Helpdesk Research Report: Regional Security Architecture
Date: 19.10.09

Query: Please identify literature on regional security programmes and approaches, highlighting examples of regional security architecture and where available, lessons learned and important factors to consider in regional security approaches.

Enquirer: DFID-Caribbean

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1. Overview

Regional organisations have in recent years focused increasingly on the promotion of peace and security. They may be considered more effective and legitimate external actors than the United Nations and other international actors. They are also more likely to have an interest in preventing, containing or resolving conflict and insecurity in their regions. Although the vast majority of the literature on regional security architecture focuses on conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding, regional organisations are increasingly seeking to address transnational or ‘unconventional’ security threats. These include: cross-border crimes such as drug and human trafficking, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, terrorism, money laundering and infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The extent to which regions are affected by these various threats varies – as well as their approaches and methods for addressing them. This helpdesk research report looks at regional and sub-regional groupings in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Africa

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2002 was an important step in developing a new African peace and security architecture. In comparison to its predecessor, which was constrained by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of its member states, the AU is more proactive and has adopted principles and norms that relate to the responsibility to protect. Regional Economic Communities (e.g. ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa) have also been incorporated into the African peace and security architecture. They vary greatly in terms of their strengths and resources and ability to tackle security threats. In addition, there is an increasing recognition and codification of a broader notion of security that encompasses transnational threats. The AU and the sub-regional organisations have focused on different transnational threats that are of greater concern to their particular region. Much of the literature notes, however, that while organisations in Africa have been successful in establishing regional frameworks and setting norms and standards, they have been less successful in practical implementation.
Asia

In contrast to most regions, the security architecture in Asia has primarily involved informal mechanisms. The approach of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – the key regional organisation - has focused on ‘softer’ aspects, such as regional understanding, trust and long term relationships, as methods of conflict management. ASEAN has sought as well to address transnational crime, terrorism and other cross border issues. Much of the literature notes that ASEAN as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have been effective in going beyond the development of frameworks and conventions to practical action. This has included exchange of information and intelligence and the establishment of databases; training and the sharing of best practices, and national capacity building. Regional organisations in Asia can be constrained in their actions, however, by the persistent adherence of member nations to the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non interference.

Europe

The European Union is the only organisation structured to operate at a supranational level as opposed to an inter-governmental level. This is demonstrated, for example, in its move to supranational governing bodies; and from consensus based decision making to majoritarian decision making. This model is not considered appropriate to other regional settings, however, as the necessary conditions (i.e. strong states with a high degree of internal cohesion and a high degree of economic interdependence) are not easily replicable. Instead, the less demanding approach of ‘conference diplomacy’ developed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the predecessor to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) may be an easier model to emulate. Ongoing meetings at conferences in which every member has a stake in the process is highlighted in the literature as an effective way to promote regional collaboration.

Latin America and the Caribbean

The security agenda of Latin America and the Caribbean focuses mainly on non-traditional security threats, such as illegal drug trafficking and money laundering, the illicit trafficking of firearms, corruption, transnational organised crime, the consequences of global warming as well as HIV/AIDS. The Organisation of American States (OAS) is the region’s primary peace and security organisation. Similar to other regional organisations, key challenges faced by the OAS include strongly embedded principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, a lack of political will and difficulties in building consensus among its member states. Similar to Africa, there are a number of sub-regional groupings in the region (e.g. CARICOM, Mercosur and the Andean Community). They also vary greatly in terms of their strengths, resources and capacity to counter transnational threats.

Key Issues and Factors in Regional Architecture

There are various issues, challenges and opportunities that can be drawn from the literature on regional security architecture in these regions. These include:

- Leadership and Hegemonic Power: A strong regional power can be a benefit and a disadvantage. It can be beneficial to have a strong regional power play a leadership role in setting up a regional organisation, providing resources and bringing together member nations. This has been the case with Indonesia in ASEAN. In contrast, the key regional player in South Asia, India, has been disinterested in regional groupings and to date, there is minimal regional collaboration. A hegemonic power can also be seen as a threat, however; other member nations may be fearful that this power will dominate the agenda. In Africa, this concern over hegemonic ambitions has been countered by the rejection of the idea of permanent members in the AU’s new Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the adoption of a consensual approach to decision making.
- **Common Outlook:** In order for a regional grouping to be successful, member nations need to have common values and a shared perception of threats. Where such a shared perception of threats does not exist, it may be beneficial to also develop sub-regional groupings that can cater more specifically to variation within the region.

- **Decentralisation:** Sub-regional groupings are useful components of regional security architecture as they can focus more specifically on key threats to the sub-region, which may not be a priority for the larger regional organisation. There are concerns, however, that sub-regional organisations vary greatly in resources and capacity, which can result in very different levels of effectiveness across the region.

- **Mutual gains:** All participating states have to perceive benefits from participating in regional cooperation in order for such groupings to continue and to be effective in developing frameworks and implementing plans for action. This concerns not only the perceptions of state officials but also public opinion.

- **Gradual approach:** Low-level approaches, such as regular and systematic meetings of officials (e.g. ministers and police) at conferences, and confidence-building measures can be beneficial in hashing out issues, gaining an understanding of other participating countries, and building trust. This can lay the foundation for finding solutions and for functional cooperation (e.g. information sharing and joint training).

- **Holistic approach:** When dealing with transnational threats, a holistic, multi-sectoral approach is required. Tackling drug trafficking, for example, requires collaboration between a wide range of departments and sectors, including police, security and border control, health and rehabilitation etc. A mix of tools is also important. While legal frameworks are very important, other tools such as political binding agreements, for example, can also be effective. These allow for transparency and provide information on each nation’s progress in implementation of agreed commitments, which can result in a degree of pressure.

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2. Comparative


This paper engages in a comparative analysis of regional arrangements, focusing on the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Of particular relevance to this query is the section on transnational threats. The paper finds that the extent to which transnational challenges are treated as security concerns (‘securitisation’) varies. In addition, regional arrangements differ considerably about which transnational challenges are perceived as connected to the sources of conflict within the region.

**African Union**

For the AU, terrorism and HIV/AIDS are the key threats. The AU established in 2004 the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism. It aims to develop and maintain a database on issues relating to preventing and combating terrorism, as well as to disseminate information and analysis about these issues in order to help implement the AU’s counterterrorism activities. Regarding HIV/AIDS, the AU has not engaged in much collective action but has acted as an arena for standard- and norm-setting to encourage member governments to take appropriate action. The AU also seeks to address cross-border crimes such as drug and human trafficking, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, mercenarism, food insecurity, avian influenzas and climate change. Since different parts of the continent suffer unevenly from these threats, sub-regional arrangements have often been relied upon for the most practical action. The European Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, has devoted much more attention than the AU to issues of organised criminal activity, especially in relation to the trafficking in weapons, narcotics and people.
ASEAN

ASEAN has also sought to address transnational crime, terrorism and other cross border issues. ASEAN states have engaged in exchange and flow of information and intelligence and the sharing of best practices, as well as national capacity building. They have also sought to develop appropriate regional frameworks to address terrorism, such as the ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, an ASEAN Extradition Treaty, and an ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. This convention, however, is subsumed to the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non interference.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

The SCO was established to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism. To assist with this, a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) has been established to assist, coordinate and interact with the relevant agencies of SCO member states. RATS’s work has evolved beyond the analytical into operational directions (e.g. forging a databank on terrorist, separatist and extremist organisations; and contributing to training). RATS has played a role in facilitating ‘extraditions’ (renditions) of suspected terrorists, separatists and extremists outside normal procedures, despite different state understanding. The effectiveness of the RATS is constrained, however, by political constraints, in particular in consolidating a list of wanted terrorists and organisations. Regarding drug trafficking, the SCO members have tasked their anti-narcotics agencies to offer analysis and advice on a possible systematic approach to tackling drug trafficking. In the context of narcotics trafficking and consumption further weakening the state (particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), the idea of putting an anti-drug security belt (i.e. strong border controls and zones of coordinated enforcement) around Afghanistan has been advanced.

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713636712

This paper discusses the securitisation of transnational challenges in Africa and offers some comparison with Southeast Asia. The Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) lists approximately thirty common security threats apparently faced by all or some African countries. Transnational challenges, although not explicitly identified as such, are largely subsumed under the category of “other factors engendering insecurity” and include the insecurity caused by the presence of refugees, the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), infectious diseases (such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis), human trafficking, drug trafficking, and money laundering. The paper outlines the key AU declarations and conventions adopted in the areas of trafficking of small arms and light weapons, terrorism, and infectious diseases. It finds that outside of developing these frameworks, there have been few practical developments apart from some information exchange; and standard and norm-setting and guidelines for national implementation. The development of practical collective measures has focused instead on stemming particular armed conflicts.

In contrast, the paper finds that ASEAN has been more successful in developing practical collective responses to transitional challenges. It has focused on transnational crime (particularly drugs), terrorism, and communicable diseases. Regarding transnational crime, ASEAN ministers have met regularly and established frameworks to cooperate on terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, traffic in persons, piracy and cyber crime. The aim is to develop a more cohesive, regional strategy aimed at preventing, controlling and neutralizing transnational crime. The key components of ASEAN’s collective response are: information exchange, cooperation in legal matters, cooperation in law enforcement matters, institutional capacity building, training, and extra-regional cooperation.
Kytömäki, E., 2005-2006, ‘Regional Approaches to Small Arms Control: Vital to Implementing the UN Programme of Action’, Disarmament Forum, pp. 56-64

This paper provides an overview of the rise in regional small arms control initiatives since the adoption of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (POA). The paper argues that regional small arms measures have the potential to complement and strengthen the implementation of the UN Programme of Action, particularly because they allow regions to address small arms problems in the ways that are most suitable for them. Regional organisations have played an important role in bringing together relevant actors, building bridges between different aspects of the problem, and fostering regional police and border cooperation. The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), for example, is a forum comprising all the police chiefs from the Southern African region. It has successfully integrated a regional approach to fighting crime and illicit small arms. Its subcommittees organise regular training for police officers at the regional level, and it is currently studying possibilities for harmonising gun legislation in the region. The paper notes, however, that despite positive developments and new initiatives, there is a lack of both political will and resources to address small arms problems at the regional level. While legal agreements are necessary and important, the paper stresses the effectiveness of information exchange and transparency aspects of politically binding agreements. These have proven vital in ensuring the practical implementation of agreed commitments. By keeping state parties informed of each others’ activities, they are all aware of the level of implementation in each state and can apply a degree of pressure.


This survey assesses the capacities of all regional organisations with a security mandate in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, Europe, and the Americas. This included assessment on (i) organisational capacity (legal mandate and organic structure); (ii) resource capacity (financial and human assets); and (iii) operational experience (ground record). It focuses on capacities in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. The survey also provides recommendations for the various regions.

3. Africa

Klingebiel, S. et al., 2008, ‘Donor Contributions to the Strengthening of the African Peace and Security Architecture’, German Development Institute, Bonn

This detailed report examines the role of external support in strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The African Union (AU), created in 2002, has been integral to the development of the APSA. Its willingness to engage in the conflict in Darfur indicates that it is transforming into a key, credible actor for peace and security on the continent. The AU is also developing the African Standby Force (ASF), which from 2010 should be ready to engage in a range of peacekeeping and post-conflict activities. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) form the other key pillars of the APSA. Only some of the RECs, however, are experienced in conflict and peacebuilding and new regional structures are needed to manage and prevent conflict. In addition, the success of the APSA largely depends upon African leadership and the active engagement of regional powers, particularly South Africa and Nigeria.
Donors have contributed to the APSA through support for capacity building for political and administrative structures and support for early warning systems, peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Support has been delivered primarily through: equipment / support in kind, financial support, budget support, technical support, pooled support and trilateral cooperation. The report asserts that external support for the APSA is critical, and must come from across development, foreign and security policy areas. In addition, technical, financial and logistical support is crucial.

http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/43/3/313.pdf

This paper examines the emergence of regional and sub-regional security communities in Africa. It outlines key criteria for the existence of a security community: common values, meanings and understandings; shared commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict; and increasing institutionalisation of cooperation. It finds that these elements are present in Africa. In particular, there has been increasing formalisation of regional arrangements, exemplified by the establishment of the African Union. The AU, the paper argues, furthers cooperation and contributes to the development of mutual trust and a collective identity among its member states. It also provides the framework for a system of collective security and even military integration. On a sub-regional level, the paper focuses on the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It finds that the SADC also fulfils the criteria for a security community: it has a unifying purpose in jointly confronting transnational problems such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, the adverse impacts of economic globalisation and the prevalence of conflict; its members – as members of the AU – have a commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict; and there has been increasing institutionalisation, particularly of military cooperation.

The AU, unlike its predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity – has more solid and structured relationships with the continent’s various sub-regional organisations. It relies on them as key building blocks and implementation agencies for its continental programmes. The paper stresses, however, that there are still many challenges to a security community in Africa. These include: resource constraints and political idiosyncrasies as well as the problems inherent in the uneven development of sub-regional organisations (due to their differing colonial heritages, political and security agendas, incompatible visions, uneven development of member states and widely varying levels of outside support).


This paper looks at regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). It finds that RECs are an important part of the African security architecture and that the AU has adopted a ‘subsidiarity’ model, whereby the AU outsources responsibilities to these sub-regional organisations. It argues, however, that this model has not taken the form of a ‘seamless web of strong organisations’, but rather is currently a ‘a patchwork of sub-regional organisations of varying strength and with quite a few gaping holes’. While ECOWAS has a proven capacity to deal with conflicts within its sub-region (outside of Nigeria), neither SADC nor IGAD has the same capacity, and both ECCAS and the AMU have practically none. The paper attributes the weaknesses of some RECs to the following factors:

- lack of resources: reflecting poverty and poor state governance
lack of leadership: there are few powers able and willing to play the role of a hegemon that would provide strength, resources and seek to act multilaterally in accordance with common rules, despite its ability to act unilaterally
absence of shared values and norms: in some cases, this extends to situations in which members are actually in a violent conflict with one another, either in the form of international wars or, more frequently, proxy wars
mis-matched communities: several states are misplaced in the sense that their most urgent security concerns are not addressed by the REC to which they belong.


This is the concluding paper in a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary African Studies on regional security arrangements and how they construct and respond to perceived threats. It focuses on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Originally intended to accelerate economic and social development in West Africa, ECOWAS has become increasingly engaged in removing security-related obstacles to that goal. ECOWAS members have over the years established important mechanisms to deal with questions affecting regional security, including the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. Regarding transnational challenges, the Mechanism calls for stronger and more effective cooperation among the region’s security services in their attempts to control cross-border crime, international terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). It also emphasises the need for the region’s states to harmonise their domestic laws in accordance with the relevant ECOWAS conventions. The paper notes though that apart from small arms and light weapons, there has been limited practical implementation in addressing other key transnational challenges. The paper identifies several reasons for the gap between rhetoric and implementation of agreed measures:

- the immediate concern with preserving the existing neopatrimonial regime and avoiding social transformation
- a related lack of trust between political actors
- the limited influence of regional civil society organisations
- widespread lack of capacity (due in large part to a failure of the region’s elites to invest in ECOWAS and in their own domestic security and justice systems) as well as corruption

The paper also provides a comparison of ECOWAS to regional arrangements in Asia, in particular the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. ECOWAS members, like other African countries, are more firmly disposed to allow for political and military intervention than the states making up regional arrangements in Asia. ASEAN stresses instead non-interference and territorial integrity. In addition, regarding transitional challenges, ECOWAS has focused on SALW, whereas regional arrangements in Asia have focused instead on counter-terrorism.

4. Asia

Sovannasam, U., 2005, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Efforts in Dealing with Transnational Crime, Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong

ASEAN is considered to be a successful regional cooperation in terms of moderating intra-regional conflicts and significantly reducing the likelihood of war. It has achieved this through political dialogue and security cooperation. This paper argues that given an existing cooperative
framework, the securitisation of transnational crime (drug trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering and sea piracy) could increase the sense of urgency. This in turn could lead to the mobilisation of political support and better deployment of resources for the adoption of relevant measures and mechanisms to counter transnational crime.

The paper provides a detailed overview of ASEAN’s efforts thus far to promote regional cooperation on transnational crime. They include various meetings between leaders of member countries, the adoption of accords, declarations, joint statements, and plans of action. Meetings have occurred among ministers from various departments in member countries, including foreign affairs, finance, law, drug matters, police and immigration. Efforts have been made to promote exchange of information, legal coordination, law enforcement, training, institutional capacity-building and extra-regional cooperation. Practical collaborative arrangements have been set up, such as the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL), which deals with operational aspects of cooperation against transnational crime. ASEANAPOL has been actively involved in sharing knowledge and expertise on policing, enforcement, law, criminal justice, and transnational and international crimes.

Despite the progress made by ASEAN in securitising transnational crime, there are still several challenges to regional cooperation. ASEAN’s approach to countering transnational crime has focused predominately on law enforcement cooperation. In order to achieve more sustainable results, however, it is important to develop a more comprehensive, multisectoral approach that also draws on foreign and justice ministries. In addition, since ASEAN is a consensus decision-making organisation, its response to transnational crime depends on an overlap between domestic priorities and a need for regional cooperation. Differing priorities, varying country capacities and an absence of political will could weaken ASEAN’s effort for forging closer regional cooperation on counter-terrorism.


This paper examines the set up and role of ASEAN and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in conflict management. It finds, based on the following factors, that ASEAN has been more effective than SAARC.

- **Formal and informal modalities of interaction**: ASEAN aims to prevent conflict through a combination of formal and informal mechanisms. It focuses on the latter, relying on building regional understanding, trust and decisions by consultation and consensus, rather than on formalised, rules-based instruments. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) also allow for confidence-building and conflict management in the region. In contrast SAARC has no comparable formal or informal methods to prevent or contain violent conflicts, and all its decisions are based on unanimity. SAARC does however, occasionally use looser arrangements, such as annual summits, to discuss bilateral problems.

- **Shared perceptions and values**: members of ASEAN have a common commitment to ensure a harmonious and peaceful regional order. The adopted ‘ASEAN way’ refers to a regional political culture that stresses informality, consensus building and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. By contrast, South Asian countries hold widely divergent views on many important issues and lack a common political culture.

- **Role of the pivotal power and leadership**: it is important to have a pre-eminent regional power to contribute to the formation of the regional organisation and to promote relations between the various members. ASEAN had a pivotal power – Indonesia - which was keen to create a mechanism for regional reconciliation. Most Indonesian leaders have accorded a high place to ASEAN. In contrast, India - the powerful actor in South Asia, has been disinterested in regional organisation.
Asymmetry among members: in ASEAN, members are powerful in different respects, which makes it less likely for one member to appear threatening. While Indonesia is the largest state, Singapore is economically stronger. In contrast, in South Asia, India appears threatening as it is the largest state and increasingly the most economically powerful as well.


This paper assesses the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which was established in 2001 and comprises China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its main purpose is to strengthen mutual trust among member states, to cooperate in various sectors, including in the maintenance of regional peace and security. It was designed as an intergovernmental network led by annual summits and by regular meetings of the heads of government, foreign ministers and other high officials of the member states. Despite the diverse membership of the SCO, the paper finds that the organisation has managed to harmonise interests. Similar to other regional organisations, it has done this through: the formulation of guiding principles; the creation and balancing of a programme of activities in which each party can find something to its taste; and by setting up processes that allow for difficult issues to be worked through to compromise.

The SCO’s primary focus is combating terrorism, separatism and extremism. Its 2001 Convention on these issues establishes a common understanding of the terms and commits member countries to cooperate through: exchanging information and intelligence; meeting requests for help in operational search actions; developing and implementing measures to prevent, identify and suppress offending actions; collaborating to stop the flow of finance and equipment to the guilty parties; and reciprocally extraditing persons committing such crimes. Members also engage in large-scale visible live exercises aimed at preventing cross-border movements and violent actions by indigenous armed groups. The other main engine of SCO joint action is the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure. Its mandate is to carry out ‘analytical work’, but its activities have developed in some clearly operational directions, such as planning a shared databank on terrorist, separatist or other extremist organisations (their structures, leaders, members, operational channels and financial resources); contributing to command and tactical-operational training; and helping to draft international legal documents concerning the fight against terrorism. The paper finds that these mandates and activities have been effective in the development of joint policies in the related fields of domestic and functional security and a degree of coordination and interoperability among its members’ armed forces and security services in regard to potential anti-terrorism deployments.

5. Europe


This paper discusses the evolution of the European Union from its origin as a peace project. It highlights some of the key steps in its progression. These include:

- A simple expansion of the organisation, through the creation of new offices, directorates, and the expansion of staff;
- A piecemeal transfer of what had previously been sovereign powers of the member states to the European Community, for example through the direct application of EU law without the transmission of national legislation;
An expansion of the competencies of the European Commission and the European Parliament, both representing the Community at a supranational level, at the expense of the European Council, which operated at an inter-governmental level;

A gradual move from consensual modes of decision-making that protected state sovereignty by implicitly allowing for a veto, to more majoritarian modes.

The paper also discusses the development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which has allowed for the formulation of common strategies in a number of fields. For example, the EU has under the CFSP developed an arms-control policy, intended not only to harmonise the positions of the member states in various international bodies and negotiations, but also to regulate the behaviour of member states (e.g. with a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports). Although not legally binding, it is politically binding and has contributed to enhancing transparency in this field, involving some of the world’s largest arms exporters. The paper argues that despite the success of the EU, it is not an appropriate model for regional collaborations in other parts of the world because the foundations of the EU (strong states with a high degree of internal cohesion and a high degree of economic interdependence, based on strong and diversified economies) would be difficult to replicate. Instead, the less demanding approach developed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (discussed below) may be more desirable.


This paper traces the evolution of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into the present Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the contribution of both to regional security. The CSCE adopted a diplomatic approach with regular conferences and consensus-based decision making. It managed to maintain momentum, despite the absence of a fixed structure, such as a permanent secretariat. This allowed for the development of shared norms, principles and procedures and improved levels of mutual trust. Such progress, the paper asserts, is likely due to the fact that there was something in it for all participants (‘basket format’) and the fact that the CSCE adopted a comprehensive approach to security (subsequently adopted by NATO and the EU). After the end of the Cold War, the CSCE was transformed into a formal regional organisation in the form of the OSCE. There was at the time considerable optimism about the possibility of creating a functioning collective security system for Europe on the basis of the CSCE/OSCE. The paper argues, however, that the formalisation of the CSCE was not accompanied by any increase in legal or political stature. Most areas of the OSCE are weak, understaffed and under-funded. The paper concludes that the process nature of the CSCE may be worth emulating as it allows for effective collaboration among countries with varying strengths and weaknesses and unlike the EU, does not require strong and prosperous states or any high degree of economic interdependence.

6. Latin America and the Caribbean

http://www.crisisstates.com/Publications/wp/WP34.2.htm

This paper provides an overview of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the transformation of its approach to security. The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for peaceful dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation and legal norms. The adoption of an expanded, multi-dimensional concept of security - based on the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment threats – resulted in new attention by the OAS to issues of drug trafficking, democratic stability, terrorism and mine
clearing. This in turn resulted in a shift in focus from deterrence and collective security to cooperative security. The latter involves confidence- and security-building measures that guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information. The paper asserts that despite the fact that the OAS receives limited attention compared to other regional security organisations, it has played an important role in facilitating communication and preventive diplomacy; and in tackling new security challenges.


This paper provides an overview of cooperative efforts by Mercosur states to confront security threats, including the containment of new transnational threats such as organised crime, drug and arms trafficking and terrorism. Addressing these threats requires institutionalised cooperation between not only Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Offices, but also the Home Offices, the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Economic Affairs and Defence as well as police authorities. The paper documents the cooperative process that has emerged among Mercosur states since the mid-1990s (designed at the Conference of the Home Secretaries). It includes:

- Political and security forums and agreements: these have simplified the transnational cooperation of the police- and security forces of the subregion;
- The General Plan for Regional Security: this provides for the exchange of information among security and police officials; the simultaneous adoption and execution of measures to control and repress criminal activities; improvement of the equipment of police institutions; and more effective employment of personnel resources and coordinated forms of training.
- The data bank for information relevant to the security (SISME): this is intended to provide the infrastructure for information on criminal cases and related police operations and for practical cooperation between federal police agencies and security forces in the subregion. Such exchange of information is considered crucial to the effective prosecution of criminals operating transnationally.
- The sub-regional cooperation of police institutions and the Mercosur Centre for Police Training: these have been important preconditions for police collaboration on the operative level and have allowed for the federal police of the Mercosur-countries to carry out common operations in most types of criminal cases.

Through sub-regional agreements on training, exchange of information and operative cooperation, the member states of Mercosur have created the political framework and operational instruments for transnational crime control, including the transnational prosecution of criminal offenders in the Mercosur area. Through an exploration of the problems of organised drug trafficking and international terrorism, the paper finds that while there are still difficulties, Mercosur’s political and operational arrangements have been successful in addressing security threats.


This case study analyses the main conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and examines the mechanisms that have been developed to prevent or resolve them. It finds that the Organisation of American States (OAS), the key regional organisation, has been successful in
some cases of conflict prevention but weak in others. In addition, it finds that although the OAS has set up new programmes and structures in order to deal with new sources of conflicts and violence (e.g. urban violence closely associated with gangs, drug trafficking and organised crime), internal fragmentation and inter-governmental political confrontations have undermined its ability to deal effectively with these threats. The study thus advocates for attention to sub-regional integrations schemes and examines the role they can play in facing current threats.

Within LAC, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has been the most active in conflict resolution and prevention. It has engaged in fact-finding missions, set up task forces, and participated in joint missions within the OAS. It has also sought to set up frameworks to counter HIV/AIDS and transnational crime, for example through the Pan Caribbean Partnership Against HIV/AIDS, and the Regional Crime and Security Initiative. The study also highlights the work of the Central American Security Commission, which within The Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America (TMSDCA) meets regularly and develops cooperation programmes. The Commission recently identified five priorities for regional cooperation: prevention of violence and rehabilitation of youth, illegal trafficking of persons, demining and treatment of mine victims, activities associated to drug trafficking, and confidence- and security-building measures. In addition, there have been joint Tradewind exercises, held annually in order to prepare participant countries for combating transnational organised crime and drug trafficking as well as for natural disaster response. The study examines as well the role of Mercosur and the Andean community. It concludes that despite some successes, similar to the OAS, sub-regional organisations also demonstrate limited progress. It recommends the strengthening and institutionalising of sub-regional organisations; and greater attention to structural prevention and the role of non-state actors, in particular civil society organisations.


This brief paper discusses the transnational security threats facing the Caribbean, the need for transnational solutions and key challenges in address these threats. It advocates for cooperation both at the bilateral and multilateral level. Cooperation between and among countries can be difficult to achieve, however, for various reasons, including: political leadership changes within countries; unfavourable public opinion within the more resource-endowed states; and the fact that policy makers in the relatively better-off states may be uncertain about the benefits they may receive from investing in a collective project. The paper also stresses the importance of cooperation not only between and among countries but within countries. Various agencies within countries – such as the army, coast guard, army intelligence and police intelligence; health ministries; trade ministries; foreign affairs ministries; and national security ministries need to cooperate. However, this has often been challenging due to bureaucratic politics and jurisdictional and turf battles. Another key challenge for internal and transnational cooperation is the limitations of intelligence capabilities of many Caribbean states. Although, there are Joint Information Coordination Centres and Joint Operations Command Centres in the region, the paper highlights that in almost all cases their establishment and operation are due to interest and investment by non-Caribbean state actors, notably the United States and Britain.

The governments of countries in the Caribbean have recognised that drug trafficking in the region continues to threaten the peace, security and sustainable economic and social development of communities. This paper stresses the importance of an integrated and balanced approach to the fight against drugs which aims not only to reduce supply but also to reduce the demand for drugs. The paper highlights various initiatives over the years to coordinate such a strategy. These have centred on data collection on the prevalence and incidence of drug and alcohol use in Caribbean countries and attempts to set up a regular monitoring system. However, shortages of staff and funding and a lack of computer hardware and data analysis software have limited the effectiveness of these efforts. The paper argues for policy development that highlights the linkages between drugs and other health and social problems, such as HIV/AIDS; prevention education; treatment and rehabilitation programmes and facilities, which are currently lacking especially on smaller islands; and research and development to provide a database on drug use patterns and trends to support evidence-based policies.

7. Additional Information

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Websites visited
Centre of Excellence for Policing and Security, Council of Europe, Crisis States Research Centre, CSIS Indonesia, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Google, GSDRC, IDRC, Ingenta Journals, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Bank, United Nations University – Comparative Regional Integration Studies

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