Formal and informal policing in Iraq

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Question

Identify literature on improving public security in Iraq through formal and informal policing mechanisms.

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1. Overview

The literature on improving security in Iraq is mostly focused on military analysis with relatively few insights and recommendations to be found on improving formal policing and the government systems that underpin them. Research for this report was unable to find literature on informal policing mechanisms with the exception of some recommendations relating to private security companies and ethnic militia. This annotated bibliography, therefore, looks at a range of material on security and policing and identifies key messages and recommendations from it. Much of the material is from a small number of US-based experts and tends to not reflect the current context but instead provides general suggestions for approaches to reform.

Within the literature there seems to be a number of common themes and recommendations:

- **Supporting the judiciary and improving investigative capability:** There is a need for greater security for the judiciary and improving legal education and the capacity of lawyers, as well as greater support for investigative capacity (US Department of Defense, 2010; Perito & Kristoff, 2009). In particular there was the suggestion of greater investigation, prosecution and conviction following attacks on minorities (Chapman, 2012).

- **Improving police-community relations:** This can be through setting up joint committees with representatives from both the police and the community (Chapman, 2012). Some organisations and authors support a shift towards community policing (IOM, 2014; Santana, 2008). Other
suggestions include greater recruitment of minorities into the police to ensure community representation (Chapman, 2012).

- **Mentorship of police**: Perito (2011, 2013) highlights the beneficial role of the Italian national military police – the Carabinieri – in the training and mentorship of Iraqi police. In particular he notes that they were able to discuss the moral and ethical dimensions of policing with Iraqi trainees, as well as impress on them their conviction to civic duty as police themselves.

- **Joint agreement on the role of police**: There should be agreement between Iraqi and international stakeholders on the specific role and focus of the police, which avoids the militarisation of police (Perito, 2011).

- **Developing administrative capacity**: There needs to be development of the capacity to manage budgets, procure goods and services, and administer and educate its employees (Perito & Kristoff, 2009). Several authors argue there should be greater reform of the Ministry of Interior, who manage the Iraqi police (Perito & Kristoff, 2009; Perito, 2009; Rathmell, 2007; Santana, 2008).

- **Prioritisation and harmonisation of efforts**: Rathmell (2007) highlights the need for focusing on key issues such as the abuse and corruption of the police and judiciary and not overloading the system. It is important to support Iraqi-led initiatives rather than imposing international standards. Efforts across the system should be more integrated.

- **Avoiding private security companies and ethnic militia**: The effectiveness of private military companies and private security companies in Iraq has been mixed and there is anecdotal evidence that some Iraqis prefer them over Iraqi security officers who are seen as prone to corruption (Isenberg, 2006). However, their continued use would threaten Iraqi ownership of their security sector in the long-term. The use of ethnic or religious militia was felt unlikely to improve security and possibly detrimental to it (Chapman, 2012).

2. Improving security literature

**Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq**


http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/June_9204_Sec_Def_signed_20_Aug_2010.pdf

This is the most recent of a series of reports submitted to US Congress which outlines the ongoing security situation in Iraq. The report highlighted the issue of judicial intimidation, particularly in the northern provinces of Ninewa and Diyala, and that cooperation between the judiciary and the national Iraqi Police has improved this situation. In particular there is a need to improve the police’s capability to collect and process evidence so as to deliver proper testimony to support the judicial process and to strengthen the relationship between the judiciary and the police. The report notes that aside from efforts to assist specific groups such as those working in the judiciary, legal representation and services remain beyond the reach of a large number of Iraqis. There are US-funded programmes to upgrade legal education and to improve the capacity of lawyers and NGOs to provide services.
The report finds that the Iraqi Police have the basic capability to carry out police functions and have improved technical skills but interior security forces continue to have gaps in funding, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability; specialisation; and logistical infrastructure. Forensics lab capacity has been expanded, while investigative intelligence sharing, domestic and family violence initiatives, and sexual assault prevention initiatives were established in support of promoting policing. Despite these limitations, the report finds that the police are increasingly becoming a professional force that, in conjunction with a maturing court system, supports the rule of law throughout Iraq. Furthermore, the disparate elements that make up the police continue to make improvements in cross-department and cross-ministerial coordination and support in each of these areas.

Figure 1: Public views of security

Source: p. 38

In terms of views of public security, as of April 2010 most Iraqis described their local area as calm, and felt that the security situation had improved in their neighbourhood. Most Iraqis surveyed felt the police were controlling crime, which is up from earlier surveys. Over 40% of Iraqis felt that the national police were most responsible for providing security in their local area while around 25% attributed it to the Iraqi army. The exception was in Kurdistan where almost 80% felt the Kurdish (rather than national) Police are most responsible for providing security in their local area. 5% of Iraqis felt their tribe were most responsible for providing security.
Improving security for minorities in Iraq


In Iraq in July and August 2011, 300 members of 14 ethnic/religious communities were interviewed for their views on security for their community, perception of security forces, and views on measures to improve security. Most Iraqis surveyed in the research stated that they do not feel safe when leaving home, travelling or at work/school/university. The Kurds, who live in the region with the lowest levels of violence in Iraq, said they felt most safe. The communities feeling most insecure when leaving the home were Armenians, Yezidis, Black Iraqis and Shabak.

The survey asked which of a set of proposed measures were most likely to improve security for their communities. The respondents suggested:

- **Justice for attacks on minorities**: Identifying, prosecuting and punishing those responsible for attacks on civilians was overwhelmingly felt by respondents to be likely to improve security. This reflects a widely held frustration that perpetrators of the major attacks on minorities have not been identified and prosecuted. Examples of such attacks include attacks against the Christian population of Mosul and bombings in Baghdad against Sunni and Shi’a communities.

- **No ethnic/religious militias**: Most respondents were of a negative opinion about communities setting up their own militias along ethnic or religious lines. Most felt they would not improve or could possibly worsen security. There was some variation with Yezidis and Sunni Arabs expressing more positive opinions of such militia.

- **Increased recruitment of minorities to the police and army**: Most respondents considered that recruiting more members of their own communities to the police and army would improve security for them. Yezidis, Shabak and Chaldean-Assyrian Syriacs were the most positive of this.

- **Improved police/community relations and information sharing**: Most respondents considered that setting up joint committees with representatives of the community and the security forces to improve relations and communication would improve security for minorities. At the same time the survey identified potential mistrust as a problem, especially the perception that the police have been infiltrated by terrorists. In some case minorities are afraid to go to the police with information about security threats in case the person they were talking to was linked to an insurgent group, and would target them after leaving the station.

- **Autonomous area for minorities in the Nineveh Plains**: Though not proposed in the survey this emerged as a proposal favoured by many respondents. The establishment of some kind of autonomous area, or new governorate, in the areas of the Nineveh Plains inhabited by minorities, has been identified as having potential to improve security.

- **Increasing security force presence**: Other common proposals relate to a general increase in the presence of security forces, either in minority localities generally, or at hotspots such as places of worship or entrances to villages. This option was most popular among Faili Kurds and Yezidis.
The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire


This report looks at US efforts to train and equip a national constabulary force, the Iraq National Police, now termed the Iraq Federal Police (IFP). In creating the IFP, the report identifies the following lessons which could be applied to future reform:

- **Early agreement on police roles:** Agreement on the roles and missions of the police at the outset of the operation is essential. This requires international actors and the Iraqis to create a common understanding. Failure to do so can mean a police force that is unprepared for roles that the international actors attempt to use them for, or the creation of police forces independent of international actor efforts.

- **Use serving professional police officers as role models:** The role of Italian Carabinieri was essential for training skills but also with discussions of ethical issues and the moral obligation of police to protect society. The author argues that the fact that their Italian mentors were engaged in national service in their own country made a lasting impression on the Iraqi trainees.

- **Avoid militarisation of the police:** Militarisation of the police will produce a force that is inconsistent with the country’s long-term needs of enforcing the rule of law. A paramilitary force, with military-style training can create a force that does not meet Iraq’s post-conflict needs.

Biting the Bullet in Iraq


This chapter provides a history of the Iraq police from pre-US intervention to 2011. Of note was the role of trainers from the Italian Carabinieri who the author argues made a meaningful contribution to the police assistance programmes. Carabinieri are both a military police and an internal security force whose duties range from riot control and criminal investigation to border patrol. The Carabinieri provided training in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and crowd control but also involved a moral and spiritual element. The Carabinieri spent an extensive amount of time with trainees discussing the role of police in a democratic society and the moral and ethical responsibilities of a police officer in performing his duties. To introduce a spiritual element into the training and build relationships with their students, the Italian training teams developed a common prayer that they said every day with the Iraq trainees, both to demonstrate their own spirituality and to tap into the religious fervour of many of their students. The prayer was designed to capture the moral authority inherent in the police officer’s duty to enforce the law, maintain order, serve others, and keep the peace.

The chapter notes that by autumn 2008 the police force was on track to meet its goal of providing a national-level rapid response police capability to deal with large-scale civil disturbance and insurgent and terrorism operations. While still primarily located around Baghdad, the force had begun to deploy to stations outside the city. Around this time there followed an improvement in the security situation in Iraq though the author does not attribute this to the police or another specific factor. The author does however note that towards the end of 2009 the police force’s performance and presence had improved.
Iraq's Interior Ministry: The Key to Police Reform

At a public forum on security sector reform in Iraq, the authors presented this report which includes recommendations for future police reform. The authors argue that there are broader, structural problems in providing effective security. Iraq’s security sector challenges which cannot be solved within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) alone. Other aspects of the criminal justice system are weak and to improve the delivery of security there needs to be reform of other systems, in particular the investigatory and judicial system. The broader public administrative systems on which the ministry relies are also equally weak. For example, although total Iraqi government expenditures grew from 2005 to 2007, the Iraqi government was unable to spend all the funds it had budgeted over that period. The author concludes that the wider Iraqi government lacks capacity to manage budgets, procure goods and services, and administer and educate its employees, and these ultimately restrict the efficacy of the MOI in achieving public security.

The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector Reform
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Special%20Report%20223_The%20Interior%20Ministry's%20Role.pdf

This report explains the role of the interior ministry and the steps needed for ministerial reform in reforming the security sector. Key steps required to improve security include:

- **Better understanding of the role of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI):** This relates to their role in policy guidance, administrative and logistical support, and training for Iraq’s police forces.

- **Assessment of the MOI:** A comprehensive assessment of the ministry, its role in the justice sector and in the conflict.

- **Strategic planning to ensure a common vision:** Form a multidisciplinary strategic planning team to develop the MOI’s mission statement, goals and objectives, and to identify the means to attain them.

- **Technical assistance and training for MOI functions:** This is for reform, including in the following areas: i) command and control (i.e. leadership, senior management); ii) strategic planning and operations; iii) intelligence collection and analysis; iv) budget and programming; v) logistics (e.g. infrastructure, equipment); vi) procurement; vii) human resources; viii) public affairs (e.g. public information, citizen education and outreach); ix) communications and IT services; and x) inspector general (i.e. internal audit and internal affairs processes to prevent corruption).

- **Evaluating progress and incorporating lessons learned:** This should focus on effectiveness, efficiency and impacts, rather than just inputs and outputs.

In terms of the role of international advisors, the author recommends that they should: i) establish a close personal relationship; ii) understand the workings of the ministry and the host government; iii) provide
subject matter expertise and policy guidance; iv) connect the advisee with essential services; and v) coordinate with the intervention force.

Fixing Iraq's Internal Security Forces: Why is Reform of the Ministry of Interior So Hard?


This paper examines why institution building and reform at the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) have proved so difficult, and notes flaws in the international capacity building effort that need to be addressed. The author argues that Iraq’s political dynamics, combined with the unprecedented burdens being placed upon the MOI, will continue to make institutional development and reform difficult. There are, however, signs of nascent, MOI-led reforms. The author recommends the following steps:

- **Support Iraqi-led initiatives and reforms rather than imposing Coalition standards**: Support senior officials in the MOI who are pursuing a range of reforms and initiatives to build capacity.

- **Do not overload the system**: MOI capability will evolve very slowly in the coming years and the MOI needs to be given several years to develop its capacities and be in a position to take more of a leading role. In the meantime the Iraqi Army and Coalition forces may have to provide public security.

- **Maintain pressure on abuses and corruption**: The MOI and Iraqi judicial institutions should address and to some extent prioritise prosecuting illegal acts by MOI officials (e.g. torture, murder, extortion).

- **Support elected bodies and civil society to provide oversight**: Local and national elected bodies as well as civil society institutions can provide oversight of the ministry and its forces. International actors should support such oversight processes to shed light on abuses and corruption.

- **Integrate international efforts**: There have been some improvements but it is important to properly integrate the diplomatic, security, assistance, intelligence and strategic communications efforts of international actors. For example, where there are problems of sectarian abuse, it would help to combine diplomatic lobbying, information operations, intelligence and, possibly, security operations, along with aid conditionality, so as to help counter and prosecute such action.

- **Adopt a multidimensional approach to capacity building**: Support should involve using a range of tools in support of Iraqi-developed and led strategies.

- **Prepare international advisors**: There is a lack of civilian police advisors in general but there is also a lack of preparation of advisors so as to be more effective on the ground.

- **Fix organisational disconnects**: There are numerous organisational disconnects within the security sector. For example, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, who focus in part on linking the civil ministries to local government, should work together with Police Transition Teams, who focusing
on training local police forces. There needs to be greater connection between those working centrally in Baghdad and those working in the provinces.

Enhancing Cooperation Between Police and Communities

http://iomiraq.net/article/0/enhancing-cooperation-between-police-and-communities

This report covers the project which allowed senior Iraqi Police Officers to visit Pristina, Kosovo, to observe lessons learned and good practices identified under the Kosovo Police’s Community Policing\(^1\) programme. The visit aimed to provide participants with information on Kosovo’s CP policies, to introduce the KP’s training modules and structure, and to enable exposure to practical CP initiatives, such as the establishment and engagement of Local Public Safety Committees (CSCs).

The report notes that participants recognised that, although a long-term process, building trust between police and communities would bring mutual benefits and support overall efforts to restore and maintain security and stability in Iraq. One participant commented that the exchange visit was valuable as it has allowed Iraqi police to witness how a community-policing model supports the police to assist Kosovo’s various sects and minorities which is an objective for the Iraqi police as well. Participants suggested that a national-level Steering Committee be established to bring together the Iraqi Police and other government entities. Other participants proposed various community-level initiatives, such as awareness and outreach sessions in schools and universities. A 36-month Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the IOM and the Iraq Ministry of the Interior on 01 April 2014. Based on this there will continue to be collaboration between IOM and the Ministry of Interior to expand and strengthen Iraq’s community policing programme.


This paper promotes the idea of introducing a community-oriented policing philosophy into police training in Iraq. The author argues that Iraqi culture and social control traditions are community based (family, clan tribe), and that these are compatible with the COP philosophy. Specific recommendations are:

- **Local leaders:** The Ministry of Interior (MOI) could engage local leaders who would then bring in support from the rest of the community.

- **Establish common understanding of community-oriented policing:** The MOI and United States military advisors should establish the conditions for community-oriented policing implementation and United States military personnel must agree on a common definition of community-oriented policing.

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This definition should be based on the civilian literature and studies on the application of the philosophy in the United States as well as around the world.

- **Military and civilian police partnerships:** Military and civilian police partnerships can be forged through the cooperation between garrison law and order operations and departments near and around military communities. Some Army posts could even serve as regional training facilities where Military Police and civilian law enforcement can share training.

- **Internship programmes:** This could allow officers to experience different temporary assignments in different types of police departments in varying contexts to ensure a holistic education regarding law enforcement duties.

- **Better integration of criminal justice system with police:** The justice ministries are often the primary legal research agency that most US police departments use to improve their operations. Likewise such personnel can help the Iraqi criminal justice system better integrate with police operations.

- **Culturally-sensitive trainers experienced in civilian policing:** Private contractors need personnel experienced in the operations of large metropolitan police departments to provide training. Personnel should understand and be able to work with the cultural requirements of the supported operation and speak the local languages.

**Challenges of Security Privatisation in Iraq**


http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots783=9c879a60-8a40-14e8-76c3-2c016ae9096c&lng=en&id=116051

This chapter looks at what can be learned from the involvement of private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs) in Iraq’s security sector. The author finds that their impact in Iraq has been mixed, with lack of regulatory capacity and local ownership being particular problems. The impact of PMCs and PSCs has varied significantly according to the context and to who they are accountable to – i.e. whether they are accountable to the US military, civilians doing reconstruction work, other US government agencies, the Iraqi government, or Iraqi civilians. Being accountable to non-Iraqis has undermined the principles of ownership. PMCs and PSCs have been relatively ineffective in training Iraqi military and police. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many Iraqis prefer the use of foreign PMC/PSC personnel as ‘honest brokers’ who are less susceptible to corruption or pressure than fellow Iraqis. However, a stable security sector would require public confidence in fellow citizens staffing positions in the security sector. The author concludes that due to a lack of a full accounting of the actions of all contractors operating in Iraq, it is impossible to assess where the balance lies between positive and negative assessments.
3. Additional information

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