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Reconstruction as Modernization: The Post-conflict Project in Afghanistan

Author: A Suhrke
Date: 2007
Size: 19 pages (182KB)

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Summary

How successful has the recent post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan been in the light of historical experiences of similar reforms? This Third World Quarterly article argues that the conflation of post war reconstruction with a broader agenda for development and modernisation has brought out a wide range of tensions associated with social change. The entire project shows signs of severe contradictions that are adding to the problems caused by the growing insurgency.

The framework for the post-Taliban reconstruction project was laid down in the UN-sponsored Bonn Agreement of December 2001. The document contained all the main elements of modernity as commonly understood – from the Weberian-type state to more recent additions of social justice and women’s rights.

Previous reform attempts had several implications for this new reconstruction project. King Amanullah’s reforms in the 1920s showed the importance of not overloading the modernist agenda in relation to the coalition carrying it. President Daoud’s reforms in the seventies showed the importance of not excluding potential rebels from the political arena. Finally, the experience of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) from 1978 showed that foreign forces should not be allowed to lead the war against a militant opposition.

These lessons seem to be casting a growing shadow over the present reconstruction-cum-modernisation project:

• The transnational modernising coalition is divided by different interests, priorities and conflicting principles of legitimacy. It has a narrow Afghan base, and the international component is huge and unwieldy (with some 60 countries providing foreign aid, and 37 governments assisting in some military capacity or other).
• Among the Afghans several foci of contestation emerged. The most fundamental challenge came from the militant Islamists – the Taliban and their supporters – who opposed the entire project.
• Another set of conflicts centred on the state-building agenda, which called for change with respect to key areas of state power: revenue collection, the armed forces, public administration and control over the illegal opium economy.
• The reform agenda also raised hopes and fears, expectation and resistance in the social and legal arena. Different visions of the good society collided and merged with deep-seated power struggles, with women and social mores appearing as emblematic issues.
• Resistance to the Western-backed modernisation project could mobilise political support by drawing on the discontent generated by the failure of the post war project to bring rapid peace, order and prosperity.

How does the present modernisation project score in relation to the lessons from previous modernisers?

• Amanullah’s experience has been forgotten as the present ambitious agenda stands in sharp contrast to the fractious coalition on which it rests. The most obvious result is a highly conflictual policy process with limited results.
• The government has been more attentive to the lesson from Daoud. However, the more President Karzai tried to co-opt potential rivals in the state administration, the more he alienated members of his modernist coalition, who advocated Weberian merit-based criteria for appointment.
• In its most radical form, an inclusive policy would mean trying to strike a deal with the Taliban. This has been impossible because the government, like the PDPA before it, could not prevent foreign forces from fighting a war on Afghan soil. The Taliban and al-Qaida are the enemy in a larger US-led war on terror, and Washington has refused to negotiate.

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Source: Suhrke, A., 2007, 'Reconstruction as Modernization: The Post-conflict Project in Afghanistan?, Third World Quarterly, 28:7, pp. 1291-1308
Author: Astri Suhrke , Astri.Suhrke@cmi.no
Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), http://www.cmi.no