GFN-SSR REGIONAL GUIDE
Security Sector Reform in Southern Africa

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Introduction

This regional guide provides an introduction to literature on security sector reform (SSR) in Southern Africa. The inclusion of states in this topic guide is based on membership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Madagascar, Mauritius, Lesotho, Seychelles and Swaziland are not addressed as individual states because of the lack of relevant and current information on SSR that is available for these countries. Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo, although members of SADC, are also not included in this guide. The former is covered elsewhere in the East Africa regional guide whereas the latter will be included in a regional guide on Central Africa at a later date. The guide highlights key regional texts and resources that cut across a number of different security sectors and countries. Whilst not exhaustive, this guide provides an indication of the growing literature available on SSR in the region. Texts are selected for their relevance, usefulness and/or recommendations they provide to policymakers involved in improving the region’s security sectors.

Clicking on the link in a document title will take the reader to a more extensive summary in the GFN-SSR Document Library, which includes a direct link to the original relevant document. Where applicable, this guide also provides links to
relevant justice, conflict and fragile states related resources on the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre website (GSDRC).

**Current Security Challenges**

The Southern African region is at present characterised by a peace dividend with an absence of interstate conflict. Although the region is generally free from conflict, governance deficits, corruption and nepotism continue to weaken the ability of the state to deliver security and justice, to all. Poverty, food scarcity, HIV/AIDS, population pressures and movements, crime and a range of socio-economic ills all affect Southern Africa. Vast inequalities in access to and distribution of resources and systemic patrimony characterise governance in many of the countries presented here, and it is precisely these issues that threaten the democratic gains made in Southern Africa and provide the greatest obstacles to SSR.

**SSR in Southern Africa**

Much of what is called SSR in Southern Africa occurred during transitions to democratic rule in the post-colonial era. However, a deficiency of security governance remains in many of the region’s countries. Furthermore, there are few SSR processes that can be seen to fulfill current ambitions of SSR as a multi-sectoral approach based on a broad assessment of the security and justice needs of the state and its people. As indicated in the available literature, many of the states that undertook some form of SSR have primarily followed sector-specific reforms to meet certain security and justice needs. Furthermore, much of the SSR that has occurred in Southern Africa has been centred on defence or police reform with little focus on the other security service providers or on the interdependencies and interrelationships between the various sub-sectors. In reality, meeting the ambitions of comprehensive SSR rooted in improved democratic controls, accountability and the delivery of security services has not been possible throughout the region.

Out of the countries covered here, only South Africa has undertaken or is attempting to undertake comprehensive and fundamental reforms of the entire security system. Other countries have and continue to undertake ad hoc and piecemeal reforms in line with democratic and governance evolutions and donor interests. There are severe deficiencies in the access to justice and the prisons in the region are characteristically overcrowded. There are major backlogs in the courts in most states and poorer segments of society struggle to access the justice system. Those who cannot afford an attorney can wait in prison for years before facing trial.

SSR in Southern Africa has humble and mixed beginnings. It is a topic that attracted attention during transitions to democratic rule, especially in the 1990s. Since then, however, very little has been achieved in terms of building on the
immediate democratic gains and ensuring that the region’s security services are accountable, professional and protect human rights. The challenge for stable democracies in the region is that there is no immediate and pressing need for reform within the security sectors and there is little civil society advocacy for greater reforms (with the exception, perhaps, of South Africa). With social and economic threats dominating the landscape, the security sector does not attract high levels of civil society or donor attention. The key determinant for SSR in Southern Africa is governance – change in the governance structures and power arrangements could bring change within the security sector, albeit incremental reforms. As a regional community, the commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights is being challenged by atrocities committed by state security agents in the region.

There is a significant nexus between DDR and SSR, particularly with reference to the police and military establishments. For some Southern African countries, the DDR process was the first step towards broader defence and police reforms. For others, DDR was the closest to comprehensive reform that was witnessed. There are many reasons for the second phenomena, primarily associated with the political context and perceived threats to the ruling regime. However, in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, DDR has been considered as largely unsuccessful, partly because the ‘reintegration’ element was overlooked. In many cases, the unsuccessful programmes actually created security threats within about a decade of being implemented.

In terms of looking forward to a future agenda for SSR in Southern Africa, the key challenges and recommendations include:

- Creating security services that are responsive and suitable to the regional context. For example, the establishment of the regional standby brigade and the movement towards greater intelligence collaboration through the regional early warning centre;
- Developing policy frameworks within states to guide the development and interaction of the security services;
- Detailing the mandate, function and powers of the security agencies in legislation;
- Limiting the use of the security services for a political agenda, political repression or to serve the interests of a political elite;
- Building professional security services, curtailing human rights abuses and ending impunity for security personnel who commit violations;
- Improving the equality of access to and delivery of justice and security services;
- Improving access to information and freedom of expression as the basis for public participation in security policy formulation and monitoring;
- Creating effective regulation and oversight for Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs);
- Enabling and supporting the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) in security discourse and in the oversight of security institutions.
GFN-SSR Southern Africa Resources

Changing intelligence dynamics in Africa
The book discusses the intelligence capacities of both larger, more established states and those of smaller and weaker states. It includes two chapters on the South African intelligence services.

Lighting up the Intelligence Community: A Democratic Approach to Intelligence Secrecy and Openness
This policy paper is based on the 2008 report of the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence in South Africa. It begins with an outline of a democratic approach to intelligence secrecy, and then makes practical recommendations on expanding intelligence transparency without prejudicing the security of the country.

No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform
This publication aims to contribute to operationalising donor countries’ policy commitments to local ownership of SSR. It includes a chapter on inclusive SSR Design and the White Paper on Defence in South Africa

More information on security sector reform throughout Southern Africa can be found online in the GFN-SSR Southern Africa SSR Guide webpage, and further documents in the GFN-SSR Document Library.

A Good Place to Start

General: SSR
Berg, J., 2005, Police Accountability in Southern African Commonwealth Countries, Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town
This University of Cape Town report provides a brief overview of the oversight mechanisms that hold the police accountable in ten Southern African Commonwealth countries. The report reviews mechanisms (such as laws, policies, structures and institutions) which have been created on paper to address police accountability. Making the police accountable in any developing country is a process. A culture of accountability and democratic process needs to be created to replace a police culture of impunity and violence.
What is the impact of democratic governance on national security in Southern Africa? How does it affect collaboration in regional security? This study, by the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM), looks at the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) - South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland and Tanzania. Taking both an historical and comparative perspective, it suggests that the relationship between democratisation, national security and security cooperation in the region is still not clear. The relationship depends on the stability of a country, the nature of its democratic transition and the degree of institutionalisation of its democratic governance.


What dynamics influence the democratic governance of the security sector in Southern Africa? This paper reports on a workshop that brought together regional experts, academics, civil society representatives and national and regional security practitioners. Participants found that, despite apparent democratic transitions in many states, deficits of security governance, leadership, conceptualisation and regionalism remain. Problems include the questionable behaviour of security actors towards citizens, and partisan, regime-centred security structures. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and member states should adopt a comprehensive human security approach and encourage greater involvement by civil society in the security debate, including women's groups.


What are the key security challenges facing the countries of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)? This chapter highlights the importance of: sub-regional conflicts, migration and xenophobia, democracy and governance, regional institutional structures, environmental and water issues, HIV, and security sector reform. It finds that in spite of many achievements, regional security in the SADC region must be comprehensively consolidated. Incomplete SSR is one of the greatest threats to security and development in Southern Africa.
**Defence Reform**


How have the independent states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) responded to the challenges presented by defence and security threats in the post-colonial era? How have they established, financed, controlled, equipped, commanded, reinforced and maintained their militaries? This book from the Institute for Security Studies describes how the 13 states of the SADC developed their military institutions following independence.

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)**


This paper examines the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. It finds that in all cases, DDR was unsuccessful, partly because programming neglected reintegration. Further, the unsuccessful programmes actually created security threats within about a decade of implementation. For example, disenchanted ex-combatants' protests demanding cash, employment, and recognition from governments have threatened national stability, and in Angola, failed DDR twice led to renewed armed conflict. DDR initiatives should be informed by principles of interconnectedness, long-term sustainability and social cohesion.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons**


There has been no accurate validation to date of the argument that small arms and light weapons (SALW) are an obstacle to sustainable peace in southern Africa. This monograph, published jointly by the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Gun Free South Africa and The Institute for Security Studies, reports results of a comprehensive study of SALW proliferation in the region. Only through an understanding of the trade, use and control of SALWs can sustainable strategies be identified to manage proliferation and limit SALW misuse.
Group 1: Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and Zambia

For purposes of simplifying the presentation of information, the states comprising Southern Africa have been split into four groups. This first group of states can be classified as reasonably stable democracies with mechanisms for civil control and legislative oversight of the security services, in general. All these states have undertaken some sector specific reforms with no comprehensive, coherent or holistic SSR agenda.

Botswana

Botswana is characterised as a peaceful, stable democracy and as an economic success story. It is dominated by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has pursued policies that have encouraged relatively high socio-economic development. Current security challenges include cross-border crime, refugees and small arms. HIV/AIDS remains a problem and despite a heralded treatment programme, one in three adults remains infected or has developed AIDS.

Botswana has enjoyed relative peace since the mid-1990s, yet its defence policy is formulated ad-hoc and centralised in the Office of the President. Similarly, the reform processes that have been pursued have been ad hoc in nature, sector specific and driven largely by the democratic evolution and security needs of the state. These reforms have been based on enhancing governance, producing legislative frameworks and creating professional, efficient and effective security services. Examples of this include the current defence review process and the enacting of legislation to govern the intelligence sector. At the strategic level, however, there has been criticism of the lack of a guiding policy for the security architecture. Furthermore, the issue of integrating women into the Botswana defence and police services continues to be controversial with progress towards greater gender equity proceeding at a very slow pace.

General: SSR


This chapter draws on interviews with key figures in Botswana's establishment to examine the country's governance and security sector. It finds that Botswana's security challenges require regional security co-operation, a reorientation of security policy towards internal threats and a consultative defence review. Botswana's security policy and resource allocation focus on military strength, yet its key security concerns are largely internal issues that the military is not best suited
to address. These issues are cross-border crime, illegal immigrants, refugees (primarily from Zimbabwe), small arms, poverty and HIV/AIDS.

**Defence reform**


How has the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) evolved and developed since its creation in 1977? What is its current state in terms of professionalism, capabilities and reputation? This article from African Security Review describes the evolution, role and key characteristics of Botswana's military establishment. It argues that Botswana has created and developed a small but highly professional military establishment.

**Other GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Botswana can be found online in the GFN-SSR Document Library.

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**Malawi**

Malawi has made recent progress in achieving economic growth but human development levels remain low (it is ranked 31st out 51 African countries in the Human Development Index) and HIV/AIDS remains a major challenge. Other key threats in Malawi are: illegal immigration; drug and human trafficking and illegal cross-border trade; slow and compromised judicial structures; processes and capacity leading to costly, delayed and denied justice; police brutality alongside small arms proliferation and armed crime; a disempowered citizenry; and inequitable access to security services.

One of the greatest successes of SSR programmes in Southern Africa have been the police reform activities undertaken in Malawi, in connection with stemming the tide of small arms proliferation. The programme, based on partnership and communication, created networks between the police and the community through Community Policing Forums. Regional civil society organisations, international donors and sub-regional coordinating bodies supported the locally-led initiative.
Policing

Institute for Security Studies and Saferworld, Community policing in Malawi, Action on Small Arms in Southern Africa Newsletter 3

What steps have been taken to develop community policing in Malawi? Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the Malawi police, aided by the UK Department for International Development, have undertaken a programme of reform. Recognising the importance of cooperation between the public and police to tackling armed crime, a coalition of NGOs launched a project to promote community policing. This short article from Saferworld and the Institute for Security Studies provides a brief outline of the project.

Justice


The right to justice is challenged in Malawi due to weaknesses in the judicial system such as a shortage of lawyers, especially legal aid lawyers and a lack of financial and material resources. Over-crowding and degrading prison conditions are resultant of the lack of legal assistance provided to poorer sections of the community and delays in criminal justice procedures. This report documents the work of the Paralegal Advisory Service as a means to addressing some of the challenges faced in the delivery of justice. It provides an interesting case study of potential ways to address backlogs and highlights the positive role that non-governmental organisations can play in SSR activities.


The end of dictatorial rule in Malawi and the adoption of a new, democratic constitution in 1994 transformed the institutional and legal framework of the country. To what extent has Malawi met its commitment made then to comply with African and international norms and standards on human rights, the rule of law and democratic governance? This Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) report argues that while considerable and laudable progress has been made, much still remains to be done.
**Small Arms and Light Weapons**


Do most of Malawi's illegal small arms come from Mozambique? This report finds that there does seem to be a (reduced) inflow of arms from Mozambique used for violent crime. Efforts by the Malawian state to curb small arms proliferation appear to have had little impact, however. Malawi requires more coordinated and better-resourced measures to reduce the inflow of arms, but should also recognise domestic proliferation issues. In particular, the arms caches of the disbanded political militia need to be found and the use of the police or armed forces' own weapons in crime needs to be acknowledged and addressed.

**Other GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Malawi can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

**The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)** also has a number of related resources for Malawi in the thematic areas of justice and conflict.

Documents:
- [Justice related documents on Malawi](#)
- [Conflict related documents on Malawi](#)

Helpdesk reports
- [Governance in Malawi: Please provide key resources on current political and economic governance issues in Malawi](#)

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**Namibia**

A former German colony, Namibia attained independence from South African occupation in 1990. It is generally considered a stable country with a multiparty democracy. The primary security threats are potential instabilities due to the land reform processes, extreme inequality, HIV/AIDS and the potential for disruption and succession in the Caprivi Strip in the East.
The National Defence Force was formed in 1990 comprising former enemies of the 23-year bush war, namely the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South West African Territorial Force. Military assistance provided by Britain included force integration planning and training and this assistance helped reinforce principles of civilian supremacy and the Defence Force Act of 1990 helped delineate the institutional roles of a civilian-led MoD with a professional and politically neutral army. However, Namibia’s involvement in conflicts in Angola and the DRC suggest that the Namibian military has become more politically influential.

The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) assisted in various stages of the defence transformation process, including DDR. However the success of the programme was undermined by the government’s failure to plan and implement comprehensive reintegration programmes. The employment prospects of former PLAN fighters was restricted by their lack of formal qualifications. In an attempt to avert full-scale instability, the government implemented a programme of affirmative public sector job placements. This has largely been considered to have been successful although it has led to a large public sector.

**General: SSR**


Who are Namibia's main security actors and what are their respective roles and functions in security governance? How effective is Namibia's security governance in terms of democratic norms? This paper from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung explores the relationship between security actors and the state in Namibia. It argues that the character of Namibia's security sector signifies that the country is still in a transition phase towards consolidating its democracy.


Since independence, Namibia has been characterised by multi-party elections, good governance, a generally free media, respect for the constitution, and the rule of law. However, this chapter notes that Namibia's military has increased in both operational strength and political influence, and that civilian oversight of the security sector requires improvement. Namibia's most significant security challenges are extreme inequality and persistently high poverty and unemployment, complicated by high rates of HIV infection. Greater focus on human and common security is therefore needed, both in Namibia and in Southern Africa more widely.
**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration**


How was disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants carried out in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa? What lessons do the experiences of DDR processes in those three countries hold for those undertaking DDR in future? This paper from the Institute for Security Studies reviews DDR processes and their outcomes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. It finds that the reintegration component of DDR was inadequately addressed in all three countries, with negative consequences for security.


Having initially omitted reintegration from its DDR programming, (assuming that this would happen spontaneously), Namibia spent the next fifteen years trying to address its former ex-combatants' demands. This paper finds that Namibia's reintegration programmes ultimately produced results, including – unusually – the creation of thousands of jobs for ex-combatants in the public sector. However, those results seem to have favoured government supporters, and were both economically and politically costly. Three key lessons for reintegration programmes emerge: 1) all procedures should be transparent, and benefits equitably distributed; 2) outside stakeholders can provide much-needed impartiality; and 3) links with genuine security sector reform can promote reconciliation and create jobs based on actual security needs instead of on political expedience.

**Policing/Non-state Actors**


What can be learned from the intersection of state and non-state security practices in Namibia's Caprivi borderland? This chapter analyses the outsourcing of policing functions to chiefs and vigilantes, in which chiefs act as lower-tier representatives of state authority. It focuses on an attempt to introduce new border policing arrangements in 2002. Official policy was renegotiated as local people sought to limit the disadvantages and maximise the opportunities arising from the reform.
Policing and border management (like other facets of life) in the Caprivi region reflect pragmatic ambiguity between 'state' and 'non-state'.

Other GFN-SSR resources
More documents covering security sector reform in Namibia can be found online in the GFN-SSR Document Library.

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of conflict related resources for Namibia.

Documents:
- Conflict related documents on Namibia

Zambia

In October 1964, Northern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of Zambia. Security concerns for Zambia in the early years of independence centred on the transition from colonial rule that was occurring in the region and tensions with some neighbours, most notably Rhodesia and South Africa. As independence spread through the region, internal security in Zambia was challenged by the outbreak of civil war in Angola and Mozambique that generated thousands of displaced persons seeking refuge in Zambia.

After riots and an attempted coup in 1990, Zambia adopted a multiparty system in 1991. Since then, there have been limited electoral and constitutional reforms and in the political sphere remains relatively stable. The primary challenges for Zambia are overcoming high levels of corruption and patrimony that plague the public service and render the state incapable of delivering services.

There are few internal security threats, but several external threats exist such as fears of a spillover of conflict from the DRC. There is also a problem of illegal immigrants entering from Rwanda, DRC and Zimbabwe, and of hired criminals from Angola (called “Caravinas”) killing elderly people suspected of practicing witchcraft. Further security and justice problems include: internal displacement due to floods; gender-based violence (including domestic violence) and corresponding security sector responses; abuse of underage girls and children by men; land issues; human rights abuses; HIV/AIDS; and corruption.
There has been no real drive for SSR in Zambia, but there is a need to situate the security services within a set of accepted democratic norms and practices, especially to combat corruption, partisanship and human rights violations. This is particularly true of the intelligence services – a lack of parliamentary scrutiny has contributed to a perception amongst citizens that the intelligence services abuse their mandate.

**General: SSR**


What is the state of civil-military relations in Zambia? In April 2004, the Institute for Security Studies held a workshop on civil-military relations and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in Zambia. This book is the product of that workshop. It highlights the need for Zambia to promote good civil-military relations in order to deal with internal economic and political pressures.


What factors have influenced Zambia's approach to national and regional security? To what extent has democratisation affected security governance? This chapter finds that geopolitics and democratisation have had significant influence on Zambia's security concerns and approaches. Zambia has depoliticised its Defence Forces and has also to some extent achieved parliamentary oversight of the military. However, greater transparency is needed in Zambia's security governance, and democratic oversight of the intelligence services has yet to be established.

**Other GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Zambia can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).
Group 2: Angola and Mozambique

The Lusophone states form a common group, not because of language but rather as a result of civil wars experienced and the nature of reforms that were undertaken in the post-conflict period. Angola and Mozambique emerged from Portuguese colonial rule and were plunged into devastating civil conflicts that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, caused massive damage to property and infrastructure, and further weakened the already challenged state structures’ capacity to deliver services. When the civil wars ended, both countries were challenged to create an environment of security in which development could be pursued. Central to the post-conflict reconstruction agenda was the disarming and demobilisation of combatants.

Angola

Angola experienced a long civil war (1975-2002) that followed a liberation war against colonial rule. The Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government forces defeated the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and this led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding. However, several security threats persist including an armed separatist conflict in Cabinda and high levels of SALWs. Furthermore, Angola continues to be one of the world’s poorest countries despite rising oil production, a post-war reconstruction boom and staggering economic growth rates.

UNITA’s military defeat left them with no options but to integrate. The resulting DDR process demobilised and integrated 105,000 ex-combatants into the Armed Forces of Angola. However, beside the DDR process, which had mixed results, there has been no significant or fundamental SSR in Angola. There have been minor reform processes but these have not been aimed at nor have they achieved any of the good governance ambitions of the SSR agenda. The restructuring that has occurred within the security agencies has generally come at a time when the political taskmasters needed to ensure the loyalty of the security forces and have utilised high ranking appointments to underpin a pervasive system of political patronage within the security sector. The security sector has also increasingly been involved in the maintenance of control, and security agencies - in particular police and intelligence - have been associated with the suppression of dissent. Although there have been improvements in the protection and promotion of human rights, freedom of expression and media freedom is limited, arbitrary detention and torture still occur, and the police continue to be accused of using excessive force. There seems to be a culture of impunity in terms of holding security personnel to account for human rights violations.

Local private security companies (PSCs) have been operating in Angola since the early 1990s. However, little attention has been paid to their impact on local
populations. They are generally perceived to reinforce the weakness of the state and of public security forces. Furthermore, ownership of PSCs by senior military and government officials hinders reform and effective implementation of oversight.

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)**


What factors have influenced the reintegration into society of ex-combatants from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? This monograph from the Institute for Security Studies assesses the reintegration of ex-UNITA combatants in three of the most contested provinces in Angola's civil war. It examines the relationship between reintegration, on the one hand, and vulnerability, identity, social capital, sustainable livelihoods and political participation, on the other.


How does a rebel movement transform itself into the leading party of democratic opposition? What are the prospects of such a party? This *Conflict, Security and Development* publication examines the development of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and its emergence as the leading opposition party.

**Policing**


Despite legal provisions requiring respect for human rights and police reforms to entrench such respect, human rights violations by the police continue with impunity in Angola. This paper, published by Amnesty International, documents human rights violations by Angolan police between 2005 and 2007 and the failure to bring perpetrators to justice. Angolan authorities and international agencies should strengthen police accountability mechanisms and create an independent oversight agency in order to end Angola's culture of impunity.
Justice reform


How does Angola's criminal justice system fare in terms of respect for human rights? How are suspects, defendants and prisoners treated by Angola's criminal justice institutions? This report from the Justice, Peace and Democracy Association examines the Angolan criminal justice system with respect to human rights. It finds that the system systematically violates rights to freedom, equal access to justice and defence, moral and physical integrity and prison visits.

Private Security Companies (PSCs)


How do Angolan citizens view Private Security Companies (PSCs) and what are the impacts of PSC activities on people's everyday lives? This case study finds that although PSCs may increase employment and spending, they are generally seen as weakening the state and fomenting a culture of violence, impunity, distrust and fear. This is in spite of a legal regulatory framework governing PSCs. Regulations must be clarified and better implemented, and conflicts of interest within the security sector must be addressed.

Other GFN-SSR resources

More documents covering security sector reform in Angola can be found online in the GFN-SSR Document Library.

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of related resources for Angola in the thematic areas of fragile states, justice and conflict.

Documents:
- Justice related documents on Angola
- Fragile States related documents on Angola
- Conflict related documents on Angola
Mozambique

From independence in 1974 until 1992, Mozambique was plagued by civil war which cost the lives of more than one million people and left nearly six million people displaced within the country and in neighbouring states. Mozambique has since achieved relative stability and security but continues to suffer severe socio-economic pressures and is vulnerable to natural disasters. Citizens still experience high levels of insecurity, which partly arises from state action (torture, extra judicial killings and arbitrary arrests and detentions), or communities or individuals taking matters into their own hands (e.g. through vigilante killings). Formal justice is dispensed through a plural legal system where the majority of citizens are still governed by Customary Law.

DDR was implemented as part of the General Peace Agreement, signed in 1992 between the ruling FRELIMO and the opposing RENAMO. The task of disarming ex-combatants was immense: the exercise, led by UNOMOZ, is largely considered as ineffective leading to an abundance of illicit small arms that remain in circulation. Furthermore, the DDR process left the defence force so weak and ill equipped that conscription had to be introduced to bolster capacity.

Therefore, the main focus of change within the security environment was DDR and action against small arms and land mine problems. The UNDP led an SSR process from 1997-2007, where police reform was undertaken in parallel to judicial and penal reform. However, there has been no significant consideration of multi-sectoral and holistic SSR: Military reform, demobilisation and police reform were not linked whilst police and judicial reform have been addressed separately.

Failures to democratise the police during the 1990s led to the introduction of community policing measures. However, community policing has been primarily used by local police to expand their reach and assert state-sovereignty by outsourcing extra-legal tasks to young men.

There are still many challenges which limit access to justice: the judicial system is increasingly dysfunctional, corruption is rife, and the police have found it difficult to move from a political to an anti-crime role. Furthermore, there is a lack of qualified personnel in the police, judicial and penal systems, plus inefficiencies and chronic delays in the resolution of cases.

**General: SSR**

After over a decade of SSR assistance in Mozambique coordinated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), what lessons have been – or could be – learned? This chapter considers the UNDP's SSR activities in Mozambique from the organisation's initial involvement during the last stages of the DDR programme to the beginning of 2005. It finds that a fragmented approach to police and judicial reform missed opportunities for mutual reinforcement and undermined sustainability. Managerial reform should be prioritised and short-term programme cycles extended.


What impact has democratisation had on security in Mozambique? This chapter finds that democratisation prioritised public security and led to a total reorganisation of the security sector. While the sector is politically independent, its democratic accountability needs to be strengthened. In particular, its capacity must be improved in order to reduce high levels of criminality. Staff skills and salaries must be increased and corruption addressed.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**


What impact have disarmament programmes had on security and perceptions of security in Mozambique? What steps must Mozambique take to implement the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials? This monograph from the Institute for Security Studies looks at Mozambique’s efforts to curb the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in southern Africa.

**Policing**


What has been the impact of community policing in Mozambique? What do local versions of community policing mean for everyday policing practices and police-citizen relations? Based on ethnographic fieldwork, this article examines the implementation of state-initiated community policing in a rural former war-zone. It recommends that community policing in post-war contexts be viewed with caution. Historically embedded cultures of policing and state-citizen relations are very influential, and police officers can easily lose control over community police.
**Other GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Mozambique can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

**The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of related resources for Malawi in the thematic areas of fragile states, justice and conflict.**

Documents:
- [Justice related documents on Mozambique](#)
- [Fragile States related documents on Mozambique](#)
- [Conflict related documents on Mozambique](#)

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**Group 3: Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe is in a group on its own because of the current status of affairs in which the security sector is frequently accused of human rights violations and the economy is malfunctioning.

Zimbabwe was effectively a one-party state until parliamentary elections in 2008, which resulted in a unity government. Zimbabwe’s security sector displays a typical post-conflict orientation towards regime stability, including a lack of transparency and accountability. The army, air force, police, intelligence agencies and judiciary generally operate above the law and are politically partisan. However, the new inclusive government provides an opportunity for security and justice reforms. Furthermore, the re-engagement of regional and international actors may provide a stimulus for public debate on security and justice provision.

However, much progress remains to be made. The establishment of the National Security Council is a positive move towards establishing civilian oversight, but it has hardly met since the signing of the Global Political Agreement. Political violence continues and there has been a surge in crime. Furthermore, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2000 (amended in 2007) has been used by the ruling party to prevent civic organization and therefore provides a major barrier to grass-roots initiatives in support of security and justice reform.

There is a broad category of literature on SSR in Zimbabwe that is forward-looking and functions from the position of reforming the manner in which the security sector has been used as a tool of governance and control. Recommendations made in the literature include: the removal of the military from domestic law
enforcement; improvement in human resource systems – particularly to stabilise the payment of security sector personnel; an overhaul of the criminal justice system. There is also recognition that since peace was brokered by politicians, SSR may be a complicated and open-ended process.

**SSR: General**


What role should security sector reform play in Zimbabwe's renaissance? This paper, published by the Royal United Services Institute in September 2009, argues that security sector reform (SSR) must be a fundamental component in Zimbabwe’s stabilisation and reconstruction, and suggests ways to achieve this. Zimbabwe's economy has revived since the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009. However, developments in the security sector will dictate whether the nation’s recovery is durable or temporary.


What role do Zimbabwe's security institutions play in the governance of Zimbabwe and the management of its economy? What part could they play in the transition to a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe? This background briefing from the Council on Foreign Relations outlines the role of Zimbabwe's security institutions. It finds that as Zimbabwe's economic crisis has deepened, President Robert Mugabe has ceded significant power to the country's security forces. However, experts are divided over whether the security sector can help to bring in a new government in Zimbabwe.


Zimbabwe's new inclusive government, formed in 2008, provides an opportunity to consider provision of fundamental reforms of security and justice services to the people of Zimbabwe. This Institute for Security Studies paper examines Zimbabwe’s need for security sector reform (SSR) and recommends measures by which to construct an effective security sector. The will to achieve widespread democratic reform does not currently exist in Zimbabwe; long-term, comprehensive SSR will occur only when it becomes politically necessary.
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)


What lessons can be learned from Zimbabwe's two unsuccessful demobilisation and reintegration programmes? This paper finds that demobilisation must be undertaken as part of broader economic regeneration and the demilitarisation of society. Many social actors should be involved in implementing demobilisation, and a ministerial committee and a coordinating agency should be established to ensure better management of the process.

Policing


What measures are needed to uphold the rule of law and administration of justice in Zimbabwe and to prevent police impunity for human rights violations? How can partisan policing be overcome? This paper reports on a fact-finding visit to Zimbabwe carried out for the International Bar Association Human Rights Institute between 11-18 August 2007. The delegation found that the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) is responsible for serious human rights and rule of law violations. The ZRP has consistently shown contempt for the law, lawyers and judicial authorities. Far-reaching reforms are necessary to align Zimbabwe's policing operations with the constitution and with regional and international human rights standards.

Related reading


How has the political crisis contributed to the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe? How should the African Union (AU) and the international community respond to these crises? This report from Human Rights Watch examines the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe. It argues that this crisis is a direct consequence of the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) abusive rule. The AU should acknowledge the scale of the crisis, put human rights at the top of the agenda and hold human rights abusers to account.
**Other GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Zimbabwe can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

**The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)** also has a number of related resources for Zimbabwe in the thematic areas of justice and conflict.

Documents:
- [Justice related documents on Zimbabwe](#)
- [Conflict related documents on Zimbabwe](#)

Helpdesk reports:
- [Mainstreaming Peace and Conflict Prevention in Zimbabwe: Please provide examples of and lessons learned from development and humanitarian interventions in Zimbabwe that have provided entry points for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution.](#)
- [Transitional Justice and Reconciliation - Zimbabwe: Please identify recent literature on transitional justice and reconciliation in relation to Zimbabwe.](#)

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**Group 4: South Africa**

South Africa is also in a group of its own because of the very opposite reasons that Zimbabwe is. It is the South African state most commonly associated with SSR and is often cited as a model case study.

With the transition from apartheid to democratic rule in 1994 came a massive restructuring of the state security service providers. The reforms in the transitional period focused on creating state security structures that represented national racial and gender demographics. The reforms also created systems of democratic control, accountability and professionalism to ensure that the security services could not be used again as a tool of oppression and a symbol of elite control. The 1996 Defence White Paper was developed using an inclusive process; it focused on democratic control and established a human security approach to domestic security.

A primary criticism has been the lack of an overarching national security policy that still hampers the coherence of the state security architecture. Criticisms have also been leveled at the country’s intelligence agency with observers arguing that the intelligence mandate is too broad and ill defined.
The provision of private security has become pronounced in recent years and the total numbers of private security offices has overtaken the number of uniformed police. Although the industry is reasonably well regulated there are flaws and omissions with regard to oversight and monitoring. This is especially pertinent because in some areas, private security has replaced the public police entirely.

As the democratic state has matured and the ideals of accountability, transparency and security service delivery have become institutionalised, it has become possible for researchers and academics to focus not on the SSR programmes but on the outcomes of the change initiatives. The literature presented here is in this category of reviewing the sector reforms now that the impacts can be more easily seen.

**General: SSR**


What are the achievements, shortfalls and challenges of South Africa's security governance? This article examines the roles played by governance actors, including the executive, parliament and civil society, in the fields of defence, safety and security, and intelligence. South Africa has consciously and fairly successfully sought to apply best democratic practices to the governance of security. However, while an ambitious, extensive and systematic process of reform has been carried out, progress has been uneven and fragmentary, and organisational and perhaps political fault-lines have emerged.


How did the process of producing the South African White Paper on Defence of 1996 contribute to its impact? This case study from the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform examines the drafting and consultation process for South Africa's White Paper on Defence. It argues that the White Paper is an example of well-designed and consultative security sector reform (SSR).


What are the obstacles faced by new democracies in implementing security sector reform (SSR)? This Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management report identifies a number of obstacles drawing on the process of transforming the armed forces in post-apartheid South Africa. Obstacles to SSR in emerging...
democracies are many and varied. Moreover, the higher the level of instability and violence in the national or regional arenas the less likely it is that reforms with an anti-militarist orientation will be introduced.

**Policing**


What is the state of corruption in the South African Police Service (SAPS)? What measures have the SAPS and the South African government taken to counter police corruption? This paper from the Institute for Security Studies provides an overview of what is known about corruption in the SAPS and efforts to counter it. Since disbanding the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) in 2002, the SAPS has struggled to implement an anti-corruption strategy. Indicators suggest a lack of will on the part of both the SAPS and government to counter corruption, causing loss of public faith in police institutions.


What is the capacity of the South African Police Service (SAPS) to manage protest marches and the 2010 FIFA World Cup? What effect has restructuring had on South Africa's public order police units? This book from the Institute for Security Studies assesses the effectiveness of the SAPS Crime Combating Units (CCUs). It concludes that the restructuring of the CCUs in 2006 is responsible for the crisis in crowd management that the units are facing.


South Africa’s private security industry has grown enormously. However, only state police conduct is formally monitored. This study by the University of South Africa calls for greater monitoring and oversight of the activities of private security operatives. There must be more professional training and greater cooperation with the state police. A formal framework of accountability would allow private police officers to understand their responsibilities and the limitations on their actions.
**Defence reform**


What impact did the African National Congress's military, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), have on the creation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 1994? How does this compare with the impact of the Boer Commandos on the creation of the Union of South Africa Defence Force (UDF) in 1912? This monograph from the Institute for Security Studies compares the differing impacts of the Boer Commandos and MK on South Africa's armed forces. It finds that the Boer Commandos had a greater impact on the creation of the UDF than MK had on the SANDF.

**Intelligence**


How has history shaped the South African intelligence services? This chapter evaluates the governance of the South African intelligence services over the past century and reflects on the interests that have been served. It finds that while the gains of the post-apartheid period have been significant, there is still room for much improvement in performance and accountability. Public vigilance and policy rigour are needed to ensure that accountability becomes entrenched.


What is the role and function of the South African intelligence community in the security apparatus of the state? What is the relationship between intelligence and democracy? This collection of papers from the Institute for Security Studies evaluates how the South African intelligence community is grappling with the democratic demands of openness and accountability while maintaining the secrecy necessary for intelligence services to function effectively. It acknowledges that democratic control of the intelligence sector is a challenge even for mature democracies.

What did the Ministerial Review Commission's investigations of 2006-2008 reveal concerning South Africa's domestic intelligence mandate? What lessons can be learned relevant to other democratising states? This chapter finds that the domestic intelligence mandate in South Africa is much too broad and ill defined, and involves a political intelligence function that is inappropriate in a democracy. Ironically, these problems are partly due to the mandate's basis in progressive concepts of holistic and human security. South Africa's intelligence mandate should be narrowed to focus on the prevention of serious crime.

*Other GFN-SSR resources*

More documents covering security sector reform in South Africa can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of related resources for South Africa in the thematic areas of fragile states, justice and conflict.

Documents:
- [Justice related documents on Malawi](#)
- [Fragile States documents on South Africa](#)
- [Conflict related documents on Malawi](#)