About this report

This rapid review provides a short synthesis of some of the most recent, high quality literature on the topic of border security in Libya and regional cooperation. It aims to orient policymakers to the key debates and emerging issues, and draws on 13 days of desk-based research. It was prepared (in September 2013) for the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability, © European Union 2014. The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of GSDRC, its partner agencies or the European Commission.

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1. Overview

This rapid literature review examines security related developments that determine Libya’s relationships with its neighbours, namely Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia. The report also looks at the incentives for neighbouring countries to maintain or develop regional relationships or cross border mechanisms with Libya and the main challenges in implementing them. Finally, an overview is provided of international agency contributions to border management and security in the Sahel and Maghreb.

Libya’s border control is weak and fragmented, allowing markets in arms, people, and the trafficking of illicit goods to flourish, with detrimental consequences for the Maghreb and Sahel (Cole, 2012). The following conflict drivers determine Libya’s relationships with its neighbours:

- **Cross-border ethnic and tribal relations**: The cross-border movement of ethnic groups such as the Tabu and Tuareg, who retain close ties to kin in Chad, Niger and Mali, facilitates the trafficking of illicit goods. As such, these groups are seen as a source of insecurity for Libya and its neighbours (Cole, 2012).

- **Cross-border smuggling**: Arms smuggling out of Libya to neighbouring countries is thriving as a result of instability and a growing demand from extremist groups. Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have benefited from the increased availability of arms, and use the financial rewards from smuggling to fund their activities (Lacher, 2012b).

- **Cross-border terrorism**: Instability in Libya has allowed extremist groups to use the country as a launch pad for attacks on neighbouring countries. This has contributed to tense and sometimes problematic relations between Libya and its neighbours (Zoubir, 2012).

It is important to understand the historical context of competition and conflict with the Maghreb, and Muammar Qaddafi’s attempts to extend his influence over the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. These dynamics determined Libya’s relationships with its neighbours during Qaddafi’s reign and shed some light on the differing responses of neighbouring countries to the 2011 Libyan conflict. Specifically:

- Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan supported the revolution to various extents for their own national, geopolitical and historical reasons (Lacher, 2012a).

- Algeria, Chad and Niger’s supported Qaddafi to various extents and their relations with the National Transitional Council (NTC) were initially tense.

In part, the reactions of Libya’s neighbours to conflict in Libya has led to new alliances and tensions, and continuing instability in Libya has produced new obstacles to regional cooperation (Lacher, 2012b). There is a suggestion that Libya’s new government will turn towards the Arab world and Europe at the expense of the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. This is because it is preoccupied with internal issues, but also because Qaddafi’s African policies were deeply unpopular amongst the Libyan population (ICG, 2011; Lacher, 2012a).

Despite ongoing tensions, Libya and its neighbours have made attempts to engage in cross-border security cooperation. Several bilateral agreements on border security have been signed with neighbouring countries, and a number of regional initiatives to improve coordination on border security issues have been discussed. However, a number of challenges exist, that may hamper the ability of Libya to play an effective regional role:

- Without a functioning security sector, the Libyan government will find it difficult to influence developments on its border areas, in lieu of any agreements with neighbouring countries (McGregor, 2013a).
Libya lacks the institutional structures to support the implementation of regional security cooperation agreements (EC, 2012).

Libya’s likely political realignment away from sub-Saharan Africa means that its ability to influence developments in its borders with Sahelian countries will diminish (Lacher, 2012a).

Regional and domestic challenges have compelled Libya and its neighbours to cooperate in the economic and security spheres in order to preserve their own national interests. However, the literature does not provide explicit evidence for the extent to which neighbouring countries, or powerful actors within those countries, have interests in a stable or unstable Libya.

2. The lack of border security in Libya: an overarching challenge

Libya’s border control is weak and fragmented, allowing markets in arms, people, and the trafficking of illicit goods to flourish, with detrimental consequences for the Maghreb and Sahel (Cole, 2012).

As the Libyan state’s armed forces collapsed during the Libyan conflict, a large variety of local armed groups took control of border crossing points. Meanwhile, the revolutionary brigades that had fought against Qaddafi during the conflict merged into large well-organised coalitions and moved into Libya’s central and southern borderlands to protect key infrastructure and to monitor border areas. The brigades eventually formalised their operations with the Libyan Ministry of Defence, and became known as the Libyan Shield Forces. Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) and the Libyan Shield Forces subsequently attempted to integrate the local armed groups into a border guard, authorising them to act in the NTC’s name. However the integration of these groups into a broader border management system has proved difficult; they operate in areas with scarce infrastructure or communications, and do not have a centrally recognised leadership (Cole, 2012).

The challenge of ensuring border security is intimately related to the Libyan government’s current struggle to control the country’s numerous armed groups and to develop an accountable and inclusive security sector. Unsuccessful attempts to establish a degree of control over the country’s numerous armed groups have led to the formation of hybrid security entities. These are characterised by a combination of official and non-official actors, unclear lines of authority, and a tenuous allegiance to the central government (Wehrey & Cole, 2013).

3. Cross-border conflict drivers that determine Libya’s relations with its neighbours

3.1 Cross-border ethnic and tribal relations

The Tabu and Tuareg are seen as a source of insecurity for Libya and its neighbours. The Tabu and Tuareg have close ties to kin in Chad, Niger, Mali and Algeria. Arab communities such as the Awlad Suleyman and Warfalla also have relatives dispersed across the Sahel. Consequently, it is common for these groups to circumvent official border crossings, and this movement has allowed for the cross-border trafficking of illicit goods, often with the knowledge of border posts. For many of these groups operating in border areas, their kin ties are stronger than their trust or loyalty to the new Libyan government (Cole, 2012).
Key developments

Libya-Chad relations are affected by a number of issues concerning Tabu communities. Relations have been affected by suspicions about the destabilising role that the Tabu play in Libya. In the wake of Qaddafi’s ouster, the Tabu who had settled in the Aouzou Strip while Qaddafi claimed it as Libyan territory subsequently returned to their historical lands in Kufra (southeast Libya) and sought to have their registration recognised in Libya (P. Cole, personal communication, 27th August, 2013). This aggravated an existing conflict between Tabu and Arab-Zway groups in Kufra, based on economic rivalry over smuggling routes and ethnic tensions. Zway groups view the Tabu as non-Libyans, whilst Libyan media outlets and Zway leaders in Kufra claimed that the Tabu were aided by Chadian and Sudanese militias (Cole, 2012; Wehrey, 2012).

Furthermore, there is a risk of instability along the Chad-Libya border. The Chadian government has had concerns with the threat posed by Tabu combatants in the Tibesti region, who have kin in southern Libya. The proliferation of arms could benefit the Tabu and other armed groups who dislike Déby, such as the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad, which is thought to be the last group claiming a presence in Tibesti (ICG, 2011).

3.2 The smuggling of arms, people and illicit goods

Since the demise of Qaddafi, arms smuggling out of Libya to Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Sahel has increased (Lacher, 2012b). Qaddafi was distrustful of his army and scattered part of his weapons stocks throughout Libya, with many weapons stocked in the southwestern Sebha region. The weapons cache included assault rifles, mines, shells and surface-to-air missiles. From the beginning of the Libyan conflict, unguarded arsenals became easily accessible to looters, rebels, and others wishing to traffic them, including tribes, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as Sudanese, Chadian and Tuareg mercenaries who participated in the Libyan conflict (Aïda Ammour, 2012).

The regional trade in weapons has increased as a result of instability in Libya and a growing demand from extremist groups and insurgents in northern Mali. Furthermore, rivalries over the control of illicit activity have helped fuel violent conflicts between tribal militias in southern Libya (Lacher, 2012b). Cigarette smuggling in the Sahara and Sahel, which began to thrive in 1980s and developed into a large-scale business, is a regional problem that has greatly contributed to the emergence of practices and networks that have allowed drug trafficking to grow. Instability in Libya does not appear to have disrupted the smuggling of drugs, including cocaine and cannabis; seizures of cannabis in Tripoli suggest that the city has become a major hub for the drugs trade (Lacher, 2012b).

Key Developments

In the early stages of the Libyan conflict, different armed groups gained control of key Libya-Tunisia border crossings from retreating pro-Qaddafi forces. Ras Jdeir, one of the busiest crossings, was taken by Zuwarans fighters, whilst other border posts fell to groups such as the Tabu. The Zuwarans formed their own border guard and engaged in cross-border smuggling with their kin in Tunisia, which triggered conflict amongst competing groups (Cole, 2012).

Since the fall of Qaddafi, the Tunisian-Libyan border has experienced a notable increase in the smuggling of everyday goods, weapons and explosives. Violent incidents have become common along the border, and repeated events have led Tunisian authorities to enact temporary border closures (McGregor, 2013).

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1 Zuwara is a port town in northwestern Libya
Trucks and traders transporting goods across the border through Ras Jdeir have been attacked and harassed on both sides, resulting in protests in December 2012 (Ghanmi, 2013).

The transit of Libyan weapons heading for Egypt’s Sinai and Gaza is a concern. A shipment route for arms trafficking has been established along the north coast of Egypt. This has encouraged greater activity by militants in that area, and there are fears that Libyan weapons could eventually be used against the Egyptian authorities (McGregor, 2013a). Libyan weapons have also been trafficked to Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Aïda Ammour, 2012).

Human trafficking is a well-established concern all along Libya’s southern border with Niger, Chad and Sudan (Cole, 2012). Reports suggest that human trafficking from Niger has increased acutely. Illegal immigrants are collected in northern Niger and brought into Libya by Tabu groups, entering Libya in convoys of 10 to 20 at a time (Thorne, 2013). Niger has been used as a smuggling route for Libyan weapons (Ammour, 2012). Lacher (2012b) claims that the contraband of illicit goods and illegal immigration takes place openly with the collusion of authorities in Niger. Drugs seizures and weapons shipments are rare in northern Niger, and it appears that the government has turned a blind eye in order to preserve stability.

3.3 Cross-border terrorism

Extremist groups across the Sahel have benefited from the increased availability of Libyan arms, using the funds from illegal trafficking to buy weapons. This has, in turn played a key role in provoking instability across the region (Boukharas, 2012). Weapons, including missiles and other sophisticated weaponry, which have fallen into the arms of various extremist groups, have been observed in use in southern Algeria and throughout the Sahel, particularly in Mali where AQIM has a safe haven (Zoubir, 2012).

Libya has been used as a base for armed and extremist groups to launch attacks on neighbouring countries (McGregor, 2013a). Aïda Ammour (2012) argues that extremist groups such as AQIM have sought to reap material and ideological benefits from Libya’s instability in order to extend their sphere of influence and intensify their actions.

Key developments

Algeria is facing an upsurge in terrorist activity from AQIM, partly as a result of instability in Libya (McElroy, 2011). A prominent event was the attack on Algeria’s In Amenas gas field in January 2013. The alleged planner of the attack, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is believed to have travelled to southwest Libya in late 2011 and early 2012 to purchase weapons and establish contact with local extremists. At least two of the terrorists involved in the attack were identified as Libyan. As a result of the insecurity that allowed this attack, several southern regions in Libya were declared a military zone (McGregor, 2013a; 2013b). Algeria also increased its military presence on its border with Libya, with the deployment of infantry brigades, together with increased airborne surveillance (Fornaji, 2013).

Recent incidents raise the question of whether terrorist attacks in Niger are being launched from Libya. In March 2013, suicide bombers struck a barracks in Agadez and a French-run uranium mine in Arlit, both in northwest Niger. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA)2 claimed responsibility for the attack (BBC, 2013). Amid growing tensions between the two countries, Niger later claimed that the attacks were launched from southern Libya, which was subsequently denied by Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan (Lewis, 2013).

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2MUJWA emerged in late 2011 as a splinter faction to AQIM. See Bakrania (2013) for more information.
There have also been repeated cross-border incursions by armed and extremist groups into **Tunisia** from Libya (Lacher, 2012a). In January 2013, two large arms depots were discovered in the southwestern town of Medenine, on the main route to Libya (McGregor, 2013). Tunisia’s President Moncef Marzouki claimed that local jihadists had ties with terrorist forces in northern Mali, and that Tunisia was becoming a corridor for the trafficking of Libyan weapons to these regions (McGregor, 2013). In August 2013, the Tunisian army launched an offensive against suspected al-Qaeda aligned militants, reported to include Libyans, in the Chaambi mountains located near to the Tunisia-Algeria border (Fornaji, 2013).

4. **Regional factors that determine Libya’s relationships with its neighbours**

4.1 **Conflict and competition within the Maghreb and North Africa**

Under Qaddafi’s leadership, Libya had been in conflict with almost all of its neighbours. This includes a four-day war with Egypt in 1977, territorial disputes with Algeria, Niger and Tunisia, and the failed invasions of Chad in the 1980s. Libya and Sudan also clashed over several regional conflicts in late 1970s and 1980s (Sturman, 2003; Meerpohl, 2013).

The Maghreb countries of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia have historically been uncooperative and distrustful of each other (Zartman, 2011). Although culturally, geographically and historically integrated, the Maghreb countries have failed to integrate at the economic and political levels, an enduring phenomenon that has been called the ‘**non-Maghreb**’ (Novotný et al, 2011). Various attempts have been made to organise cooperation since independence in the 1950s and 1960s, mostly in response to perceived threats rather than through active collaboration, but all have collapsed due to divisive politics and perpetual competition (Zartman, 2011; Yasser, 2013).

Algeria and Morocco are the dominant powers in the Maghreb, and have been competing for regional hegemony since independence. Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania, had to find ways to protect their independence and to ensure that neither Algeria nor Morocco became too dominant. As such, alliances have shifted as part of a regional balance of power game, the rules of which have been determined by countries’ efforts to protect their own independence and regional security interests, and to ensure that no one state became dominant (Deeb, 1989).

The Maghreb countries were divided in their responses to the 2011 Libyan conflict, displaying the same patterns of conflict and cooperation that have historically been characteristic of the region (Zoubir, 2012).

4.2 **Qaddafi’s ambitions in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa**

Qaddafi’s relations with the Sahel were often volatile. In the 1970s and 1980s, Qaddafi’s Libya combined its oil wealth with an intense anti-imperialist outlook and supported insurgencies, coup d’états and radical governments in sub-Saharan Africa (Huliaras, 2001). Qaddafi used finances and arms to support several African regimes, with the Sahel region being a particularly important target for Libya’s foreign policy. Prominent examples of intervention include efforts by Qaddafi to mediate between governments and rebel factions in Chad, Mali, Niger and Sudan (Blanchard and Zanotti, 2011; Cristiani, 2011a).

De Wall (2013) claims that **military adventurism** was a feature of Qaddafi’s sub-Saharan Policy, and that Sudan and Chad bore the brunt of this tendency. Qaddafi’s role in Chad is indicative of his efforts to extend his sphere of influence in Sahel – both as peacemaker and patron of different warring factions. As part of the territorial dispute over the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad, Qaddafi supported various armed
factions, including Tabu insurgents, against President Hissène Habré’s government. This escalated in the early 1970’s and from 1983 to 1987, when Qaddafi conducted a broad intervention ranging from financial and military support for armed factions to the large-scale involvement of Libyan armed forces. Libya was decisively defeated in 1987 (Huliaras, 2001; Cole, 2012).

The relationship with Chad improved only in 1990 when Idriss Déby, a leader of an armed faction previously supported by Qaddafi, ousted Habré in a coup d’état. Libya subsequently became one of Chad’s most important economic and diplomatic supporters (Cristiani, 2011a). Qaddafi became an important mediator of conflicts in Chad. He helped bring peace to Tibesti, a border region in northwestern Chad mainly populated by the Tabu, by brokering a series of peace agreements between the government and armed groups. In doing so, Qaddafi aimed to stop instability from Tibesti overflowing into Libya. Qaddafi also brokered a number of peace agreements between Chad and armed groups supported by Sudan – actively facilitating contact between N’Djamena and Khartoum in 2009 in order to prevent a direct war (ICG, 2011; Meerpohl, 2013).

Qaddafi’s political and diplomatic support meant that some neighbouring Sahelian countries were reluctant to condemn domestic repression in Libya in response to the uprising, or to support subsequent intervention efforts by the international community (Cristiani, 2011a).

4.3 The reactions of neighbouring countries to the 2011 Libyan conflict

Countries that supported the revolution and the NTC

Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan supported the revolution and the NTC to vary degrees.

During the early stages of the Libyan conflict, reports indicated that post-revolutionary Egypt shipped arms over the border to aid revolutionary forces, sent around 100 special forces to aid the insurgency, and extended logistical support to the revolution in Libya (Levinson and Rosenberg, 2011; UPI, 2011; Eleiba, 2011).

The Sudanese played a pivotal role in the Libya conflict, coordinating with the Libyan opposition, and providing revolutionary forces with logistical assistance, training and arms, as well as intelligence support. Sudanese interventions in the Libyan conflict were seen as a response to the Justice and Equality Movement’s (JEM) support for Qaddafi (Elhag, 2012). Sudanese troops also coordinated with Qatari forces in the Kufra region and helped rebel forces seize the town (McGregor, 2013a).

Tunisia was heavily involved in supporting anti-Qaddafi revolutionary forces (Zoubir, 2012; de Waal, 2013). Reports suggest that Tunisia received more than 600,000 Libyan refugees during the conflict, whilst wounded Libyan fighters were provided with medical aid (Daragahi, 2012; Sayah, 2012).

Countries that supported Qaddafi or were hesitant to recognise the NTC

Algeria, Chad and Niger supported Qaddafi to different degrees and their initial relations with the NTC were tense.

Algeria observed a policy of neutrality over the Libyan conflict and its relations with the NTC were initially tense. Algeria was the last of the North African countries to recognise the NTC, which they finally did in

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3The Justice and Equality Movement are a Darfur opposition group who Qaddafi supported. The JEM launched an attack on Omdurman in Sudan in Chad in May 2008 using vehicles and supplies provided by Libya. Libya later became a refuge for JEM. See Meerpohl (2013).
Cristiani (2011b) states that this stance was due to concerns that an unstable Libya would turn into a safe haven and source of weapons for AQIM. Tensions with the NTC emerged over claims that Algeria supported Qaddafi by sending mercenaries, weapons and equipment; a claim that the Algerian government denied (Cristiani, 2011b). In August 2011, after Qaddafi’s fall, Algeria granted asylum to members of Qaddafi’s family, including his son Hannibal and daughter Aisha, which became another source of tension (Lewis, 2011; Aïda Ammour, 2012).

Chad defended Qaddafi’s stance during the initial uprising, claiming that anti-Qaddafi revolutionary forces had connections with Islamist groups such as AQIM. Chadian fighters fought alongside pro-Qaddafi forces, but it is not clear whether these were government troops or mercenaries recruited by intermediaries working for Qaddafi. It was only when NATO intervened and power shifted away from Qaddafi that the Chadian government took a more strategic stance, calling for negotiations and establishing contacts with the NTC (ICG, 2011).

Nigerien Tuaregs are known to have supported Qaddafi during the Libyan conflict together with mercenaries recruited in Niger during the early stages of the uprising. The leader of the 2007 Tuareg rebellion in Niger, Aghali Alambo, joined Qaddafi’s forces with fighters from his group. He returned to Niger around the time of Tripoli’s fall, together with weapons and vehicles (Lacher, 2011a). The Nigerien Government was perceived as pro-Qaddafi by the NTC, partly because it hosted several Qaddafi loyalists. In September 2011, a large convoy of Libyan soldiers, reportedly led by Tuareg leader Rissa agBoula, crossed the desert border into the Nigerien frontier town of Agadez (Mamane, 2011). Moreover, one of Qaddafi’s sons, Saadi, was granted asylum by Niger in November 2011 (Smith, 2011).

### 4.4 The Libyan government’s regional outlook after the conflict

Zoubir (2012) claims that the Arab Spring has reconfigured intra-regional relations in the Maghreb and the Sahel. New alliances and tensions have arisen in the region, producing new obstacles to regional cooperation (Lacher, 2012a).

There is a suggestion in the literature that Libya’s new government is likely to turn towards the Arab world and Europe at the expense of sub-Saharan Africa. This is not only because it is pre-occupied with internal issues, such as building an accountable and inclusive security sector, but also because Qaddafi’s African policies were related to his personal geopolitical ambitions and were deeply unpopular amongst the Libyan population (ICG, 2011; Lacher, 2012a).

### 5. To what extent do neighbouring countries have an interest in a stable Libya?

The literature does not provide explicit evidence for the extent to which neighbouring countries have interests in a stable or unstable Libya. However, as many of the conflict drivers cross borders, it is likely that neighbouring countries will benefit more from a stable Libya than from continued instability.

Despite continuing tensions in the aftermath of the Libyan conflict, regional and domestic challenges have compelled Libya and its neighbours to cooperate in order to preserve their national interests (Lacher, 2012a; Zoubir, 2012). This is made evident by the signing of several bilateral and regional security agreements between Libya and its neighbours – which are explored further in section 7 below. The economic and security considerations that may compel neighbouring countries to pursue stability in Libya are explored below.
5.1 Security considerations for Libyan stability

The literature indicates that in some cases, country responses to the Libyan uprising were driven, in part, by concerns over regional stability and security. Even the reactions of those countries that supported Qaddafi, such as Algeria, were driven by considerations such as the fear of civil war, the strengthening of Libyan radical Islamist forces, the breakdown of the Libyan state, and the risk of further instability playing into AQIM’s hands. Algeria feared instability spreading across the border from Libya—that popular revolts against the Qaddafi regime could provide a base for a similar uprising against the Algerian authorities. Algeria was also fearful of a post-Qaddafi foreign policy more closely aligned with that of Western powers, which could have the potential of harming Algerian interests (Cristiani, 2011b).

5.2 Economic considerations for Libyan stability

In the post-revolution era, a number of neighbouring countries have pursued good economic relations with Libya in view of their own economic difficulties. Libya and Egypt have pursued a programme of economic integration, with Egypt receiving a USD 2 billion loan from Libya in April 2013. Furthermore, Sudan is seeking financial support from Libya, and Libya is an important economic partner for Tunisia (Lacher, 2012a; Maxwell, 2013; Zoubir, 2012).

Lacher (2012a) states that Libya is a particularly important export market for Egypt and Tunisia. Furthermore, prior to the conflict, there were an estimated two million Egyptian migrants and 300,000 Tunisian migrants in Libya. Libya’s stabilisation is a precondition for these migrant workers to return and find jobs that allow them to send home remittances.

Libya and Algeria are also tied through important commercial interests. The Algerian oil company Sonatrach operates in the Ghadames Basin southwest of Tripoli, and has other considerable interests in Libya, while Libya has invested in several Algerian sectors (Zoubir, 2012).

6. Challenges in implementing regional coordination and cross-border mechanisms

The progress made on the various regional cooperation agreements (see section 7) is not evident from the literature. Additionally, there is no substantial analysis of the impact that these agreements and initiatives have made, if any. Furthermore, there is no explicit evidence in literature to suggest that regional agreements have not worked due to disincentives for neighbouring countries to engage with Libya. However, the literature does indicate the challenges that Libya and neighbouring governments face in implementing border security initiatives.

6.1 Libya’s preoccupation with internal political and security challenges

EC (2012) suggests that Libya lacks the institutional structures to support the implementation of bi-lateral and regional cooperation agreements. Lacher (2012a) argues that the Libyan authorities will, for the foreseeable future, be preoccupied with domestic developments and will therefore be unable to play an effective regional role. Therefore, as Cole (2012) argues, without a coherent security sector or Interior Ministry, regional security agreements are worth little.
6.2 The declining regional influence of Libya in the Sahel

Libya’s potential re-alignment away from sub-Saharan Africa means that its influence in the Sahel region may decline. This may also diminish Libya’s ability to cooperate regionally on security matters. Libya is unlikely to invest in efforts, as Qaddafi did, to stabilise northern Niger and Mali, since this would mean supporting efforts to integrate or demobilise fighters who fought against the NTC. Similarly, the government will also find it difficult to influence developments on its border, such as the insurgencies in the Tibesti mountains of northern Chad, which had previously been contained through cooperation between Qaddafi and the Chad government (Lacher, 2012a).

7. Regional cooperation and cross border mechanisms

7.1 Bilateral agreements and security cooperation

Libya has signed a number of agreements with neighbouring countries on security cooperation.

**Algeria**

In March and April 2012, Libya signed bipartite agreements with Algeria on common security issues (EU, 2012). In August 2013, faced with continuing cross-border incursions by smugglers and terrorists, Libya and Algeria decided to activate a joint commission, of which security is a major aspect. Algeria has also been supporting Libya to develop its army and police. In August 2013, Prime Minister Zeidan announced that Libyan police were being sent to Algeria to attend training courses (Fornaji, 2013).

**Egypt**

In April 2013, a military cooperation agreement was signed between Libya and Egypt in the areas of joint military training, illegal immigration, illegal fishing operations and drug trafficking (Gulhane, 2013).

**Niger**

The literature suggests that the Libyan Government regards Niger with suspicion, particularly because it hosted members of the former Libyan regime. As of October 2012, no bi-lateral agreements on border security had been agreed (Lacher, 2012a; Cole, 2012).

**Sudan**

After the NTC victory, the Sudanese continued to cooperate with Libya, including joint monitoring of the Libya-Sudan border. In May 2013, the Sudanese and Libyan defence ministries agreed to activate joint protocols on strategic cooperation in the fields of border control, trafficking and illegal immigration (Omar El-Haj, 2013).

**Tunisia**

Libya and Tunisia signed a bipartite agreement on security cooperation in March 2012. The agreement included joint border control patrols, the reactivation of checkpoints, and improved cooperation in the exchange of information (EU, 2012).
In August 2013, Prime Minister Zeidan met with the Libyan Foreign Minister in Tripoli to further discuss border controls and the smuggling of goods, and the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism (Mzioudet, 2013).

### 7.2 Regional cooperation agreements

Libya and its neighbours have also made efforts to cooperate regionally. The main initiatives are described below.

**Tripartite agreement with Sudan and Chad**

In February 2012, Libya signed a tripartite agreement with Chad and Sudan on border surveillance and security (Cole, 2012). Subsequently, in March 2012, a joint border force was established by the three countries, but its deployment has been plagued by delays (Wehrey, 2012).

**The Tripoli Action Plan**

The Tripoli Plan, adopted by Libya and its neighbours at a conference in March 2012, includes provisions for specialised training in border security, the use of advanced technologies, and the development of laws that underpin better border control. At the conference, participants discussed the possibility of creating an expert committee to share expertise. Participants also agreed to draw up a permanent mechanism for regional cooperation in combating organised crime and illegal immigration (Mohamed & Ramzi, 2012).

**High-level delegation visits to neighbouring countries**

In December 2012, Prime Minister Zeidan led a high-level delegation to Algeria, Chad, Niger and Sudan to discuss border security issues and bilateral relations. The visits resulted in an agreement with Chad, Libya, Niger and Sudan to form a joint security committee to look into implementing mechanisms related to border security (UNSC, 2013a).

**The Ghadames summit**

In a meeting in Ghadames (southwestern Libya) in January 2013, Prime Minister Zeidan met with his Algerian and Tunisian counterparts and adopted a coordinated security strategy to enhance security along their common borders. Mohamed & Ghanmi (2013) cite the measures agreed as:

- **The sharing of information** on trafficking routes and illegal immigration networks.
- **The creation of a committee**, which will convene on a regular basis and provide recommendations to country governments.
- **Civil society initiatives** in order to encourage cultural and social exchanges along joint border areas.
- **Development and governance initiatives** in border areas involving the private sector and civil society organisations.
Cooperation over the development of cross-border regions

Libya has been working with its neighbours to develop its border regions and to improve the livelihood opportunities of communities residing there. For example, in May 2013, Libya, Sudan and Egypt agreed to establish free trade zones in the tri-border area, including provisions to improve transport and energy infrastructure and facilitate the cross-border passage of goods and people (The Tripoli Post, 2013).

8. International agency contributions to border management and security in the Maghreb and Sahel

8.1 African Union (AU)

The African Union Border Programme (AUBP)

The Declaration on the AUBP was adopted by AU member states in June 2007. The declaration stressed ‘the need to put in place a new form of pragmatic border management, aimed at promoting peace, security and stability, but also at facilitating the integration process and sustainable development in Africa’. A further declaration was adopted in 2010 calling for the pursuit and acceleration of AUBP’s implementation (AU, 2012, 3).

As part of this, the Strategy for Enhancing Border Management is an instrument developed by the AU to improve border security and to facilitate the movement of people and goods with the AU. The strategy is based on the pillars of coordination and cooperation, capacity building and community involvement (AU, 2012).

The AUBP has four components: delimitation and demarcation; cross-border cooperation; institutional building and capacity development; and resource mobilisation. The programme is being supported by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) through its Border Management in Africa Project, which began in 2008 and runs until 2015. Thus far in the Sahel, GIZ has supported the AU in Mali, supporting the delimitation and demarcation of borders between Mali and Burkina Faso, and mediating cross-border disputes between village communities residing on opposite sides of the border (GIZ, n.d.).

The Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention

The AU is supporting the implementation of its 2013-2017 Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. Through the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism, located in Algiers, the African Union supports member states in implementing its legal framework on counter-terrorism through regional and international information-sharing, cooperation and coordination (UNSC, 2013b).

8.2 European Union (EU)

The EU is pursuing a comprehensive approach to the crisis in the Sahel region based on the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, which was presented to the European Council in March 2011. The EU strategy is based on the assumptions that development and security are interconnected and can be mutually supportive, and that the crisis in the Sahel requires a regional answer (EU, 2013). As part of this strategy, the EU has mobilised financial resources along four lines of action:

- Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution.
- Political and diplomatic action.
- Security and the rule of law.
- Countering violent extremism and radicalisation.

The EU is implementing a number of capacity building missions under the rubric of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These include the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali, and EUCAP Sahel Niger.

**European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya**

EUBAM Libya was approved in May 2013 with an initial mandate for two years. The mission is supporting the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s land, sea and air borders in the short-term, and to develop a broader Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy in the long term (EEAS, n.d.).

**European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali**

The EU launched the European Union Training Mission in Mali in February 2013 with an initial mandate of 15 months. It is providing support in the areas of command and control, and logistical chain and human resources, as well as training on international humanitarian law, and the protection of civilians and human rights (EU, 2013).

**EUCAP Sahel Niger**

EUCAP Sahel was launched in August 2012. The mission aims to provide training and advice to support the Nigerien authorities in fighting terrorism and organised crime. The mission includes a team of almost 50 experts, who are permanently deployed in Niamy, with liaison officers in Mali and Mauritania (EEAS, 2013).

### 8.3 Italy

Libya signed bilateral maritime security agreements with Italy in December 2007 and August 2008. The agreement was a response to the increased numbers of irregular migrants being smuggled across the Mediterranean to Italy and Malta. As well as engaging in joint naval patrols, Italy provided Libya with a number of naval vessels and trained Libyan forces to use them. The two countries also put in place a comprehensive surveillance system for the southern borders (EC, 2011).

### 8.4 United Kingdom (UK)

The UK Government’s tools for security assistance in Libya include the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Conflict Prevention Pool and the Arab Partnership Strategy.

Funded through the MENA Conflict Pool, the Libya Stabilisation Response project was set up during the Libya crisis in mid-2011. In 2012 the project focused on policing advice and training to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Interior (DFID, 2012).

The Arab Partnership Strategy is the UK Government’s response to the Arab Spring events, covering the period 2012 to 2015. As part of this, the UK Government plans to work closely with reforming governments, civil society, the media, and parliaments in the Middle East and North Africa towards
political reform. The programme has three priority areas including political participation, public voice and freedom of expression, and good governance. The last of these priorities incorporates issues such as access to justice and support for civil society initiatives to strengthen the rule of law, transparency, integrity and tackling corruption. Country programmes are envisaged in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria (DFID, n.d.).

8.5 United States (US)

US security policy in the region has largely focused on creating a security network that brings together the Maghreb and Sahel states (Zoubir, 2009). Much of the US approach is geared towards counter-terrorism assistance.

The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

The TSCTP is the primary vehicle of US counter-terrorism policy in North Africa. It was established in 2005 as the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative and became the TSCTP in 2007. It is a US Department of State led programme merging diplomacy, development and security assistance to combat terrorism in the Sahel and Maghreb under the (Bray, 2011). The overall goals of the programme are to enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso and Niger, as well as Niger and Senegal) to confront the challenges posed by terrorist organisations. TSCTP also facilitates cooperation between Sahelian countries and their Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). The TSCTP includes a military component, Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) (AFRICOM, 2010). Libya was invited to join the TSCTP, but as of March 2010, was not a participant (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011).

AFRICOM (2010) cites the following programme components:

- **Counterterrorism** programmes in partnership with regional organisations such as the African Union and its Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers. The programmes include training to improve border and aviation security and overall CT readiness.
- **Counter-terrorism Assistance Training** and Terrorist Interdiction Programme activities.
- **Public diplomacy programmes** to develop cross-regional programming, with an emphasis on countering extremism, particularly amongst youth and rural populations.
- **Governance** programmes that support democratic institution building and economic development in the Sahel.
- **Military** programmes to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure that adequate resources are available to train, advise and assist regional forces, and to establish institutions promoting regional cooperation, communication, and information sharing.

The US BoCT (2013) provides an overview of the some of the activities that the TSCTP have been engaged in to date. US training and equipment have assisted Mauritania in efforts to monitor its border with Mali and sustain professional units during operations against AQIM. Similarly, Niger has been supported in efforts to protect its borders and interdict terrorists attempting to transit through its territory. Several programs have worked towards countering violent extremism in youth, including educational and training courses in Algeria and Morocco, and extensive youth employment and outreach programs, community development, and media activities in Niger and Chad.
The Export Control and Related Border Security Programme (EXBS)

EXBS seeks to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilising accumulations and irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons by helping to build effective national strategic trade control systems. The programme is designed to help countries develop and improve their strategic trade and border control systems. The EXBS programme provides technical assistance in the following key areas: laws and regulation; licencing; enforcement; government-industry cooperation; interagency and international cooperation coordination. Partner countries in the Maghreb include, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia (US DOS, n.d.).

Assistance to Libya

Between February 2011 and August 2012, the US provided a total of USD 170 million in assistance to Libya. This includes support towards the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militia members and justice and security sector development. In terms of specific security assistance, the US is supporting conventional weapons mitigation efforts, including the survey, inventory and disposal of known weapons and ammunition storage sites. The US Department of Defense is providing advisory support to the Libyan Ministry of Defence through the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), to assist in the process of establishing armed forces that are unified, capable, and subject to civilian control. With regards to border security, the Export Control and Border Security Programme (EXBS) provided targeted technical assistance on land border security (US DOS, 2012).

8.6 United Nations (UN)

In June 2013, Romano Prodi, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel, presented the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. The strategy supports efforts to address the causes of regional instability within a sustainable and long-term perspective (UNSC, 2013b). UNSC (2013b) identifies three strategic goals:

- Enhancing inclusive and effective governance throughout the region.
- Strengthening the capacity of national and regional security mechanisms to address cross-border threats.
- Integrating development and humanitarian interventions to build resilience.

The strategy is designed to provide a basis for a coherent UN engagement in the Sahel. It envisages a range of innovative actions including, the enhancement of regional security analysis and regional capacity to manage borders, and the strengthening of local government and state capacity to distribute resources more equitably (UNSC, 2013b).

United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

UNSMIL is a special political mission established in 2011 by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2009 (September 2011) to support the country’s new authorities in their post-conflict efforts. On the 14th March 2013, UNSMIL’s mandate was extended for an additional 12 months (UNSMIL, n.d.).

UNSC (2013a) cites the key intervention areas as:

- Security Sector Architecture and Coordination: UNSMIL has been supporting the Libyan government to articulate immediate and longer-term national priorities for security sector reform, transitional justice and the rule of law.
- **Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration:** UNSMIL is collaborating with the World Health Organisation to provide psychosocial training programmes for revolutionary fighters suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

- **Border security:** UNSMIL has been working closely with the European Union to ensure that international support in the areas of border security and border management is provided in a timely, coherent and complementary manner. The UN is participating in working group established by the European Union on border security and management to coordinate international support.

- **Arms and ammunition management:** UNSMIL, together with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), is actively involved in training on ammunition management, search awareness and explosive ordnance disposal with the Ministries of Defence and Interior. Along with the armed forces, military councils and some local revolutionary brigades, UNSMIL is supporting Libyan-led ammunition and weapons management initiatives and identified potential new projects.

- **Defence:** UNSMIL has been supporting the Libyan Government towards developing a defence white paper outlining a national strategy.

- **Ministry of Interior and Police:** UNSMIL is working with the Ministry of Interior and the Central Committee for Integration, offering technical advice on a range of issues, including on demobilisation and reintegration, and police reform.

8.7 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa (UNODC ROMENA)

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) **Regional Programme for the Arab States** for the period 2011-2015 covers eighteen countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Sudan, and Tunisia. As part of the regional programme, UNODC has developed strategic partnership with the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). The programme focuses on: countering illicit trafficking, organised crime and terrorism; promoting integrity and building justice; and drug prevention and health (UNODC, n.d.).

As part of the ‘countering illicit trafficking, organised crime and terrorism’ subcategory, UNODC aims to support the accurate assessment of regional drug and crime patterns, and to develop an evidence base for policy and programme responses. Also included are activities to build the capacity of regions and countries to tackle transnational organised crime, including border control (UNODC, n.d.).
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10. Appendix 1: Terms of reference

This rapid literature review was prepared for the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability.

Question

How do security developments and instability in Libya determine its relationships with neighbouring countries?

Subcomponents

1. Security related developments that determine Libya’s relationships with its neighbours. This should include an overview of important security related developments (historical and recent) that determine Libya’s relationships with its neighbours. Include descriptions on each of Libya’s neighbours, exploring historical ties, key security issues, threats and ongoing cooperation. Also include analysis on the effect of the regional movement of armed groups on the security relations.

2. Incentives (or disincentives) for neighbouring countries to maintain and/or develop relationships with Libya, or to cooperate on security related matters. Include coverage on current and previous regional cooperation and cross-border mechanisms. Explore the extent to which neighbouring countries (or powerful players within these countries) have an interest in a stable Libya.

3. International Agency contributions to border management and security in the region, including major initiatives in the previous 3 to 5 years.
11. Appendix 2: Country overviews – Libya’s neighbours

This appendix brings together information collected during the research period on the historical ties between Libya and its neighbours. It also provides further detail on the role of neighbouring countries in the Libyan conflict.

Algeria

Historical ties

Algeria supported Libya during their border war with Egypt in 1977, and also brokered a peace deal between Libya and Chad in the late 1980s. The two countries also shared good relations based on their support for the Western Sahara Polisario Front. Nevertheless, several points of tension are evident in their relationship. Algeria was distrustful of Qaddafi’s attempts to increase influence over Tuareg groups in the Sahara and Sahel regions. Algeria also alleged that Libya allowed weapons to be transported through its territory to Islamist forces during the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. Relations were also disturbed by the signing of the 1984 Oujda Treaty between Libya and Algeria’s regional rival Morocco (Cristiani, 2011b; Zoubir, 2012).

Role in the Libyan conflict

Algeria observed a policy of neutrality over the Libyan conflict and its relations with the National Transitional Council (NTC) were initially tense. Algeria held out longer than other North African countries from recognising the NTC, which they finally did in September 2011 (Zoubir, 2012). The NTC also made claims, denied by the Algerian government, that Algeria supported Qaddafi by sending mercenaries, weapons and equipment (Cristiani, 2011b).

Cristiani (2011b) argues that Algeria’s stance during the conflict was due to concerns that an unstable Libya would turn into a safe haven and source of weapons for AQIM. Politically, Algeria feared that popular revolts against the Qaddafi regime could provide a base for a similar uprising against the Algerian government. Algeria was also fearful of a post-Qaddafi foreign policy more closely aligned with that of Western powers, which could have the potential of harming Algerian interests (Cristiani, 2011b). Underpinning these concerns was Algeria’s overt dislike for the kind of Western intervention that helped to bring the NTC to power, which is rooted in its experience of French rule. As a result, Algeria opposed NATO’s mission in Libya, and unsuccessfully tried to encourage mediation through the African Union (Lewis, 2011).

Algeria granted asylum in August 2011 to members of Qaddafi’s family, including his son Hannibal and daughter Aisha, which was justified by the Algerians on humanitarian grounds. The NTC responded to the move by announcing it as an act of aggression (Lewis, 2011; Aïda Ammour, 2012a).
Chad

*Historical ties*

ICG (2011) states that Qaddafi played a paradoxical role in Chad. As part of the territorial dispute over the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad, Qaddafi supported various armed factions, including Tabu insurgents, against President Hissène Habré’s government. This initially escalated in the early 1970’s and from 1983 to 1987, when Qaddafi conducted a broad intervention ranging from financial and military support for the armed factions to the large-scale involvement of Libyan armed forces. Libya was decisively defeated in 1987 (Huliaras, 2001; Cole, 2012).

The relationship with Chad improved only in 1990 when Idriss Déby, a leader of an armed faction previously supported by Qaddafi, ousted Habré in a coup d’état. Libya subsequently became one of Chad’s most important economic and diplomatic supporters (Cristiani, 2011a).

Qaddafi also became an important mediator of conflicts in Chad. Libya helped bring peace to Tibesti, a border region in northwestern Chad mainly populated by the Tabu, by brokering a series of peace agreements between the government and armed groups. In doing so, Qaddafi aimed to stop instability from Tibesti overflowing into Libya. Qaddafi also brokered a number of peace agreements between Chad and armed groups supported by Sudan. For example, Libya actively facilitated contact between N’Djamena and Khartoum in 2009 in order to prevent a direct war (ICG, 2011; Meerpohl, 2013).

Huliaras (2001) argues that Qaddafi’s military intervention in Chad was Libya’s most significant external involvement and influenced the policies of sub-Saharan countries towards Libya. The withdrawal of Libyan forces in Chad marked a significant change in Qaddafi’s foreign policy, with a shift from engagement in other Arab states to a greater focus on sub-Saharan Africa (Huliaras, 2001).

*Role in the Libyan conflict*

Chad initially defended Qaddafi’s stance during the uprising, claiming that the Libyan revolutionary forces has connections with Islamist groups such as AQIM. Chadian fighters did fight alongside pro-Qaddafi forces, but it is not clear whether these were Chadian government troops or mercenaries recruited by intermediaries working for Qaddafi. It was only when NATO intervened and power shifted away from Qaddafi that the Chadian government took a more strategic stance, calling for negotiations and establishing contacts with the NTC (ICG, 2011).

Egypt

*Historical ties*

After the Libyan coup d’état of 1969 led by Qaddafi, Libya established close ties with Egypt on the basis of Arab solidarity. However, Libya and Egypt later fought a border war in July 1977 after Qaddafi had sent thousands of protesters on a ‘March to Cairo’ to protest against a proposed peace treaty with Israel. When demonstrators were turned back at the border, Libyan forces raided the coastal town of Sollum. The Egyptians retaliated in force, destroying Libyan forces as they crossed over the border into Libya. A complete invasion was only averted by Algerian mediation (McGregor, 2013).

Relations improved in 1997, when Qaddafi and President Hosni Mubarak agreed a series of trade agreements, which saw greater amounts of Libyan oil flowing to Egypt (Maxwell, 2013). Libya
subsequently became an important market for Egyptian exports and goods as well as a destination for Egyptian labour migrants (Lacher, 2012a).

**Role in the Libyan conflict**

During the early stages of the Libyan conflict, there were reports that post-revolution Egypt shipped arms over the border to revolutionary forces, sent around 100 special forces to aid the insurgency, and extended logistical support to the revolution in Libya (Levinson and Rosenberg, 2011; UPI, 2011; Eleiba, 2011).

**Niger**

**Historical ties**

Qaddafi was an influential figure in Niger due to Libya’s economic investments and longstanding ties with the Nigerien political elite (Tabe, 2011). He was particularly influential with respect to the Tuaregs. During the 1980s and 1990s, Qaddafi recruited Nigerien Tuaregs into the Libyan armed forces and as part of the Islamic Legion deployed in Chad (Cole, 2012). Furthermore, Qaddafi played a fundamental role in brokering peace agreements between the Nigerian governments and Tuareg rebels in the 2000s, with Qaddafi supporting the Tuareg as a mediator (Cristiani, 2011a; Cole, 2012).

**Role in the Libyan conflict**

Niger was perceived as pro-Qaddafi by the Libyan authorities, partly because it hosted several Qaddafi loyalists. In September 2011, a large convoy of Libyan soldiers, reportedly led by Tuareg leader Rissa ag Boula, crossed the desert border into the Nigerien frontier town of Agadez (Mamane, 2011). Furthermore, one of Qaddafi’s sons, Saadi, was granted asylum by Niger in November 2011 (Smith, 2011). The NTC later urged the extradition of Saadi and other ex-regime officials in order for Niger preserve its relations and interests in Libya, but Niger rejected the demand on humanitarian grounds (Al-Jazeera, 2012).

Nigerien Tuaregs are known to have supported Qaddafi during the Libyan conflict together with mercenaries recruited in Niger during the early stages of the uprising. The leader of the 2007 Tuareg rebellion in Niger, Aghali Alambo, joined Qaddafi’s forces with fighters from his group. He returned to Niger around the time of Tripoli’s fall, together with weapons and vehicles (Lacher, 2011a).

**Sudan**

**Historical ties**

Libya and Sudan maintained good relations between 1967 and 1971 because both countries maintained a policy of Arab solidarity. However, Sudan’s shift in the 1970s towards Western powers conflicted with Libyan interests. Consequently, relations deteriorated and the two countries clashed over several regional conflicts in the 1980s (Meerpohl, 2013).

Subsequent relations with Sudan can be seen in the context of Qaddafi’s interventions in Chad. A number of sub-Saharan African countries, including Sudan, feared Qaddafi’s expansionism and aided anti-Libyan forces in Chad (Cristiani, 2011a). Under the presidency of Omar al-Bashir, relations improved but were
aggravated again over Qaddafi’s support to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfur armed opposition group (Meerpohl, 2013). After the eruption of conflict in Darfur in 2003, Gaddafi became both a peacemaker and patron of different warring factions. He provided finance, arms and political support to the JEM and its leader Khalil Ibrahim. In May 2008, the JEM launched an attack on Omdurman from Chad, using vehicles and supplies provided by Libya. After Sudan and Chad were reconciled in January 2010, Libya became a refuge for JEM leaders expelled from Chad, and continued to sponsor their ambitions in Sudan (de Waal, 2013).

**Role in the Libyan conflict**

When the Libyan uprising began in February 2011, JEM’s leaders were in Tripoli. (de Waal, 2013). According to rumours, the Qaddafi regime provided anywhere between 10 to 100 million USD to the JEM in return for military support against the revolutionary forces (Meerpohl, 2013).

Sudanese interventions in the Libyan conflict were seen as a response to JEM’s support for Qaddafi. The Sudanese authorities played a pivotal role, coordinating with the Libyan opposition, and providing revolutionary forces with logistical assistance, training and arms, as well as intelligence support (Elhag, 2012). Sudanese troops also coordinated with Qatari forces in the Kufra region and helped rebel forces seize the town (McGregor, 2013).

**Tunisia**

**Historical ties**

In the 1970s, Qaddafi pursued a unification plan between Tunisia and Libya with the proposed ‘Arab Islamic Republic’, which Tunisia later reneged on. Relations were further strained in 1975 over Tunisia’s support for the partition of the Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania. In the late 1970s, Tunisia accused Libya of several subversion attempts, including supporting insurgents and opponents of the regime. In the 1980s, tensions appeared over a maritime boundary dispute, which was resolved by the International Court of Justice in favour of Libya (Zeidan, 1989).

Relations continued to be strained, but improved under Tunisian President Ben Ali Libya, with the two neighbours becoming important economic partners. In the period 2000 to 2009, bilateral commercial exchanges were the densest of all North African countries. In October 2010, the two countries lifted all administrative and financial obstacles to facilitate the free flow of goods, capital and labour (Zoubir, 2012).

**Role in the Libyan conflict**

Although post-revolutionary Tunisia did not recognise the NTC until August 2011, it was heavily involved in supporting revolutionary forces in Libya (Zoubir, 2012; de Waal, 2013). Reports suggest that Tunisia received more than 600,000 Libyan refugees during the conflict, whilst wounded Libyan fighters were provided with medical aid (Daragahi, 2012; Sayah, 2012).