Topic Guide on
Security Sector Reform
About this guide

How can states develop a secure environment based on development, rule of law, good governance and local ownership of security actors? How does reform of the security sector relate to development? How can civil society be involved in security sector reform? What is the proper role of the private companies in the security sector? What can security sector reform accomplish in post-conflict areas?

This guide provides an introduction to a few of the key recent debates for development practitioners involved in security sector reform. It includes academic articles, donor reports and case studies from a range of developing countries.

The chapters of this topic guide were prepared by researchers at the Global Facilitation Network on Security Sector Reform and the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre between 2006 and 2010.

About the GSDRC

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) provides cutting-edge knowledge services on demand and online. It aims to help reduce poverty by informing policy and practice in relation to governance, social development, humanitarian response and conflict. The GSDRC receives core funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).

www.gsdrc.org

Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)
International Development Department, College of Social Sciences
University of Birmingham, UK

The content of this guide was first published by GFN-SSR (the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform) between 2006 and 2010. Currently inactive, GFN-SSR worked to promote a better understanding of security and justice sector reform through the provision of information, advice and expertise to practitioners, academics and policymakers.

This edition was published by the GSDRC in January 2013.

© DFID Crown Copyright 2013
Contents

Introduction to security sector reform ................................................................. 4
  What is security sector reform? ........................................................................ 4
  Where is a good place to start? ...................................................................... 5
  Key texts on security sector reform ................................................................. 5
  Civilian oversight and accountability ............................................................. 6
  Financial management of the security sector .................................................. 7
  Additional information resources ................................................................. 8

Security and development ................................................................................... 9
  Where is a good place to start? ...................................................................... 9
  What is security? ............................................................................................ 9
  Links between security and development ..................................................... 10
  Donor strategies ............................................................................................ 11
  Responsibility to protect ............................................................................... 12
  Peacekeeping .................................................................................................. 13
  Human rights and security ............................................................................ 13
  Additional information resources .................................................................. 13

Civil society and security sector reform ........................................................... 14
  Where is a good place to start? ...................................................................... 14
  The role and relevance of civil society to SSR in different contexts ............... 15
  Role of media .................................................................................................. 15
  Community based and participatory approaches to security reform ............. 16
  Vulnerable groups, hidden voices and gender aware approaches to security reform .............................................................................................................. 16

Private military companies .................................................................................. 19
  Where is a good place to start? ...................................................................... 19
  Government policy towards PMCs ............................................................... 19
  PMC and SSR .................................................................................................. 20
  Case Studies .................................................................................................... 21

Weapons reduction and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration ............. 23
  Where is a good place to start? ...................................................................... 23
  Managing small arms and light weapons (SALW) ......................................... 23
  Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration ............................................ 24
  Additional information resources .................................................................. 25

Regional guides to security sector reform ........................................................ 27
Introduction to security sector reform

What is security sector reform?

Security is a core aspect of the vulnerability of the poor. Unprofessional, inefficient and unaccountable security institutions threaten human rights, democratic politics and the achievement of poverty reduction goals. Security sector reform (SSR) aims to develop a secure environment based on development, rule of law, good governance and local ownership of security actors. In countries at risk of conflict or in post-conflict contexts, SSR can be of central importance for stability or conflict prevention. Sometimes SSR is referred to as security sector transformation (SST) or security sector governance (SSG).

The security sector can be defined in a variety of ways. The resources below cover the military, paramilitary, police, intelligence, and border and customs authorities. The resources focus on making security institutions appropriate, affordable and accountable to democratic oversight and control. The reality in most countries is that these services are delivered by a large number of actors. Some are state agencies and services, but some are likely to be non-state organisations and systems. Although the state has an irreducible role in justice and security provision, effective reform across the system requires working with a broad spectrum of actors:

- **Core security actors:** armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).

- **Management and oversight bodies:** the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

- **Justice and the rule of law:** judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems.

- **Non-statutory security forces:** liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, political party militias.

All of the above are interlinked and – as experience has shown – trying to develop one specific security area without considering the effect upon and affect from others is likely to result in a project with limited if not negative impact.
Where is a good place to start?


How can governance reforms foster a secure environment that is conducive to poverty reduction and sustainable development? What are the key components of security? This guide suggests that the traditional concept of security is being redefined: the concept of security is being broadened to include well-being and human rights; security and development are increasingly seen as inextricably linked; and security is now seen as involving legal, social, and economic instruments in addition to the military. The document sets out key concepts and principles of SSR and suggests ways to support it in developing countries.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1150

Key texts on security sector reform

Recent years have seen the growth of a huge literature on security sector reform. The following documents are a short selection covering both practical guidance and analyses of the wider context and the politics of reform.


This paper provides an overview of the content and process of donor engagement in security sector reform and the linkage to broader governance issues. It addresses the need for a co-ordinated approach within government amongst stakeholders’ ministries and departments and the challenges involved in making this a reality.


This paper argues that wider and more innovative reform – security sector ‘transformation’ – would be a way of addressing the issues of socio-political dynamics of civil-military relations, as well as taking account of the political economy of conflict. It concludes with a number of detailed recommendations that the UK might address and points out that, while in developed states there are signs that policy coordination has increased, there is still a risk that policy can be co-opted by special interest groups, notably military-industrial actors, whose interests may not always coincide with security sector reform in conflict prone societies.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/294

This collaborative research from the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, Witwatersrand University and other partner institutions examines the governance of security in developing and former communist countries. It makes recommendations as to emerging best practice.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/768


Extraordinary resources and efforts are being invested in SSR in South-eastern Europe. However, whose interests are served by SSR activities in the region? This chapter claims that temporary foreign actors are driving the demand, financing, and mechanisms of accountability for SSR. Instead of turning authoritarian regimes into democratic regimes, in which security is right for the citizens, external actors are motivated by a policy of ‘containment’, which aims to protect Western European countries against the effects of regional instability.


In recent years, security sector reform has become an important feature of the international development agenda. Yet there are almost no tools to help governments assess the quality of democratic security sector governance, and plan and implement sector reforms. This framework aims to fill that gap by identifying security sector governance needs and developing a strategy to address them.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/845


What is the added value of regional or sub-regional approaches to SSR and conflict prevention strategies? This article argues that the UK government and other donors should assist in establishing or further developing regional and sub-regional SSR programmes due to the cross-border nature of many security challenges. Equally, donors should strengthen their ties with established regional mechanisms and institutions to facilitate links between SSR programmes and wider conflict prevention activities.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1756


Civilian oversight and accountability

Civilian oversight and accountability is needed to ensure that state-military relations are conducive to democratic politics and that human security is promoted as well as national security. This can be difficult to achieve where there are complex technical issues at stake, vested interests and cultures of secrecy.
Approaches in this area often include building the capacity and expertise of a variety of state institutions, including governments, legislatures, judicial institutions, ombudsmen and complaints bodies. Non-state actors can also play an important role and some approaches seek to strengthen the capacity of civil society watchdog organisations.


Why is parliamentary oversight of the security sector necessary? What is the role of parliament and how is it best performed? This handbook provides a comprehensive picture of current security issues and deals exhaustively with all aspects of parliamentary oversight of the security sector.


This extensively referenced paper is the first survey of Commonwealth Parliaments’ security sector committees. It emphasises the need for democratic and civilian oversight of security forces leading to an effective security sector, good governance and human rights protection. The paper highlights an ambitious range of country studies. The rationale is to provide a spectrum of nations and socio-economic contexts. Sri Lanka, Nigeria, South Africa, Barbados and St Lucia are reviewed in detail.


What does the concept of civil society bring to our understanding of SSR and inversely, how does SSR further our understanding of civil society? This working paper argues that an SSR perspective enables an understanding of the relationship between civil society actors and the various sectors of security policy. Inversely, an examination of SSR through the prism of civil society emphasises issues of accountability, participation, and ultimately, the legitimacy of governance.


Financial management of the security sector

Reform of inefficient and unaccountable security sector expenditure is important for democratic control and for effective use of public finances. This includes making sure expenditure is transparent and within the budget, and allocating resources according to priorities within the security sector and between sectors. ‘Right-sizing’ the security sector aims to ensure that expenditure is appropriate, and does not divert resources from other areas such as development. Tackling corruption in security sector expenditure is important for bringing the sector under civilian control, and for reducing the informal political power of security actors.


The importance of security to development has become widely recognised in recent years. Yet donor involvement in providing support to the security sector lacks a coherent framework, particularly in the area...
of defence. This report argues that donors need to accept security and the defence sector as one core component of a well functioning public sector and adjust their policies accordingly. The report presents options for the World Bank and other donors for incorporating the defence sector into public expenditure work.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/645

Section Four of the IPU/DCAF handbook below provides information about promoting parliamentary control over security budgets.


Why is parliamentary oversight of the security sector necessary? What is the role of parliament and how is it best performed? This handbook provides a comprehensive picture of current security issues and deals exhaustively with all aspects of parliamentary oversight of the security sector.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1041

Additional information resources

Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC)
BICC is an NGO working to promote peace and development through the transformation of military-related processes, functions, assets and structures. It produces online papers on a broad range of issues relevant to SSR, including economics, small arms, voice and accountability, and preventative conversion.
http://www.bicc.de/

Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College London
CDS carries out research on British, European and International security issues, including work with the British Government.
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/cds/index.aspx

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
DCAF is an international foundation made up of member governments, aiming to support security sector reform and the strengthening of democratic governance of the security sector. It carries out networking activities, provides support to parliaments and produces lessons learned.
http://www.dcaf.ch/

Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria
This research institute based in South Africa carries out research, consultancy and training, and houses many online documents on security and justice across Southern Africa.
http://www.iss.co.za
Security and development

There are many different ideas about what security means and whose security donors and development practitioners should focus on. This guide uses DFID’s concept of security, defined as the physical security of poor people.

Where is a good place to start?


What are the connections between security and development? This paper argues that there is a symbiotic relationship between the two. Traditional interpretations of security that focus on military solutions are inadequate for developing countries and for preventing global terrorism. The paper instead interprets security as human security, and within this category focuses on political violence as an important source of insecurity.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1468


The nexus between development and peace has become a central focus of development thinking and practice. What should the relationship between development aid and peace building be? This article presents and critiques a typology of seven ways in which this interaction has historically been conceived.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1643


SSR is fundamental to the promotion of peace, stability and sustainable development. This document outlines the joint SSR strategy of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of peace in fragile countries require a coherent response across the UK government. A joint SSR strategy helps to achieve such coherence and to refine the UK’s overarching policies and objectives on security-related issues in developing countries.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1936

What is security?

‘Security’ is a concept that has been interpreted in different ways. It has historically been understood to mean the security of the state. Recently, the more people-centred concept of ‘human security’ has emerged which considers a new range of threats and emphasises that poverty, illness and human rights violations kill far more people than wars. However, ‘human security’ is a very broad concept and can be seen as synonymous with ‘development’. In line with DFID policy, this page focuses on ‘security’ as the physical security of poor people. Although this is related to the security of states, it is possible to enhance state security without improving the human security of poor communities living within those borders. Focusing on the physical insecurity of poor people requires the promotion of capable and accountable states that
Security and development

deliver security and justice for all citizens, including the poor. In practice this means understanding ‘drivers’ of insecurity at local, national and regional levels, supporting security and justice sector reform programmes, enhancing social cohesion and inclusion, and promoting women’s empowerment.

What is the link between security and development? What is the best way to achieve both? This strategy paper outlines how DFID, through its commitment to fighting poverty, can help tackle insecurity among the poor. It explains the complex connections between security and development and sets out how DFID can build security by working with poor people, their governments, and international partners.


Security has historically been considered the responsibility of the state, but the evolution of threats has altered this understanding. How should the world now respond? This paper argues that as threats challenge our collective capacity to respond, there is a case for rebuilding the foundation of our multilateral system and adapting it to the realities of an interdependent world.


Links between security and development

There has been anxiety amongst development practitioners that incorporating security issues into their work will mean prioritising the security concerns of Western donors above humanitarian principles and developmental aims. Their concern is over whose security is given priority – the security of the donors, the local states or the poor? In promoting the security of the poor, development actors will increasingly be required to collaborate with international and national security professionals. This is challenging as the two disciplines have not routinely worked together and often have different approaches, priorities and terminology. This can cause tension, for example security personnel may want to focus on building the capacity of elite units in intelligence forces whilst development actors view pro-poor institutional reform in the areas of security and justice as the priority.

The growing interaction between security and development staff presents an opportunity for development thinking to influence the security agenda, ensuring more holistic, effective engagement in insecure and conflict areas. However, it also presents operational concerns about ensuring the safety of development personnel and ensuring that the military are not undertaking ‘development’ work that could be better carried out by development professionals.

‘No development without security’ is proving more and more to be a development policy paradigm, one that calls for new approaches in the field. What are the implications of this trend? This paper argues that convergence between security and development may enhance overall coherence between these previously diverse agendas. However, international donors and in particular, Germany, should redefine the position of
development policy in relation to other external policy fields to avoid the risk of overlapping competences and the subordination of development to military interests.


Over the past decade the importance of integrating security and development policies has been heavily emphasised. What are the impediments to designing security and development policies that are compatible and mutually reinforcing? How far have they been integrated in practice? This paper draws on recent research to examine the relationship between security and development policies. It argues that international policies are not equal to the developmental and security challenges facing developing countries in the 21st century.


What are the problems of state-reconstruction in war-torn societies? This paper examines the role of international actors in the hugely ambitious project of rebuilding states after war. The study argues that the traditional linear model of conflict progression as pre-, during, and post-conflict, with attendant progression from relief to reconstruction and development, is too simplistic. Effective interventions must take account of individual contexts, have national ‘buy-in’, and must be founded on good political and moral principles to gain legitimacy.


Donor strategies

As research has emphasised the conceptual links between security and development, donors have been forced to rethink their internal structures and develop new strategies for dealing with this multi-dimensional topic. The resources below outline the approaches of some of the major bi-lateral donors.


How do security issues impact on development activities in post-conflict transitional societies? Is there a gap between external donor policies on security reform and implementation by local partner institutions? Is it possible to promote a coordinated strategy among donors? This paper argues for stronger collaboration among bilateral and multilateral institutions to improve coordination and ensure local ownership of security.


How can the UK improve its strategic approach to countries at risk of instability? This paper outlines the challenges and risks of instability. It identifies practical steps the UK Government can take to improve its prevention and response strategies in partnership with other international actors. It argues that more
Effective action will require common or aligned strategic approaches across all countries and key international agencies.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1684

The changes that have taken place in the world since the Millennium Declaration demand that consensus be revitalised on key challenges and priorities. What are these and how can they best be achieved? This report suggests that security, development and human rights must be advanced together, otherwise none will succeed. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can be met by 2015, but only if all governments dramatically increase their efforts.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1577

How is Africa’s crime rate affecting development prospects? What short- and long-term measures are available to reduce crime rates? This report examines the issue of crime in Africa and its connection with underdevelopment, and gives suggestions for action by policy makers. It argues that crime is an under-appreciated source of suffering in Africa and that it is essential to understand the dynamics between conflict, crime, corruption and development.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1592

Responsibility to protect
The security and development debate has created great policy challenges regarding the nature of security, humanitarian or development interventions and the changing concept of sovereignty. Is sovereignty a smokescreen that hides failing political leaders and their human rights violations, or is it a necessary defence against the encroachment of stronger states and a vitally important recognition of equal status?

When, if ever, is it appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state? This paper argues that where a population is suffering serious harm and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1488

Humanitarian issues have temporarily been downgraded on the public policy agenda, but what should be the correct response when reports of massacres, mass starvation, rape, and ethnic cleansing emerge in the future? This study analyses the work ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. It argues that although the research has some shortcomings it does provide an essential framework for when military intervention for human protection purposes is required.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1464
Peacekeeping

The section above deals with the macro issues of intervention. The following resource is a comprehensive review of more micro aspects of peacekeeping activities.


In 2000, the Brahimi Report made recommendations for improving peace operations, but insufficient progress has taken place since. This synthesis report explores why this is the case. The report is based on a comprehensive review of three core peace operations in East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, as well as insights from ongoing operations in Afghanistan. It argues that whilst the continuing relevance of the Brahimi Report needs to be recognised, it does have limitations in light of developments on the ground.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1636

Human rights and security

Whilst rigid enforcement of state security is often perceived as a potential threat to human rights, the concepts of ‘human rights’ and ‘human security’ have much in common. The article below argues that both are emancipatory, people-centred discourses designed to protect the individual and so they must be placed at the top of the ‘security and development’ agenda.


What is the future for states and markets? Will they be developed to protect individuals or in spite of them? This study argues that human rights and human security are linked because they challenge the two structures that dominate our lives: states and markets. Using the case of Sri Lanka, the study suggests that we need to think of people, not the state, as the central security concern. We also need to use the human rights discourse to mitigate the threat of uncontrolled markets to human security.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1449

Additional information resources

Human Security Gateway is a research and information database which hosts online resources on human security.

http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/
Civil society and security sector reform

The term ‘civil society’ is often used with imprecision, but is generally understood to encompass areas of activity that take place outside of both the state and the market. It includes a wide range of actors through which citizens can articulate their views and priorities – including non-governmental organisations, grassroots organisations, professional organisations, religious groups, labour organisations and the media.

However, there is little substantive discussion of how civil society actors can influence decisions on security and defence involving the military, police, intelligence services and judiciary.

Some argue that the role of civil society is little understood by the military and defence sectors, which have traditionally been resistant to public input. Others state that civil society doesn’t have either the necessary expertise or interest needed to provide an informed input into what is a uniquely specialised policy area. Therefore, a major objective of SSR is to make the sector more democratic and accountable to citizens and communities, and more responsive to their needs.

Where is a good place to start?

Civil society can and should play an important role in encouraging the state to fulfil its responsibilities transparently and accountably. Civil society often seeks to influence policy, provide an alternative analysis, and help educate and inform policy makers and the wider society. The range of functions include advocacy, education, informal oversight, independent monitoring, policy support and service delivery. Donors often espouse the importance of local ownership and civil society to SSR, but in many cases their policies actually impede deep and meaningful involvement.


Why is civil society involvement important in SSR? Can civil society influence government accountability and policy formation? What are the challenges for civil society in promoting democratic security sector governance? Ball argues that the existence of unprofessional and unaccountable security forces derives from the failure to develop democratic systems. Possibilities for civil society involvement vary according to context and are dependent upon the overall state of democratic governance in that particular context. There are both internal and external challenges to civil society involvement in the security sector. Internal challenges include a lack of expertise and confidence or unwillingness to engage. External problems include government suspicion and donor policies that give inadequate attention to strengthening democratic governance.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4450


What is civil society? How can it contribute to democratic governance of the security sector? This introductory chapter explores these questions and provides an overview of subsequent chapters which explore the role of civil society (including the media) in post-communist Europe. It argues that civil society
Civil society and security sector reform

in post-communist Europe is still weak and has been hampered by both a lack of civil society interest in and expertise of security issues. Donor policies have hindered civil society involvement by preoccupying themselves with legal frameworks, institutional reforms and direct security assistance.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4448

The role and relevance of civil society to SSR in different contexts


What potential and opportunities exist for substantive civil society engagement with the military in Zambia? How can civil society help ensure the democratisation of the military to civilian control? Despite recent democratisation, civil society in Zambia has failed to take a leading role in the democratisation of the military. The institutional environment limits civil society organisations’ participation in security matters, but civil society organisations themselves have little willingness to engage and seem content with viewing the military as a remote and distinct entity. The paper argues that civil society in Zambia has a vital role in: (1) collaborating on the defence policy and budget, and (2) exposing corruption, bad practice and abuses of power.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4453


What role does civil society have in reconstructing the security sector in post-conflict environments? What lessons can be learnt from Bosnia and Herzegovina? Civil society in post-conflict environments remains insufficiently involved and underused. The extent of civil society’s influence depends on the nature of the state: civil society can fulfil its roles within an intact and functioning state but is severely limited in post-conflict environments where the state has collapsed. Bosnia and Herzegovina is notable for the interventionist approach to peace-building taken by the international community. This has resulted in a situation where non-governmental organisations have been more responsive to donor priorities than their own constituencies. The paper states that sustainability of civil society organisations can only be ensured if they reflect the interests of and are accountable to their constituencies.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4459

Role of media

The media is an integral part of civil society and has a vital role to play in enabling society to scrutinise security related decisions. However, as yet, the role and agency of the media in different contexts has been the subject of little research.


Has democratisation in Croatia improved transparency and accountability in issues of defence reform? What sort of relationship exists between the security establishment and the media? This paper argues that a history of non-transparency during the communist rule has had an impact on contemporary media-military
relations. Progress has been made since secession in the early 1990s and freedom of information and association is now widely recognised. However, certain military related issues, such as army budgets and the costs of entrance into NATO, remain closed to public scrutiny. On its part, the media is also failing to provide analysis and inform the public of key issues relating to defence reform.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4463

Community based and participatory approaches to security reform

Participatory approaches are designed as bottom-up processes where local communities undertake research themselves, identify priorities for action and are then involved in addressing their own local problems. Such approaches are popular amongst the development community as a means of empowering communities and generating local ownership. As yet, they have not been prevalent in the security sphere, but there are some emerging examples of bottom-up and grassroots approaches to SSR.

SEESAC, 2007, ‘Philosophy and Principles of Community Based Policing (3rd edition)’, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade

Before the political upheaval of the 1990s, police forces in the former Yugoslavia and Albania were centralised and repressive components of the state apparatus. Since then, various initiatives have been undertaken to address the numerous problems of police forces in the region. This has provided an opportunity to introduce community based policing (CBP). This policy document aims to set out the principles and key issues of undertaking successful CBP. It emphasises the importance of a strategic management process in undertaking CBP and, based on this, outlines a ‘model’ for CBP.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4428


How should the success of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) schemes be measured? How can participatory methods shed light on the security concerns of people affected by the spread and misuse of arms? This report summarises the findings of a research project undertaken to explore the applicability of participatory approaches to weapons collection activities in Mali, Cambodia and Albania. It argues that approaches to designing and evaluating DDR schemes are often top-down and derived externally from local communities. Participatory monitoring and evaluation involved local communities in all elements of the process, and this can help define indicators of success that reflect the security aspirations of beneficiaries.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4494

Vulnerable groups, hidden voices and gender aware approaches to security reform

Security is cited as a priority concern by the poorest and most marginalised. Insecurity affects these groups in unique ways, and security decisions are often taken without prior consideration of their particular needs and priorities. In particular, very few women (and organisations representing women’s interests) enter into debates and discussions surrounding the security sector. The security sector affects women and children in different ways, particularly when public security diminishes and security forces become predatory. It is therefore imperative that SSR attends to the security needs of the most vulnerable groups in society,
including women, children, indigenous groups and other communities who are discriminated against or socially or politically excluded.


According to this major World Bank study, insecurity and vulnerability are priority concerns of the poor. The study used participatory methods to gather the views, experiences, and aspirations of more than 60,000 poor men and women from 60 countries. Poor people, particularly women and children, consider persecution by the police and lack of justice, as well as civil conflict and war, as key sources of insecurity. Insecurity has a profound impact on well-being; it disrupts lives and can ultimately have detrimental impacts on livelihood and survival strategies of the poor.


This book aims to contribute to operationalising donor countries’ policy commitments to local ownership of SSR. Chapter 5 focuses on citizens and vulnerable groups as the primary beneficiaries of SSR. It argues that the security sector tends to be much less responsive and people-centred than other sectors of the state. Even when such conditions for a functioning civil society are favourable, vulnerable groups lack the organisational means to influence governments and are often neglected in the government’s security priorities. The chapter proposes a number of strategies to ensure that SSR meets the needs of vulnerable groups, including ‘local security survey’ templates to help identify and address the security needs of poor communities.


What role have vulnerable sections of society played in developing the concept of SSR? How can proponents of SSR ensure that the voices and opinions of women and the ‘dispossessed’ are heard and acted upon? These questions are explored in this paper, which is part of the Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series. Violence against women (particularly domestic violence) and the insecurity it promotes is drastically under-scrutinised in discussions about the security sector. This is despite the fact that non-mainstream voices have played a key role in challenging, shaping and expanding our collective understanding of security. An in-depth assessment of SSR is impossible without gaining access to the insights of those who are socially excluded – most of whom have little or no access to decision-making bodies. The paper offers suggestions for addressing this situation.


This toolkit publication from Women Waging Peace and International Alert aims to be a resource for women peace builders. It outlines the components of peace building from conflict prevention to post-conflict.
reconstruction and highlights the role that women play in each of these. Section Three focuses on the role of women in security, how they can contribute and the international policies that exist to promote their inclusion. Examples are provided of how women can contribute to SSR through their involvement in the security forces, parliament, government and civil society.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4460


This paper from Women Waging Peace explores how women have helped shape the post-apartheid security sector in South Africa. Women in their various roles as academics, activists, ANC members and cadres, and grassroots civil society actors, have helped shape and articulate a broad and inclusive vision of security for National Security Review as part of a national security review. It was largely due to the insistence of women that the Review review was undertaken as a nationwide consultative process, effectively democratising the debate and enabling citizens to articulate their own security concerns. The paper identifies several strategies issued by the South African Ministry of Defence to promote the inclusion of women in the security sector.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4461
Private military companies

The terms Private Military Company (PMC) and Private Security Company (PSC) have been used exclusively and interchangeably in different contexts. Technically the difference is between the services that each provide. A PMC will typically provide military combat services (offensive and/or defensive) as well as military training and intelligence. As opposed to this, PSCs will provide actual security for commercial interests and/or government interests, close protection of VIPs, risk assessment and risk analyses. However, with the diversification of these companies and the massive contracts that they now command, there is a huge overlap in the work they do, and it is not uncommon to find major PMCs and PSCs offering the same service. The topic guide will use the term PMC to refer to both of these companies.

Where is a good place to start?

What are PMCs? Are they more cost-effective than the military? How does domestic law apply to them? What international regulations have been proposed for PMCs? This short document provides an overview of the reasons PMCs are employed and the legal framework in which they operate. This legal framework includes both national law (of the countries in which PMCs act and the countries in which they are based) and international law. The diversity of this legal situation is illustrated by a comparison of the different legal approaches taken by the United States and South Africa.
Full document: http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/34953/525123/file/bg_private-military-companies.pdf

Goddard, S., 2001, ‘The Private Military Company: A Legitimate International Entity Within Modern Conflict’, A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA
This thesis tracks the development of PMCs from the start of operations of Sandline, Executive Outcomes, and Military Professional Resources Inc. These three PMCs were involved in controversial events in Africa and Europe and brought PMC activity to public attention and scrutiny. The thesis focuses on the PMCs that have a strategic political and security impact on the countries in which they operate and attempts to define their role and the legitimacy of their existence and services offered.

Government policy towards PMCs

As private, commercially led institutions in conflict areas PMCs have received a lot of attention and there are many concerns over their roles in conflicts. As PMCs operate in a grey area of the law and are paid to carry out security services, many critics are concerned at the way in which there appears to be a lack of accountability in areas where government agencies would be held accountable. This green paper defines what a PMC is, what its function is, and what are acceptable contracts for it to undertake and what are not, and discusses the various regulatory options available for the UK government in dealing with PMCs. It also gives detailed examples of where PMCs have been active in the past and why the industry should be
Private military companies

regulated.


Why must a specific set of regulations for PMCs be made and what should they be? Should the spotlight be on actors themselves or on activities and their consequences? What scope should there be for a licensing system? This paper discusses the FCO’s green paper ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’ and proposes a multi-regulatory system which includes international bans on unlawful participation in armed conflicts, a licensing system for PMCs, and a code of conduct for them to operate under.

*One-page summary:* [http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4482](http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4482)


This report builds on the findings of the FCO’s green paper ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’, surveying existing regulation of PMCs and the problems and benefits of a regulated private military sector, leading to a series of recommendations to guide the UK government in regulating and using PMCs. This paper also includes an annex of PMCs and PSCs contracted by HMG departments abroad.

*Full document:* [http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/92202.htm](http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/92202.htm)


This paper contains a comparative analysis of two different government approaches to regulating PMCs, including the historical background which led to the status quo in each country. The paper focuses on Western countries as it is Western countries who employ PMCs the most and use them for their own interests. The paper also analyses government use of PMCs with reference to the use of public/private partnerships in other areas of governance.

*Full document:* [http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/portlandarchive/krahmann.pdf](http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/portlandarchive/krahmann.pdf)

**PMC and SSR**

The role of the private sector in providing support to or carrying out SSR is controversial due to the sensitivities surrounding SSR and the mainly commercial nature of PMCs. The potential for misusing the services of these private firms has been discussed in the following papers:


This paper examines PMCs as part of the program of SSR to achieve democratic control of those institutions that exercise force on behalf of the civilian community. In order to factor the role of PSCs into SSR the paper maps out duties and roles as well as legislation that includes both areas. The paper advocates placing restrictions on physical operations and the use of weapons, as well as the prohibition of political affiliations or ties between political parties and the private security industry. The paper draws heavily on the Sarajevo
Code of Conduct for PSCs, a set of guidelines and principles aimed at improving professionalism within the private security industry.  

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4411

This paper looks at regulation of private sector involvement within SSR and how the use of private firms in SSR makes oversight more complicated but even more of a necessity, particularly if, as the paper forecasts, outsourcing SSR operations to the private sector increases. The paper also names a set of risks that must be mitigated as much as possible prior to commissioning the private sector in SSR efforts.  

Full document: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Goodcompanyweb.pdf

Case Studies

Singer, P., 2004, ‘The Private Military Industry in Iraq; What have we learned and where to next?’, DCAF, Geneva  
Singer looks at examples in Iraq where there were obvious benefits in outsourcing various tasks to PMCs. However, he makes it clear that there were also serious concerns that must be addressed in order for the positive aspects of PMC involvement not to be undermined, particularly the total lack of accountability of the PMCs in Iraq and their involvement in local conflict; these problems are still to be solved. One of the key reasons for this lack of accountability, Singer believes, is that the industry is wholly financially motivated, disregarding any moral, ethical or legal boundaries. He then suggests possible future steps to counter this serious problem.  

Full document: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots783=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=14132

Isenberg details the PMCs operating in Iraq and the way they are staffed (both local and international staff). He looks at the lack of civilian oversight and regulation under international law, and recommends that certain safeguards need to be placed to regulate not just the PMCs but also the client who hires the PMCs. The example of the Abu Ghraib scandal is looked at, with lessons learnt from how the involvement of PMCs in the scandal. The paper also suggests the extension of the International Court of Justice to include PMCs, the negotiation of a convention on the use of PMCs by an occupying force, and the harmonisation of national laws regarding PMCs.  

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4458

This report covers Romania, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro (at time of publication), Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Croatia, providing detailed accounts of the participation of PMCs and PSCs in these countries and their effect on the internal security of these countries. It acknowledges that there has been huge growth in the industry, and that governments should work with the more progressive elements of this industry to regulate and monitor their operations. The report also
Private military companies

recommends that vetting be an integral pre-condition to awarding contracts and that the role of the public and private sectors in providing security be clearly defined.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4418
Weapons reduction and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

High levels of armed violence in both conflict-affected and ostensibly peaceful societies are often a sign of a weak security sector. In countries where the government cannot provide security for the population, recourse to arms is widespread. In these cases, violence can become a way of life and a means of making a living. The resources on this page consider the design and effectiveness of programmes to integrate ex-combatants into society and to reduce the availability of small arms and light weapons in developing countries.

Where is a good place to start?


How effectively have disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes and weapons reduction initiatives managed the transition from war to peace in post-conflict societies? How can future interventions maximise the chances of securing peace? This chapter from a work published by the Small Arms Survey examines the history of DDR and weapons reduction programmes to identify lessons learnt during past interventions. It argues that future programmes need to exhibit clearer objectives, better co-ordination and improved integration into broader political and developmental reforms.


Managing small arms and light weapons (SALW)

The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons provides a market for arms trafficking, facilitates corruption, and prevents the security sector from functioning effectively. Programmes to reduce armed violence aim to take weapons out of circulation and restrict their supply to help break this cycle.

The following two documents outline the UK government’s approach to managing SALW.

2004, UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light Weapons


Although armed violence poses significant obstacles to poverty reduction, few development agencies have addressed small arms issues in their policies or programmes. In April 2003, small arms experts and development agency representatives came together to discuss ways of making arms controls more development sensitive. The report highlights key findings and recommendations from this workshop.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/783

The resources below explore the impact of the global arms trade and the availability of small arms on human development and poverty reduction.

The uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of arms by government forces and armed groups takes a massive human toll in lost lives, lost livelihoods and lost opportunities to escape poverty. What action is required at international, national and local level to control arms proliferation? In this report, Amnesty International and Oxfam argue that governments can and must do more to control arms proliferation effectively. Better co-ordination between governments is needed to address both the trade in arms and safety at community level.


This report addresses the issue of how practitioners can assess and deal with the impact of small arms on development interventions, recommending a preventative approach that goes beyond interventions focussed only on security and disarmament. Violence using small arms is a major contributing factor to increased poverty and human insecurity. Small arms are cheap, portable and available, and are the weapons of choice in civil war and organised crime. Their direct impacts on human development are death and injury.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/466


What effect does small arms violence have on development? How have development agencies and governments sought to tackle small arms use? This chapter analyses the social, economic and human cost of small arms use around the world. It argues that such violence causes widespread damage to developing societies, and outlines developmental responses aimed at cutting demand for small arms, regulating their use and destroying surplus stocks.


Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants into peacetime economic and social life is essential for restoring security. DDR programmes are complex and include political negotiations, humanitarian relief, the technical aspects of weapon disposal and socio-economic interventions to provide livelihoods, training and skills. DDR is an important aspect of security sector reform during transitions to peace. The following documents provide an introduction to the subject.


Policy analysts have debated the organisational factors that contribute to successful DDR programmes, but little is known about the factors that account for success at the micro level. What are the individual level determinants of successful demobilisation and reintegration? This research finds that an individual’s prospects of gaining acceptance depend largely on the abusiveness of the unit in which he or she fought. There is no evidence that participation in internationally funded DDR programs improves an individual’s
chance of acceptance by their families or communities.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1725

What is the state of the DDR programme in Angola? What recommendations can be given for the current and future re-integration of post-conflict Angola? This paper written for the Institute of Security Studies looks at the DDR process in Angola, its evolution over decades of civil war, and the lessons which can be drawn from the Angolan experience.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/663

Recent studies show the increasing extent that women operate as combatants in regular and irregular armies in conflict. How can DDR programmes become more gender-sensitised? This study examines men’s and women’s active involvement in warfare, their gender-specific roles, and gender relations within armies, and discusses the challenges for DDR programmes in targeting female ex-combatants.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1430

What are the specific needs of women in post-conflict reconstruction? How can gender mainstreaming contribute to the success of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, repatriation and resettlement (DDR(RR)) programmes? This study examines pioneering efforts to introduce gender mainstreaming into DDR(RR) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It argues that paying equal attention to men and women in the theory, design and practical implementation of DDR(RR) programmes is crucial to their success.

One-page summary: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display/document/legacyid/1364

Additional information resources
The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project based in Geneva. Its website provides access to their numerous publications, including yearbooks, occasional papers, special reports and a book series.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/

The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR) was initiated by the Swedish government in 2004. SIDDR aims to contribute to the planning and implementation of DDR activities and has several resources available on their website.
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNDIR) takes a people-centred approach to its research on security, disarmament and development.
PeaceWomen (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) host several resources focusing on the gender dimensions of small arms and DDR.
http://www.peacewomen.org/themes_theme.php?id=9

GSDRC Topic Guide on Conflict
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/conflict
Regional guides to security sector reform

The following regional guides were published by GFN-SSR (the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform). They were last updated in October 2010.

**Southeast Asia**

**Southern Africa**

**South-Eastern and Eastern Europe**

**East Africa**

**West Africa**

**Latin America and the Caribbean**

**Arab Middle East**