GFN-SSR Regional Guide: SSR in South Eastern and Eastern Europe

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Introduction

This regional guide provides an introduction to literature on security sector reform (SSR) in South Eastern and Eastern Europe, focusing on the Balkans and the Southern Caucasus. It highlights key issues and priority areas in the regions and countries, and identifies relevant regional and country texts that cover a number of security sectors. Research on SSR in the Balkans is fairly extensive. There is less available literature, however, on the Southern Caucasus. As such, there is a greater concentration of resources on the Balkans in this topic guide.

Clicking on the link in a document title will take the reader to a more extensive summary in the GFN-SSR Document Library, which includes a direct link to the original relevant document.

Where applicable, this guide also provides links to relevant justice, conflict
and fragile states related resources on the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre website (GSDRC).

**The Regional Political Context**

The countries that comprise the Balkans and the Southern Caucasus, with the exception of Albania, (re)gained independence in the 1990s after the fall of European communism. In the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia emerged from the former Yugoslavia. In the Southern Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Moldova gained independence from the former Soviet Union.

The legacy of socialism/communism continues to have a profound impact on democratic governance in all of these countries. Decision-making in government institutions during socialist/communist rule was centralised and closed. Citizens were excluded from decisions about public services, safety and security. This has resulted in continued difficulties with public oversight of government and government’s responsiveness to citizens’ needs.

The legacy of violent conflict has also had a profound effect on the two regions. All of the countries discussed have a history of recent conflict, either inter-state or internal, or in the case of Albania, a period of civil unrest and internal disorder. While the Balkans region is now peaceful, inter-ethnic relations are still strained in many of these countries and nationalist rhetoric remains an issue, particularly in BiH. The situation in Kosovo, which declared unilateral independence in February 2008, remains tense. Divisions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs persist and Belgrade and Pristina’s positions are still irreconcilable on the issue of Kosovo independence. The conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, considered “frozen conflicts” but in reality still dynamic, remain unresolved. They run the continued risk of a return to violence, evidenced by the August 2008 war between Georgia on the one side, and South Ossetian separatists and Russia on the other.

One of the main incentives for consolidating peace and encouraging reforms has been the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. The prospect of EU and NATO membership has been a driving force for governance and security reforms in many countries in the Balkans. All the countries of the Balkans, with the exception of Kosovo, have signed Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU. Albania and Croatia are NATO members; Macedonia and BiH are fully integrated into the NATO Membership Action Plan; and Serbia and Montenegro have signed Individual Partnership Programmes with NATO. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, with their closer proximity to Russia, have a more distant relationship with Euro-Atlantic structures. Still, all have signed up to NATO’s Partnership for Peace and have Individual Partnership Action Plans, and engage with the EU through its European Neighbourhood Policy.
Current Security Challenges

Difficulties with the legacy of violent conflict and the persistence of “frozen conflicts” are key security challenges. Many of the conflicts experienced in the two regions pitted the security services of the state against some of its people or neighbouring peoples, and much of the present-day lack of trust in government and security institutions derives from this.

Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence has had repercussions from BiH to Georgia, with some viewing it as a precedent for redrawing international boundaries along ethnic lines and others arguing that Kosovo is a *sui generis* case, creating no legal precedent. The Southern Caucasus hosts several breakaway regions – the Georgian government does not control the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Armenia controls Nagorno-Karabakh, a part of Azerbaijan. Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniestria is the only genuinely “frozen” of all these conflict areas, with a return to violent conflict unlikely and tensions at a lower level than elsewhere.

Corruption and organised crime also pose big challenges to security. The combination of political transition and violent and/or unresolved conflicts in the regions has created an environment conducive to corruption and organised criminality. Both undermine a sense of safety, particularly when they are connected to the security forces. They have undermined public confidence and trust in government institutions and constrained economic development.

High levels of unemployment and poverty, particularly in BiH and Kosovo, as well as growing inequalities, in Azerbaijan for example, have exacerbated societal tensions. Economic grievances can be defined in ethnic terms as in BiH and make reconciliation more difficult while providing nationalist politicians with a receptive support base.

The circulation of small arms and light weapons, another legacy of conflict in the regions, poses an ongoing security challenge. These weapons continue to cause civilian injuries and deaths, undermining safety and security. They also enhance criminal capability, impede economic development and contribute to ethnic and societal tensions. The successful removal of illicit weapons from communities rests on increased public confidence in the police and other security agencies.

**SSR in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe**

Security sector reform (SSR) in South Eastern and Eastern Europe remains incomplete and uncoordinated at best. The situation on the ground differs from country to country, as do the reforms’ scale and degree to which they have been implemented.
Transforming the state-citizen relationship and developing civilian oversight of security institutions are overarching priorities. Despite the fact that legislation establishing oversight mechanisms has been introduced in all countries, there is still a general lack of involvement by civil society (e.g. parliamentarians, NGOs, media and think tanks) and the wider public in the defence and security sectors. This is attributable to continued concentration of power in the executive, particularly in the Southern Caucasus. In the Balkans, the same effect is caused by weak parliaments (with the partial exception of Albania), often due to unwieldy coalitions as in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo.

Defence reform is one of the more advanced areas of SSR in the regions. Most countries, particularly in the Balkans, have engaged in downsizing their armed forces, which were bloated from both the socialist/communist legacy and the recent conflicts. In many cases, downsizing has been accompanied by better military education and training programmes. Albania and Croatia, which are NATO members, are beginning to establish small, modern, effective, deployable and specialised professional armies in line with NATO requirements. Many countries in the regions have also reorganised their intelligence agencies, which under socialism/communism, were centralised, politicised and not fully under civilian control.

Police reform has been an integral part of democratic governance and security sector reforms. In both regions, police forces under socialism/communism had existed mainly in order to support the state authority and those in power as opposed to serving the needs of citizens. During the conflicts as well, most notably in Serbia, the police played a significant role in carrying out violence and were used as tools of repression. Transforming the police into a public service accountable to society has been a key priority in the regions, although Azerbaijan and Armenia lag behind here. Developing public trust in the police, after decades of public alienation, is a lengthy process, requiring active interventions. Some countries are developing community-based policing in order to foster cooperation between the police and citizens and better address community needs. In order to create confidence in the police on the part of all groups, particular attention has been paid, for example in Serbia and Macedonia, to establishing ethnically balanced police forces.

The justice sectors in many of the countries suffer from weak capacity and backlogs of cases, which impact negatively on the perceived effectiveness of the police as well. Access to justice for marginalised and minority groups is also problematic. Imbalanced representation of ethnic groups and language policies in the judiciary can deter groups from accessing the court system. For instance, in Georgia, Georgian is the only official state language, which makes accessing all state institutions – including justice institutions – practically difficult. In Kosovo, the refusal of Kosovo Serbs (backed by Belgrade) to acknowledge the authority of justice institutions run out of Pristina compelled Kosovo Serbs to rely on parallel justice institutions.
Countering corruption in the police, justice and border management sectors continues to be an essential part of SSR. Vetting has been used throughout the Balkans to remove corrupt employees, war criminals and those involved in organised crime from justice and security agencies. The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine has had some success in reducing the incidence of trafficking across the Moldova-Ukraine border. Border security has been difficult in the Southern Caucasus, however, due to borders being under the control of separatist regimes.

International executive authority has been an important factor to the reform of the security and justice sectors in both BiH and Kosovo and there are clear lessons to be drawn. For example, in Kosovo, EULEX retains executive powers in the areas of corruption, organised and war crimes (amongst others) and EULEX police, judges and prosecutors have variously been involved in searches, investigations, arrests and convictions. Similarly, EUFOR in BiH (which assumed responsibility for peacekeeping operations from NATO’s SFOR) and its Integrated Police Unit retain executive powers as well as a training mandate.

**Challenges for Reform and Key Recommendations**

Wide-ranging reforms are still needed in every area of the security sector throughout South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. Key challenges and necessary areas of focus include:

- **Citizen-state relations and civilian oversight:** the lack of oversight by civil society throughout the regions must be addressed in order to successfully reform the security sector and achieve progress in broader governance reforms. Restructuring citizen-state relations is a lengthy process, however. It involves changing attitudes and creating a new culture where citizens hold the state accountable and demand the state adopt a service-provision ethos. In addition, it requires that citizens receive education and training in order to build up the expertise necessary to participate effectively in defence and security policy-making, implementation and oversight.

- **Corruption and organised crime:** fighting endemic corruption in security institutions and organised crime in the regions is also necessary. It is a key security challenge that threatens rule of law, the integrity of public institutions and economic development. Stronger systems of transparency and accountability; an effective system for vetting; and border management are necessary to counter criminality and corruption.

- **Reconciliation in the security sector:** most countries in the regions, to varying degrees, continue to struggle with the creation of ethnically and politically representative security forces. Some countries, such as Macedonia, have made progress in integrating security forces. Others, however, in particular Kosovo and BiH, continue to experience difficulties
with nationalism and minority insecurity – resulting in the persistence of parallel or overlapping ethnically-based security institutions.

- **Private security companies (PSCs):** downsizing bloated security forces from the socialist/communist era combined with continuing insecurity has resulted in the growth of the private security industry in most countries in the regions. Citizens, businesses and even government institutions in the Balkans use PSCs to supplement poorly performing police forces. Although professionalism in the industry has improved, there is still a need for greater regulation including appropriate legislation and oversight.

- **Donor coordination:** there are a vast number of security sector projects, run by various international agencies, in the Balkans. Coordination of these projects is essential in order to avoid duplication and to promote effectiveness of reforms as a whole. While in many countries there has been success at greater coordination at the political level, this has yet to translate into increased coordination in operational activity on the ground.

This guide points to some of the main research from academia, civil society organisations and governments that analyses the security sectors and SSR programmes. The reports and publications that follow contain key recommendations specific to countries and sectors for policymakers and other actors involved in security sector reform in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.

**GFN-SSR Eastern Europe Resources**

**ssrbulletin**
Kosovo has been featured as a case study in the GFN-SSR *ssrbulletin: Kosovo (August 2008).*

More information on security sector reform throughout Eastern Europe can be found online in the GFN-SSR *Eastern Europe Regional SSR Guide* webpage, and further documents in the GFN-SSR *Document Library.*
A Good Place to Start: South-Eastern Europe - The Balkans

SSR: General


In order to institutionalise democratically-based security sectors and achieve Euro-Atlantic integration, Western Balkan countries need to change their value systems substantially. This book, published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in cooperation with the Partnership for Peace Consortium, is an assessment of the status of security sector reform (SSR) in the Western Balkans. SSR in Western Balkan countries has been heavily influenced by assistance from the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Given their desire to join both institutions, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro have begun to incorporate Euro-Atlantic security norms and standards. All countries have developed SSR legislation, including language calling for security sector transparency and public accountability. Despite SSR legislative progress, Western Balkan security institutions need to establish more transparency and accountability and improve their policy formulation and implementation capacities.


How has security sector reform (SSR) progressed in the Western Balkans? This Austrian Ministry of Defence paper examines the progress of SSR and Integrated Border Management (IBM) against EU and international criteria in Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. It finds that the biggest weakness in SSR reform is the lack of implementation capacity and the political realities of reform. International cooperation and assistance for all countries would be useful.
Defence Reform

Jazbec, M., 2005, Defence Reform in the Western Balkans: The Way Ahead, Policy Paper 06, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva

What next for defence reform in the Western Balkans? This paper aims to present and analyse defence reform processes in the European sub-region of the Western Balkans. Defence reforms have already proved themselves as one of the most important and influential parts of the overall reform process. The defence reform process requires clear understanding of the security environment. It must be carefully planned, sensitively shaped in its implementation, and during the course of time constantly adapted, accompanied by strong political support. Reforms so far have been primarily the result of constant pressure from the international community, combined with both the decreasing amount of defence expenditure and changes in the security environment. Positive and continuing progress of defence reform (and security sector reform) in the sub-region, regulated through democratic political means, will have a positive effect for the wider region.

Pietz, T., 2006, Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, Brief no. 34, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Bonn

How realistic is the process of defence reform and conversion planning, and how efficient are the institutional frameworks for reform in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia? What is the role of external support and are sufficient resources available for defence reform in these countries? This briefing from the Bonn International Center for Conversion analyses the development, achievements and shortcomings of defence reform and conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia. Defence reforms in the three countries have resulted in a significant downsizing of military structures in the Western Balkans, guaranteeing regional stabilisation. They have also brought an absence of major unrest from discharged military personnel and the denationalisation and internationalisation of all three countries’ armed forces. All three countries’ security sectors, however, still contain structural deficiencies, including lack of civilian control over the armed forces, conflicting competencies and lack of independent input. Lack of planning and structural problems have also had a negative impact on how all three countries have dealt with resettlement and reintegration.


Ethnically representative armed forces in post-conflict countries can encourage a sense of commonality across ethnic boundaries and help secure a fragile peace. This paper, authored by Sven Gunnar Simonsen, cites recent
efforts to establish ethnically representative armies and security forces in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, Bosnia and East Timor. While expectations of what an integrated national army can achieve should be realistic, ethnically integrated national armies can help increase the sense of security among different groups in the population. The military may not be the integrative institution par excellence, but institutions that soften ethnic divisions contribute to peacebuilding.

Police Reform


Experts agree that police reform involving the community is critical for peace and development. This document, by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Support to Security Sector Reform (SSSR) Programme, looks at project activities that address the issue of community involvement in police reform in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. The research found that all the cases involved the support of a forum allowing the community and police to work together. These forums identify and solve local issues of crime, security and development. In four cases, community-based policy (CBP) has been brought into the classroom. Activities such as awareness education and sports activities involving students and officers create greater trust in the police and may reduce juvenile crime. The report recommends that CBP training should involve all officers and staff and should emphasise the need for community partnerships and problem solving. Yet concrete practices must not only be taught, but also be put into practice in the field.

Harris, F., 2005, The Role of Capacity-Building in Police Reform, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Police Education and Development, Pristina

What is the role of capacity-building in police reform? This Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report argues that police reform programmes require a thoroughly systematic approach to capacity-building as a means to desirable organisational change. A systematic capacity-building programme must be firmly connected to the general framework of a reform process. The report offers a reform strategy based on the experience of police organisations in the former Yugoslavia and other European states.

Saferworld et al., 2006, Creating safer communities: Lessons from South Eastern Europe, Balkan Youth Union, Centre for Security Studies, CIVIL, Forum for Civic Initiatives, Saferworld

Effectively addressing security issues requires partnership between those affected by insecurity and those responsible for maintaining the welfare and safety of the public. This publication outlines the approach to community safety developed in South Eastern Europe by Saferworld, the Balkan Youth
Union (BYU), the Centre for Security Studies – Bosnia-Herzegovina (CSS), CIVIL and the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ). The approach is guided by a number of principles, including community participation, empowerment and inclusivity, conflict-sensitivity and sustainability. It involves accompanying communities through an action-planning process which enables them to identify and address their own safety concerns in collaboration with others. This approach encourages community action to address security concerns, creates links between communities and official structures, strengthens accountability and improves security situations on the ground.

SEESAC, 2007, Philosophy and Principles of Community Based Policing, 3rd edition, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade

Before the political upheaval of the 1990s, police forces in the former Yugoslavia and Albania were centralised and repressive components of the state apparatus. Since then, various initiatives have been undertaken to address the numerous problems of police forces in the region. This has provided an opportunity to introduce community based policing (CBP). This policy document aims to set out the principles and key issues of undertaking successful CBP. It emphasises the importance of a strategic management process in undertaking CBP and, based on this, outlines a ‘model’ for CBP.

Justice Reform

UNODC, 2008, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans and Affected Countries, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna

South-East Europe is a region stigmatised for its role in heroin trafficking, human trafficking, and other forms of organised crime. This report, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), argues that the crime situation in the area is improving. Specifically, it suggests that the rise of organised crime in the Balkans was a direct result of past instability, but that the situation seems to be changing for the better. As the region stabilises and the rule of law is secured, the incentives and opportunities for criminality should further fade.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

Saferworld and SEESAC, 2006, South Eastern Europe Small Arms and Light Weapons Monitor 2006, Saferworld and South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC)

What progress have the countries of South-Eastern Europe made towards controlling small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation? This report from Saferworld and the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) outlines progress
made on SALW control during 2005-6. States in South Eastern Europe have done far too little during this period to meet international commitments they have made in regard to SALW control. While there is always a need for greater resources, failure of political will is the most obvious explanation for this inertia. Considerable support from civil society and international actors will be required to make progress on SALW control.

**Private Security Companies**


The rapid privatisation of security in South Eastern Europe following the rejection of communism in the 1990s mirrors the global trend in which security roles that have traditionally been conducted by the state have been gradually outsourced to private actors. While private security companies (PSCs) in the countries of south-Eastern Europe have recently improved the professionalism of the sector, there is a need for more state intervention to increase the regulation, oversight and professionalism of the industry. This SSESAC survey examines the PSC industry’s key trends and regulatory issues and recommends country-specific reforms. While national regulatory legislation is critical, mutually reinforcing national, regional and international regulatory frameworks are also needed.

SEESAC, 2006, *The Sarajevo Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies*, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC)

Private security provision has increased across the world during the last decade. However, national regulation of private security companies (PSCs) and their activities is often weak or entirely absent. This can result in low standards of professional behaviour and service delivery, and can ultimately have a negative impact on access to justice and security. The Sarajevo Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies, developed by the non-governmental organisations Saferworld (UK) and the Center for Security Studies (BiH), provides basic principles for voluntary adoption by PSCs when national regulation is either weak or entirely absent. Based on European and international best practice, it covers a wide range of areas, including recruitment, training, health and safety, non-discrimination and relations with clients the police and other security companies.
A Good Place to Start: SSR in Eastern Europe - The Caucasus

**SSR: General**


Security sector reform (SSR) poses profound challenges to the Southern Caucasus. This book, published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Partnership for Peace Consortium, analyses obstacles to SSR in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. While Southern Caucasus countries have different histories, cultures, religions and mindsets, they exhibit similar low levels of democracy, severe economic and social problems, and a high level of politicisation of organisations and institutions. A lack of public financial and human resources, a Soviet-style organisational mentality and resistance to change in the Southern Caucasus are major obstacles to SSR. Other obstacles are the lack of involvement of civil society in SSR; politicised security ministries; and lack knowledge of the rule of law and commitment to service to citizens on the part of police.

**Defence Reform**


What are the priorities for defence institution reform in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova? This volume places Partnership Action Plan-Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) reform needs in their national and regional contexts and considers common priorities in the region. The study finds that the following issues are priorities either for all four nations or the majority of them: building transparency; civilians working in defence; extending or enhancing democratic control over defence policy implementation; formulation of defence policies in a comprehensive and institutionalised manner; and public awareness of defence issues.

**Justice Reform**


Although the active armed struggles in the South Caucasus came to an end in the early 1990s, since then the region has been in a state of 'frozen'
conflict. This International Alert report examines the connections between corruption and frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus region, exploring corruption on all sides of the conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorný-Karabakh. Anti-corruption strategies in the South Caucasus need to take into consideration the protracted conflicts. Likewise, conflict transformation activities need to factor in corruption in the institutions concerned.

Country Case Studies – The Balkan Peninsula

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Dayton Agreement, signed in November 1995, put an end to the 1992-5 war between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims); and officially divided the country’s administration into two entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska (RS). The fragmentation and ethnicisation of security structures in Bosnia during the armed conflict have been particularly challenging for security sector reform. Under Dayton, most governmental functions – including law enforcement, judicial and prosecutorial functions - fell under the mandate of the two entities. In addition, as part of the Dayton Agreement, the ethnic armies of Bosnia and Herzegovina were downsized, with the demobilization of nearly 300,000 soldiers.

Police reform, linked by politicians to controversial constitutional reform, has been much more problematic. Whilst the RS had created one unified police force, the Bosniak-Croat Federation created eleven independent forces. This encouraged fragmentation and left the forces open to political influence. From 2000-2002, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) had a training and institutional building mandate which, amongst other things, resulted in the downsizing of police numbers from 44,000 to 15,800. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003 with a mandate to establish sustainable policing arrangements under local ownership. It has since tried to drive through various technical changes and a standardisation and harmonisation of the police. Some progress was achieved in April 2008 with the adoption of two critical police reform laws, which will allow for police coordination at the state level, but political will to implement these laws remains lacking. Furthermore, despite words to the contrary, police reforms efforts have been criticised as being foreign-driven and lacking in local-ownership.

Justice reform did not feature prominently in Dayton; however, progress has been made in this area. As part of broader security sector reforms, war criminals have been vetted from police, the courts and prosecutor’s offices. Further, the establishment of the War Crimes Chamber in 2005 in Bosnia,
and its placement within the domestic justice system, has fostered local ownership of the reform process. In addition, the cooperation between international and local prosecutors has promoted skills and knowledge transfer.

Despite some important achievements in security sector reform, broadly, Bosnia is stagnating. Increased negative and nationalist rhetoric from political leaders in the latter part of 2008 has raised tensions, hindered reforms and prompted the international community to extend the timeline for the Office of the High Representative (with powers to enforce the implementation of the Dayton Agreement) in the country.

SSR: General


Has security sector reform (SSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina enhanced the security of Bosnia as a whole? This Conflict, Security and Development article argues that SSR has produced some notable results and contributed to the general improvement of security in Bosnia. However SSR has inadvertently created some new security risks. Furthermore, until the lack of local 'ownership' of SSR and the Dayton constitutional arrangements are effectively addressed, Bosnia will remain a weak, marginalised country.


How has security sector reform (SSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) been undertaken since 2002? This International Peacekeeping article assesses the success and failure of SSR reforms as well as the contribution of external actors. International efforts have been the driving force. However, as the international community's role decreases, the onus will increasingly be on local authorities to complete SSR reforms. This will be essential if BiH is to succeed in drawing closer to Europe.

Defence reform


What has been the impact of military downsizing on broader state building agendas in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)? This article argues that state-led demilitarisation in BiH has had a negative effect on public support for the country's ethnically fragmented administration and has undermined the
legitimacy of the central state. This suggests the need to consider the state building implications of post-conflict demilitarisation and the downsizing of armed groups, particularly: (i) the size of the military/militant force(s); (ii) the symbolic importance of the military (and its affiliates, such as veterans and war widows); (iii) the level and foundation of the state’s legitimacy; (iv) the presence or absence of competing or alternative sources of authority; and (v) the ability to provide substantial, effective, and culturally appropriate reintegration or post-service transition assistance.

**Police Reform**


Was the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) an appalling failure? This paper from the Institute Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) analyses the 2003-2005 period of the mission and assesses whether EUPM merited the harsh criticism it received. It finds that while EUPM failed to achieve its goal of ‘Europeanising’ Bosnian police services, it achieved a number of tangible results. These include developing state-level police agencies, strengthening community policing practices, progress in police accountability, professional skills and management, and introducing technical reforms harmonising police standards. EUPM progress was limited by a number of shortcomings of the mission, including: insufficient civilian presence; adoption of a state-centric approach to local ownership; lack of a mandate to engage directly in police restructuring; coordination problems between EUPM and EUFOR Althea and the different approaches of both missions to fighting organised crime; and the artificial nature of the ‘European best practices’ at which EUPM aimed for the Bosnian police services. In some cases not even EUPM met these standards.


What can be learned from previous security and defence operations? This chapter describes the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM). This was the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operation and is still ongoing. The EUPM has helped transform the Bosnian police into a professional service and made progress in bringing institutions and practices into line with European norms. But shortcomings in law enforcement remain, including the high politics of police restructuring and the fight against organised crime and corruption.

What factors have undermined the implementation of security sector reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina? This article reviews the reform process, analysing the key political actors and debates. It argues that the international community's attempt to restructure the police force failed due to its implications for the country's ethno-political power-sharing model. Future efforts at reform will need to be based on better dialogue and debate as opposed to prescriptions from international actors.


How successful has police reform in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina been? This article analyses the role of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in police reform, and the implications of making reform a condition of European Union membership for the country. Police reform plays a key role in Bosnia's internationally-supervised state building process. It is one of the four key conditions for the country to join the European Union. This politicisation of police reform has been in essence constitutional reform by other means. The EUPM should have led from an early stage on restructuring to avoid the subordination of its work to other actors with different agendas.

**Justice Reform**


This chapter in Justice as Prevention examines two approaches to personnel vetting in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. It examines UN efforts to screen and certify the police, and the reappointment of judges and prosecutors by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (HJPC). It argues that efforts to build public institutions to prevent the recurrence of abuses should generally not be limited to excluding abusers, but requires comprehensive institutional reform, including a full review of personnel.

What progress has Bosnia and Herzegovina made towards establishing a juvenile justice system that meets international standards for children's rights? This article from Youth Justice examines Bosnian efforts to establish a specialised juvenile justice system that complies with international standards. It finds that proposed reforms, including juvenile-specific legislation, courts and actors and diversion from prosecution and/or criminal sanction, represent a step in the right direction. While lack of awareness of children's rights standards and rights-based legal tools have hindered progress, Bosnia's responsiveness to juvenile offending is slowly improving.


To what extent has the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) brought justice and accountability to Bosnia and Herzegovina? This report, published by Human Rights Watch, argues that the WCC has made progress and is capable of effectively prosecuting war criminals. Continued fair trials and increased respect for rule of law in Bosnia can only come about with sustained and significant support from the government of Bosnia and the wider international community.

GFN-SSR resources
More documents covering security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be found online in the GFN-SSR Document Library.

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of related resources for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the thematic areas of justice, fragile states and conflict.

Documents:
- Justice related documents on Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Fragile states related documents on Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Conflict related documents on Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia

Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991 under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman, a hardline nationalist. It was only after his death in late 1999 that Croatia was able to begin a process of genuine democratic reforms. Successful security sector reforms including: the adoption of defence and security legislation; the establishment of civilian control over the security and defence sectors; army downsizing and a shift to more deployable forces; demilitarisation and depoliticisation of the police; and the reintegration of Croatian and Serb officers in the police force, as well as the incorporation of women – have propelled Croatia toward Euro-Atlantic integration. Croatia became a NATO member on 1st April 2009 and hopes to become a member of the EU by 2011.

Croatia still faces several challenges in its reforms, however. They include continued tolerance for corruption in the security sector and a deficit of expertise in the police and armed forces. Although educational courses and training have been underway, proper expertise and capacities take time to develop. Further, high-profile murders in the second half of 2008 could indicate that Croatia’s reforms do not extend as deeply as its Euro-Atlantic progress suggests.

SSR: General

Edmunds, T., 2007, Security Sector Reform in Transforming Societies: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Manchester University Press, Manchester

What progress did Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro make in security sector reform at the political, organisational and international levels between 2000 and 2006? What lessons do the experiences of these states have for security sector reform in general? This book uses the examples of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro to examine the theory and practice of security sector reform in transforming societies. It argues that the experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro demonstrate the utility of the security sector reform concept, as well as some of its limitations.

Police Reform


While Croatia might be perceived as another Eastern European country on the road towards a democratic society, its challenges and successes to date make its experience quite distinct and different. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, the expectation of war in Croatia put defence at the top of the country’s priority list. Democratisation reforms that did not directly correlate
with war-related efforts were sidelined for at least two years. The size of the police force is an illustrative example: the number of sworn officers first increased as a consequence of war-related activities, only to be dramatically reduced to a number that more closely corresponds to the European standards once the war-related activities subsided. The police are an integral part of a larger society and, as such, are strongly affected by the conditions in the society. The war in Croatia had an effect not only on the state of police recruitment, training, and supervision, norms of police culture, and the achievement of police accountability, but also on the availability of equipment and the size of the police budget. Societal tolerance and acceptance of the corruption of public officials, including high-ranking officials of the ruling party, creates an atmosphere in which corruption is an integral part of the political system, economy, and public services. Establishing a relatively advanced set of legal boundaries for police work and behaviour is a crucial but insufficient condition for democratisation.

SEESAC, 2006, SALW Survey of Croatia, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade

What impact do small arms and light weapons (SALW) have on society in Croatia? What measures has the Croatian government taken to address these problems? This survey from the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) examines the small arms situation in Croatia. It presents findings on the distribution, impact and perceptions of small arms and government capacity for conducting SALW intervention. The threat posed by the presence of SALW in civilian hands is evident from the high number of armed assaults, murders, robberies and suicides, and the increase in serious and organised armed crime. Croatians’ perceptions regarding security reflect this situation, although significant geographical differences exist. People in urban areas feel less secure, while those in rural and war-affected areas have a higher level of perceived security.

GFN-SSR resources
More documents covering security sector reform in Croatia can be found online in the GFN-SSR Document Library.

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of related resources for Croatia in the thematic area of conflict.
Kosovo declared independence unilaterally in February 2008, committing to the so-called Ahtisaari Package (the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement). This was greeted with protests in Serbia and in Serb-areas in Kosovo. It is recognised as an independent state by 70 UN member states and the Republic of China (Taiwan). On 22 July 2010, in response to a request by Serbia, the ICJ ruled that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law.

The population of Kosovo is around 90 per cent ethnic Albanian. Minority Serbs in Kosovo have established parallel institutions for state administration – courts, policing, schools, hospitals and local government – which are particularly strong in the Serb-majority North and in Serbian enclaves. The government in Pristina considers these parallel structures to be a threat to the territorial integrity of Kosovo. EULEX, the European Union’s Rule of Law mission, was launched in December 2008. Its mandate is to mentor, monitor and advise the Kosovo government in the police, justice, customs and border sectors.

The former UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established after the Kosovo war in 1999, restored basic safety and security and supported the development of indigenous/national institutions for justice and security service delivery. Whilst Kosovo has low rates of violent and inter-ethnic crime, it suffers from a number of weaknesses: The judicial system is considered corrupt, inefficient and lacking in skilled personnel, and many cases concerning war crimes and inter-ethnic violence from 1999 and riots in 2004 remain unresolved. The presence of international prosecutors and judges, while welcomed by many as a means of ensuring impartial justice, has not resulted in skills transfer to national counterparts.

The conflict left around 20,000 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants, many of whom were the focus of international (primarily NATO led) DDR efforts in late 1999. However, a large percentage of ex-combatants were recruited to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a newly formed civilian protection organisation which was replaced by the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) in 2009, and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).

The Kosovo Police Service (KPS, now simply called the Kosovo Police), created in 1999, has achieved better results. While still too big for the population size, it is one of the most trusted institutions in Kosovo. Confidence in the Kosovo Police is much lower among Kosovo Serbs, however, and improving this relationship is a key focus for international SSR donors in Kosovo. The Kosovo police have limited ability to tackle organised crime, financial crime and trafficking. Other challenges and sources of insecurity are organised crime and the prevalence of small arms and light weapons. In addition, high unemployment and poverty risk destabilising Kosovo in the medium term, especially with a growing youth population.
**SSR: General**


What were the factors in the Kosovan conflict that eventually led to Kosovo's declaration of independence as a sovereign state? This case study analyses the role of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the conflict, the emergence of Kosovo as a sovereign nation, and how the KLA and its members made the transition to peacetime roles. Unlike other resistance movements, whose actors have been reintegrated into an existing state structure following peace accords, the KLA transformed itself into a de facto state architecture under international protection.


What is the relationship between the security sector reform (SSR) and democratisation? What does this relationship imply for SSR and the democratic transition under the UN in Kosovo? This article from the journal Security Dialogue explores the relationship between SSR and democratic transition in post-conflict contexts, drawing on Kosovo as a case study. It finds that not only do SSR and democratisation agendas interfere with each other, but measures to manage post-conflict security challenges can affect them both. This demonstrates that a well-developed UN theoretical discourse is not matched by UN practices in the field.


What role will the EU play in Kosovo's security sector reform (SSR)? What challenges does the EU-led presence face? This paper from the European Security Review takes Kosovo as a test case for the EU in striving for a comprehensive approach to SSR. A complex history and political background, ethnic divides and widespread corruption all pose challenges. In learning from experience and continuing present efforts, the EU must take up its responsibilities as a global actor in crisis management.

Studies have suggested that the UN has limited state-building capacity and had, as of 2008, no agreed framework of security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict environments. This chapter addresses these concerns in the context of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It argues that, while it could be claimed that the UN has stabilized the territory, in terms of justice and security, it has been less successful in reconstructing and developing Kosovar-led national justice and security services. On this basis, the chapter presents recommendations on approaches the UN should employ to support SSR in post-conflict scenarios, all the while suggesting that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations may not be the most suitable or effective mechanism by which the international community can support the development of justice and security services in post-conflict environments.

**Policing**

Forum for Civic Initiatives, 2007, *Policing in Kosovo*, Forum for Civic Initiatives (Pristina) and Saferworld (London)

While public trust and confidence in the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has improved, there is a marked disparity between Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb perceptions of police, crime and personal security. This paper, published by the Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld, reports the results of a citizen survey on personal and community safety and security issues. Kosovars want the KPS to improve its professionalism and effectiveness and work with communities to solve safety and security problems. The marked Albanian-Serb disparity of opinion on safety and security indicates the need for the KPS to address its effectiveness in the Serbian community.

**Justice Reform**


What accounts for the failures of the UN justice mission in Kosovo and how can these mistakes be fixed? This report, published by Amnesty International, highlights seven years of failings by the UN Mission in Kosovo's (UNMIK) Department of Justice. Although the model of internationalising local courts by temporarily importing experienced jurists could work, the effort in Kosovo cannot serve as a model. By publicising the findings of its own internal review, UNMIK should begin to assess transparently its inadequate planning, oversight and implementation.

Underlying drivers of conflict, including the decision on future status, must be addressed in order to move Kosovo towards a more prosperous and stable future. This paper, published by the Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld, reports the results of a conflict analysis conducted throughout Kosovo. International and local administrations need to clarify the division of security sector competencies and engage the public in discussions of nation building and security issues.


More than two years after declaring independence, Kosovo struggles with uneven rule of law and a weak justice system that is failing its citizens. This report surveys Kosovo’s domestic legal system and recommends national and international actions to address systemic weaknesses. Above all, Kosovo’s President, government and Assembly must fully support efforts to curb high-level corruption and adopt key framework laws for the judicial system.


Combating organised crime should occur throughout the conflict continuum, from conflict prevention to post-conflict peacebuilding. This paper, published by Swisspeace, examines the impact of organised criminal groups on peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo and Liberia. Although types of organised crime differ in the two countries, both cases demonstrate that it presents a serious threat to peacebuilding efforts and damages the functioning of democratic institutions. It threatens the development of democratic institutions, interferes in political affairs and social and economic policy, and hampers the application of the rule of law through pressure on criminal justice system actors.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

Istrefi, A. et al., 2007, *Small Arms and Human Security in Kosovo: An Agenda for Action*, Saferworld (London) and the Forum for Civic Initiatives (Pristina)

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) poses a fundamental challenge to the stability of Kosovo. This briefing paper, authored by Astrit Istrefi, Anna Richards, Simon Rynn, Henry Smith and Juliana Sokolová, reports on the 2006 SALW Survey of Kosovo. It proposes measures that government, civil society and international authorities in Kosovo should take to improve SALW controls. Coordinated planning and
strategy development, and links to relevant institutions and processes, are crucial to the development of effective SALW control in Kosovo.

Saferworld, 2009, **Ready or not? Exploring the Prospects for Collecting Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo**, Saferworld, London

When is the right time to begin collection of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Kosovo? This study examines attitudes towards SALW in Kosovo and identifies lessons learned for conducting a weapons amnesty and collection. Such a collection would not currently yield significant positive results in Kosovo as a number of preconditions are not yet in place. SALW collection should only take place as part of a broader strategy, based on a detailed understanding of the factors that drive demand for weapons.

GFN-SSR resources
More documents covering security sector reform in Kosovo can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of related resources for Kosovo in the thematic areas of justice, fragile states and conflict.

Documents:
- [Justice related documents on Kosovo](#)
- [Fragile states related documents on Kosovo](#)
- [Conflict related documents on Kosovo](#)

Macedonia

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) managed to avoid the violent conflicts from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. However, it experienced low-intensity conflict in 2001 between government forces (mostly police) and the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA). The Ohrid Agreement, signed in August 2001, ended the fighting. It provided for greater rights and representation of ethnic Albanians in government and security institutions, and an amnesty for NLA fighters in return for the disarming and disbanding of the NLA.

Macedonia has since made progress in security sector reform. It has sought to professionalise its military, with appropriate representation of all ethnic communities, sufficient downsizing and modernisation of equipment. While it
has made progress along these lines, it continues to struggle with effective
democratic governance and oversight – largely due to the shortage of
competent civilian specialists in defence and security issues. Other
challenges are a lack of public trust in state institutions, including the police.
In order to rectify this, community-based policing has been introduced, with
particular attention to ethnically-balanced police patrols, not least as part of
implementing the Ohrid Agreement. While NATO considers Macedonia to
have fulfilled all the requirements for membership, its entry has been
deferred until Macedonia resolves its long-standing name dispute with
Greece.

**Defence Reform**

Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans: Self-Assessment
Studies on Defence, Intelligence, Police and Border Management Reform,
eds. A. H. Ebnöther, P.H. Fluri, and P. Jurekovic, National Defence Academy,
Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence and DCAF in
cooporation with PfP-Consortium of Defence Academies and Security
Studies Institutes, pp. 137-160

This Austrian Ministry of Defence report assesses the current functioning of
the defence sector in Macedonia. Since 2001, Macedonia has enjoyed stable
governments which have invested in the development of a reform process.
However, economic and political constraints have made the reform process a
lengthy affair. Preventing the influence of these constraints on the reform
process in the future depends on the degree to which political stability can be
sustained.

**Police Reform**

Ioannides, I., 2009, *The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) and the
European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, in European Security and Defence
Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-2009), eds. G. Grevi, D. Helly and D.

How successful has European Union (EU) support to the Macedonian Police
been? This chapter analyses experiences between 2003 and 2006 of the EU
Police Mission to Macedonia (Proxima) and its successor, the EU Police
Advisory Team (EUPAT). The programmes were undertaken in the context of
a fragile peace, but with police being gradually redeployed to former crisis
areas.

Governance in the Western Balkans: Self-Assessment Studies on Defence,
Intelligence, Police and Border Management Reform, eds. A. H. Ebnöther,
P.H. Fluri, and P. Jurekovic, National Defence Academy, Bureau for Security
What progress on police reform has occurred in Macedonia since independence? This analysis, published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence, argues that a period of intensive reforms is bringing progress within a longer-term programme of security sector reform (SSR). During the initial decade of independence, SSR seemed to some to represent mere security sector build-up. However, genuine, comprehensive reform has been apparent since 2001.

**GFN-SSR resources**
More documents covering security sector reform in Macedonia can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

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**Moldova**

Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The republic is shaped by Romanian, Russian and Ukrainian influence. Transdniestria, a breakaway region of Moldova mostly east of the River Dniestr, has been a source of some instability since. Fighting broke out in 1991-1992, largely over the choice of official state language, and ended in a ceasefire. Some tensions remain due to large numbers of small arms and light weapons present in Transdniestra and minimal transparency in SALW control, but a return to conflict is very unlikely. In addition, citizens living in the Security Zone between Transdniestria and government-controlled Moldova suffer particularly low levels of personal security due to weak police capacity and occasional confrontations between Transdniestrian militia and Moldovan police.

The Soviet legacy and the difficult process of achieving attitudinal changes have also stymied reforms. Moldova has formal democratic structures in place; however, democratic oversight remains weak. While oversight institutions such as ombudsman and auditor general offices, civil society institutions and the media exist, they have yet to be effective in promoting accountability of Moldova’s security institutions. In addition, there is insufficient attention paid to ensuring equitable and efficient interagency cooperation in the security sector.
SSR: General


What is the current status of Security Sector Reform in Moldova – particularly parliamentary oversight – and how could improvements be made? This book by Moldovan experts reviews the situation as of early 2009. It finds that Moldova has put in place most of the laws and institutions needed for democratic security sector governance, but is not using them to full effect. Parliament has failed to closely, critically and consistently oversee the security sector. EU assistance should seek to strengthen the involvement of Moldova's Parliament in the making and oversight of security policy. Moldovan initiatives to review and reform the security sector are urgently needed.

Defence Reform


What is the situation regarding reform of the defence sector in Moldova? What impact does NATO and EU enlargement have on security sector reform (SSR) in Moldova? This report from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) examines defence reform in Moldova. It finds that SSR is becoming ever more important for Moldova due to the rapid enlargement of the EU and NATO.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

SEESAC, 2006, *SALW Survey of Moldova*, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade

How have internal conflicts affected the distribution and impact of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Moldova? What effect does Moldova’s constitutional arrangement have on its capacity to address SALW issues? This survey from the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) examines the small arms situation in Moldova. Since gaining independence Moldova has experienced conflicts in Gagauz Yeri and Transdniestria, which now enjoy autonomy and de facto independence respectively. Failure to resolve the Transdniestrian conflict and large numbers of SALW in Transdniestria have led to the politicisation of SALW and security issues. SALW control has therefore suffered from low transparency and high levels of distrust between the Moldovan government and the Transdniestrian authorities. While SALW
have not had a significant impact on public health or crime, they have had a significant effect on security sector reform and democratisation.

GFN-SSR resources
More documents covering security sector reform in Moldova can be found online in the GFN-SSR Document Library.

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of related resources for Moldova in the thematic area of conflict.

Montenegro

Montenegro declared independence from its loose union with Serbia in June 2006, after a referendum the month prior. Since then, Montenegro has been stable and its economy has grown. Key security sector challenges in Montenegro are police reform, high levels of corruption and organised crime, and control of small arms and light weapons. As with Serbia, policing in Montenegro suffered from the socialist-era legacy. Police were utilised for oppression and potential combat, and were less skilled in many traditional policing tasks such as criminal investigation, community policing and crime prevention. In addition, police oversight and accountability are still underdeveloped and have allowed for continued corruption. Reform in border policing has made the most progress. It was identified as a key priority by the pro-independence government to demonstrate its ability to be responsible for border security. While enhanced border security will help to fight some forms of organised crime and trafficking, it will not be sufficient, and stronger political will is necessary to continue to improve governance of the broader security sector.

Police Reform


This Austrian Ministry of Defence article examines police reform in the Republic of Montenegro. It argues that police reform did not start properly until 2001 and has always been primarily a political issue. The political
sphere, however, failed to support police reform through consistent reform policies. The political elite of today's independent Montenegro have no more excuses, but to undertake the four 'Ds' - de-politicisation, de-militarisation, decriminalisation and de-centralisation of the police.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**

SEESAC, 2004, [SALW Survey of Montenegro](#), South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade

“A house isn’t a home without a gun” is a common sentiment in the Republic of Montenegro. This survey from the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) examines the small arms situation in Montenegro. It presents findings on the distribution, impact and perceptions of small arms, and on government capacity for conducting SALW intervention. It finds that there is an abundance of small arms in Montenegro and that Montenegrins believe there are too many guns in society. However, traditions of gun ownership, perceptions that guns offer security from crime, and mistrust of the police, make Montenegrins reluctant to surrender their weapons.

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**GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Montenegro can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

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**Serbia**

Serbia has been party to three wars since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It has also endured continued political instability since 2000, after a “revolution” ousting President Milošević, the assassination of its Prime Minister in 2003, and the secession of Montenegro and of Kosovo. The unresolved dispute over Kosovo, in particular, has led to strained relations with NATO and suspicions towards foreign assistance. In such an environment, security sector reform has been difficult, particularly concerning the depoliticisation of the different security services. Serbia’s current president, Boris Tadić, who is a staunch supporter of European integration, saw his reformist party’s power strengthened after elections in early 2008. It is hoped that his coalition government remains strong enough to continue pursuing reforms.
In contrast with other states in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, the dissolution of the previous regime did not lead to demands for defence reform. Serbia (and Montenegro) inherited its security agencies almost unchanged from the former Yugoslavia. During the Milošević era, all security agencies were centralised and politicised, with their functions deliberately duplicated. Many were also involved in criminal enterprises on behalf of the state.

Donor interest in SSR has been targeted towards defence and police reform. However reforms from 2000 to 2010 have mainly been cosmetic. In 2005, a White Paper on Defence integrated Serbia’s defence planning within a common NATO framework and made a clear case for reforms including military and civilian downsizing. In 2007, further plans were put into place, under the leadership of Chief of Staff General Ponos, which pushed for a smaller and more professional army. However, this came up against considerable political opposition fuelled, in part, by widespread public reaction to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Finally, the 2009 National Security and Defence Strategy signalled a u-turn away from support for NATO and European integration. In sum, despite successes with downsizing, the military and especially the defence industry remain large and outdated and unjustifiably geared towards territorial defence.

Police reform has focused on decentralising forces. There have been successes with the introduction of community policing and the creation of the Multi-Ethnic Policing Element (MEPE) in 2001. These reforms have yet to fully transform the culture of the police, however, and corruption remains a problem. At the end of January 2009, it was announced that the MoI is working on developing a new police reform strategy. Reform of the numerous intelligence agencies has received much attention in Serbia due to their connection with organised criminality and war crimes.

In an area of relative success, Serbia has passed legislation mandating civilian oversight of military security services; and there has been an increase in the competencies of parliamentarians in dealing with intelligence and other security issues. The arrest in July 2008 of Radovan Karadžić, the wartime leader of the Bosnian Serbs, is considered an indicator of successful de-politicisation of the internal intelligence service.

**SSR: General**


What progress did Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro make in security sector reform at the political, organisational and international levels between 2000 and 2006? What lessons do the experiences of these states have for security sector reform in general? This book uses the examples of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro to examine the theory and practice of security sector reform in
transforming societies. It argues that the experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro demonstrate the utility of the security sector reform concept, as well as some of its limitations.


What led to the failure of Serbia's attempt at security reform, begun in 2007? How can the Euro-Atlantic security community help Serbia to overcome its now incoherent and isolationist security stance? This article examines the political and policy-making processes that led to the adoption of the Serbian National Security and Defence strategies in 2009. It finds that attempted reform was hijacked by domestic ethno-nationalist forces; Serbia's civil society and security institutions had not learned how to work together to achieve reform, and did not fight hard enough for it. A balanced, coordinated set of actions by the EU, NATO, the United States and Russia could help to reset Serbia’s relationship with Europe and increase regional stability.


What is the role of external donor assistance in Serbian security sector reform (SSR)? How can such assistance be improved? This paper examines defence and police reform in Serbia and finds that the country is still stuck in the 'first phase' of the SSR process. A lack of direction and lack of capacity have affected both domestic Serbian and international reform efforts. Donors should adopt a more focused and strategic approach that considers local ownership.

**Police Reform**


The reform of Serbia’s police force and its transformation into a service accountable to the citizens was one of biggest challenges Serbia faced after the overthrow of Milošević. How successful has it been? This paper by the Conflict Studies Research Centre assesses Serbian police reform between 2000 and 2006. It suggests that although the police are no longer seen as a negative force, they are still not perceived as an accountable citizens’ service.

This paper finds that the lack of a strategic approach to police reform in Serbia hinders both police reform and Serbian integration into Europe. The Stockholm Programme, a five-year European Union strategic plan for building and preserving the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, could be used as a starting point for a Serbian police reform strategy. The Stockholm Programme focuses on protecting citizens and their human rights, and on the deepening of regional police cooperation.

**Intelligence Reform**


What role have Serbia's intelligence agencies played in its democratisation since 2000? What does the Serbian experience demonstrate about civilian control of intelligence agencies and the role of the intelligence sector in democratisation? This article from Europe-Asia Studies examines the governance and reform of the Serbian intelligence agencies since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. It argues that Serbia's intelligence agencies have played an important but complex role in Serbia's ongoing political transition.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**

SEESAC, 2005, Living with the Legacy - SALW Survey of the Republic of Serbia, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade

This 2004 survey from Saferworld and the UNDP Small Arms Control in Serbia and Montenegro Project (SACISCG) examines the small arms situation in Serbia. It presents findings on the distribution, impact and perceptions of small arms and on government capacity for conducting small arms and light weapons (SALW) intervention. Most owners of firearms in Serbia possess them to protect themselves, their families and property, possibly indicating the legacy of conflict, poor state control and mistrust of state authorities. However, most citizens feel safe in their communities and do not experience SALW-related crime. They are not, therefore, greatly concerned by SALW proliferation, despite perceptions of too many guns in society and the state’s inability to adequately guarantee security.

**GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Serbia can be found online in the GFN-SSR Document Library.
The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of related resources for Serbia in the thematic area of conflict.

Country Case Studies – The Caucasus

Albania

Unlike much of the rest of the Balkans, Albania did not experience overt violent conflict in the 1990s. However, it did go through a period of civil unrest and internal disorder in 1997, following the collapse of several pyramid schemes. It took the government a further two years to regain full control of its territory. During this period of unrest, citizens looted military establishments resulting in a massive proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The government, with the help of the international community, responded by establishing a commission to coordinate weapons collection, and around half the weapons have since been retrieved. Still, vast amounts of SALW remain in civilian hands.

In addition to progress with SALW, Albania has been successful in other areas of security sector reform. It has downsized its armed forces and has made progress in transforming its military into a small, mobile, modernised and well-trained force, in line with NATO principles. In 2005, the armed forces were downsized from 43,000 to 16,500 troops, a reported 5 years ahead of schedule and there are plans to further reduce this to 14,500 personnel by 2010.

Police reforms from 1997-2000 separated the police force from the military, introduced a clear chain of command, clear rules for career advancement and introduced basic principles for the relationship between the police and the public. Further reforms after 2000 attempted to create greater transparent relations with communities and to foster public trust.

International assistance has played an important role to SSR in Albania. Examples of assistance include support for the strengthening of parliamentary oversight, border policing, provision of equipment and technical expertise provided by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In addition, the UNDP has supported community policing projects, police station refurbishment and education awareness initiatives. However, a high turnover of personnel, politicisation within the police, and internal corruption have hampered reform efforts.
**General: SSR**

Abazi, E. et al., 2009, *Security Sector Reform in Albania*, Initiative for Peacebuilding

How successful has security sector reform (SSR) in Albania been, including international SSR assistance? This paper finds that although there have been positive results, professionalising and depoliticising the security sector remains important. The main objective of reform should not be membership of the wider European security structure in and of itself. For full integration, comprehensive reforms are required that benefit the country and society as a whole.

**Defence Reform**


Is Albania ready for membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)? This Journal of Slavic Military Studies article assesses Albania's military reforms in the light of NATO's 'open-door' policy, which promotes membership expansion. While Albania has a long way to go, NATO's policy has nevertheless served as an important catalyst for encouraging Albania's military transformation.

**Justice Reform**


This East European Politics and Societies article provides a detailed and informative account of the transitional justice process in Albania and examines the logic behind the initiation of the lustration process. In essence, Albania was largely unsuccessful in implementing a serious programme of transitional justice after the fall of communism in 1991. Transitional justice in Albania became highly politicised and was used by politicians for political gains.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**

Holtom, P. et al., 2005, *Turning the Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania*, Report on Small arms and security in South Eastern Europe, Center for Peace and Disarmament Education (Tirana) and Saferworld (London)

What impact have small arms and light weapons (SALW) had on public health and human security in Albania? What steps has the Albanian
government taken to control SALW and combat SALW proliferation? This report from the Center for Peace and Disarmament Education and Saferworld examines the impact and distribution of SALW and SALW control measures in Albania. Armed theft and threats and accidental shootings were the most commonly suffered misuses of firearms, with others including intentional shootings, murder and revenge killings. Available data and media reports suggest that suicide and domestic violence are also significant SALW-related problems in Albania. Since the late 1990s the number of casualties attributable to firearms misuse has decreased, as has violent crime. Further progress in reducing accessibility, visibility and misuse of weapons, together with measures to increase public safety and confidence, is necessary to continue these trends.

**GFN-SSR resources**
More documents covering security sector reform in Albania can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

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**Armenia**

Armenia gained full independence with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a violent war, beginning in 1988, over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. A ceasefire agreement was reached in 1994, with Armenia occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and some of Azerbaijan proper. This “frozen conflict” remains unresolved and poses a constant threat to the stability and security of the two countries and the Southern Caucasus region. In November 2008, the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia signed the Declaration on Regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, and the European Union pledged support soon after for resolving the conflict.

Governance issues persist in Armenia: the executive retains disproportionate powers, the judicial system suffers from politicisation, and corruption is prevalent. The OSCE Election Observation Mission cited various problems with the presidential elections in February 2008: in particular, the vote count lacked accountability and transparency; and complaints and appeals procedures were ineffective. The elections were followed by violent clashes between police and protesters. The ensuing state of emergency contributed to hindering progress with governance and security reforms.

Armenian military capability is strong and it maintains an operational advantage over Azerbaijan. The military was created from scratch after independence and under extreme conditions of conflict. As such, it was greatly influenced by the Soviet model. This legacy continues and the
military still operates based on an outdated military doctrine. There is also minimal civilian oversight of army and security services – symptomatic of broader issues with democratisation.

**SSR: General**


What steps has the Armenian government taken to reform the Armenian security sector? Are Western models of the security sector relevant to Armenia? This report from Saferworld analyses the Armenian security sector. It finds that the limited reforms that have taken place in Armenia cannot be understood as security sector reform (SSR) as it is usually defined. The Armenian authorities have never perceived security in the same way as it is perceived in Western models of the security sector. The development of the Armenian security sector should be seen in terms of an initial formation phase followed by a strengthening of security institutions. Reforms to strengthen the rule of law, reduce corruption and increase public trust in the security sector, however, would gain public and international support. This would allow the Armenian government to implement reforms, especially in regard to justice and policing, despite opposition from elements who are resistant to change.


In the wake of a seismic shift in international security since September 11, 2001, there has been little study or evaluation of the concept of Armenian national security. This Armenian International Policy Research Group paper examines the current threat environment facing Armenia and focuses on the concept of Armenian national security. The new post-9/11 realities of the South Caucasus region have fostered a new strategic environment, endowed with significant challenges but also substantial opportunities for Armenia.

**Defence Reform**


To what extent has Armenia realised democratic governance of its security sector since its independence in 1991? This article, by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), describes the country's current and historical constitutional framework for security policy. It outlines the roles played by parliamentary oversight, the expert community, the
media, non-governmental organisations and the international community. It concludes by arguing that a system of democratic control has yet to be established in Armenia due to a number of reasons, though primarily because of the delay of the general democratisation process and the unresolved Karabakh conflict.

**GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Armenia can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](#).

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**Azerbaijan**

Azerbaijan gained full independence with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The “frozen conflict” with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia’s occupation of other areas in Azerbaijan is a constant source of grievance and insecurity. Nagorno-Karabakh was awarded to Azerbaijan by the Soviet Union in the 1920s, but has been controlled by Armenia since a ceasefire with Azerbaijan in 1994. Azerbaijan has been keen to build a strong and effective army in order to regain Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied areas. It has been able to increase its military budget due to high oil and gas revenues. Though an increase in funds has been insufficient in strengthening the armed forces.

Governance reforms aimed at reducing corruption and at increasing professionalism, civilian oversight and transparency are necessary to improve the performance of the military. However, such reforms have been minimal - symptomatic of the broader problems with democratisation in the country.

Azerbaijan suffers from other social and governance issues. Despite high oil and gas revenues, vast segments of society remain poor, with growing inequality. This, combined with increasing popular anger at the ruling elite for perceived corruption and repression of civil society, continues to cause tensions.

**Defence Reform**


What progress has Azerbaijan made in establishing an effective and accountable military? What are the challenges facing reform of Azerbaijan’s
defence sector? This policy briefing from the International Crisis Group examines management and reform of the defence sector in Azerbaijan. It finds that Azerbaijan's military requires deep reforms to make it less corrupt and personality driven, more transparent and better directed. So far there has been insufficient political will to increase democratic and civilian control or to stop using the army to serve elite interests.


How has Azerbaijan dealt with the challenge of democratising its defence institutions over the past few years? What progress has it made towards compliance with the principles of democratic governance of the security sector? This report from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces examines the building of democratic defence institutions in Azerbaijan. It argues that despite an official commitment to integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures, Azerbaijan has failed to make significant progress towards democratising its defence system.

**GFN-SSR resources**
More documents covering security sector reform in Azerbaijan can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](https://www.gfcn.org/resources). The [Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)](https://gsdrc.org) also has a number of related resources for Azerbaijan in the thematic area of conflict.

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**Georgia**

Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, two “frozen conflicts”, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, have undermined stability in Georgia. Fighting between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists in 1991-1992 and between the Georgian government and Abkhaz separatists in 1992-1994 ended in ceasefires, but sporadic clashes since have kept the country unstable. Violent conflict broke out again in August 2008 between Georgia on the one side, and Russia and South Ossetian separatists on the other.
The “Rose Revolution” of 2003 resulted in the resignation of President Edward Shevardnadze. His successor, Mikheil Saakashvili, has been successful in rebuilding institutions, implementing economic reforms and perhaps most importantly, reducing rampant corruption. However, concentration of power in a small group of elites, politicisation of the judiciary and a weak parliament remain key challenges to democratisation.

Instability from the “frozen conflicts” and problems with governance have made security reforms especially challenging. The lack of consensus amongst international actors on the need and nature of reform - a consequence of conflicting geopolitical interests between Russia, the US, the EU and NATO has also presented challenges.

There has been no attempt at comprehensive SSR in Georgia, although discrete reforms were initiated in the wake of the Rose Revolution as part of wider state transformation agreements with NATO and EU. The most visible reforms have occurred in the defence sector with assistance from the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) and the US-backed Georgia Train and Equip Programme (GTEP). Reforms have resulted in a number of successes: civilians have been introduced into defence and security institutions and democratic control through parliamentary oversight and the lessening of constraints on civil society has improved. Armed groups outside of government control have also been disbanded.

The police service was also radically changed in the wake of the Rose Revolution. There was a huge reduction in the number of police personnel and those that remained were given much improved salaried and training.

Justice reform has moved at a slower pace. Georgia inherited an inflexible Soviet style juvenile justice system, which has resulted in minimal diversion of children outside of the criminal justice system and few sentencing alternatives outside of prison. Moreover, the courts system, particularly at the higher levels, is politicised and not de facto independent of the executive. Various projects have been implemented with international support but with little overall impact on the quality of justice and rule of law.

SSR: General

Hiscock D., 2009, Impatient Reformers and Reignited Conflicts: The Case of Georgia, in Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, eds H. Born and A. Schnabel, Lit Verlag, Munster, Germany, pp119-140

What is the impact of the wider political process on security sector reform (SSR) in Georgia? This chapter analyses how and why SSR has taken place in Georgia, the context in which it operates and key lessons learned. It argues that SSR is inextricably linked to broader national and international political processes. International best practice fails to consider the narrow windows of opportunity for SSR in challenging environments. Quicker, more
flexible approaches may be needed, although their long-term results may be questionable. Local ownership is critical to long-term, sustainable reform.


How successful has Georgia been in its security sector reforms? This paper from the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development argues that a lot remains to be done to eliminate legislative flaws and the shortcomings of management. However, in such a fragile state, attempts to introduce best democratic practices immediately, without taking into account Georgia’s particular circumstances, could threaten the state. NATO and the EU should assist Georgia and make it a test site for mutual cooperation. The future development of the security policy and sector should promote attainment of maximum harmonisation of security on the one hand and democracy and the requirements of the rule of law on the other.


In Georgia, security sector reform is but one priority amongst many challenges. How can a state undertake security sector reform in circumstances of transformation, when under-financing is a chronic problem, renewed conflict is a constant possibility and Tbilisi does not have control over all its territory? This book, from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), analyses the problems of security sector governance in Georgia from 1992. In January 2004, Mikhail Saakashvili inherited an enfeebled state with a distorted, unreformed, corrupt security sector and a disenchanted and impoverished society. Saakashvili declared security reform to be a priority of the new government. Personnel changes have 'civilianised' the leadership of the power ministries, and reductions in personnel numbers are planned. Democratic control through parliamentary oversight has improved. However, much of the enthusiasm for genuine parliamentary committee work has vanished since the revolution. In addition, there are a lot of ambiguities in the process of reform. The lines of responsibility, authorisation and accountability are not clear, and the mix of Soviet and Western approaches creates particular obstacles.

Defence Reform

What progress has Georgia made towards building effective and efficient national defence institutions under civilian and democratic control? This report from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) examines Georgia’s defence sector reforms since 2004. It finds that NATO-Georgia cooperation has played a crucial role in encouraging Georgian efforts to build effective defence institutions under civilian and democratic control. Nevertheless, a number of shortfalls remain in Georgian legislation and management of the defence sector.

**Border Security**


What are the challenges to promoting border security in post-Soviet Eurasia? This Nonproliferation Review article argues that even in states that have experienced regime change, such as Georgia, border security remains an issue. Challenges include: the gradual nature of border regime reform; trade-offs that subordinate border reform to other developmental priorities; bureaucratic inertia and politics; and the continued existence of unrecognised territories that lie beyond the reach of the state and of international law.

**Justice Reform**


How successful was the European Union’s 2004-2005 Rule of Law mission in Georgia? This chapter analyses the experience of the first rule-of-law mission undertaken under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EUJUST Themis aimed to assist the government to develop an overarching criminal justice reform strategy based on local ownership. The mission was a stand-alone civilian programme with no military component. While ESDP flexibility is a strength, the EU Council needs to ensure that ESDP has sufficient authority to apply leverage for reform.


To what extent is current Georgian legislation and practice relating to children in conflict with the law consistent with UN standards? This UNICEF Georgia report assesses the juvenile justice system in Georgia and argues that it fails to meet these standards. The current juvenile justice system in Georgia is rigid, and there is too little emphasis on prevention and diversion.
from the criminal justice system. Georgia does not have juvenile courts or juvenile judges. In addition, there is no specific juvenile criminal procedure for children who appear before the court. The juvenile justice system for children over the age of 14 should be reformed to ensure compliance with UN standards. This would involve changes in policy, legislation and practice.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**


Small arms proliferation and misuse has had a dramatic and painful impact on Georgia since 1991. This Saferworld report presents the findings of research conducted on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and human security issues in Georgia. It finds that while significant and commendable progress has been made, much still needs to be done to minimise the risks presented by illegal arms proliferation and misuse.

**GFN-SSR resources**

More documents covering security sector reform in Georgia can be found online in the [GFN-SSR Document Library](https://gfn-ssr.org/).

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) also has a number of [related resources for Georgia in the thematic area of conflict](https://gsdrc.org/).