Recent literature on instability and intrastate conflict in Zimbabwe

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Question

What recent (last two years) literature (reports, assessments, analysis) exists which assesses and analyses instability and intrastate conflict in Zimbabwe?

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1. Overview

There is consensus in the recent (2011-13) literature on Zimbabwe that although the country has stabilised considerably since the last elections in 2008, the risk of internal conflict during the period surrounding the 2013 elections is high. The principal factors underpinning the potential for conflict are:

- The bitter divisions among the main political parties, the apparent desire to seek power at any cost, and the established practice of using violence as a political tactic.

- The aftermath of the ‘Fast Track’ land reform initiative, which has left controversies over allocation of land.
- Unresolved issues about justice for abuses carried out in the elections of 2008.
- The diamond trade and the triangular relationship between control of diamonds, the security forces, and the Zanu-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front).
- The destabilising influence of the arms trade and particularly China’s role in supporting the current regime.

Experts contacted in the course of preparing this report commented that there has been little research published recently on Zimbabwe. The most recent commentary on last week’s (31 July 2013) elections has not yet appeared in peer-reviewed journals or other research publications; commentary appearing in the news media has not been included in this report.

2. Synthesis articles


This report from the independent NGO International Crisis Group finds that a return to protracted political crisis, and possibly extensive violence, is likely, as Zimbabwe holds inadequately prepared presidential, parliamentary and local elections. Conditions for a free and fair vote do not exist: confidence in the process and institutions is low, the voters roll is a shambles, security forces are unreformed and the media are grossly imbalanced. The electoral commission is under-funded and lacked time to prepare. Concerns about rigging are pervasive, and strongly disputed results are highly likely. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) face severe credibility tests.

The situation is similar to 2008, including an atmosphere of intolerance and restricted access, state media bias and lack of confidence in institutions. There are, however, some significant differences: voters have more access to information than ever before through the internet, social media, mobile phones and satellite news; Zanu-PF no longer has an increasingly frustrated region’s unquestioning loyalty; and SADC publicly acknowledges the need for reform.

The violence and intimidation before the 2008 presidential run-off haunts the approaching vote and while there have been fewer violent incidents this time, the pattern is similar. Due to systemic impunity, perpetrators continue to live within the communities they victimised. The organisations and groups involved in the 2008 violence are largely in place and can easily be reactivated. President Mugabe has deployed the military within the country and ignored SADC’s request to publicly remind security forces of the prohibition on political partisanship. The police are a broken, largely corrupt force in which most people have little faith. Most observers anticipate violence will be kept within bounds during the first round of voting, but prospects for serious bloodshed are real if a second round is needed. There is no visible deterrent to violence; most incidents are not even reported to the police.

Zanu-PF and the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) factions each retain substantial national support and claim responsibility for the nation’s future. However, they have made little genuine progress toward mutual trust or tolerance that might enable a solution to political deadlock. The necessary reforms of law, the media and especially the security sector have long been known, but are either not in place, exist only on paper or are insufficiently implemented. Polarisation, a skewed balance of power, and the determination of those with power not to give it up mean that the elections are unlikely to prove a satisfactory mechanism for determining who holds office.
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This UNDP report notes that the periods before and after the 2008 elections were affected by political polarisation and conflict, which resulted in political instability and a deep economic crisis including hyper-inflation and a 50 per cent drop in GDP. This led to capital and skills flight and reduced public financing, severely affecting the country’s capacity to deliver basic social services. It also severely weakened national governance and accountability institutions and reduced the country’s capacity for economic planning and implementation. Following the formation of the Inclusive Government, the economy stabilised, GDP grew by 6 per cent to 8 per cent in 2009 and 2010, and progress was made on health and education MDGs. However, economic recovery remains fragile due to political challenges, deteriorated social and economic infrastructure, low ODA and investment flows, and high external debt (103 per cent of GDP). The recent economic crisis and political impasse have constrained political participation and engagement, produced societal fragmentation that requires national efforts to promote social cohesion and reconciliation, and weakened the capacities of national institutions to deliver basic public services including those related to the rule of law, human rights, justice and accountability.


This briefing paper notes that although Zimbabwe’s new constitution was supported by the main political parties and approved in the referendum held in March, there are concerns that the political stakes will be higher in the 2013 elections and that this could result in violence. The new constitution will spur new battles to terminate the shaky coalition government, which both President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai have conceded to be dysfunctional. Voting in the referendum was largely peaceful and orderly but the run-up to the referendum was marred by intimidation and the harassment of political activists and civil society representatives. Deeply entrenched political interests, lack of political cohesion, biased institutional structures and elite groups keen to maintain the status quo are some of the challenges to the implementation of the new constitution and democratic and peaceful elections in Zimbabwe.


In this paper from a US-based think tank, the author argues that Zimbabwe is more volatile now than it has been at any time in the past decade. Extensive preparations will be required for the 2013 elections, including revisions to the electoral roll and strengthening the institutional frameworks for managing and supervising the elections. Although the MDC has not distinguished itself in the government of national unity, the faction led by Tsvangirai remains popular. The economic situation looks likely to improve, although the ‘indigenisation’ policy may threaten foreign investment, and weaknesses include high dependence on food imports, and high (80 per cent) unemployment. Diamonds in eastern Zimbabwe provide wealth which the ruling regime uses to entrench its power. South Africa and other SADC members no longer regard support for Mugabe as unquestionable and there have been open criticisms of the regime from neighbouring countries.

This peer-reviewed journal article presents a new dataset of indicators of political freedom, property rights and political instability for Zimbabwe for the period 1946 to 2005. The dataset shows that political freedom has a strong negative correlation with property rights, implying that the two do not necessarily have to go together and that even autocratic regimes may choose sound property rights. The dataset also shows that the political instability index has no significant relationship with the political freedom index. This supports the notion that political conflict is significantly higher in the in-between category of semi-democracy than at either end of the democracy scale.

3. **Political parties and power structures**


This report from the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies outlines the political processes that led to the drafting of Zimbabwe’s new constitution and discusses the prospects for the 2013 elections. The constitution-drafting process took more than three years, and involved representatives from the different parties in parliament as well as a public consultation process. Polarisation, party influence, and violence (predominantly by Zanu-PF supporters) threatened to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the public outreach. The new constitution overhauls executive authority, which will be constrained by parliament, and sets fixed term limits with elections every five years. It imposes restraints on and increases accountability of the security services, devolves powers and responsibilities to provincial and local authorities, strengthens the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), and guarantees the participation of women in elected institutions and commissions.

Given Zimbabwe’s history of election-related violence, parties must demonstrate commitment to credible, peaceful and transparent elections. The military is not expected to stage an outright coup but could try to continue to influence and control the country’s political trajectory from behind the scenes to prolong Zanu-PF’s grip on power. SADC and the AU will need to deploy monitors well in advance of the scheduled elections to inspect the political environment, and to prevent violence and intimidation. SADC should ensure that the 2013 elections meet regional standards in order to ensure legitimacy and conclude the constitutional reform and transitional process.


In March a national referendum approved the new draft constitution formulated by the main political parties. This sets the stage for elections to be held under a new constitution that all parties recognise. However, the referendum was accompanied by complaints of human rights abuses by police and the arrest of the country’s top civil rights lawyer and senior opposition figures. The government has said it will not permit Western election observers, raising concerns about possible violence and intimidation as has happened in previous elections. Another chaotic and disputed election could potentially result in another government of national unity, but the experience of the current power-sharing administration suggests that this would not produce an efficient and effective government.
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Political uncertainty is likely to rise substantially in 2013-14 in the run-up to and aftermath of elections. In previous elections, Zanu-PF has used violence and intimidation against MDC supporters, and the same may happen again although opinion polls suggest that the MDC is losing support. Many high-ranking members of the security forces remain determined to prevent an MDC victory, and although they are not expected to intervene overtly, it is likely that they will contribute to an unstable environment in which the vote is neither free nor fair, and may also collaborate in (or at least fail to prevent) vote-rigging. However, a Zanu-PF victory would not be accepted by a proportion of the population, raising the likelihood of persistent low-level unrest. Whichever side wins, disorder is a serious possibility. There is also speculation that some high-ranking military personnel are positioning themselves to take over the leadership of Zanu-PF if Mugabe leaves power. The president has given no indication that he intends to stand down, but there has been persistent speculation about his health. There is a split within Zanu-PF between supporters of the vice-president, Joice Mujuru, and of the defence minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa.


The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger is a ranking of 163 countries based on their estimated risk of experiencing major bouts of political instability or armed conflict. In this year’s (2012) edition, Zimbabwe has moved from ‘some risk’ in 2010 to ‘high risk’. The power-sharing arrangement arrived at after the 2008 elections led to Zimbabwe being classified as a partial democracy, which has led to a significantly higher estimated risk score. More open competition within Mugabe’s own Zanu-PF political party and between his party and the MDC could act as a catalyst for major conflict or instability.


The history of independent Zimbabwe started with an election victory for Robert Mugabe and his faction which has systematically destroyed its rivals until it has reached a position, thirty years later, where the military and political elite are able to act with virtual impunity. The roots of this power lie within the military integration process which followed the war. This peer-reviewed journal article traces the roots of the current political dominance of the military in contemporary Zimbabwe and explores how Mugabe was able to take advantage of the integration process to destroy his opponents. Zanu-PF and the military allied to isolate political opposition, in a long-term programme whose seeds were sown in the early years of Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwean army have engaged domestically in widespread purges of the opposition groups, and the use of force internally has been largely political with the aim of regime protection. This regime protection has been bought by an increasing ownership and control of the means of production within the economy by senior military figures, and made sustainable by access to diamonds, effectively fuelling regime security. The eventual outcome of the integration process that began thirty years ago is therefore a capable but politically biased force that excludes those initially integrated. The army has developed the capability to deploy as a conflict entrepreneur (e.g. in the gold and diamond fields of Eastern Zimbabwe and in the DRC), and this has developed into a system whereby the military tend to treat large parts of their own country as an operational zone and, along
with auxiliary and intelligence units, practice counter-insurgency operations on Mugabe’s political opposition.


In this peer-reviewed article, the author notes that the incorporation of opposition parties under the power-sharing arrangements of 2009 changed the political context of Zimbabwe, but not Zanu-PF’s de facto rule through violence, intimidation, repression, patronage, and narrow nationalist appeals. Zanu-PF’s rule is increasingly through informal networks rather than formal institutions. These informal networks blur the distinction between state and non-state institutions and constitute a sort of parallel government. Zanu-PF has prevented civil service restructuring that would harm important party bases of violence and patronage, has used state companies to deny mining resources to the Treasury in order to retain important levers of patronage and starve the government of income, and has continued to allow personalised networks of violence and patronage to operate against the opposition in rural areas. The informalisation of Zanu-PF politics is firmly entrenched, and when the ‘inclusive government’ no longer brings competing factions together against the opposition, or when Mugabe dies or retires, the nature of Zanu-PF’s rule could usher in a new type of undemocratic regime.

4. **Land reform**


Questions of who was allocated land under Zimbabwe’s Fast Track land reform programme and how productive the beneficiaries have been are highly controversial. This peer-reviewed journal article presents detailed empirical data on beneficiaries who were small and medium-sized commercial farms in Goromonzi district. Official criteria for selecting beneficiaries that emphasized the potential to use the land productively were ignored in practice. The institutions responsible for land allocation were captured by members of the ruling party and by representatives of the state security apparatus, and most beneficiaries were drawn from the governing or the local elite. Many lacked sufficient capital to invest meaningfully in commercial agriculture, did not have relevant farming experience, and were unable to put the bulk of their land into production for several years. As a result, in Goromonzi District the impact of Fast Track land reform on commercial agriculture has been negative.


This peer-reviewed journal article reports that although Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform was redistributive, substantial areas of large-scale foreign and state-owned agricultural estates were retained. These estates were encouraged to produce bio-fuels and cash crops, as well as wildlife ranching for domestic and export markets, alongside expanded small food producers. This reflects the unresolved contradictions of seeking autonomous development in the context of sanctions, political polarisation and declining agricultural production, while promoting reintegration into broader world markets. Neoliberal policies introduced by 2008 promoted stabilisation and agricultural recovery but with limited impact. The persistence of land concentration (under foreign,
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domestic, and state ownership) at the expense of more comprehensive redistributive land reform continues to be resisted both through advocacy efforts and through illegal land occupations. Foreign agricultural investment in Zimbabwe is atypical of the current neoliberal land grabbing in Africa, because Zimbabwe reversed past inequalities, retains some state autonomy, and because land concentration remains contested.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2011.609341

Since the launch of the ‘fast-track land reform programme’ in 2000, many white farmers have been expelled from their farms. Those who manage to remain on their farms are seen as a threat to a social order that is based on separation between white farmers and black Africans. The racial cohabitation that currently takes place on some farms is experienced by the rest of the white farming community as a form of symbolic, social and mental disorder, a betrayal of the values and ‘habitus’ of their community. A growing number of former white farmers have become land managers for the new black owners, or now lease land to new black owners; arrangements which the rest of the community generally frowns upon. In an attempt to maintain the former order and support their position, some of those who left their farms resort to the law and level accusations of corruption and ‘madness’ against those who remain.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2011.635787

This peer-reviewed journal article examines the extent to which negotiations and bargaining by women with the family, state, and traditional actors enabled them to access land after fast track land reform in Mwenezi district. It demonstrates complex and innovative approaches that women adopted in accessing land and shaping non-permanent mobile livelihoods. A few women managed to acquire land individually, but the majority did so through marriage and cultural contracts. Land access is not formalised, but based on negotiation and trust relations. This brings some insecurity, but for most of the women investments continued based on this arrangement. The author challenges the assumption that Western notions of individual rights to land are the best mechanisms for women in Africa; rather it is the negotiated and bargaining processes that exist in patriarchal structures that lead to cultural contracts enabling women’s land access. Access to land was critical for women’s economic independence and became the basis of off-farm activities such as trading in South Africa.

5. **Transitional justice**

http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022278X110000243

This peer-reviewed journal article investigates people’s willingness to consider punishment for human rights abusers in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s violent presidential election campaign of 2008. The article shows that exposure to violence was widespread and that attitudes to transitional justice are mixed. A main finding is that Zimbabweans would countenance the prosecution and punishment of human rights abusers but, in the context of an uncertain political transition, presently prefer peace above justice.
Zimbabweans regard peace as their top political priority, and see democratisation as the best means to achieve this goal. Power sharing is not enough; only 17 per cent of Zimbabweans feel that the interim power-sharing arrangement was ‘a good alternative’. However, the outcome of the current political transition is incomplete and far from certain; the old authoritarian regime is weakened but still holds the upper hand in government. While power sharing has reduced intimidation and violence, the formal and informal apparatus for coercion remains largely intact. There is widespread fear and growing evidence that armed militias will remobilise with logistical support from the uniformed forces as campaigns get underway for a constitutional referendum or general election. Under these circumstances, citizens face acute dilemmas: how to balance truth and amnesia, prosecution and amnesty, punishment and forgiveness.

Most citizens of Zimbabwe, especially those who have personally experienced violence, support a form of retributive justice for perpetrators of past political abuses. The urge to punish the guilty is equally strong among individuals who affiliate politically with the country’s democracy movement. But, for those who worry that premature attention to ‘the torturer problem’ will disrupt the country’s fragile peace, and for ethnic minorities who doubt the sincerity of any majority-led government, the excessive risk of a state-sponsored backlash is a step too far. For these individuals, the dossiers on the subject of transitional justice cannot and should not be opened until a transition to democracy is complete. In the short run, people may prefer to put an end to on-going violence, even if this means putting justice on a back burner, but once political conditions allow, they are likely to acknowledge that a permanent peace is impossible without close attention to justice.


Since 2008, the Government of Zimbabwe, the international community and non-governmental organisations have all advocated the need for transitional justice in Zimbabwe, but few initiatives have emerged. This peer-reviewed journal article suggests that local communities could help fill this policy vacuum. The results of a pilot research project involving 1,400 victims of violence show a clear demand for justice at the grassroots, but education is necessary and transitional justice capacity needs to be built. Current unstructured and unorganised opinions on how to cope with past violence need to be translated into practical programmes of action. An opportunity currently exists to deepen an understanding of transitional justice which will enable community groups to initiate and respond to Zimbabwe’s transitional justice processes when the national political environment becomes more receptive to this need.

6. The diamond trade


This peer-reviewed journal article describes the outcomes following the discovery of one of the world’s largest alluvial diamond deposits at Marange in eastern Zimbabwe in 2006. The revenue from these diamonds could be beneficial to Zimbabwe’s economy and to the government’s revenues. However, a close symbiotic relationship exists between the security agencies and Zanu-PF, and with the consent and assistance of Zanu-PF politicians, members of the security agencies became the key beneficiaries of the diamond wealth through soliciting bribes, establishing mining syndicates, positioning themselves in and around joint ventures, and securing a ‘diamonds for arms’ deal with China. This capture of wealth from diamonds had precedents in other examples of
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Zimbabwean security agencies' plundering of natural resources. These arrangements have helped Zanu-PF maintain its dominant position, and the position of the MDC has been weakened by the undermining of the most prominent ministry it controls, the Ministry of Finance.


The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme aims to combat atrocities associated with ‘conflict diamonds’ by identifying and excluding them from the legitimate diamond trade. Diamonds from Zimbabwe’s Marange fields are mined using systematic relocation, mass murdering campaigns, and torture camps, but because the mines are controlled by Zimbabwe’s ‘legitimate’ government, not a rebel group, the diamonds are certified as conflict-free. This peer-reviewed journal article calls for changes to the definition of conflict diamonds to include human rights violations, for increasing Kimberley Process investigative powers, and for the USA as chair of the Kimberley Process to take a leading role in implementing changes.

7. China and the arms trade


This peer-reviewed journal article gives a detailed account of Chinese arms sales to Africa, a region beset by conflict and unstable regimes and where arms sales have been shown to be a significant and positive predictor of an increased probability of political violence. China is the largest supplier to the continent and Chinese arms transfers have been highlighted as particularly questionable by Western observers. Small arms have been reported to be traded for ivory, and aircraft and vehicles have been supplied to replace equipment that was no longer operational due to a lack of parts and maintenance issues resulting from Western sanctions.


Arms sales and military relationships with African countries help China meet its oil and mineral needs, and gain allies in the United Nations for its political goals, including preventing Taiwanese independence and diverting attention from its own human rights record. Chinese military involvement in Africa takes three forms: arms sales which make their way into conflict zones, participation in peacekeeping operations, and responses to kidnappings of Chinese nationals or attacks on Chinese facilities.

Beginning in 2000, Mugabe’s Zimbabwe was faced with sanctions by Western countries. Faced with increased international isolation and severe economic crisis, in 2005 Mugabe announced a ‘Look East’ policy. China supplied equipment ranging from small arms and riot control gear to tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft, and built a weapons factory for Zimbabwe. China’s military support has to some extent helped to sustain oppressive rule in Zimbabwe, enabling Mugabe and the Zanu-PF to suppress political opposition.
8. Climate change


Zimbabwe’s economic and political turmoil that began in 2000 provoked mass population displacements, but the causes of these movements were political and economic; ecological shocks have not played a major role in causing these movements. The Zimbabwean government and international humanitarian appeals have invoked drought as an explanation for hunger and dislocation, likely with the aim of deflecting attention from economic mismanagement, inflation and political violence. The meteorological record does not support popular perceptions of increased severity of environmental shocks. The crisis period has been characterised by better rainfall, and fewer and less severe droughts compared with the preceding two decades. Droughts during the crisis period were experienced as extreme events and contributed disproportionately to food insecurity because of increased vulnerability due to the political conflict and economic contraction.

Future climate patterns and impacts cannot be forecast reliably. There may be challenges in water-stressed arid areas, but it has also been argued that rainfall changes may not be distinguishable from natural variability. Analyses disagree as to whether drought will become more severe in the future because of global warming. Although temperatures are likely to continue to increase, there is controversy over past and future rainfall and drought trends.

There are multiple interactions between the crisis, ecological shocks and migration. Planning for future environmental and climate change needs to recognise that vulnerability to ecological shocks is inseparable from political and economic changes. Planning for adaptation to future shocks will need to involve state agencies and local authorities, the capacity and professionalism of which has been eroded in the course of the current crisis. The capacity of migrants to circulate within the region and internationally should be upheld, as these have become survival mechanisms and close contacts with home are likely to maximise remittance flows and other investments by migrants in the process of reconstruction.

9. Books recommended by experts

The following recently-published books were recommended by experts contacted in the course of carrying out this review. Since the books are not available online, we were unable to obtain copies and review them within the time available to produce this report.


10. About this report

Expert contributors

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Suggested citation


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