Literature Review on State-Building

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Zoe Scott
University of Birmingham
International Development Department
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the Literature</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part A and B: Theories and Concepts of State-building from Development and other Literatures</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual Framework</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-building v. Nation-building</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of the Terms</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-building and Development</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding the State</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding the Socio-political Context</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-patrimonialism</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Ownership and the Role of External Actors</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Security and Peace-keeping Literature on State-building</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations Literature on State-building</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies and Political Science Perspectives on State-building</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Literature on State-building</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part C: Critiques and Theory on the Role of the International Community in State-building</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of the International Community’s Role</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous vs. Endogenous State-building</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonisation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Considerations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part D: History and Trajectories of Change</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Search for Success Stories</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferability of Lessons from History</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating Factors</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part E: Typologies</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaps in the Literature</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summaries of Key Documents on State-building</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part A: Theories and Concepts of State-building 12
Part B: Non-development Theories and Concepts of State-building 18
Security and Peace-keeping 18
International Relations 21
Social Studies / Political Science 23
Economics 25
Part C: Critiques and Theory on the Role of the International Community 26
Part D: History and Trajectories of Change 34
Part E: Typologies 40
Additional Bibliography 40
Other Relevant Research and Literature Reviews 42
GRC/GSDRC Research Reports 42
Other Relevant Literature Reviews 42
Overview of the Literature

Part A and B: Theories and Concepts of State-building from Development and Other Literatures

Conceptual Framework

State-building is currently experiencing a ‘renaissance’ and is the topic of several recent books, journal symposia and research initiatives. There is a vast amount of written material that relates either explicitly or implicitly to the topic of state-building. In the time allowed for this literature review it has not been possible to cover all that has been written on the topic. Instead, this review focuses on presenting diverse opinions on state-building, from literature spanning several different fields, mainly written in the last ten years. Although much recent work on state-building focuses on Iraq and Afghanistan, this review attempts to present a more geographically unbiased, global perspective, with particular attention paid to including material on Africa.

State-building is a truly inter-disciplinary topic, drawing interest and discussion from social sciences, international relations, political studies, anthropology, economics, international development and security studies, amongst others. Often, representatives from these diverse fields are coming together and working collaboratively to analyse extremely complex state-building situations. An example is Berger and Weber’s article in Third World Quarterly: a jointly published article by an historian and a political scientist, in a mainstream development journal (Berger and Weber, 2006). It is therefore not possible to consistently identify one coherent perspective on state-building and attribute it to a particular discipline. International relations academics, for example, articulate very diverse approaches to state-building – their thinking does not appear to be limited primarily by the university department in which they sit or the journal in which they are publishing. A political scientist’s writing on state-building may actually have more in common with a conflict specialist’s views, than with another political scientist. Whilst this means that it is not possible to neatly fit theories and concepts of state-building into organised categories sorted by discipline, it is possible to identify some primary concerns or preoccupations in the literature that loosely fit with particular fields of expertise. This section of the overview will therefore highlight general theories, concepts and problems arising from the state-building literature and then go on to specifically address the perspectives of the more mainstream security, international relations, social studies and economics literatures.

State-building v. Nation-building

There is much confusion over the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ (Hippler 2004, Goldsmith 2007). Some authors use the terms inter-changeably, some with completely different meanings. In general, most people use ‘state-building’ to refer to interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of the state, for example the bureaucracy. In contrast, ‘nation-building’ also refers to the creation of a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state. Most theorists agree that a well-functioning state is a requirement of the development of a nation, and therefore most would also agree that state-building is a necessary component of nation-building. Several authors argue that whilst state-building is something that external actors can engage in, the development of a cultural nation is inherently something only the emerging society can itself shape. Using this line of thinking, it seems most appropriate for development actors to limit themselves to using the terminology of state-building.

However, although ‘state-building’ is possibly a less controversial term than ‘nation-building’ for external actors to use to describe their interventions, there has, in recent years, been a tendency for the difference between the two terms to become less marked and for them to be used inter-changeably by many in the international community. This is most common in non-academic circles, particularly the media, donors, NGOs, think tanks etc. This has probably largely been influenced by the Bush administration’s (and, as a result, the media’s) tendency to use the term ‘nation-building’ for its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the
term ‘nation-building’ is increasingly being used for activities that could more accurately be described as ‘state-building’.

Whilst current foreign policy and popular culture tends to conflate the two terms, it is also possible to argue that state-building and nation-building are opposing forces (Ottaway 1999). Whilst state-building focuses on creating an homogenous nation-state, a ‘nation-building’ approach emphasises the importance of cultural identity which may ultimately lead to calls for self-determination.

Finally, another possible reason for the lack of distinction between state- and nation-building may be that the literature really neglects the ‘building a cultural identity’ aspects of nation-building, choosing instead to focus on the more technical aspects of building state capacity. Writers might therefore claim to write about nation-building, but in fact their emphasis is really on state-building.

**History of the Terms**

There are historical reasons why external actors engaged in state-building activities might be cautious about their choice of terminology.

Whilst state-building and nation-building are often used interchangeably in current debates, they have not always been perceived as synonymous. Nation-building was heavily discussed in the 1950’s and 1960’s and carried a strong conceptual link to modernisation theories of development (Dinnen 2006, Hippler 2004). During the Cold War, the US and the USSR both used nation-building as a tactic to limit the reach of their enemy. However, by the 1970’s the term fell out of favour having been linked with the US’s involvement in the Vietnam War. During the 1980’s state- and nation-building were firmly off the international agenda, with the focus turning to reducing the role of state and unleashing the market (Fukuyama 2004). It was only in the 1990’s that state-building began to re-emerge as the importance of ‘good governance’ was increasingly discussed in the light of limited developmental progress in many Southern states. The ‘good governance’ agenda put the focus firmly back on the capacities and structures of the state in developing countries. Now, in the post-9/11 era, security and development are once again being linked, as they were during the Cold War. The security of wealthy states is viewed as being threatened by the under-development of poor ‘fragile’ states. This perspective ensures that state-building will remain a preoccupation of the international community for some time to come.

**State-building and Development**

Interestingly, the literature on state-building has been largely driven by the international relations and political science fields. The development community has not written widely on the subject (Hopp, 2004). However, although the development community has not used the terminology of state-building to a great extent, the primacy of the good governance agenda within development and the increasing focus of development policy on the primacy of politics and the state means that many aspects of mainstream development activity are akin to state-building activities. Examples include service delivery measures, tax reforms, civil service reform, infrastructure development, democratisation, political party support, public financial management training and conflict management. It is therefore possible to view state-building as a sub-set of development. Interestingly, out of all the literature surveyed for this review, the only author who firmly considered state-building to be part of development policy was Stephen Mallaby, an international relations theorist and journalist (Mallaby 2002). In general, development experts seem hesitant to adopt the language of state-building. This may be an attempt to distance themselves from the modernisation theories of the past and the aggressive foreign policies of the present, or it may be in recognition of what an extremely large and diverse topic state-building really is; development practitioners generally tending to specialise in aspects of building state capacity rather than claiming expertise in how to develop all aspects of a nation-state.

Another tension between the discourses of development and state-building is over the issue of local ownership (see paragraph below). Development policy uses ‘participation’ as a
guiding principle and advocates on behalf of the world’s poorest people, hopefully in their best interests. Much of the state-building literature is less self-consciously altruistic and carries overtones of meeting the needs of the external actors in the international community, rather than the needs of poor communities on the ground. This tendency is marked by a willingness to discuss state-building in terms of ‘neo-imperialism’ or ‘neo-colonialism’ (Mallaby 2002, Paris 2006, Etzioni 2004). It is likely that this perspective and terminology would be strongly resisted by the development community who, having more exposure to the negative aspects of colonialist rule through their work in ex-colonial countries, are perhaps more sensitive to accusations of ‘colonialist’ activity than other fields.

**Understanding the State**

The literature on state-building is also largely divided depending on alternative assumptions about the state. Several authors (Zartman 1995, Chesterman et al. 2004) consider the concept of the nation-state to be the bedrock of the international system and therefore the entity of the state should be preserved at all costs. Other theorists argue that states are often not worth preserving and the international community should let them dissolve so that new states can emerge that more accurately reflect pre-existing local ‘nations’ (Brock 2001, Ottaway 2002).

Interestingly, there is very little debate in the literature over what type of state the international community should try to build in fragile contexts (Samuels 2004) – the normative assumption is that a state is a liberal market democracy spread over a geographic territory. According to this interpretation, state-building is actually about the transfer of Western values, institutions and norms, which is what exposes it to accusations of neo-imperialism. Proponents of state-building argue that this sort of neo-colonialism is unlike previous incarnations of colonialism in that it is more altruistic, it is multi-lateral, it involves the non-governmental sector and interventions advocate early exits (see Paris 2002).

**Understanding the Socio-political Context**

There are no blueprints for how to conduct successful state-building interventions. Several authors emphasise the need to tailor reforms to the local context, although little solid advice is given on how to do that effectively. Migdal, for example, emphasises the inherent links between the state and society and outlines how each impacts on the other (Migdal 2001). From this perspective, it is not possible to think of state-building as a technical process divorced from its socio-political context.

This viewpoint is emphasised by an ethno-centric reading of state-building (Brock 2001, Ottaway 1999). Nation-building of the 1950’s and 60’s approached ethnicity as a ‘pre-modern’ phenomenon which would simply disappear as a more modern, rational state emerged. However, history has proved that this is not the case and that any state-building actors must take the matter of ethnicity seriously. Attempts at ‘homogenising’ a state from an ethnic perspective are not appropriate. Ottaway (1999) raises the question of whether it is even appropriate to expect to be able to build an homogenous multi-ethnic state, particularly in an African context where all current nation-state contain multiple ethnic identities.

**Neo-patrimonialism**

Understanding the socio-political context of state-building activities in many developing countries, particularly in Africa, requires a recognition and an understanding of neo-patrimonialism. Several authors argue that it is misguided to assume that state weakness causes a power vacuum in fragile states (Reno 2000, Chabal and Daloz 1999). Often, where state apparatus appears weak, power is actually vested in extremely strong informal networks. Reno calls these ‘shadow states’ and emphasises that what are often classed as symptoms of state weakness are actually often deliberate strategies of rulers to enlarge their personal economic power base (2000). This perspective highlights that there are often major disincentives that prevent rulers in developing countries from supporting state-building initiatives. At worst, attempts to improve the capacity of the state can prompt rulers in neo-patrimonialist contexts to deliberately sabotage reforms ultimately resulting in an even weaker bureaucracy.
Local Ownership and the Role of External Actors

A strong emphasis in the literature on state-building, across all disciplines, is the need for ‘local ownership’ (Chesterman et al 2004 and Narten 2006). However, as Narten (2006) discusses, this general ‘call’ is rarely broken down into specific advice for how to ensure local ownership in a context that may well be marred by conflicting factions, powerful elites and serious distrust of external actors. Many authors voice general concerns about the need to tailor state-building strategies to the particular local context, but again there is little practical advice about how to do this.

The issue of elite engagement in statebuilding processes is significant. Authors such as Chesterman (2004), Morales-Gamboa and Baranyi (2005) emphasise the importance of having strong elites to provide local leadership behind which wider society can mobilise. Barnett and Zuercher (2006), however, offer an alternative perspective, arguing that by working with elites, external actors simply recreate oppressive systems of social hierarchy. With the only exception being Zartman (1995), all authors emphasised that, as ‘outsiders’, the international community can only play an extremely limited role in facilitating state-building. This concern was voiced even more strongly when discussing nation-building. Historically, state-building has been most successful as states have sought to break away from external powers – the process has not been facilitated by them (Etzioni 2004).

The Security and Peace-keeping Literature on State-building

Just as some authors use the terms nation-building and state-building interchangeably, much of the security literature uses peace-building as a synonym for state-building (Paris 2002, Barnett and Zuercher 2006). Several authors argue that peace-building cannot just be about ending violence, it must be about creating sustainable peace. This focus on sustainability has prevented peace-builders from pulling out of situations straight after the cessation of violent conflict – instead, they have been forced to work on state-building activities like democratisation, developing the bureaucracy, building justice systems etc. Rather than focusing exclusively on technical conflict management, peace-building has become a vehicle for exporting a particular vision of the state into non-Western environments (Paris 2002). Interestingly, in conflating the terms state-building and peace-building, security specialists assume that state-building is something that primarily happens in ‘post-conflict’ contexts. This assumption is not as explicit in other literatures. Therefore, for the security and conflict community, peace-building is the same as state-building. For other disciplines that would advocate state-building in weak but not necessarily post-conflict environments, peace-building is a sub-set of state-building.

The security literature on state-building is heavily dominated by discussion of exit strategies (Rubin 2006, Fearon and Laitlin 2004). The international community increasingly calls for early exit strategies from peace-keeping / nation-building ventures whilst simultaneously emphasising the importance of building sustainable peace. Several authors argue that these are conflicting aims and that strategic peace-building, involving a restoration of the state, will always be a lengthy process. Some even call the idea of exit entirely into question, instead calling for a new type of state entity, part way between an independent sovereign state and one supported entirely by the international system (Fearon and Laitlin 2004).

International Relations Literature on State-building

International relations literature on state-building is dominated by concerns over the role of external actors in restoring the state. The concepts of the nation-state and of state sovereignty are foundational principles in international relations. The question of sovereignty raises massive debates as to how justified the international community is in under-taking state-building activities and intervening in the domestic affairs of a state. International relations specialists have offered a broad spectrum of responses on this matter, ranging from calls for ‘strong’ Western states to ‘scale up’ their interventions in weak states in order to save the world from anarchy (Mallaby 2002), to requests for the international community to practice restraint and withdraw from nation-building initiatives altogether (Etzioni 2004). The middle
ground is also represented by authors who claim that international intervention in weak states is necessary, but only in order to enable such societies to become their own masters again (Jackson 1990).

The ‘war on terror’ has strengthened the focus on the conceptual link between security and development. Most literature on state-building adopts this perspective, particularly articles by international relations theorists. They suggest that state-building is important not because of human rights and global responsibilities to the world’s poorest people, but in order to protect the interests of wealthy states and to preserve the existing world order.

**Social Studies and Political Science Perspectives on State-building**

Social studies and politics literature on state-building broadly aims to draw the debates away from technocratic discussions of topics like the sequencing and prioritisation of reforms, and focus instead on the historical, socio-political context. Authors in these disciplines emphasise the primacy of culture and the need to consider important issues such as ethnicity. Social scientists are generally more willing to question normative assumptions about the importance of the state than international relations experts. Several authors advocate that states should be left to dissolve or emerge as the societies within those territories see fit (Brock 2001, Ottaway 2002). Their focus is on the indigenous population rather than on the international community and a preservation of the current nation-state world order.

Historians are increasingly making contributions to the state-building literature. Unsurprisingly, they call for an end to ahistorical analyses of state-building interventions (Berger 2006), arguing that understanding the past can prevent a repeat of costly failures (Dodge 2006).

**Economics Literature on State-building**

Relatively little economics research has been done that specifically uses the terminology of state-building, although there is much relevant, related research. For example, recent studies of patterns of economic growth suggest that the state plays an important role in economic development (Kohli 2004). This implies that state-building, which focuses on increasing the capacity and effectiveness of state interventions in the market as well as in society, is good for economic growth. This finding challenges the traditional view that suggested that a strong, effective state that intervened in the market would have a negative overall effect on growth (Fukuyama 2004).

**Part C: Critiques and Theory on the Role of the International Community in State-building**

**Limits of the International Community’s Role**

There is a particularly strong emphasis in the literature on the extremely limited role that external actors can play in state-building processes. Virtually unanimously, writers on state-building assert that the international community is not a major player in the reconstruction of the state. To be successful, they argue, state-building efforts must originate from within the state. Where external actors do play a leading role in state-building, they undermine the ability of the emerging state to learn to govern independently and they disrupt patterns of local ownership, often breeding resentment and creating spoilers (Chesterman 2004, Narten 2006 and Carothers 2007). Authors repeatedly call for external actors to have very modest expectations of their role and what they can achieve in other states (Samuels 2004). This is not to say that the international community should just ignore failing states and refuse to help, just that their help should be designed through the lens of ‘facilitating’, not ‘guiding’ the process. Ultimately, the international community needs to learn patience and be willing to let grassroots responses to state failures emerge rather than pushing for a particular outcome from outside (Carothers 2007).

**Exogenous vs. Endogenous State-building**

Linked to calls for limiting the role of the international community in state-building is a preference for endogenous state-building, as opposed to exogenous processes (Ottaway
The emphasis on ‘local ownership’ in state-building literature is discussed above, but it cannot be emphasised enough as it is echoed like a mantra across all fields of research on state-building. As Narten highlights, there is little advice on exactly how to stimulate local ownership, particularly in ‘post-conflict’ contexts where societies are themselves divided but decisions have to be taken quickly (Narten 2006). There is also a question about how to stimulate local appetite for reform in countries that have a weak state but are not emerging from violent conflict. Often, informal systems have developed to the point where society has little incentive to call for reform and no expectation of real change (Reno 2000, Fukuyama 2004).

So what can the international community realistically do to support state-building without twisting it from being an endogenous to being primarily an exogenous process? Several authors emphasise that the primary role of external actors should be around the provision of human resources - both military in conflict zones and manpower in non-conflict areas - and financial support. However, there is a contradiction: by placing conditionalities on financial support the international community undermines local processes (Paris 2002). However, given donors accountability to their taxpayers it is unrealistic to expect donors to not require some formal accountability for the funds they provide.

A second role for the international community is to facilitate participation and create space for dialogue amongst local actors. There has been a tendency to accept partnerships with local elites as indicating a good degree of local ownership (Chesterman 2004). In reality, the international community should aim for more than just elite participation and advocate for the integration of all sections of society in state-building endeavours. The development community, with its long history of facilitating participation, should be able to lead the international community in this sort of best practice.

**Harmonisation**

The international community has been heavily criticised for its lack of harmonisation in state-building activities (Ghani et al 2005, Samuels 2004, Paris 2006 and Rubin 2006). Paris (2006) questions why state-building missions have been so marred by the international community’s inability to work together effectively. He concludes that the lack of harmonisation is a symptom of a greater, underlying issue: the lack of harmonisation of values and ideals. Because the international community does not agree on best practice in state-building, it is not currently able to adopt a coherent, strategic approach.

Several authors call for the emergence of a new international entity to help coordinate state-building missions (Rubin 2006). There are also suggestions that the inadequacies of the US mission in Iraq is preparing the way for a greater, more internationally supported role for the UN in state-building (Rubin 2006 and Samuels 2004). Regardless of whether a new body is created or not, international donors must recognise the impact that their fragmented approaches to aiding state-building is having on the success of the missions.

**Technical Considerations**

There are a number of technical considerations that are repeatedly mentioned in discussions about external involvement in state-building. They centre around issues of resources. Ultimately, most case studies of state-building failures list a lack of resources as a key obstacle to progress (Dodge 2006). This is true of several types of resources: manpower, military troops and financial resources. State-building is an extremely costly process, something which most donors fail to appreciate at the beginning of an initiative. This may be because donors are often embarking on an initiative of unknown size, or because of their reluctance to be realistic about likely costs for fear of upsetting the electorate back home.

This mis-placed optimism regarding the setting of resource levels is linked to over-optimism when setting the likely time-horizons of state-building. There is no doubt amongst experts on state-building that it is an extremely lengthy process if done appropriately. The current emphasis on ‘early exits’ is unrealistic and leads to pressure to withdraw support before sustainable reconstruction has been reached (Dodge 2006, Dobbins 2006, Etzioni 2004).
Part D: History and Trajectories of Change

The Search for Success Stories

Unfortunately, far more is written on state-building failures than on success stories. The state-building literature is extremely heavily skewed towards analysing failures, particularly the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and calling for the international community to take different approaches in future. Very little research has been done that attempts to identify successful state-building and then analyse factors that facilitated transitions from weak to effective statehood. That may simply be because there is a lack of examples of successful transitions, or it may be a symptom of the difficulty of applying the labels ‘weak’ and then ‘strong’ to a particular state (Cahen 2005, Morales-Gamboa and Baranyi 2005). The reluctance to label state-building initiatives as successes perhaps reflects recognition that situation can change rapidly, and that what looks like a successful transition today, may be negatively impacted by changes tomorrow.

Transferability of Lessons from History

To combat the difficulty of identifying modern state-building success stories several researchers have looked further back in history and specifically focused on the development of European nation-states (Tilly 1985, Moore 2004). Their assumption is that understanding how pre-modern Europe developed into the co-ordinated, highly-developed set of states that it now is will provide some insight into how to best support state-building processes in developing countries. This assumption raises questions over the transferability of these lessons. Whilst some authors argue that transferable lessons can be gleaned (Tilly 1985, Moore 2004), others strongly assert that they cannot (Herbst 2000). These contrary perspectives seem to centre on the question of the similarity of context. Tilly (1985), for example, emphasises the similarity between the political contexts of Europe in the 16th and 17th century and of many countries in the modern developing world, arguing that both are dominated by coercive, self-seeking, violent rulers. However, even if that is true, the political landscape is not the only relevant context; aspects of the social and historical contexts of developing countries may well be so markedly different to 16th century Europe that the lessons prove to be totally non-transferable. It is certainly true that the global political climate with globalization, an enormous aid infrastructure, US hegemony and the ‘war on terror’ as defining characteristics is extremely different to the contexts of previous centuries.

Facilitating Factors

What is particularly interesting about the limited research that has been done on trajectories of change and successful state-building is that there is little coherence in the factors that are identified as pivotal for facilitating effective transitions. Germany and Japan are often cited as the only concrete examples of state-building success (Dobbins et al 2003). However, a high level of economic development is not generally regarded as a necessary pre-requisite to successful state-building. ‘Previous experience of democracy’ is also not mentioned as a ‘facilitating factor’ as much as might be expected.

In summary, different writers assert the importance of different factors in enabling state-building. Morales-Gamboa and Baranyi (2005) emphasise the need for ‘enlightened local leadership’ to creatively lead state-building initiatives. In contrast, Tilly (1985) argues that European states emerged despite extremely ‘un-enlightened’, despotic leadership. He emphasises the importance of grassroots insurgency and popular uprisings in shaping state formation. This emphasis on the role of state-society relations in shaping state-building, even if brokered through violent means, is reiterated by Moore (2004), albeit from a different perspective. Moore argues that functioning tax systems are a key part of state development as they strengthen the social contract. He claims that the bargaining that takes place between state and society via taxation facilitates the emergence of a strong, constrained and effective state.

Another suggested factor that facilitates successful trajectories of change is social homogeneity (see Cahen 2005). Germany and Japan both had high degrees of social cohesion at the time of their development. Unfortunately, the majority of situations where the
international community is currently involved in state-building activities are societies that are highly fragmented and marked by ethnic divisions. State-building in such environments must proceed with great respect for pre-existing social groupings within the nation (Cahen 2005).

In summary then, the only tentative conclusions to draw are that good leadership and social homogeneity might be important for state-building and an active, vocal civil society probably is important. Mechanisms that allow society to influence the state, ranging from tax systems to rioting, probably play important state-building functions. A potential important role for the international community therefore emerges from these studies – to undertake state-building by facilitating the emergence of civil society and creating or strengthening mechanisms for its development.

Ultimately, the main analysis emerging from the case studies is that successful state-building is complex and messy. It cannot easily be reduced down to a handful of facilitating factors. Instead, it involves the fortuitous interplay of multiple shaping forces such as geography, politics and history.

Part E: Typologies

There is no single typology of states in the developing world that is widely used across the academic field1. Instead, there is a plethora of different attempts to categorise states and various terms used by different authors (Leftwich 2000). Examples from the literature covered in this review include ‘collapsed states’, ‘neo-patrimonial states’, ‘shadow states’, ‘weak states’, ‘warlord economies’ and ‘quasi-states’. However, these different terms are more attempts to identify previously unrecognised characteristics of the state in developing countries; they are not efforts to develop a coherent typology. As a result there is often a lack of conceptual clarity about the meaning of different terms, terms often overlap and, taken collectively, they do not cover all types of state. An overview of the literature then provides more a myriad of different perspectives on and labelled characteristics of states, that it does a usable typology or method of neatly categorising states.2

There have been attempts to develop typologies, although these are not widely used or recognised as they tend to be criticised for being over-simplistic. An example of this would be Kohli’s typology used in his economics research (2004): he categorises states in the three groups of ‘neo-patrimonial’, ‘cohesive capitalist’ and ‘fragmented-multiclass’. ‘Neo-patrimonial’ states are marked by political systems that work on strong, informal patronage networks despite having the democratic institutions of a ‘modern’ state. ‘Cohesive-capitalist’ states are also described as ‘developmental’ states, marked by cohesive, though often repressive and authoritarian, politics. These states tend to pursue rapid growth and national security. ‘Fragmented-multiclass’ states lie in-between the other two categories, and tend to be ‘middling performers’ economically. Public authority is more fragmented in these states and relies upon broader allegiance. All democracies are ‘fragmented-multiclass’, although not all ‘fragmented multi-class’ states are democracies.

International development donors have also tried to develop typologies. The World Bank’s LICUS system (Low Income Countries Under Stress) divides states into ‘policy-poor but resource rich’, ‘weak government capacity’ and ‘emerging from conflict’ (World Bank, additional bibliography). Again, this has been criticised for being too simplistic (GRC query 2003, listed under ‘Other relevant research and literature reviews’). The OECD-DAC has distinguished between types of fragile state context using the categories of ‘post-conflict / crisis or political transition situations’, ‘deteriorating governance environments’, ‘gradual improvement’ and ‘prolonged crisis or impasse’ (OECD-DAC, additional bibliography). Again these are very broad categories and little guidance is given on how to actually distinguish between these types.

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1/ It is for this reason that only one document is included under this heading in the summaries section. This document is not a typology itself, but discusses the categorisation of states.

2/ The Governance Resource Centre completed two relevant research queries in 2003 and 2004 listed under the ‘Other relevant research and literature reviews’ section. The reports list additional resources that may be of interest, expert comment and give findings that are consistent with this report.
It seems likely that no typology exists, not because nobody has thought to try and develop one, but because this would be an extremely difficult process: if too few categories it would receive criticism for being too simplistic, if too many it would be criticised for being unworkable. There is always significant debate on the measures used to allocate states to different categories; for example, what indicators to use to make allocations. Even the World Bank, with its LICUS system, recognises that LICUS is a multifaceted continuum rather than a set typology, because states necessarily change position on that continuum as they are continually evolving entities.

One alternative to simplistic typologies is to develop typologies within typologies. For example Jackson and Rosberg (1986) take one type of political system in Africa, that of ‘personal rule’, and break it down further into categories of ‘prince’, ‘autocrat’, ‘prophet’ and ‘tyrant’. Whilst this approach may be criticised for creating a proliferation of terms and categories, it emphasises both the elusive nature of the state in developing countries and the tendency amongst political scientists to resist attempts to simplify or generalise about the enormous complexities of state systems.

Gaps in the State-Building Literature

Several gaps in the literature on state-building were observed during the research for this literature review. However, there may well be significant reasons for these gaps. For example, no authors offered clear guidance on the prioritization and sequencing of state-building activities. However, this appears to be because the debate is at a much more embryonic stage; there is no consensus amongst experts that donors even should be engaged in state-building, let alone how they should go about timetabling their operations. Despite the vast quantity of material on the topic of state-building, the academic debate has not travelled very far and is marked by wide divergence of opinion. This creates a tension between the research needs of donors, keen for some guidance on best practice, and academics who, struggling with the basic concepts of state-building, are consequently reluctant to produce the sort of neat, practical advice that is being required of them by the international community.

Despite this tension in the research/policy nexus, there are several potential areas of research on state-building that need attention in order to drive the debates forward:

- **Development**: more clarity is needed on the overlaps and inconsistencies between development as a concept and state-building processes. In what way is development just a different term for state-building? What is the specific contribution that a ‘development lens’ can bring to state-building analysis?

- **Gender**: none of the material reviewed mentioned gender in any way. Research could be carried out into a gendered perspective of state-building, and analysis of how different genders interact with or are discriminated against in state-building processes;

- **Pro-poor**: There was no specific mention of strategies for ensuring that state-building processes are pro-poor. Research has been done on elite capture of state-building processes (Barnett and Zuercher 2006), but this is minimal – the mainstream view is that strong elite leadership is good for state-building;

- **Culture**: There is little coverage in the nation-building literature of how cultural identities are shaped and emerge. It may be that this research exists in other fields such as anthropology. A particular angle of interest would be what role external actors can positively play in the process;

- **Local ownership**: Despite the emphasis on ensuring local ownership of state-building, very little is written about how to practically do this. One approach would be to link research on participation in conflict environments or divided societies with the specific challenges of state-building missions;
• **Spoilers**: what are the specific disincentives for supporting state-building at all levels of society? The research on neo-patrimonialism touches on this from the perspective of rulers. How can societies’ disincentives be overcome and spoilers become supporters?

• **Comparative historical analysis**: more analysis that compares long-term historical perspectives on state-building from different regions would potentially be helpful in identifying ‘trajectories of change’. Analysis of Asian countries seems to be particularly lacking;

• **Transferability**: Research on the limits of using individual or regional success stories to develop best practice is necessary;

• **Civil society**: If a strong, effective state emerges partly because of demands placed on it by an articulate and energetic civil society, what innovative mechanisms are there for supporting the development of civil society in fragile state contexts?

### Summaries of Key Documents on State-Building

**Part A: Theories and Concepts of Statebuilding**


  The development community has had an ambivalent attitude towards nation-building, generally linking it negatively with post World War II reconstruction, decolonisation, the fall of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and an emphasis on promoting the interests of external actors. This chapter emphasises that the term has primarily been used in the debate on foreign and security policy. “It has so far hardly been applied at all in the domain of development policy, which is also being increasingly defined via contributions towards strengthening the functionality of the state” (p.137).

  Two main poles of thinking on nation-building have emerged. The first equates nation-building with state-building, a process that is organised from the outside to boost international security. The second perspective defines nation-building as “an autonomous process of the development of a nation”, that can only be achieved by internal actors and goes beyond a monopoly of violence and an effective infrastructure. It focuses on the development of a national identity – “external actors do not play any role in this regard as exerting their influence would be a disruptive interference in the country’s national sovereignty” (p.139).

  The authors suggest that a development policy perspective would be about the “continuous development of an integrated society based on shared values and goals with recourse to a functioning statism and infrastructure” (p.141). It is possible for external actors to play a role in this process, but they must respect the sovereignty of the emerging nation. Development policy can bring a useful perspective to the debates on nation-building by focusing on boosting integration processes, ensuring that elitist groups and powerful members of the diaspora do not just form a government in exile which overlooks large groups of the population. Development policy also exerts an indirect influence on nation- and state-building as development processes can serve as a preventative measure stopping fragmentation and inequality, instead fostering participation and empowerment.


  This article traces the history of the term ‘nation-building’ and outlines different definitions of the concept.
Nation-building as a term was not used after the Cold War until the second half of the 1990's when it became popular again. The international community’s experiences in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq emphasised that state breakdown can trigger conflicts, humanitarian disasters and under-development. Nation-building was a key concept of the 1950’s and 60’s, linked to modernisation theory. It was largely a post-colonial phenomenon which was a competitive enterprise during the Cold War i.e. newly independent states were supported strategically as part of a Western strategy for containing socialism and the Soviet Union in the third world. During the 1970’s the term disappeared, compromised by the Vietnam War.

Nation-building is a vague term with two main, distinct meanings. Firstly it is “a process of socio-political development, which ideally – usually over a longer historical time span – allows initially loosely linked communities to become a common society with a nation-state corresponding to it” (p.6). Alternatively, nation-building is viewed as “a political objective as well as a strategy for reaching specific political objectives”.

Hippler (2004) argues that we ultimately need integrative ideologies, for example where someone can be a Pashtun but also be an Afghan, which they have in common with other non-Pashtuns.

A functioning state apparatus is essential for nation-building, emphasising that “state-building is a core aspect of successful nation-building” (p.9).

External actors can make nation-building easier or harder but they can never force or prevent it in contradiction to the wishes of the broader society. Ultimately “nations” do not just exist, rather they emerge like many other social phenomena in a difficult and inconsistent process – or simply do not. And in most countries, the existence of a state preceded that of a nation, even in the classic examples of European nation-states” (p.10).


Ottaway argues that state-building and nation-building are not synonymous but are actually conflicting processes. She claims that both state- and nation-building are underway in Africa but their aims are contradictory. State-building aims at developing more inclusive democratic political systems whereas nation-building encourages ethnic nationalist movements to increase in militancy and make a bid for becoming their own state. In that way, nation-building threatens the coherence of multi-ethnic states and thereby undermines state-building. She argues that “in no African country did the nations within the state give way to a nation embracing the whole state” (p.85) and goes on to claim that post-colonial leaders turned nation-building into narrower state-building, which actually just worked to produce authoritarian states rather than inclusive nations.

The chapter emphasises the importance of considering the difficult incompatibilities between ethnicity and democracy when focusing on nation- and state-building. Ottaway asserts that there are three possible outcomes for democracy within the multi-ethnic African context:

- Ethnic parties realise they cannot win elections alone and so form inter-ethnic alliances;
- There is an increase in ethnic conflict and divide until the state collapses. Stability is difficult to re-establish in this context;
- The existing state system breaks up to match more accurately with pre-colonial ‘nations’.

Ottaway concludes that ‘it is impossible to form homogenous ethnic states’. Whilst conventional wisdom used to say the state was a ‘given’ but a nation could be formed, it now says the reverse: the nation is a given but the state can be formed. Ottaway argues that in reality, neither assumption is realistic and concludes that “ethnic identities cannot be made to
disappear easily, but, at the same time, it is impossible to form homogenous ethnic states except by forcing major population migrations. This leads to the conclusion that African states can achieve stability and continue to democratise only if they learn to live with their multi-ethnicity” (p.94).


To what extent can existing conceptualisations of the state in sub-Saharan Africa contribute to an understanding of the exercise of power as it is empirically observed? This chapter argues that the state in Africa was never properly institutionalised because it was never properly emancipated from society. This is due to both historical and cultural factors. It concludes that the weak character of the state in Africa may be more perennial that has hitherto been envisaged.

There is little consensus on the nature of the state in Africa, even on the fact that it is both poorly emancipated and very largely patrimonial. If in some cases it is merely a mirage, in most others it is in productive symbiosis with society. If we start from the empirical realities of contemporary Africa, the paradigm that emerges is the political instrumentalisation of disorder - that is, the profit to be found in the weak institutionalisation of political practices. The state is both vacuous and ineffectual. The failure of the state to be emancipated from society has profoundly limited the scope for ‘good government’ in sub-Saharan Africa. Equally, such a poorly institutionalised state has not had the means to seriously spur sustainable economic growth on the continent.

Nevertheless, the very weakness and inefficiency of the state has been profitable to African elites. The development of political machines and the consolidation of clientelistic networks within the formal political apparatus have been enormously advantageous.

The informalisation of politics in Africa might prove a defining feature of its socio-political order for the foreseeable future:

- There may be an inbuilt bias against the institutionalisation of the state;
- The current patrimonial and prebendal practices of political elites are satisfactory, at least from the micro-sociological perspectives of the individuals and communities they serve;
- The momentum for reform is unlikely to arise from civil society;
- The legitimacy of African political elites derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests. It is therefore imperative for them to exploit governmental resources for patrimonial purposes.

There is a critical contradiction at the heart of the present political condition of sub-Saharan Africa. Proper institutionalisation of the state would remove the need for rulers to continually display the substance of their power. If political domination became embodied in a bureaucratic state, political elites would no longer have to justify their prominence through the fulfillment of their patrimonial duties. What this would mean, however, is that they would have to accept both the supremacy of institutions over individuals and the temporary nature of their political eminence. The severity of the current economic crisis in Africa is unlikely to favour the institutionalisation of the state. Political elites urgently seek the resources that the informalisation of politics might generate. Such heightened competition is apt to bring about greater disorder, if not violence. Conversely, it is likely that the elites will use the reforms, brought in by the so-called transition to democracy, to secure both renewed legitimacy and access to the new assets that the liberalisation of the continent’s economies makes available.

Reno argues that activities often described as the consequences of incompetent administration, corruption, bureaucratic decay, evasion or bad policies are actually often better understood as the purposeful, systematic, deliberate strategies of rulers. This paper highlights how African rulers create ‘shadow states’ to meet their own personal goals. A ‘shadow state’ is described as the informal, commercially oriented networks that operate alongside remaining government bureaucracies. Shadow states are created by rulers’ manipulation of markets and the law to enhance their own power and wealth. African rulers in this position often, very logically, prefer weak formal institutions so that their own power is not compromised. It is for this reason that many have historically overlooked, or even resisted, state-building and institutional development within their governments.

Reno emphasises the impact of this type of neo-patrimonialism on health and education spending: the more a ruler relies on buying support, the less money available for investment in social services. In fact, a ‘shadow state’ is organizationally incompatible with the provision of public goods, for example security. This is because “a shadow state ruler will minimise provision of public goods to encourage individuals to seek his personal favour to protect themselves from the chaos that the ruler’s own methods create” (p.4).

It is important to recognise that shadow states can exist in degrees – it is not an ‘all or nothing’ label. State-building or institutional development of the bureaucracy is inversely proportional to the presence of ‘shadow state’ characteristics and strategies.

Reno concludes that efforts to reform ‘shadow states’ carry risks of hastening the rulers’ destruction of the remaining elements of the bureaucracy.


This article calls for a shift from technocratic approaches to nation-building which ignore the historical context and assume that there is a ‘right’ set of strategies. We need new, creative paths for achieving effective states in difficult environments. Nation-building techniques from the Cold War era are now inappropriate and limited given the crisis of the UN centred nation-state model, US hegemony and the post 9/11 geopolitical situation.

During the Cold War, there was a tendency to link security and development as poverty and under-development were seen as a threat to the global order. This perspective is re-emerging and dominating the nation-building literature.

The authors argue that it is imperative to understand that the current global context for state-building is a ‘de-territorialisation of wealth and poverty’ as “sites of power and authority that define social experiences and political practices are no longer, if they ever were, confined to the domains demarcated by the territorial boundaries of any given nation-state... Social and political relations could never have been, and now more than ever cannot be, explained in national territorial terms” (p.202). The article challenges the dominant literature on state-building which centres on territorially based assumptions and ahistorical analyses. This normative approach seeks to ‘naturalise the nation-state system and conceal the increasingly transnational character of social power relations’ (p.203).

The article discusses the problems inherent in the concept of sovereignty and ultimately argues for an approach that combines traditional political concerns with a post-colonial focus on identity and culture. “Any progressive attempt at addressing the question of security and development in relation to ‘collapsing and failing’, or ‘collapsed and failed’, states ought to at least operate with a notion of social solidarity that carries us beyond the liberal capitalist conception of development and the naturalisation of the nation-state system that has been central to the dominant conceptions of state-building in the 21st century” (p.207).

This chapter consciously uses the term nation-building rather than state-building, but recognises this is a ‘fuzzy, often pejorative term’ that does overlap with state-building. Goldsmith defines nation-building as “the establishment of a common national identity within a given geographical area, based on shared language and culture” (p.26). The term is associated with modernisation theories of development and has architectural and engineering connotations. State-building is therefore a ‘central characteristic’ of nation-building, which Goldsmith defines as “the creation of effective organs of central government” in order for the state to “develop respected and effective public institutions to carry out policy” (p.27). Goldsmith recognises that these distinctions have faded in current foreign policy discourse and policy-makers increasingly see nation-building as being the development of stable, effective public institutions, and therefore synonymous with state-building. Goldsmith places nation-building within the ‘good governance’ development strategy of the 1990s: “sending in combat troops or peacekeepers is not central to the term’s meaning. Nation-building is mainly about civilian expatriates helping an inoperative or threatened nation state back on to its feet by overhauling its civic institutions along democratic, capitalist lines” (p.28).

The chapter uses a variety of global indicators to emphasise that state failure is worryingly common, but signs of nation-building are also prevalent in that democracy is spreading, there are signs of increased capacity for state administration and markets are opening up.

The chapter includes a section on external involvement in nation-building which highlights that “nation-building is not a predetermined or unidirectional process [-] local experimentation and adaptation are critical to making it work” (p.38). Goldsmith concludes with 3 broad policy implications for actors involved in nation-building:

• Be patient;
• Be adaptable;
• Have modest expectations.


This chapter places the state as central to processes of development and argues that it is vital and must therefore always be reconstructed after collapse. However, Zartman does concede that there might be a few occasions where you have to change the state dimensions before reconstruction can proceed.

The paper emphasises that civil society must also be reconstructed and developed in a way where it is integrated with the state. Often, civil society thrives after state collapse. State and civil society have different reconstruction needs: civil society needs political space to develop and flourish, whereas the state needs structures and institutions. Zartman emphasises that power structures should be constructed from the bottom up and that fostering constructive participation is vital for the restoration of legitimacy.

Resources are needed for reconstruction. A central task of state-building is to restore the state’s ability to extract and allocate resources. Often resources will have to come from outside the state. The chapter takes a very positive view of external assistance and the role of the international community in state-building, arguing that it is at worst ‘useful’, and at best ‘vital’.

The chapter does not propose a set sequence for reconstruction efforts, but argues that state-building should be a “process that combines order, legitimacy and authority with policy production, and extraction, rather than a series of discrete steps taken one at a time” (p.273). Zartman also asserts that “it must be done with a keen sense of indigenous orders, customs
and ways of doing things, which are the strongest allies of reconstruction efforts but can also be their undoing”.

Finally, state-building is not an automatic process but something that takes considerable effort and time.


This concepts paper summarises the thinking of several authors writing on nation-building and traces the evolution of the concept. It discusses the difference between state-building and nation-building: “state-building is seen as the task of building functioning states capable of fulfilling the essential attributes of modern statehood. ‘Nation-building’ on the other hand, refers to more abstract process of developing a shared sense of identity or community among the various groups making up the population of a particular state” (p.3). The author notes that ‘it is hard to find any references that address the practicalities of external assistance to the building of national identities. This is largely because ‘nation-building’ in this sense has not been a major focus in development assistance” (p.5). Donors largely focus on state-building, even if they use the terminology of nation-building.

The author states that nation-building from a developmental perspective comprises:

- The development of an effectively functioning state;
- A physical, social and communications infrastructure that is shared by all;
- A socio-cultural structuring and integration process leading to shared characteristics of identity, values and goals.

Nation-building is not exclusively a top-down process and external actors necessarily take a limited role. It is primarily about promoting active citizenship and political participation.

Finally, it is important to remember that there is no blueprint for success. Donors must proceed with caution, aware of how their aid instruments impact on state-society relations.


This introductory chapter argues that state ‘resuscitation’ is possible and that “repair and revival are possible outcomes” (p.41) of state failure.

Rotberg argues that state performance should be assessed on the provision of security, political freedoms such as participation, and services and infrastructure. He outlines the following as characteristics of failing states:

- Enduring violence;
- Victimization of citizens by the state;
- Loss of control over peripheral territory;
- Growth of criminal violence;
- Flawed institutions, particularly an emphasis on the powers of the executive rather than the legislature;
- Deteriorating infrastructure;
- Failing provision of basic services;
Enormous economic opportunity for a very select few, in the context of generally declining GDP;

Widespread corruption.

Using these criteria Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan can be labelled as failed states.

Rotberg argues that “to fail a state is not that easy. Crossing from weakness into failure takes will as well as neglect” (p. 14). Anarchy, predation and security dilemmas help to tip the balance towards failure. Whilst preventative measures are possible, it is probably too late once a non-state actor has a significant armed following. However, the chapter emphasises that even modern states with inherent weaknesses are not preordained to fail, and cites Botswana and Mauritius as countries who were able to flourish under good leadership despite failing tendencies. Whilst it is not possible to give precise ‘tipping points’, Rotberg details 3 signals of impending failure:

- Economic: rapid reduction in incomes and decline in living standards;
- Political: “the state becomes equated in the eyes of most citizens with the particular drives and desires of a leader and a smallish coterie” (p. 25);
- Violence increases.

He asserts that the primary concern when restoring a failed state must be stabilisation and a recovery of peace / law and order. After that has been established, three parallel goals should be pursued simultaneously – to jump-start the economy, to re-introduce the rule of law and to rejuvenate civil society.

Part B: Non-development Theories and Concepts of Statebuilding

Security and Peace-keeping


The involvement of the international community in state-building is now an inevitability. The current ad hoc, un-strategic state-building efforts of donors should be reformed under the banner of neo-trusteeship, which more provocatively could be classed as 'modern imperialism'. This differs from classical imperialism as state-building is now multi-lateral, involves the non-governmental sector and is based on the idea of exiting the country as soon as possible.

This article is written from a security perspective and argues that state-building is an inevitable result of mission creep (i.e. the escalation of goals and expectations) in Peace-Keeping Operations (PKOs) in weak states. Peace-keeping is being forced to develop into more long-term state-building: "the reality of state weakness means that peacekeepers need to foster state-building if there is to be any hope for exit without a return to considerable violence" (p.21).

The authors outline four strategic challenges for neo-trusteeship:

- Recruitment: who pays and manages the process?
- Coordination;
- Accountability;
- Exit.
The article emphasises the difficulties in the concept of an exit strategy: “the search for an exit strategy is delusional, if that means a plan under which full control of domestic security is to be handed back to local authorities by a certain date in the near future. Exit requires a functioning state capable of providing order” (p.36). It is important to recognise that the emerging state often has disincentives to support the exit strategy, particularly from a financial perspective. Developing an effective, functioning tax system is an essential part of an exit strategy to ensure that the fledgling state is financially viable.

In conclusion the authors argue that it is too optimistic to expect to transfer a state back to full sovereignty, but it may be more appropriate to aim for a state that remains embedded in and monitored by international institutions.


Peacebuilding literature has generally focused on technical conflict management and failed to see that peacebuilding missions are actually about the transmission of a particular vision of the state. Peacebuilding is therefore inadvertently state-building, based on normative assumptions of liberal democracy and market economics.

Paris argues that because peace-building is therefore about the transfer of norms values and institutions, it is similar to colonialism’s ‘civilising mission’. Peace-builders do not use the civilised / uncivilised dichotomy and they have a more altruistic motivation, but essentially, they are engaged in a similar mission. This is not necessarily wrong – a globalised vision of the state may be a good phenomena – but it is important to recognise that peacebuilding represents a new chapter of history.

The article outlines four mechanisms through which peace-builders promulgate liberal market democracy:

- Shaping the content of peace agreements;
- Provision of ‘expert’ advice in the implementation of peace agreements;
- Imposing social and political conditions on aid, for example, free and fair elections, respect for human rights etc;
- Performing a quasi-governance function by standing in administratively for the state.

Paris concludes by emphasising that peacebuilding missions serve as vehicles for the globalization of values and institutions.


This article, in the International Institute for Strategic Studies Journal, presents a militaristic, interventionist view of nation-building. Dobbins comments that nation-building is growing in prominence globally, with the US, UK, Canada and Germany taking a special interest. He defines nation-building missions as aiming “to halt a conflict, if one is still underway, forestall any resumption in the fighting and promote the emergence of an indigenous government capable ultimately of resuming full responsibility for the security and well-being of its population” (p.31). Interestingly, he asserts that “nation-building missions are not launched in order to make poor societies prosperous, but rather to make warring ones peaceful” (p.36).

The article argues that if nation-building founders, it’s usually because of a mismatch between objective and commitment. The wider the aims of the intervention, the more resistance it is likely to inspire and the larger the pool of spoilers created. This has cost implications and must be taken into consideration when deciding how extensively to reorder society.
US nation-building strategies can be contrasted with UN nation-building processes. The former generally “impose peace on unwilling parties and aim to alter long-standing power relationships” whereas the latter “seek to perpetuate existing truces while co-opting contending factions into peaceful, but potentially mutually advantageous, relationships” (p.32). Dobbins notes that the UN technique incurs considerably less financial cost.

Nation-building needs a mix of civil and military, multi- and national participation. There will always be some trade-off between unity of command and broad burden-sharing. No international organisation, not even the UN, has all the capabilities needed for nation-building. It is also important to consider working with neighbouring states who can often be powerful, effective spoilers.

The article develops a ‘rough hierarchy of nation-building functions’ (in order of importance):

- Security;
- Humanitarian and relief efforts;
- Governance;
- Economic stabilisation;
- Democratisation;
- Development and infrastructure.

Dobbins places ‘poverty reduction’ in the last category.


This book uses a specific definition of nation-building as “the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbours” (p.xvii). The authors outline how such missions have become more common, with growing objectives besides the restoration of peace, for example DDR, democratisation and economic growth. The authors state that “international military interventions have proved to be the best, and indeed the only, reliable means of preventing societies emerging from civil war from slipping back into conflict” (p.xviii).

The authors state that governments are beginning to recognise how complex nation-building is, recognise their previous mistakes and are trying to establish a more professional approach to nation-building. The book aims to help that process and specifically focuses on military and police contingents, civil administration, political reform and economic development.

Planning is an essential precursor to a nation-building mission. Objectives, the scale of the intervention and institutional arrangements should all be addressed. The book emphasises that ensuring the means match the intended ends is critical to success.

Two alternative approaches to nation-building are outlined: Co-option and deconstruction. ‘Co-option’ is typical of most UN missions as the intervening authority tries to work within the existing institutions, impartially working with all elements of society. In contrast, ‘deconstruction’ involves the intervening authority dismantling existing state mechanisms, and consciously disempowering some elements of society and empowering others in the process of rebuilding different state apparatus. The US approaches nation-building more in this way.

The book explores issues of prioritization, from the perspective that “the prime objective of any nation-building operation is to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones prosperous, or authoritarian ones democratic” (p.xxiii). Whilst the first priority in nation-
building is public security and humanitarian assistance, the authors outline the following hierarchy of tasks:

- Security: including law enforcement, rule of law and security sector reform;
- Humanitarian relief: return of refugees, response to disease, hunger and lack of shelter;
- Governance: resuming basic services and restoring public administration;
- Economic stabilisation: establishing a stable currency and the start of commerce;
- Democratisation: building political parties, media, civil society and electoral systems;
- Development: economic growth, poverty reduction and good infrastructure.

**International Relations**


This article places the new emphasis on state-building in a post-Washington Consensus context. Fukuyama argues that the current state-building preoccupation comes after decades of economics-driven development strategies that focused on limiting the scope of the state. As a result, state-building has largely been missing from development debates and has only resurfaced recently.

The paper raises theoretical questions around our ideals of state-hood and asks the critical question ‘should we be building state scope as well as state strength?’ The article develops a matrix where countries are mapped according to state scope as well as state strength. For example, the US scores highly on state strength, but much lower on state scope than a European country like France. Fukuyama admits that the matrix is limited in that state capacity varies enormously across agencies and functions, and that states are always evolving so their location on the matrix is continually changing.

The paper asks many questions, primarily ‘is it more important to increase state strength or reduce state scope?’ and ‘how do you increase state strength without also increasing state scope?’ Fukuyama takes an economist’s perspective by questioning whether growth will fall if state scope is enhanced. If so, how can we do state-building without damaging growth?

The paper closes by commenting on the lack of local demand for reform. Fukuyama concludes that “well-meaning developed countries have tried a variety of strategies for stimulating such local demand, from loan conditionality to outright military occupation. The record, however, if we look at it honestly, is not an impressive one, and in many cases our interventions have actually made things worse” (p.30).


This article discusses nation-building rather than state-building, but takes a broad view of the former, which includes the re-construction of state institutions.

Etzioni’s central argument is that foreign powers cannot do nation-building and so they should scale back their ambitions. He argues that nation-building has historically worked in nations breaking away from external powers, not been facilitated by them – “most nations were built in opposition to external powers rather than by them” (p.5). Societal change is difficult to achieve by external actors as

- It is costly in terms of time, money and lives;
• Western ways may not suit other contexts;
• They have a limited understanding of context;
• There is often strong resentment of their presence.

Etzioni asserts that there are three elements of nation-building: unification, including pacification, democratisation and economic reconstruction. For the latter two types there is a long list of ‘facilitating factors’ that are required for success.

Germany and Japan are often cited as the best examples of successful nation-building but the article emphasises their differences from the contexts where nation-building is being carried out today. For example, nation-building began in both countries after they were defeated in a war and there were no problems with ethnicity. Both processes also cost a lot of money and involved long occupations.

Overall, the paper suggests working with current power-holders and advocates a scaling back of nation-building efforts arguing that “the narrower the goal, the greater the commitment, the lower the expectations, the more likely it is” (p.14).


Mallaby argues that the US is history’s only non-imperialist superpower and that America has resisted imposing its institutions on other states. However, given the threat that failed states pose in the international system, Mallaby argues that this ‘anti-imperialist restraint’ is no longer appropriate in the context of increased state chaos in the developing world. Terrorism, growing population and longer, more violent civil wars all threaten to spark increased state failure. The West’s traditional alternatives to imperialism have been foreign aid and nation-building, but neither of these has been reliably effective at combating state failure.

This short article positions nation-building as an off-shoot of development policy and practice. During the 1980’s the development community began to acknowledge the need to work with the state and the ‘good governance’ agenda emerged. Development aid began to consider politics and the state, focusing not just on democratisation but also on building political parties, police forces, law courts, tax systems, central banks, civil society institutions and the media.

Mallaby argues that this type of development, or nation-building, has proved too difficult, leaving a large gap between what nation-builders want and what the world institutions are able to deliver. He casts the United States as the ideal player to fill this gap and respond to the growing danger of failed states.

“A new imperial moment has arrived, and by virtue of its power America is bound to play the leading role. The question is not whether the United States will seek to fill the void created by the demise of European empires but whether it will acknowledge that this is what it is doing. Only if Washington acknowledges this task will its response be coherent.”

Mallaby concludes by calling for a new international body to be set up to deal with nation-building; one that combines American thinking and values with internationalism. America should take the lead of this organisation, by supplying money, troops and commitment, to ensure an appropriate response to the problem of failed states. From Mallaby’s perspective, the "logic of neo-imperialism is too compelling for the Bush administration to resist".

How have notions of sovereignty changed in the post-colonial era? How do these changes affect the way development is done? This chapter from explores these questions, using a distinction between "negative" and "positive" sovereignty.

Since 1945 the world has been formally leveled into a sole constitutional category: sovereign states. Ex-colonial states have been internationally enfranchised and possess the same external rights as all other sovereign states (negative sovereignty). But most of them lack the real features of statehood in providing public goods for their citizens (positive sovereignty). Former colonies were granted independence without possessing freedom. They lack established institutions capable of constraining and outlasting the individuals who occupy their offices. But these quasi-states enjoy a right to exist and high prospects for survival despite their weakness and illegitimacy. This is a new constitutional mechanism, which has replaced colonial and pre-colonial military and diplomatic security arrangements. Key features of this system are:

- While there is legal equality, there is deep empirical inequality between North and South which is likely to persist indefinitely;
- Weak, marginal states are freed from power contests and treated as international protectorates;
- Weakness is not a threat to sovereignty, as in the past, but now a reason for international assistance;
- Quasi-states are part of a more general process of self-determination which has affected domestic as well as international politics, rooted in Western egalitarianism.

International aid is justified because independence is necessary but not sufficient to enable former colonies to become their own masters. It is an attempt to compensate for the lack of real (positive) sovereignty of quasi-states. Policy issues are:

- International society can enfranchise states easily, but it is difficult to empower them. State-building is a domestic process occurring over a long time;
- It is not possible to interfere with sovereignty, although aid may be tied to human rights demands;
- The most significant factor is not variations in empirical statehood, which have always existed, but changes in international norms and expectations concerning underdevelopment.


This chapter explores the inter-relation between the state and society. Migdal argues that state failure cannot just be a symptom of weak, depraved regimes and leaders. Instead, one has to consider the structure of society – “society’s structure... affects politics at the highest levels of the state and the actions of the implementers of state policy at much lower levels” (p.92). Therefore, to fully understand the characteristics and capabilities of state leaders, start by studying the social structure.
Migdal argues that leaders are more able to apply a single set of state rules and build sustained political support if there is not a culture of ‘strong men’. However, social control is often vested in numerous local level social organisations whose rules of behaviour are dictated by strong men. There is a circular link in that society impacts on the state as strong men influence policy makers. The state accordingly then impacts on society reinforcing fragmentation. Strong men and local leaders become the brokers for contracts, jobs, goods, services, security etc. Migdal sees the fragmented structure of society as the root cause of:

- Leaders’ focus on survival over social change;
- Corrupted styles of state politics;
- Bureaucratic structures of state organisation;
- Difficulties in implementing policy;
- State capture by elites.

The chapter’s conclusion asserts that “for the near future, at least, the prospects for building cohesive states, which can apply their rules and policies effectively, are not bright in societies with fragmented social control” (p.93).


This article is consciously written from a social sciences perspective, in particular political science, and aims to bring an understanding of ethnicity into the current debate on nation-building.

Brock’s central concern is to question why the international community is preoccupied with saving states and building states, and he questions the normative stance that nation-states should be preserved when they are in the process of failing. The article raises questions over whether the state system is destined to fail because it is inaccurately mapped and fails to consider ethnicity. Classical nation-building has ignored issues of ethnicity, presuming that ethnic difference is a pre-modern phenomenon that will eventually be overcome as a modern, rational nation emerges – the principles of nation-building are “bolstered by the idea that people are similar and that differences between them could be overcome at the altar of the sovereign state” (p.1). Nation-building has therefore come to mean and be measured in terms of ‘assimilation’ – “to put it more pointedly, where ethnic homogeneity did not exist, nation-building proceeded as the institutionalisation of ethnic rule in multi-ethnic states (ethnocracy). This was not only tolerated but actually supported by the aid bureaucracies of the North either because it was felt... that it would have a developmental payoff effect after all, or because West and East were competing for political allies and were most interested in buying loyalties than in supporting development and democratisation” (p.8).

Brock concludes by emphasising that despite its shortcomings, nation-building is not obsolete. Ethnicity should take a central role in nation-building debates as “ethno-politics are a dependent and an independent variable of social relations in the context of present world developments” (p.23).
What is the role of the state in developing economies? This question is fundamental to the debate over the failure of states in transition. This research looks at the arguments and suggests that a shift in the focus of reform is needed as well as political reorganisation in poorly performing economies.

The analysis of state failure has been driven by two views of what the state does. The ‘service delivery’ view says the state’s role is to provide law and order, stable property rights, key public goods and welfare redistributions. In failing to provide these, the state contributes to economic under-performance, poverty and a series of governance failures. These need to be addressed to focus the state on its core service-delivery tasks. The second view puts the state in the context of ‘social transformation’: the dramatic transition developing countries are going through as traditional production systems collapse and a capitalist economy emerges. These states have intervened in property rights and devised rent-management systems to accelerate the capitalist transition and the acquisition of new technologies. State failure, in this ‘view’, has been driven by the lack of institutional capacities and their incompatibility with pre-existing distributions of power.

An examination of the econometric data and historical evidence questions whether the governance reforms suggested by the first view can improve growth. There is at least a need for caution in the claims that are being made for governance reforms of the types that follow from the service-delivery model. For example:

- There is no historical evidence that these reforms were a precondition for growth, or that they can be meaningfully implemented in transformation economies;
- There is some support for this reform agenda in developing countries but competing factions have also found anti-corruption slogans useful in factional political conflicts;
- There is little evidence that new productive coalitions have formed around these reforms;
- There is a real danger that disillusionment will grow further if no significant economic progress is achieved;
- Multilateral agencies may not be spending public resources well in pushing reforms based on questionable evidence and linking them to growth improvements.

In contrast, the ‘transformation state’ perspective identifies critical state capacities for managing and regulating rents and for organising changes in property rights systems. If growth and sustained poverty reduction are the objectives, these capacities have to become the focus of institutional and political reform.

- The challenge is to suggest feasible reforms that account for the particularities of each country;
- While political restructuring is outside the remit of multilateral agencies, they can focus on simple regulatory capacities;
- Attention needs to be given to basic state capacities in areas such as technology acquisition and attracting multinationals;
• Institutional capacity building has to proceed in parallel with restructuring political and organisational power;

• International agencies should transfer knowledge, offer support in enhancing dynamic transformation capacities and encourage the construction of productive coalitions to support reforms;

• Further research is needed about how the distribution and disposition of organisational power has affected different transformation strategies and the use of this information to suggest feasible institutional and political reform.


This introductory chapter emphasises the pivotal role of the state in fostering different rates and patterns of economic development. State intervention has led to a variety of different economic outcomes in developing countries. In some states intervention has promoted rapid industrialisation and improved economic equity. In others government corruption has led to a failure to promote growth and wealth has stayed in the hands of elites. “States have helped to solve some important economic problems, while ignoring other problems and creating new ones” (p.1). The chapter asks why and considers various explanations for differing state capacity to choose and implement economic decisions. Ultimately, Kohli argues that “the creation of effective states within the developing world has generally preceded the emergence of industrialising economies” (p.2) and that “there is a stunning lack of evidence for the proposition that less government facilitates more rapid industrialisation in the developing world” (p.7).

Kohli outlines a typology of states in the chapter: neo-patrimonialist, cohesive-capitalist and fragmented-multiclass. (See section E for more on this). He finds that “in sum, fragmented-multiclass states, like cohesive-capitalist states, sought to promote industrialisation, but they did so less effectively because their goals were more plural and their political capacities less developed. In other words, varying patterns of state authority decisively influenced developmental trajectories” (p.15).


Part C: Critiques and Theory on the Role of the International Community


This paper focuses on the need to rethink the current aid architecture so that it supports processes of state-building.

The authors argue that the international community’s current state-building efforts actually work to undermine state capacity and sovereignty in the following ways:

• through the creation of parallel structures;

• the lack of harmonisation;

• non-state provision of traditional state services;

• the lack of predictability in aid flows.

The authors suggest a practical framework for reorienting the aid system through the introduction of sovereignty and state-building strategies. They urge the international
community to, in fragile contexts, work together to develop a coherent, long-term state-building strategy that aims to ultimately create a fully sovereign state. The following steps to developing a state-building strategy are outlined as:

- Create a sovereignty index to measure the sovereignty gap;
- Agree on modalities for state-building strategies for example, resourcing, incentives etc;
- Tailor state-building strategies to the context.

The paper closes by emphasising the state-building success stories of Europe and East Asia (although in a very brief way) and calling for immediate leadership from the international community to push this agenda forward.


Ottaway argues that collapsed states used to just disappear, whereas now there is a new determination to see them rebuilt as democratic states with strong institutions, within their old borders. The article compares exogenous state-building (using the examples of Mozambique, Cambodia and Bosnia) with endogenous efforts (for example, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea). Somalia is also used as an example of both types. Ottaway finds that exogenous, donor-driven attempts are more expensive and tend to focus on building institutions rather than establishing power. She criticises donor state-building techniques as focusing more on imported ‘best practice’ than local solutions, as being overwhelming for the country in question and for not being resourced adequately enough to see the donors’ goals realised. Ottaway comments that “In an attempt to remedy early mistakes and avoid future failures, the international community has developed a set of prescriptions for state reconstruction that is so exhaustive that it cannot possibly be followed in practice. The prescriptions in essence list the institutions and processes that need to be in place in a modern, Weberian, democratic state, but fail to outline a feasible process for getting there. This is the architect’s model of the finished building, but not the contractor’s plan for sequencing the various tasks, from digging the first hole in the ground to applying the final coat of paint.” (p.9)


When states fail, mechanisms for distributing political power remain, albeit in a more disorganised form. This makes it difficult for external actors to engage in a meaningful way. This paper’s main argument is that, whilst donors struggle to know whether they should focus on top-down or bottom-up approaches, “state-building works best when a population rallies behind an enlightened leader”. Local ownership is imperative – the paper uses the examples of Mozambique, Costa Rica and Singapore where state-building processes were all led by strong local elites. State-building therefore must be tailored to the local context, addressing “local needs, where possible channelled through local hands”. If local involvement early on is not possible due to conflict amongst local actors and a lack of functioning institutions, ownership should still be the ultimate goal.

Regional concerns must also be taken into consideration along with an appreciation that returning diaspora can generate political tensions as they form a new political elite.

There can be no doubt that state-building processes are slow, and domestic publics should be made aware of that fact.

The paper closes by emphasising that “states cannot be made to work from the outside. International Assistance may be necessary but it is never sufficient to establish institutions that are legitimate and sustainable. This is not an excuse for inaction, if only to minimise the
humanitarian consequences of a state’s incapacity to care for its vulnerable population. Beyond that, however, international action should be seen first and foremost as facilitating local processes, providing resources and creating the space for local actors to start a conversation that will define and consolidate their polity by mediating their vision of a good life into responsive, robust, and resilient institutions” (p.ii).


This report states that one of the main conceptual challenges for state-building is gaining clarity over what type of state is being built - “surprisingly, there is little clarity about precisely what sort of states are being built. Though rarely explicitly stated, it is assumed that such states ought to take the form of liberal democracies” (p.1). The authors also emphasise that it is important to have modest, realistic expectations about what is always going to be a lengthy, complex process.

Operational challenges include:

- a lack of harmonisation;
- the complexity of local situations;
- the inherently political context which makes state-building complex and time-consuming;
- short-term security issues;
- the need for humility and sensitivity in all state-building activities.

State-building must now be understood in the context of the ‘war on terror’. The US’s role in Iraq has heightened understanding about the political sensitivity and numerous difficulties surrounding state-building endeavours. The main lesson that may emerge is that state-building has to be carried out by a body with broad internationalism and local legitimacy. In this respect, Iraq may validate a leadership role for the UN in state-building processes.


‘Democracy sequentialists’ are theorists who argue that democracy should only be promoted after the rule of law and a well-functioning state have been established in a fragile state context. In this article Carothers partially argues from the opposite perspective and asserts that whilst democracy must wait until an adequate state is in place, there is no need to wait until it is ‘well-functioning’.

A sequentialist approach to state-building has particularly struggled in post-authoritarian regimes where bitter memories of oppressive state control have hampered society’s ability to recognise the need for a strong, capable state. Carothers claims that whilst a state must be built up to the point of having minimal functioning capacity before democracy is introduced, it does not need to be ‘well-functioning’.

The paper addresses the ‘myth’ that autocrats are better state-builders than democratic societies, arguing that autocrats have strong disincentives to build effective state capacity beyond military strength. State-building can struggle in fledgling democracies but “unlike with autocracies, there is no basic underlying tension between an effective state and a successful democratic government.” (page 20, pdf page 10).

Another key message of the article is that “the role of outside actors in most attempted democratic transitions is relatively limited” as the majority of ‘third wave’ democratic transitions have been grassroots led, not engineered by the West. Ultimately Carothers calls
for gradual democracy promotion as part of the state-building process, not a postponing of
democracy until the state is fully functioning.

  State-building Reinforces Weak Statehood', RPPS Working Paper: http://state-
building.org/resources/Barnett_Zeurcher_RPPS_October2006.pdf

This paper argues that peacebuilding is state-building: "it is not enough that former
combatants go to their respective corners, disarm, or recognise that a resumption of violence
will generate more costs than benefits. In order for there to be a stable peace, war-torn
societies must develop the institutions, intellectual tools, and civic culture that generates the
expectation that individuals and groups will settle their conflicts through non-violent means"
(p.2). Peace-building missions have often failed because they attempted to do in a few
months what took centuries in the European context. By pushing democratisation and market
economies in vulnerable contexts they merely arm divided societies with alternative tools,
'encouraging rivals to wage their struggle for supremacy through markets and ballots'.

The authors’ main argument is that external peace-building actors work with elites, their
strategies inadvertently reinforcing previously existing state-society relations, i.e. ‘weak states
characterised by patrimonial politics and skewed development’.

The three key actors in a peace-building context are external peace-builders, state elites and
rural elites. Each has their own concerns: peace-builders want stability and liberalisation;
state elites want to maintain their power and rural elites want autonomy from the state and to
hold on to their power in the countryside. This article explores the interplay and trade-offs
between these three actors where the elites are keen for the resources offered by
international peace-builders but do not want to compromise their power base.

The possible outcomes of the negotiations between these three actors are:

- ‘Co-operative’ peace where elites accept and cooperate with the peace-builders
  programme;

- ‘Co-optive’ peace where negotiations lead to a programme aimed at bringing
  stability but reforms do not threaten the elites’ power base;

- ‘Captured’ peace where the elites are able to entirely redirect assistance so that it
  meets their objectives;

- ‘Conflictive’ peace where coercive tools are used or threatened by any party.

The authors suggest that co-optive peace is the best outcome as no-one is likely to defect as
all needs are partially met.

The paper uses this model to analyse and compare the peace-building efforts in Tajikistan
and Afghanistan.

- Narten, J., 2006, ‘Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership: State Building in Post-
  war Kosovo’, RPPS Working Paper: http://state-
buiding.org/resources/Narten_RPPS_October2006.pdf

Narten argues that local ownership is imperative; otherwise state-building missions become
open-ended quasi-colonial forms of external rule. However, ‘local ownership’ can become an
empty slogan, with devastating consequences.

Little research has been specifically carried out into the problems that are inherent in
facilitating local ownership of international state-building missions. This paper attempts to
address that gap and outlines three essential dilemmas for international actors aiming to
promote local ownership:
• external *intrusiveness* vs. creating self-governing local structures;

• prolonging local *dependency* with short term vs. long term operational requirements;

• identifying local partners vs. empowering potential *spoilers*;

• The paper explores the ways in which these dilemmas are inter-linked. Essentially:

  • Intrusiveness breeds resentment which creates spoilers. Spoilers then cause state-builders to apply too long and intense, or too short and weak, strategies;

  • Prolonged dependency also breeds spoilers, which in turn means the emerging state has to rely on external assistance for longer to address the problem of spoilers;

  • Intrusiveness and dependency are linked in that the former keeps society dependent for longer, but continued dependency simply breeds continued intrusiveness.

Narten uses the example of UNMIK, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, to highlight how these dilemmas are linked and the difficult problems that emerge from not getting the balance right between international assistance and local ownership.


This article argues that it is too simplistic to call for greater international coordination of state-building activities, as many scholars have done: “stories abound of international agencies duplicating efforts or even working at cross-purposes, sometimes with limited knowledge of each other’s activities; and calls for improved coordination have become something of a mantra among scholars and practitioners of state-building” (p.2). Paris argues that it is too simplistic to just urge greater harmonisation and suggests that the lack of coordination is merely a symptom of “deeper disagreements and uncertainties about the means and ends” of state-building.

Lack of co-ordination is a real problem, but it exists because there is such little agreement on ‘state-building best practice’, i.e. what specific measures are required, in what order. How can the problem be addressed? The literature has tended to avoid answering details such as ‘who will do the co-ordinating and how, when etc.?’

The paper concludes by commenting that “the record of state-building has been mixed, in part, because there is little agreement on what specific measures are required, in what sequence, and based in which priorities, in order to create the conditions for stable peace in war-torn societies. And there is little agreement not only because the myriad actors that comprise the international state-building machinery have different approaches and interests, but more fundamentally because the entire enterprise is so uncertain, complex and politically sensitive” (p.23).


Ottaway concedes that the new ‘civilised’ nation-building has not been very successful. She argues that ‘harsh compromises’ are necessary in terms of requiring military assistance and recognising that democratisation is not always realistic.
The paper asserts that ‘nation-building is not necessarily a quagmire’. Using the example of East Timor, Ottaway argues that with a coherent plan and clear goals nation-building remains difficult but not impossible.

Nation-building is not actually about building a nation: “The goal of nation-building should not be to impose common identities on deeply divided peoples but to organise states that can administer their territories and allow people to live together despite differences. And if organising such a state within the old internationally recognised borders does not seem possible, the international community should admit that nation-building may require the disintegration of old states and the formation of new ones” (p.2).

The paper goes on to argue that nation-building is not a new concept and that it is not just war that builds states. Nation-building is also about participation and democracy, but you cannot escape that military provision is a core component of state formation.

Ottaway emphasises that the international community has ‘neither the will nor the way’ to build nations. It recognises that the tools used in earlier attempts at peace-building are not suitable today, but has not found alternatives. NGOs play a role in nation-building but only if there is a minimally functioning state. The assertion that nation-building should only take place in ‘strategically important’ states is absurd as it is impossible to differentiate between strategic and non-strategic states, especially in the ‘war on terror’.

The goal of nation-building cannot be a democratic state even though that might be the international community’s wish – instead it is important to be realistic and accept that unpalatable choices, particularly regarding the use of force, will have to be made.


This book’s main argument is that politics and the state matter for development. Lockwood argues that the focus of development NGOs and agencies has been on agricultural subsidies, doubling aid and conditionality. All of these debates have failed to recognise the central role of the state in development.

He asserts that trade is vitally important for Africa’s development but emphasises that East Asian successes only emerged because of effective state intervention in trade, industry and finance. Whilst NGOs have argued for trade interventions, they have failed to recognise that the focus must be on the nature of the state – it is the quality of the intervention that is important and therefore state capacity is the pivotal factor. “The political commitment and state capacity to deliver good-quality interventions in the economy are of central importance to Africa’s trade performance and to its economic growth, and are much more central than NGOs think” (p.45).

Lockwood shows that whilst NGO’s have heavily criticised conditionality and donors have supported it, African countries have rarely complied with the requirements placed on them.

Clientelism is central to African politics. Chapter 8 reviews the history and current situations of Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana and Mozambique and finds that none are really emerging as developmental states. Tanzania is the only country seriously attempting to reduce clientelism. “Clientelism is highly damaging for economic development and for prosperity; not only has it prevented the emergence of developmental states – it has actually led to the evolution of anti-developmental states” (p. 129).

Lockwood emphasises that change must come from Africa itself; the international community can only play a minor, supporting role. He advises donors to

- abandon conditionality;
- use aid to create incentives for political change;
• aim to diversify African exports.

Ultimately donors must engage with politics in Africa, however uncomfortable this may be: “It is the reluctance and difficulty that donors have with engaging with politics that makes them turn again and again to governance reforms. However, without such engagement, it will be impossible to address the chronic governance failures seen across the continent” (p.72). Lockwood asserts that the “overall goal of the international community with respect to Africa… should therefore be to support political transformation that changes a clientelist political system with a logic of consumption, to a developmental political system and state with a logic of productive investment” (p.130).


This paper uses Afghanistan as a case study to demonstrate that state-building missions do not just have to consider the division of society in war-torn contexts, they must also address the fragmentation and incoherence of the international community who sponsor such efforts. The paper is written in the context of the Brahimi report, which emphasised the rivalries of authority in the UN system and beyond. The author essentially calls for a multi-lateral entity to be established to facilitate coordinated peace-building. “This would involve a unified international decision-making body that would act as a counterpart to the recipient national government and potentially bring order to the anarchy that invariably flows from the multiple agendas, doctrines and aid budgets of the array of external actors involved in ‘peace-building’ in Afghanistan and elsewhere” (p.175).

Rubin argues that peacebuilding is just the UN’s politically sensitive way of discussing the controversial topic of state-building from the outside. He highlights that it is the need for an ‘exit strategy’ and for ‘sustainability’ that turns peace-building into state-building; realistically, you can only withdraw if you have built effective institutions.

The state needs three types of resources: coercion, capital and legitimacy. These are also the resources needed by peace-building missions. The paper discusses the use of these three resources in Afghanistan and concludes that the mission there failed to be the ‘integrated mission’ called for by the Brahimi report.

Rubin also emphasises that “building a national state means creating a sovereign centre of political accountability, which is not necessarily the same as building as ally in the war on terror” (p.179). For example, he notes the contradiction between the US working with warlords to hunt down the Taliban, as the UN was simultaneously trying to build an administration free from warlord interference. A key message of the case study is that the international community must recognise that “every step of the process of internationally sponsored state-building generates political conflict” (p.184).


This case study places the US occupation of Iraq in its historical context by comparing it with the British occupation in the 1920s. Both military campaigns became state-building projects. The US did not expect the total collapse of the state – they were expecting instead to simply take over the apparatus of government. “The total failure of state capacity in a given area poses distinct problems for the international community, which discursively and materially has few other tools through which to impose order” (p.189).

State-building in Iraq has been firmly exogenous, the only element of local partnership coming from a small section of the population identified by the US as its ally. The paper argues that “by its very nature, and despite claims to the contrary, external state-building is bound to be ‘top down’, driven by dynamics, personnel and ideologies that have their origins completely outside the society they are operating in” (p.190).
Dodge outlines three distinct phases of state-building

- The imposition and subsequent control of coercion;
- A shift from military force to infrastructural power, marking a transition from coercion to legitimacy;
- The evolution of a collective civic identity linked to the state.

A key to the failure of both the British and US occupations was a lack of military power and therefore a failure to impose coercion.

Dodge argues that the experience of the British is likely to be repeated by the US. “Iraq in 1932 was a quasi-state, dependent for its survival not on its military strength or administrative capacity but on international guarantees of its borders...Britain had decided instead to construct a quasi-state, one that had the appearance of a judicial and de jure state but was in fact an unstable façade, built in order to allow Britain to disengage as quickly as possible” (p. 195).

Dodge concludes by commenting on the effect of the ‘war on terror’ on international relations: “the sovereignty of states in the so-called developing world [is] now dependent upon their ruling elites meeting US-defined responsibilities...As the violence and instability in Iraq continues unabated this new ‘grand strategy’ must now come into question” (p. 198).


What is the effect of large-scale aid on public institutions and governance in poor countries? What effect will substantially increasing aid have on institutional development in Sub-Saharan African countries? This paper for the Center for Global Development argues that there is an aid-institutions paradox afflicting development in aid-dependent African countries. Large and sustained flows of aid undermine the development of effective state structures. Donors should refocus aid on debt relief, peacekeeping and security, and regional and global public goods such as disease eradication.

Sub-Saharan Africa receives an historically unprecedented level of aid. Half of the region’s 46 countries received more than 10 per cent of GNI in foreign aid, and 11 countries received more than 20 per cent. A number of current proposals support a substantial increase in foreign aid to this region. However, there is growing scepticism about the desirability of such large aid increases.

This essay explores the relatively un-researched impact of aid on public institutions in low-income countries. The critical importance of sound public institutions is now recognised by both economists and political scientists. Increasingly, measures of institutional effectiveness are an explicit factor for aid allocation and disbursement. However, aid operates in a similar way to the ‘resource curse’ by undermining the social contract between state and citizens and the incentives to build functioning government institutions. These harmful dynamics are particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa where countries have received aid for long periods. Large volumes of aid:

- Have negative impacts on (i) macro-economic competitiveness (ii) the relation between aid and measurable development outcomes (iii) the weak capacity of recipient governments to absorb existing flows;
- Reinforce undemocratic patrimonial and clientelist elements in governments, and sustain anti-developmental practices within the state apparatus;
• Displace the processes of institutional maturation essential to development, especially the capacity of the state to collect revenue;

• Fundamentally alter the government’s relationship with citizens. Elites focus on keeping donors happy and funds flowing rather than ensuring the support of the public;

• Reinforce powerful executives over already weak and pliant legislatures, supporting the tendency to authoritarianism.

Large volumes of aid undercut the principles of ownership, accountability and participation which they are supposed to foster. Not all aid is ‘bad’ however. Increased aid flows targeted at debt relief, peacekeeping, and regional security arrangements are likely to have positive effects on institutions. Funding global or regional public goods such as agricultural or anti-malaria research are unlikely to have the negative effects described. Donors should focus more on these areas. Other policy implications are:

• Taxation and developing the capacity of the institutions involved in taxation are key issues for state-building, state survival, and developing governance;

• Civil society and legislatures should be strengthened to build citizen participation and accountability;

• Donors’ incentives to improve aid effectiveness have been less strong than internal bureaucratic, commercial, foreign policy and ideological objectives. There needs to be a clearer and more prominent focus on effectiveness;

• When total aid is split into grants and loans, grants have a significant negative effect on tax revenue, while loans have a significant positive effect.

Part D: History and Trajectories of Change


This book analyses US nation-building interventions since World War II: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. All were comprehensive efforts aimed at facilitating major social, political and economic reconstruction. Whilst the US has not embarked on nation-building projects lightly, because of the high risks and costs, each successive post Cold War US led intervention has grown in scope and ambition. For example, Somalia was supposed to be a humanitarian intervention but became about democratisation, Haiti was about reinstalling a president and conducting elections, Kosovo was about political reform and the creation of a market economy. Bush criticised the Clinton administration for their expansive nation-building approach, but himself embarked on the most adventurous of all in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The success of the nation-building interventions in Germany and Japan has not been repeated. Why? The authors dismiss the idea that it’s because they were already highly developed, arguing that nation-building is primarily about political transformation, not economic reconstruction. They conclude that whilst the ease of nation-building is affected by economic development, prior democratic experience and social homogeneity, the most important controllable determinants are time, manpower and money. The study illustrates that the level of ‘effort’ put in by the US and the international community by way of human and financial resources has the biggest impact.

The book also emphasises that:

• unilateral nation-building is more straight-forward but also more costly than multilateral approaches;
• It is important to take a regional perspective as neighbours can easily destabilise a state;

• Staying a long time does not guarantee success, but leaving early ensures failure. No effort at enforced democratisation has taken less than 5 years. There is no quick route to nation-building.


This chapter uses the experiences of European state-making processes from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to draw broad conclusions relevant to current state-building processes in the third world. Tilly’s main premise is that “war-making and state-making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organised crime... At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government” (p.169). ‘Coercive exploitation’ played an instrumental role in creating European states. Tilly also claims that ‘war makes states’ and war making belongs on the same continuum as organised crime such as banditry, piracy and gangland rivalry.

The chapter emphasises that the sole difference between state violence and organised crime is the concept of legitimacy and illegitimacy. The four main functions of a state are war making, state making, protection and extraction, and each of these activities takes a number of forms.

The analysis draws out two main implications for the development of nation-states. Firstly, “popular resistance to war making and state making made a difference. When ordinary people resisted vigorously, authorities made concessions: guarantees of rights, representative institutions, courts of appeal. Those concessions, in their turn, constrained the later paths of war making and state making” (p.183). Secondly, the balance between the four state functions of war making, state making, protection and extraction significantly affects the organisation of the state that emerges:

  Summary taken from the GSDRC website: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=1520

Sources of state revenue have a major impact on patterns of state formation. This article investigates how far the quality of governance in developing countries might improve if states were more dependent for their financial resources on domestic taxpayers. It argues that we can best understand patterns of state formation in the South by exploring the different context in which they were formed in comparison with that of earlier western European states.

The fiscal sociology paradigm asserts that social evolution is driven by how states tackle raising revenues. This points towards a causal connection between the dependence of governments on levied taxes (rather than own revenue) and accountable, representative governance. This can be termed the fiscal (social) contract proposition, and is supported by literature i) interpreting the institutionalisation of representative government in western Europe as being driven by fiscal politics and ii) arguing that deficiencies in southern states can be traced to natural or strategic rents, rather than taxes. It follows that if Southern states were to become tax states, this might bring a dividend in democracy and accountability.

In Western Europe, civil, representative institutions were constructed through bargaining between rulers and those who controlled the major economic resources. There were specific
elements in place that facilitated these links between taxation and representation, including a large hinterland of lending and bondholding between taxpayers and rulers.

There are three interrelated sets of differences between state formation in Western Europe and the South:

- Southern states were created in the shadow of already rich and powerful Northern states, who used that power to form alliances and intervene in their development;
- Military technology has evolved so that states can now arm themselves through international markets, rather than relying on ordinary citizens;
- Southern states have strategic (development aid and military assistance) and resource (oil, minerals) rents available to them. Such rentier states are more likely to suffer from political pathologies, including autonomy from citizens, non-transparency in public expenditure, vulnerability to subversion and ineffective public bureaucracy.

Tax dependence is linked to the formation of effective states, but given the enormous diversity of polities in the South, the extent to which this will generate a “governance dividend” will be context-specific. Nevertheless, some of the main factors involved are:

- Coercion (rather than negotiation) is a more likely strategy for revenue collection at the local level, in agrarian environments and where governments enjoy high levels of legitimacy (especially post-independence);
- Governments are likely to remain committed to negotiation with taxpayers where there is a lack of international/external financing (which can undermine the bargaining relationship;
- The willingness and capacity of potential taxpayers to engage in collective action to bargain with the state is affected by the personnel overlap between legislators, large taxpayers, loan-providers and business associations;
- The mode of tax collection, and the level of potential discretion about tax liabilities. The state's discretionary power can be used to quash collective action;
- High inflation rates make it difficult to perform the calculations necessary to determine fiscal accountability;
- Value Added Tax is more likely to mobilise collective action because it is a "visible tax", equated with an "indirect tax". It places complex record-keeping burdens on taxpayers, is relatively difficult to avoid, and has already been a focus for the organisation of taxpayers.

How can we form a coherent view of African politics? This chapter argues that scholars have been unsuccessful in developing a view of African politics that takes the pre-colonial period seriously while acknowledging the traumas created by white rule. It suggests that there are broad continuities that become apparent when the approach of successive leaders to the same political geography is examined. As some African states break down, it becomes more important to understand the past in order to foresee a better future for Africa.
Until now scholars have focused on the European experience of state-building, despite the fact that Europe contains only a small proportion of the states formed throughout history. The European experience does not provide a template for state-building in other regions of the world. Nevertheless, to understand the extension of power in Africa, the traditional tools of political science that stress leadership decisions, institutional structures and systemic considerations can continue to be used.

For a truly comparative study of politics to develop, the great but incomplete drama of African state creation must be understood. How did those who sought to create African states respond to the continual problem of extending authority over distance, given a particular political geography? By examining both the environment that leaders had to confront and the institutions they created in the light of their own political calculations, the entire trajectory of state creation in Africa can be recovered. Fundamentally, there is nothing exotic about African politics. Rather, as elsewhere, political outcomes are the result of human agency interacting with powerful geographical and historical forces.

As is the case in other parts of the world, the viability of African states depends on their leaders successfully meeting the challenges posed by their particular environment:

- The fundamental challenge facing state builders in Africa is to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people;
- Low population densities have meant that it has been more expensive for states to exert control over a given number of people compared with Europe and other densely settled areas;
- Ecological conditions don't allow high densities of people to be supported easily. More than 50 percent of Africa has inadequate rainfall;
- State consolidation in Africa can be understood by examining several basic dynamics: the assessment of costs of expansion by individual leaders; the nature of buffer mechanisms established by the state and the nature of the regional state system.

Only by understanding all these levels is a complete analysis of the consolidation of power in Africa possible. It is important to disregard the boundaries between comparative politics and international relations because a more holistic analysis is necessary to understand the consolidation of power:

- Maximum analytic leverage is gained when the interplay between the cost of state expansion, boundary mechanisms and the state system can be understood;
- For instance, the cost of territorial expansion can be manipulated by states by changing the international understanding of what it means to control territory;
- Similarly, particular types of buffer mechanisms increase or reduce the cost of territorial expansion;
- Likewise, the nature of the international system affects what kind of buffer mechanisms states can establish.

  http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=1388

How can viable states across Africa be ensured? This study suggests that state systems are the result of political calculations of extending power. A review of the trajectories of states is valuable because many of the fundamental features of African politics become more
understandable. More importantly, a deep understanding of how states have progressed in Africa allows for the development of alternatives.

The African model – where states are born easily but do not die – is dramatically at odds with traditional western accounts of state building. There are important continuities and discontinuities in patterns of state consolidation in Africa across the centuries. The fundamental continuity is that leaders have had to deal with low population densities, which have made it expensive to control people as distance from the capital increases. The most important discontinuity is in the role of boundaries and the state system.

In the pre-colonial period, boundaries were defined according to how far a state could extend its power. Under colonialism, boundaries no longer reflected how far power could be broadcast but how far leaders believed their power should extend. The African successors to the colonialists created a new state system that was dedicated to reinforcing the viability of the colonial state boundaries. These boundaries are no longer a good reflection of state power, which tends to be fractured, weak and contested.

The contradiction of states with only incomplete control over the hinterlands, but full claims to sovereignty, has resulted in:

- Leaders who steal so much from the state that they kill off the productive sources of the economy;
- A bias in the delivery of services toward the small urban population and the absence of government in large parts of some countries;
- Weak central rule, which allows challengers to form large and sophisticated rebel armies;
- In some countries, state failure has meant that no one has been able to take charge.

Low population densities made the establishment of fixed territorial boundaries especially desirable to African leaders who would have faced difficulty in gaining sovereign control over their citizens. It is time to challenge the basic assumption held by African leaders and the international community that boundaries drawn haphazardly during the scramble for Africa should continue to be universally respected:

- Scholars, who have avoided non-European paths toward state consolidation, should take the African examples into account in order to develop a truly comparative account of how states develop;
- Leaders in Africa and elsewhere should accept that alternatives to some of the political arrangements that were initially demarcated by the Europeans must be considered, including the possibility of new states;
- The US should recognise that some states are not exercising physical control over parts of their country and thus cannot be considered sovereign. It should also consider the possibility of new sovereign states;
- More dynamism should be allowed in the creation of African states to underline the need for political control to be won not instituted by administrative fiat;
- Participation in international organisations by sub-national units, be they breakaway regions or areas abandoned by their central governments, should be encouraged.

This case study primarily asserts that state-building is not just something for the international community. It is first and foremost for local actors. The authors also emphasise the importance of appreciating that state-building occurs within a broad historical context. This context is important and relevant to all state-building activities.

The study shows that state-building is not just about making the right decisions and devising the right policies. In Costa Rica, state-building was facilitated by:

- Enlightened leaders;
- A coherent institutional response;
- International space and some foreign investment.

The authors assert that good governance arrangements can enable visionary leaders to create innovative solutions and prevent state failure. However, they conclude by emphasising that the world is continually evolving and so political and social situations can change at any time. New threats to state-building are emerging all the time and so actors cannot take anything for granted.


This chapter analyses the general assumption that Mozambique is a developmental success story, having transitioned from civil war to ‘donor darling’ in a short period of time. The transition was largely facilitated by the international community after years of extremely violent civil war.

Cahen argues that the above assessment is only partly true – whilst Mozambique may now be a model neo-liberal development state, this has been emphasised at the expense of focusing on deep problems with social and political stability. Cahen’s central thesis is that a focus on state-building and strengthening state institutions in Mozambique has drawn attention away from the urgent need to engage at the level of society and the nation.

The chapter outlines the Frelimo / Renamo conflict and the emergence of democracy in Mozambique. Strong emphasis is placed on Mozambique as a multi-ethnic society: "making the state work is primarily a question of finding ways for heterogeneous African populations grouped together by colonial caprice to achieve appropriate expression" (p.230).

In terms of lessons learnt for ‘successful’ state-building, Cahen emphasises the importance of respecting ethnicity – “at the extreme periphery of the world economy, nation-building must be conceived as the formation of nations of nations, and not of “nations against identities”, with deep respect for the original social relationships within the society” (p.231).

The article also highlights the important role played by civil society in facilitating the emergence of an effective state: “…improving state-building must rely not upon enlightened despotism – no despotism is able to remain enlightened for long – but on first developing society’s capacities to demand, impose and obtain accountability. There can be no political society without civil society” (p.230).

Cahen concludes by commenting that Mozambique is currently more of a weak, authoritarian state than a strong, effective one. Whilst it has effectively transitioned from war to peace, there is still a long way to go before the transition from civil war to civil society is convincing.
Part E: Typologies of the State


Throughout this book, Leftwich aims to show the importance of politics in shaping development outcomes. This particular chapter argues that although international donors have failed to appreciate the pivotal role played by politics, over the last 40 years various political scientists have attempted to explain the characteristics of the state in developing countries as a method of understanding their level of development.

Leftwich identifies Myrdal’s concept of the ‘soft state’ as an assessment of 1960’s India as the first attempt at explaining how the state in developing countries differs from the ideal Marxist-Weberian nation state model. He goes on to show how this type of analysis of the state in developing countries has proliferated. Whilst this has not resulted in one coherent typology, Leftwich gives a long list of the different labels used by political development theorists to emphasise the ways in which the state in a developing country can differ from Western ideals. The list includes patrimonial, neo-patrimonial, overdeveloped, under-developed, prebendal, weak, predatory, patrimonial administrative, fictitious, collapsed and quasi-states.

Much of this analysis of the state has focused on Africa. Leftwich comments that “there are intrinsic dangers in generalizing for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, for one should never forget how different are the state of Botswana and, say, Nigeria or Uganda. Notwithstanding that, it is not hard to see why a persuasive account of the state in Africa has been so elusive, for few of the preconditions from which modern states have typically emerged have been present in much of sub-Saharan Africa: yet manifestly, states do exist” (p.87).

Additional Bibliography

Special edition of Third World Quarterly, 2006, vol 27, no. 1 ‘From Nation-building to State-building’


http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=1269


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Other Relevant Research and Literature Reviews

GRC/GSDRC Research Reports

• Please provide key resources on state-building, focusing on the role of international assistance in supporting state-building processes: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=339

• Please provide resources on transitions out of ‘neo-patrimonial’ regimes. We are looking for existing research on the issue with a particular focus on the ‘how’ of such transitions: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=142

• Are there available any useful typologies in the literature on types of state (resource and tax base, related to political systems) and degrees of elite capture or elite interests which could explain either sector-specific or broad economic growth (including pro-poor growth?)?: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=166

• How does academic research explain and categorise the causes and characteristics of those states which are least responsive to the needs of the poor? You will provide:
  1) an overview and critique of the various attempts to categorise states which least respond to the needs of the poor – e. g. LICUS (World Bank), ‘difficult relationships’ (OECD-DAC), weak states, failed states, crisis states, shadow states, etc),
  2) a chart outlining the typology of (1) above, linking categories used to the identified key causes and their main characteristics
  3) suggestions for literature that DFID may wish to follow up through further research.
  http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=92

• What do we mean by state legitimacy, with particular reference to developing countries? Please provide us with references to documents (publications, reports, conference papers, and policy statements) that examine legitimacy as a description of popular feeling (sociological legitimacy), or as an accepted procedural system (normative legitimacy). We are also interested in any work that distinguishes between internal legitimacy within the state and external legitimacy between a state and the international community. http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=122

Other Relevant Literature Reviews


42