Chapter 1 - Understanding violent conflict

Conflict characteristics

New forms of violence and conflict

Since the end of the Cold War, many conflict analysts have highlighted the rise of new forms of violent conflict.  They argue that contemporary conflicts differ in terms of scope (internal rather than inter-state); combatants (non-state actors: private armies, warlords, criminal gangs, organised communal groups and terrorist or guerrilla organisations instead of governments, professional soldiers or conscripts); methods (increased use of terror and guerrilla actions and deliberate targeting of civilians instead of combat in conventional battlefields); and models of financing (external rather than internal).

Whether the objectives of contemporary wars have changed is contested, however.  While some argue that new wars are no longer about ideology and nationalism and focus instead on identity and group conflicts; others stress that group labels can only resonate if tied to a specific political project. Wars are still fought, they argue, for economic, political, ideological and geopolitical reasons.  In particular, control over and access to resources is still prevalent in many violent conflicts.  Both nationalism and identity can come into play as a mechanism to provide justification for unique claims of control over resources and territory to the (forced) exclusion of other groups.

In addition, many authors argue that many contemporary conflicts - even if not inter-state - have a regional or global dimension. For example, in West Africa and the Great Lakes region, internal conflicts have become interlinked to produce regional civil wars and conflict systems. Furthermore, some contemporary terrorist activities are global in their reach, with loosely linked groups fighting on many fronts simultaneously and groups moving from country to country to fight in conflicts, like the Afghan Mujahedeen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, and Iraq.

Along with the recent rise in terrorism, there are new pressures stemming from migration, urbanisation and ‘youth bulges’ (see children and youth in conflict-affected areas) that, combined with poor economic opportunities, seem to have resulted in a rise in urban violence. Violence against women is also on the rise during peacetime and during conflict.  Rape and other forms of gender-based violence are increasingly used as instruments of war (see women in conflict-affected areas).

“New wars”

Kaldor, M. and Luckham, R. 2001, 'Global Transformations and New Conflicts', IDS Bulletin, 32(2), pp. 48-59, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton
This article reviews the characteristics and legacies of post-Cold War conflicts, and the steps for building democratic peace. Most modern conflicts result from a breakdown in the legitimacy of political authority; the effects of globalisation, and powerful economic incentives for dissidents to take up arms against the state. They are generally struggles for control over, or access to, state power rather than against substantive grievances. Most current wars are also based on identity, using pre-existing cleavages (racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious) for political mobilisation. Military victories are now difficult and rare.  Post-Cold War conflicts predominantly involve a wide range of global and regional actors: Major powers; international agencies; neighbouring states; diaspora groups; arms salesmen; mercenaries and criminal networks. Greater access to global and regional institutions could provide greater accountability of external actors to local populations.
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Malešvic, S., 2008, ‘The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts’, International Political Sociology, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 97–112
Are recent wars completely different to their predecessors? What are the purposes and causes of new wars? This paper looks at sociological accounts of warfare and uncovers weaknesses in their explanation of new wars. It challenges the notion that there has been a dramatic shift in the causes and objectives of contemporary violent conflict. What has changed is reliance on technology and the social, political and ideological context in which recent wars are fought.
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Bailes, A.J.K., Krause, K. and Winkler, T. H., 2007, ‘The Shifting Face of Violence’, Policy Paper, no. 18, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces’, Geneva
How has the nature of violence changed in the post-Cold War era? What can be done to stop, or at least reduce, the potential for increased violence? This policy paper presents a variety of different perspectives on recent trends in conflict and security.
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Urbanisation

Beall, J., 2007, ‘Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century’, Working Paper, no. 9, Crisis States Research Centre, London
What impact do acts of terror have on cities in the global South? This paper examines the largely negative implications of terrorist activities for development and the potential of cities for propelling reconstruction and peacebuilding. While specific challenges faced by cities in the global South cannot be under-estimated, urban terrorism is breaking down any sense of a rigid binary between the 'developed' and 'developing' worlds. The 'them' and 'us' attitude is misleading and damaging to both development cooperation and global security.
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Sommers, M., 2003, ‘Urbanisation, War and Africa’s Youth at Risk: Towards Understanding and Addressing Future Challenges’, Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) Activity, USAID, Washington, DC
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Radicalisation and Terrorism

Brynjar, L. and Skjølberg, K., 2004, ‘Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature’, FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Kjeller
Why are some societies more exposed to terrorism than others? What are the common theories and hypotheses concerning the causes of terrorism? This paper surveys theories on the causes of terrorism, as well as those for explaining terrorism on an international or world system level of analysis.
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Okumu, W. and Botha, A. (eds.), 2006, ‘Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In Search for an African Voice’, Seminar Report, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, November
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European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008, ‘Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism’ Submitted to the European Commission
Understanding the origins of violent radicalisation requires understanding that terrorist groups consist of different types of disaffected individuals who undergo different paths of radicalisation. This report analyses empirical facts on violent radicalisation, recent academic literature and the link between external conflicts and violent radicalisation. More research on individuals who join terrorist groups, terrorist recruitment, indoctrination and training, and types and development of current radicalisation processes, would inform future state response strategies.
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Transnational politics and role of diaspora

The role that diasporas can play in fuelling conflict has received increasing attention in recent years. The traditional focus has been on the role that remittances play in funding violent conflicts. Yet, diasporas also play a key political role in conflict in their countries of origin and can reinforce, exacerbate and prolong violent conflict.

Diaspora groups, and group members, cannot be treated uniformly, however.  Groups evolve distinctly and adopt varying outlooks on homeland politics, different levels of involvement, strategies and methods of recruitment, mobilisation and participation.  In general, diaspora groups have the potential to contribute to conflict escalation as well as to peace processes. They may also change their positions over time.  An understanding of such transnational politics is essential in conflict analysis.

Ethnic groups often span international borders. Recent research has found that the existence of transnational ties can increase the risk of conflict, since cross-border groups can be difficult for national governments to control.

Horst, C., 2008, ‘The Transnational Political Engagements of Refugees: Remittance Sending Practices Amongst Somalis in Norway’, Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 317-339
How do diaspora groups seek to influence political developments in their home countries? What can be learned from the engagement of Somalis living in Norway with conflict and reconciliation processes in the Somali territories? This article shows that the Norwegian Somali diaspora engages primarily on a sub-national level – through clan relationships rather than through ‘state’ entities. Diaspora groups promote conflict and peace, and may promote both simultaneously. Their substantial remittance flows can alter the local balance of economic, political and military power.
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Lyons, T., 2007, ‘Conflict-generated Diasporas and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia’, Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 529-549
How can diaspora groups created by conflict contribute to either increased polarisation or new opportunities for peace in the homeland? This article explores ways in which conflict-generated diaspora groups link processes of globalisation and transnational migration to homeland politics and conflicts. The case of the Ethiopian diaspora in North America illustrates how recent political developments were shaped by this diaspora and points to broader patterns of linkages among diasporas and homeland processes.
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Fair, C., 2005, ‘Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 11, pp. 125–156
How are diasporas involved in ethnic conflict in their homelands? This paper examines the role of diasporas in north India’s Punjab insurgency and Sri Lanka’s Tamil insurgency. Both Sikhs and Tamils have mobilised financial, diplomatic, social and religious support. But while the Sikh diaspora has never developed a sophisticated over-arching structure, the Tamils have created an infrastructure with considerable global scope and strategy.
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Cederman, L., Girardin, L. and Gleditsch, K. S., 2009, 'Ethnonationalist Triads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars', World Politics, vol.61, no. 3, pp. 403-437
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Although research has generally focused on the role that diaspora groups can have in fuelling violence, members of the diaspora can also be proponents of non-violent, positive social change. For discussion and resources on the role of diasporas in peacebuilding, see the diaspora section under non-state actors and peacebuilding in this guide.

Mobilisation into violence

Processes of mobilisation

People or groups do not haphazardly fight each other, even if stark inequalities or other grievances prevail in a society; rather, they need to be mobilised. An understanding of these processes of mobilisation is critical to understanding and preventing violent conflict.

Research has demonstrated that some form of ideology or legitimising narrative is usually required to mobilise people into collective action – including of a violent nature. Many authors argue that identity-based ideologies are particularly effective: it is easier for leaders to mobilise followers based on ethnicity or religion, as targets are more easily identifiable; loyalties are more fixed and unambiguous; and (in the case religion in particular) there are often ready made networks that can be used for mass recruitment for war efforts. Others stress, however, that identities are socially constructed (see section on identity politics) and that processes of ethnic or religious mobilisation are similar to those in other types of conflict, such as class conflicts. Most authors agree, however, that to be effective, legitimising ideologies must resonate with existing narratives in a society. For example, in Rwanda, research has found that mobilisation required the existence of a collective memory among the Hutu population of a history of oppression at the hands of the Tutsi population, which was then utilised and distorted in the genocidal propaganda.

Kalyvas, S. N, 2008, ‘Ethnic Defection in Civil War’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 41, no. 8, pp. 1043-1068
How common is ethnic defection during civil war? This study examines the relationship between ethnic identity and civil war and points to instances of fluidity in the expression of ethnic identities within civil war. It argues that ethnic defection is best predicted by the extent of territorial control exercised by the main political actors and the level of prior insurgent violence. Ethnic defection is a function of the resources available to political actors. It is important therefore to analyse the internal dynamics of civil wars.
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McDoom, O., 2005, ‘Rwanda's Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide’, Working Paper, no. 77, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London
The theory that state influence alone can trigger genocide is an insufficient explanation of the 1994 genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda. This paper reports on a research project that examines the question of why so many ordinary Hutus participated in the genocide. The bottom-up factor of a Hutu mindset of historic grievances against Tutsis was a necessary pre-condition for genocide of this scale and execution to occur.
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Eck, K., 2009, ‘From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilisation and Conflict Intensification’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 2, pp 369 – 388
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Harpviken, K. B. and Røislien, H. E., 2008, ‘Faithful Brokers? Potentials and Pitfalls of Religion in Peacemaking', Conflict Resolution Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 351-373
What potential do religious actors have for acting as constructive peacemakers? How does the fundamental identity of the peace broker affect the chances of success? This article examines the role of religious actors in peacemaking. Three facets of religion – norms, identity, and organisation – are analysed. Each may feed into the emergence or escalation of conflict, and each is in itself transformed through exposure to armed conflict. Similarly, each facet forms part of the peacemaking potential of religious actors.
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For additional discussion and resources on ethno-religious mobilisation, see identity politics under causes of conflict.

For discussion and resources on the role of religious actors in peacemaking and peacebuilding, see ‘religious peacemaking’ in peacemaking – dialogue and  ‘religious actors’ in non-state actors and peacebuilding.

Micro-dynamics of armed groups

An understanding of the micro-dynamics of conflict is critical in designing strategies to deter individual and group participation in violence and to influence conflict management and peace processes with armed groups.

On an individual level, recent research on participation in civil war (based on surveys of fighters in Sierra Leone) finds that socioeconomic grievances, the expectation of material incentives and personal safety, and social pressures linked to family and community, are all important motivations.  Involuntary participation – the abduction or coercion into service – is also a critical issue. It is important to recognise that the determinants of individual participation and mobilisation are dynamic and vary over time. It is especially challenging for armed groups to motivate people to participate when the risks are high and returns uncertain.

On a group level, the development of armed groups often relies on pre-existing structures and institutional settings. Recent research on the formation of armed groups identifies three key mechanisms through which such groups come into existence: the resort to armed action by opposition that has been violently repressed by government forces; resort to armed action by individuals who feel excluded from neo-patrimonial networks organise; the evolution of state-supported irregular forces into free actors. These differently formed groups vary in their legitimacy and their ability to attract and sustain members and popular support, with the first type of formation having the most legitimacy and stability.

Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J.M., 2008, 'Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 52, no. pp. 436–455
Why do individuals choose to participate in civil war? Why do some individuals fight against the government while others defend the status quo? This study tests the three major theories relating to participation using testimony from ex-combatants who participated in Sierra Leone's civil war. The results indicate the relevance of all three theories: grievance, selective incentives, and social sanctions, directing attention to the interaction between them. Factors such as poverty, a lack of access to education, and political alienation prove to be important in determining participation but the evidence suggests that they may indicate a general susceptibility to engage in violence or a greater vulnerability to political manipulation by elites rather than political grievances.
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Schlichte K., 2009, 'With the State against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups ', Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 246 – 264
How do armed groups develop? This article investigates the formation of armed groups using the concept of figuration, which emphasises the interdependence of individuals. There are three main ways by which armed groups come into being: in response to violent repression, through exclusion from the ruling class and when government-created informal armed forces become free from state control. These mechanisms provide insights into the conditions under which armed groups are likely to form and whether they become institutionalised.
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Kalyvas, S.N., 2008, 'Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research Program: The Microdynamics of Civil War', in Order, Conflict, Violence, eds. S. N. Kalyvas, I. Shapiro and T. Masoud, Cambridge University, Cambridge, pp. 397-421
How can micro-level research on the dynamics of civil war be improved? This chapter analyses micro-level studies of civil war, identifying a mismatch between their micro-level empirical focus and their macro-level conceptual and theoretical focus. This mismatch leads to difficulties that introduce bias: problematic proxies resulting from concept conflation, observational equivalence, endogeneity, overaggregated variables, and the omission of significant variables. Engaging with cases, careful and detailed collection of fine-grained data, and thorough theorisation are therefore needed.
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Social capital and social fragmentation

Social capital refers to the norms, values and institutions that govern social relations and bond communities together, as well as the bridges between communal groups and the state. Research has found that the degree of state responsiveness (vertical social capital) and the extent to which cross-cutting networks of relations among diverse communal groups exist (horizontal social capital) can determine the likelihood of violent conflict.  High levels of social capital indicate a more cohesive society with inclusive mechanisms that can mediate conflicts and prevent violence. Associational forms of engagement that cut across identity groups, such as civic networks, trade unions, agricultural cooperatives and professional associations, can bridge communities.

While social capital can be constructive and support social cohesion and the mitigation of conflict, it can also be perverted and used to hasten social fragmentation and resort to violence. When there is a climate of tension in societies, it is highly likely that associations are separated by conflicting groups whereby each group has, for example, their own student association or teacher union.  This can foster radicalisation of group identities. The absence of cross-cutting groups facilitates the spread of divisive rumours, which can lead to violence. The genocide in Rwanda was preceded by the disappearance of cross-cutting associations and collapse of social capital between groups, combined with the strengthening of ties and social capital within groups. 

Colletta, N. J. and Cullen, M. L., 2000, ‘The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda’, World Bank, Washington
What is the interaction between social capital, social cohesion and violent conflict? How can governments and international actors foster the socially cohesive relations necessary for conflict prevention, rehabilitation and reconciliation? This report uses data from two communities in Cambodia and Rwanda, in high and low intensity conflict areas. It is argued that the higher state responsiveness and cross cutting network relations intersect, the more likely society will have the inclusion and cohesiveness necessary to mediate conflict and prevent violence.
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Pinchotti, S. and Verwimp, P., 2007, ‘Social Capital and the Rwandan Genocide: A Micro-Level Analysis’ Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton
What motivates people to kill their neighbours, friends and family members? Can we understand when genocide will happen and prevent it from recurring? This paper provides analyses case studies from the remote cellules of Akatwa and Nyagasera. Learning to observe and predict shifts in social capital could serve as a way to monitor potential outbreaks of mass violence or genocide. Rwanda needs to reach a balance of strong horizontal associations and decentralized vertical associations.
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Social-psychological elements – humiliation and collective fears

The role of social-psychological factors in mobilisation has been gaining attention in international relations and conflict literature. These perspectives understand conflict as a process driven by collective needs and fears. In the absence of mutual reassurances, parties to the conflict begin to process information in a way that confirms negative images and ignores disconfirming evidence.  This exacerbates fears and results in conflict escalation. 

Humiliation is another emotion that has the potential to mobilise. For example, research has found that humiliation, in particular public humiliation, and feelings of betrayal have strong resonance in Arab culture. They are connected to shame and loss of dignity, both of which are considered to be painful emotions, warranting revenge.  These discourses have increasingly been adopted by transnational militant Islamists and have been successful in mobilising recruits to terrorist activities, in order to avenge humiliation, in a region that had traditionally been highly secular.

Kelman, H. C., 2009, ‘A Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Analysis and Resolution’, in Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, eds., D. J. D. Sandole, S. Byrne, I. Sandole-Staroste, and J. Senehi, Routledge, Oxon and New York, pp. 171-183
How can social-psychological theory and research inform the analysis and resolution of international conflict? This chapter outlines psychological processes that promote the escalation and perpetuation of conflict. A conflict relationship generates images and norms that entrench conflict and create barriers to change. Conflict resolution work must therefore identify possibilities and conditions for change and overcome resistance to change.
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Fattah, K. and Fierke, K. M., 2009, ‘A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 67-93 
What role does emotion play in political violence in the Middle East? Why are discourses of humiliation so pervasive in the region? This article explores why humiliation provides such a powerful motivation for political violence. Both militant Islamists and the United States, through its War on Terror, have exacerbated the sense of humiliation in the region. The principle of human dignity needs to be used to rethink the international approach to the Middle East.
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