisation of the state so as to make it better suited to local conditions. Further findings include the following:

The role of identity is crucial to the creation of state legitimacy, as a legitimate political order is usually built around a cohesive group and uses institutions that are a reflection of that group’s historical evolution.
Political identity fragmentation and weak national institutions reinforce each other because: a) tribalism becomes reflected in weak governing bodies; and b) the state offers no alternative to the support provided by identity groups’ traditional loyalties.
Both democratic systems and prosperous economies require interpersonal trust, but political fragmentation results in societies with low levels of trust and high transaction costs. Lack of trust between ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ raises the cost of exchange and lowers the price of assets.
Political fragmentation warps incentives, encouraging short-term opportunism rather than investment for long-term development.
When formal governing bodies go unheeded because they are not acknowledged as legitimate, the results tend to include corrupt governments, biased courts and weak property rights. Individuals are loyal to identity groups rather than to the state, and groups compete to exploit formal institutions for their own ends.
The tenuous nature of regime and institutional legitimacy encourages leaders to use despotic or corrupt means to cling to power.

The combination of weak social cohesion and feeble state institutions creates problems that are not amenable to the types of solutions – more aid, competitive elections and economic reform – typically advocated by the international community. Formal institutions need to be reshaped according to local conditions so that they can be owned, driven and sustained by local peoples. Such strategies would leverage traditional loyalties to construct the state. Other implications are that:

Fragile states cannot create strong institutions because few people are loyal to the state or have any incentive to respect its laws.
Macroeconomic or administrative reforms cannot solve such fundamental problems.
Political campaigns and voting often worsen domestic tensions rather than improving them.

See also: http://sethkaplan.org

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Source: Kaplan, S., 2008, 'Fragile States, Fractured Societies', in Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development, Praeger Security International, London, ch. 3.
Author: Seth Kaplan , seth[at]sethkaplan.org