This paper represents emerging policy ideas, and will be revised and published as a DFID Policy Paper later this year. Comments on the paper are welcome and should be sent to Jane Alexander (J-Alexander@dfid.gov.uk) by end July.
Building the State and Securing the Peace

The DAC agreed 10 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations in April 2007. Full text can be found at www.oecd.org/fsprinciples.

DAC Principle 3: Focus on State-building as the central objective
- States are fragile when they lack political will or capacity to provide basic functions and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations;
- International engagement needs to focus on the relationship between state and society: firstly, by supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states, and secondly, by strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions.
- Civil society has a key role in demanding good governance and in service delivery.

DAC Principle 4: Prioritise Prevention
- International actors must take rapid action where the risk of conflict/instability is highest.
- A greater emphasis on prevention means sharing risks analyses; addressing the root causes of state fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities (especially those of women) to prevent and resolve conflict; supporting the peace-building capabilities of regional organisations, and undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises.

How to Use this Paper
This paper sets out the strategic framework for DFID’s engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, and its operational implications. It should be read in conjunction with the nine Briefing Papers on “Working Effectively in Situations of Conflict and Fragility”, which provide practical guidance for DFID country offices on implementing the other DAC Principles, working with our international partners, and on operational challenges such as risk management, and monitoring and evaluation. This paper is in three parts:

Sections 1 and 2 set out our conceptual understanding of state-building and peace-building, drawing on recent analytical work.1

Section 3 outlines an integrated approach to state-building and peace-building, to help DFID and our partners set strategic objectives and understand linkages and tensions.

Section 4 presents the operational implications of this approach, with case study examples from emerging practice, preliminary results, and a summary of key lessons.

Introduction
1. Building peaceful states and societies is at the heart of achieving lasting poverty reduction in highly fragile environments. Over the past few years, there has been growing evidence that poverty reduction and the MDGs cannot be achieved without addressing the underlying causes of conflict and fragility. Of the 34 countries furthest from reaching the MDGs, 22 are in, or emerging from, conflict.2 Around one third of all child and maternal deaths in developing countries occur in fragile states.3

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2 Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the MDGs, UN Millennium Project (2005)
2. Experience shows that helping states to become more responsive and supporting durable peace are both fundamental to making progress towards the MDGs. Aid can make a difference: in Sierra Leone, DFID has made a significant contribution to the restoration of peace and stability, co-ordinating aid with diplomatic and military support. In Mozambique, following the civil war in the mid 1990s, aid contributed to a fall in poverty from around 70% in 1996 to under 55% by 2003. In Rwanda, our provision of budget support since 1998 has contributed to a 12% growth rate, improvements in some aspects of governance and progress against the MDGs.

3. However, the current aid architecture is based on underlying assumptions about state capability that do not hold true in many contexts. The Paris Declaration model focuses on supporting country-led strategies to achieve growth, poverty reduction and the MDGs, and is most appropriate in contexts with capable, accountable and legitimate states. Where these conditions do not prevail, there has been a tendency within donors to work “around” conflict and fragility, rather than addressing them head on.

4. The DAC Fragile States Principles are a recognition that a shift in our approach is required. They emphasise that building peaceful states and societies needs to be central to donor responses in conflict-affected and fragile states. Increasing attention is being given to the nexus between state-building and peace-building in research and donor policy. But the Principles have so far had limited impact on donor behaviour.

5. Both state-building and peace-building are long-term, highly complex political processes, driven by a range of factors and incentives. Donors do not “do” state-building or peace-building; both are primarily internal processes within countries. They involve continual negotiation between the state and society; they are messy, non-linear and take place over generations; the influence of external actors is limited.

6. But all donor actions have political ramifications, and we can influence change in a positive or negative direction. Short-term measures to secure peace can have significant implications (positive and negative) for long-term state-building and economic growth. Equally, our approach to state-building needs to take sufficient account of past and potential causes of conflict.

7. The starting point of this paper is that as donors, we should try to understand the complex social and political processes at work, be modest but careful in our ambitions, and provide targeted support for state-building and peace-building processes.

8. There is significant value in addressing state-building and peace-building together. Both are fundamentally linked to the evolution of an inclusive political settlement. DFID’s integrated approach brings together four objectives:
   - Support inclusive political settlements
   - Address causes of conflict and build resolution mechanisms
   - Develop state survival functions
   - Respond to public expectations
1. What do we mean by State-building?

9. A DAC paper defines state-building as “action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups.”

Our understanding of state-building combines two important dimensions – the state enhancing its ability to function, and the political processes that underpin the state-society relationship.

10. State-building is not a technical process of strengthening government institutions – this is more accurately described as “institution building”. In all contexts, state-building is principally about strengthening the relationship between the state and society, and developing effective ways to mediate this relationship. Civil society has a particularly important role to play here. State-building is distinct from nation-building, which can be defined as building common identity among the population.

11. State-building is primarily an endogenous process, and a wide range of local and national actors beyond state institutions will have an impact. Many state-building processes in fragile situations are characterised by tensions between formal and informal institutions, with each wanting to exert influence and establish a dominant position. Responses may vary from attempts by the state to regulate, co-opt or abolish informal systems, to co-operative efforts between formal and informal systems.

Informal institutions in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, state institutions coexist uneasily with complex, fragmented local power structures, including tribal and clan groups, religious institutions, armed militia and criminal networks. These informal institutions dominate the political economy, forming loose, fluid alliances which resist – or seek to control – the state-building process.

Afghan leaders and their international advisers favour the development of strong central authorities to control these informal structures. However, as the organs of the state have gradually extended their authority across the territory, there has been a movement of warlords and other informal leaders into politics at the regional level, where they are well placed to resist state-building initiatives that threaten their interests. The fragile nature of the political settlement leaves central authorities with no choice but to accommodate them. State-building is therefore a highly negotiated process, subject to shifting alliances.

12. DFID’s aim is to support the development of Capable, Accountable and Responsive (CAR) states. This is a long-term goal in situations of conflict and fragility, and our Country Governance Analysis, which is designed to assess the trajectory of governance using the CAR framework, will help us monitor progress towards this goal. The state-building model below complements the CAR framework by helping us understand the dynamic processes at work, and how we can support states to become more responsive.

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5 The state includes, but does not equate to, institutions of government (e.g. Ministries, civil service, Cabinet, local government). It also includes state service providers (e.g. state hospitals and schools), law enforcement agencies (e.g. prosecution, police) and mechanisms which provide checks and balances to oversee government action (e.g. judiciary, parliament, national audit offices).
6 See also Fritz and Menocal, Understanding State-building from a Political Economy Perspective (2007)
13. **State-building is best understood as a dynamic process, with three inter-related elements** as set out in the diagram below. Progress in all three areas is needed to create a positive state-building dynamic. A basic political settlement between elites and a minimum level of state functionality are required for the state to survive; and some degree of action on public expectations is essential if stability and legitimacy are to be maintained.

![Understanding State-Building](image)

**Political Settlement**

14. The first element is building a **political settlement** which establishes the “rules of the game”. We can define the political settlement as “the forging of a common understanding, usually between elites, that their best interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power.”

15. Over time, political settlements tend to broaden beyond elites to develop a common understanding with wider society. This engagement with societal groups to win and maintain their consent is a crucial part of responsive state-building. There is a complex interplay between inter-elitist negotiation and elite-constituency relations, particularly during political crises and violent conflict.

16. Political settlements have different origins and take different forms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engineered settlements</th>
<th>Explicitly negotiated, often as part of a peace process (e.g. Nepal, Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland). These tend to change as the deals struck in peace negotiations are adjusted by national elites;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal elite pacts</td>
<td>Uneasy arrangements between elites that find accommodation through the brokering of interests. These may stagnate, often as a result of prolonged crisis (e.g. Zimbabwe) but will remain fragile;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposed settlements</td>
<td>Clear victory by one group allows them to impose a settlement on others. Maintained through a high level of security capability, often through coercion rather than consent (e.g. Burma);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrenched settlements</td>
<td>High degree of legitimacy and popular acceptance that make direct challenges unlikely to succeed (e.g. China), but may not be inclusive;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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17. Political settlements are not static. They can be formalised through elections, or within a peace agreement and/or constitution, but underlying the formal agreement is a continuous process of negotiation. This influences whether a settlement is inclusive or not. Political settlements may undergo a step-change or renegotiation, in which different actors aim to transform the nature of political power or structures of the state.

### The Political Settlement in Kenya

Kofi Annan mediated a post election political settlement in Kenya in early 2008 that led to a coalition government, the first of its kind in Sub-Saharan Africa. Power has been shared between competing parties based on ethnic coalitions and a Prime Ministerial position established to challenge Presidential power.

However, this is proving to be a coalition under strain, built on a stagnant political settlement which has yet to address the underlying grievances within Kenyan society. The most urgent challenges are holding the coalition together, and ensuring that politics is not reduced to the lowest common denominator as various elites seek their share of the spoils. In the longer term, the fundamental fault lines in Kenyan society (ethnicity, regional identity, the distribution of land ownership, urban/rural relations) will need to be accommodated within the settlement and the state’s capacity to address them enhanced, or the settlement could break.

18. Political settlements often result from short-term pacts between elites, but these are neither inclusive nor sustainable in the longer run. Where major economic elites are left out of the political settlement, this serves to weaken state and peace building processes and prospects for growth over the medium term. For example, in Uganda the state under Milton Obote and Idi Amin excluded economically powerful Baganda interests and Asian traders. It is critical that elites are able to continue to invest and accumulate wealth so that they develop a stake in the state building process.

19. The most inclusive political settlements are likely to be in democracies; this is the political system most likely to enhance accountability and responsiveness. It serves as an institutionalised mechanism for expressing expectations, protecting rights, and holding government to account for its delivery and actions. In post-conflict situations, however, elections are not enough to create a political settlement – they are often the finalisation of a process of negotiation between political actors. Democratic institutions and processes can help to rebuild state legitimacy by enabling citizens to vote for new government representatives, and ensuring that all groups, including the most marginalised, have a seat at the political table.

20. The quality of democratic politics in fragile and conflict prone states is often very weak. The level of commitment to democracy may be high, but the government may lack the capacity to meet people’s expectations, and “losers” may challenge the outcomes of elections, leading to instability. In many contexts, formal political institutions (parliaments, political parties) co-exist with traditional forms of power. The form of democratic politics therefore needs careful consideration.

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10 Crisis States Research Centre, Summary of Policy-relevant Findings (2009)
11 See the Afrobarometer survey, which shows stronger support for democracy over non-democratic forms of government
Survival Functions

21. The second element is developing **survival functions** which consolidate the authority of the state. A basic level of functionality is required to secure the survival of the state and the incumbent regime. Without accountability, there is a risk that such functions may exert state control without protecting or responding to the population. Which functions are most crucial is context specific, but evidence suggests:

- **Security** – without security for the state and the people, the economy and public services cannot function and peace cannot be achieved (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan). A regime needs to be able to defend itself from internal or external challenge; but it also has an obligation to protect the population, including excluded groups in society. Balancing strength with accountability is critical to improving state legitimacy and gaining the consent of citizens.

- **Revenue** – states need access to revenue sources (e.g., taxation, aid, natural resources) to pay for key functions, and to create confidence in the financial viability of the state. Although setting up a tax system may not be essential in the initial stages of state-building, when implemented properly it can forge a crucial relationship between the state, citizens and the private sector, generating expectations of state performance in exchange for taxes.

- **Rule of law** – states establish the conditions under which security enforcement or other sanctions might be used, to engender some predictability and control within society. The state’s expectations of the population can be set through formal or informal laws (“rule by law”). In responsive state-building, this evolves towards rule of law, whereby the state is held accountable for its own compliance with the law, which is based on public consent.

Expected Functions

22. The third element is delivering **expected functions** which are not essential for the state’s survival, but which are expected by the population. This includes delivery of public services, governance arrangements or other actions by the state which help to build its legitimacy among the population. Priorities vary according to context and are closely linked to citizens’ awareness of their rights and entitlements.

23. Examples of expected functions or actions might include:

- Economic management
- Public service delivery (health, education, water) and infrastructure
- Employment programmes and job creation
- Personal safety and access to justice (beyond what is required for state survival)
- Social protection / safety nets
- Anti-corruption measures
- Voice and accountability (fair elections, free media, etc.)

24. The line between survival and expected functions is often blurred. In some contexts, a failure to ensure macro-economic stabilisation can precipitate regime change, or threaten the survival of the state. The economic dimensions of state-building often begin by addressing macroeconomic imbalances, such as the fiscal deficit, trade deficits and debt arrears; but success in these areas relies on institutional capacity and committed elites. For example, DRC’s 2001 debt relief package provided by the
IMF was not matched by progress on political and institutional reform, and the opportunity to translate debt relief into wider state-building and peace-building outcomes was lost.\footnote{Patricia Alvarez-Plata and Tilman Brück, External Debt in Post-Conflict Countries, German Institute for Economic Research (2006), case study on DRC}

**Responsive and Unresponsive State-building**

*Responsive and Accountable State Building*

- Political settlement: State focused on enhancing legitimacy. Changing state-society relations.
- Survival functions: Survival functions delivered by consent. State accepts need to meet some expectations.
- Expected functions: Creates structures and institutions, drive for dominance and loyalty.

*Responsive state-building*, the state accepts the need to meet public expectations to enhance its legitimacy. The political settlement expands beyond elites to reflect a broader compact between the state and society, based on delivery and accountability. Public confidence and expectations grow. Tanzania is an example.

*Unresponsive and Unaccountable State Building*

- Step change: Conflict, people’s movement, demand for new political settlement.
- Expected functions neglected: Informal politics dominate. Resources focused on maintaining elite settlements.
- Survival functions: Institutions based on patronage; some groups pose potential threat.
- Political settlement: Low drive for loyalty, reliance on repression, little attention given to expectations.

*Unresponsive state-building*, the state is focused primarily on ensuring its own power and authority. Low public expectations, informal rules and patronage systems, and tensions between elites are prevail. In the long-term, this may lead to a “step change” whereby the population (or elements of the elite) demand a new form of political settlement. Zimbabwe is an example.

25. State-building can be responsive or unresponsive to the population in general, or to specific groups in society. An unresponsive dynamic increases the risk of conflict based on legitimate grievances. Broadening the political settlement to include all groups in society is therefore key to addressing such grievances, reducing the risk of violence, and achieving a more responsive dynamic. The reality of state-building in most fragile countries is a combination of responsive and unresponsive elements, as the example of Cambodia shows:
Applying the state-building model in Cambodia

Recent analysis of state-building and fragility issues by DFID Cambodia has informed the development of options for the new country strategy (2009 – 2014). The analysis indicated that the Cambodian state combines responsive and unresponsive features:

- Cambodia has a relatively robust political settlement. The governing Cambodian People’s Party ‘won’ the conflict and is now almost uncontested. But the settlement is imposed and unresponsive, rather than inclusive.
- There has been progress on establishing the survival functions of the state, particularly around security and macro-economic stability.
- Progress on expected functions has been uneven. The informal patronage system can deliver certain outputs, but performs weakly in areas that could threaten the political settlement (e.g. corruption, human rights).
- Although the political settlement is robust, Cambodia remains fragile because disputes are resolved through personal channels, rather than institutional mechanisms. Competition to capture the anticipated rents from oil and gas may become a new source of fragility.

To date, donor support for the state has tended to strengthen or ignore predatory elites, while support to civil society has been either ineffectual or too small in scale to make a difference. A cross-cutting programme on deepening democracy and accountability, focusing on institutions such as parliament, political parties, media, trade unions and NGOs, could help address this.

2. What do we mean by Peace-building?

26. At its minimum, **peace** is the absence of violence. But the absence of direct violence may disguise structural forms of violence (e.g. ethnic or gender discrimination), or underlying tensions and grievances in a society. **Negative peace** is defined as structural violence, where this is combined with the closure of avenues for challenging the status quo and expressing grievances in a peaceful way.

27. By contrast, **positive peace** can be characterised as “social peace, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development, supported by dynamic and representative political institutions capable of managing change and resolving disputes without resorting to violent conflict”.

28. **Peace-building can thus be defined as** “a process that facilitates the establishment of positive peace, and tries to prevent violence by addressing the causes of conflict through reconciliation, institution building and political and economic transformation”. It includes measures to address deep legacies and structural causes of conflict (e.g. ethnic divisions), respond to the more direct drivers or triggers of conflict (e.g. youth unemployment), and build local and national capacity to manage conflict.

29. DFID has previously characterised conflict prevention and peace-building separately – with prevention taking place before violence occurs, and peace-building taking place after violence has ceased. But conflict is not a linear process. Up to 40 per cent or

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13 This was also the definition of “structural stability” as given in OECD-DAC, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (2001). Note this is distinct from more recent definitions of “stabilisation”, which is largely concerned with the role of external military (and civilian) intervention to bring about peace in an ongoing conflict.

14 Adapted from SAIS Conflict Management toolkit [www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/index.html](http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/index.html)
more of armed conflicts that stop are found to start again within a decade.\textsuperscript{15} Conflict prevention can take place at any stage of the conflict cycle, and is integral to peace-building.

30. **Like state-building, peace-building is an internal process.** Peace can only be achieved by the parties to the conflict themselves but there are stages where external involvement can be critical. Peace-building combines three inter-related elements:

- **Inclusive peace process**

31. The first element is an **inclusive peace process** which leads to an **inclusive political settlement**, as outlined in section 1 above. Peace processes refer to the negotiation and implementation of agreements ending armed conflict, which aim to create the basis of a political settlement. They may involve diplomacy, mediation, dialogue, and efforts to change relations between the parties to the conflict.

32. Peace processes operate at multiple levels. These are not mutually exclusive, and third parties may play different roles at each level. Peace processes are strongest where the different tracks work together:

- **Track 1**: official peace negotiations between conflict parties;
- **Track 2**: quasi-official, often involving people close to conflict parties. This track can provide an entry point to formal negotiations by enabling deniable contact, and is often particularly valuable when Track 1 breaks down;
- **Public/citizens-based processes**: activities to bring people together, often through civil society, to influence leaders, build consensus and deal with perceptions and stereotypes which sustain conflict.\textsuperscript{16}

33. **A peace agreement will have a critical bearing on the “rules of the game”, and the extent to which the political settlement is inclusive.** It will have implications


\textsuperscript{16} Civil society will often have a critical role in these processes, but this can be negative as well as positive. See Paffenholz, T. and Spurk, C., Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding, World Bank (2006)
for elite negotiations and bargains that are reached, and for the foundation for a wider social contract. Elites must ultimately ‘sell’ any negotiated agreements to the wider communities and constituencies that vote for, finance or protect them. Peace agreements often help to develop a new shared vision, setting out the mutual expectations of both citizens and the state. This may be linked to a further re-articulation of rights and obligations, for example in a new constitution.

34. The influence of peace agreements on the political settlement and social contract can be seen in the types of issues they frequently address, e.g:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue categories</th>
<th>Examples of issues addressed in Peace Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military/Security</td>
<td>Ceasefires; decommissioning, demobilisation, reintegration; security sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional / territorial status</td>
<td>Structure of the state; autonomy arrangements; state characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance arrangements</td>
<td>Power-sharing; transitional governments; elections; democratisation; political pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Land reform; natural resource management; revenue sharing; reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal-judicial</td>
<td>Human rights monitoring; amnesties, prisoner releases; judicial reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional justice</td>
<td>Tribunals, truth commissions, reparations, property restitution, lustration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender/Exclusion</td>
<td>Policies to support equality, identity groups, non-discrimination and effective participation; voice and accountability programmes that focus especially on excluded groups (eg. women, youth, disabled, ethnic groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>Refugee / IDP return, humanitarian access, emergency relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. **Peace agreements present challenges and opportunities.** Negotiation processes may fail to include powerful parties to the conflict, or women, marginalised groups and civil society organisations which can make an important contribution to peace.\(^{19}\) Peace agreements do not necessarily reflect, or lead to, real changes in underlying incentives and elite interests, and “winner-loser” dynamics need to be addressed during negotiations and implementation. Peace agreements can also risk rewarding violent behaviour, sending potentially damaging signals about the utility of violence.

36. External actors can play important roles in supporting peace processes, including through encouraging parties to pursue a political strategy, building their capacity to negotiate, lobbying for and supporting participation of women and excluded groups, and ensuring donor resources are aligned in support of implementing agreements.

37. Peace processes need to take account of the **regional dimension**, and tend to work best when supported by regional actors. While most countries have a strong interest in regional stability, new political, security and economic arrangements in one country are likely to affect their neighbours. Peace processes which include regional solutions, for example, on mutual security (to prevent one country’s territory being

\(^{17}\) Adapted from Catherine Barnes, Re-negotiating Political Settlements, draft paper for DFID (2009)  
\(^{18}\) A process which vets those who have committed past human rights abuses, to exclude them from certain public offices  
\(^{19}\) UN Security Council Resolution 1325 calls on all actors in peace negotiations to ensure that women are represented at the highest levels and gender specific concerns are considered within a peace agreement
used to launch attacks on another), cross-border trade and equitable arrangements on access to natural resources (e.g. water) are likely to be more sustainable.

38. Bougainville, Papua New Guinea provides an example of an inclusive peace process effectively supported by sensitive regional and international engagement:

An inclusive peace process in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea

Bougainvillean disputes over land rights and allocation of revenues, combined with frustrations over rising inequalities, were met by an unresponsive central government and weak regional government that failed to respond to grievances. Acts of sabotage by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) led to a brutal response from the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces (PNGDF), escalating into a nine-year violent campaign for independence (1988-97).

By 1997, all parties realised they were unlikely to meet their goals through further violence. Divisions within the population made negotiations difficult, so the peace process began by building consensus between diverse Bougainville parties. New Zealand hosted talks for 70 military, political and social leaders representing different interest groups to develop the beginnings of a common platform. Direct talks with the PNG government followed. They agreed a “road map” to peace, a ceasefire overseen by an unarmed Peace Monitoring Group, and a ‘reconciliation’ regional government to bring together Bougainville factions.

The main negotiations in 1999 involved two stages – intra-Bougainville agreement, then Bougainville-PNG talks. Three points of agreement were reached: i) a constitutionally guaranteed referendum on independence, deferred for 10 – 15 years; ii) constitutional reform for high levels of autonomy; iii) Bougainville disarmament matched by withdrawal of PNGDF. The agreement was implemented sequentially, with steps for one party reciprocated by the other.

External actors provided sensitive facilitation and technical support to the peace process, including security for talks, capacity-building for both negotiations teams, and technical advice on constitutional reform and weapons disposal. The performance of the new Bougainville Administration (BA) was critical to the success of the peace agreement, so reconstruction aid was matched with state-orientated technical assistance (e.g. on community policing, and administrative reform) and efforts to maximise the peace-building contribution of aid. For example, a 600 km road rehabilitation project required the international contractor to develop numerous small construction businesses along the road route, involving former combatants and communities.

Conflict resolution mechanisms

39. The second element is building institutional capacity to resolve conflict, so that the political settlement is resilient and durable. A range of local and national institutions have responsibility for resolving conflict, including formal and informal systems. Advocacy-based civil society organisations can promote conflict resolution and demand redress, particularly where state mechanisms are hampered by overly close relations with incumbent regimes. Informal and/or traditional authorities can resolve disputes and ensure stability in local areas where the state has limited reach.

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20 Case study provided by Conciliation Resources. See “Weaving the consensus: the Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process” at www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/contents.php

21 Australia had close relationship with the PNG government, including in defence cooperation and so was careful to play an indirect support role. The main mediation facilitation roles were played by New Zealand, Solomon Islands and the UN Observer Mission (UNOMB).
40. The effectiveness of, and interaction between, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state is critical to conflict resolution. Together, they can provide the necessary checks and balances to limit coercion and preserve the space for peaceful resolution of “incompatibilities”. Political governance reform (particularly strengthening parliaments and other public dialogue and oversight mechanisms) and improving the role of security and justice institutions are of equal importance.

41. There is no substitute for the role of the state in managing serious risks of violence – but this poses problems where the state itself is a major driver of instability. Security and justice institutions rarely play a neutral role in situations of conflict and fragility. They are prone to elite capture, and can play active roles in exacerbating conflict and fragility. They are often the perpetrators of human rights abuses. Citizens may come to fear the state security and justice apparatus, and may seek justice and security from non-state actors – including seeking protection from rebels.

42. Civil society can be helpful in resolving potential conflict, and can play a complementary role to state institutions. For example, following the post-election violence in Kenya, the Ghana Peace Council and Cardinal Peter Turkson, a highly respected non-partisan figure, advocated both publicly and privately to ensure that the same mistakes would not be made in Ghana’s election in December 2008. This initiative complemented the work of the Election Commission, and the efforts of international and national NGOs to promote an inclusive process and monitor the polls. In the event, the transition of power through elections was largely peaceful.

43. For peace-building to be effective, the role of the security and justice sector must be focused on providing people with safety, security and access to justice. This is closely linked to their role in ensuring the survival of the state, reinforcing the political settlement and addressing underlying causes. The political settlement should include a process whereby the army, police and judiciary assume their ideal roles, including upholding the settlement itself, together with appropriate oversight mechanisms. Where security and justice institutions have caused grievances these must also be addressed – e.g. through transitional justice processes.

44. As the credibility of formal security and justice institutions is being built, the role of informal justice and security providers must also be considered. Their role in resolving disputes – often for the poorest – should be supported in a way that is consistent with the state’s overarching responsibility to protect citizens and respect human rights. Informal mechanisms can also play a key role in post-conflict reconciliation and transitional justice, such as East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process which used traditional systems to resolve less serious human rights abuses.

**Causes of conflict**

45. The third element is addressing the causes of conflict, to reduce the risk of violence. There are some basic, structural conditions (including weak economic and social development, poor governance and insecurity) which make fragility and conflict more likely, and which lie firmly within the mandate of development actors to address. Conflict itself also hinders economic and social development, resulting in a vicious cycle of conflict and poverty – the so called “conflict trap.” Proximity to conflict in neighbouring countries also increases the risk of instability.

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46. There is disagreement amongst analysts about which are the most significant causes of violent conflict; some emphasise grievances, others stress opportunity or feasibility. DFID’s view is that conflict and fragility are the product of a complex mix of causes, and there is merit in all of the theories above; these should each be considered in our analysis. Some examples are set out below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
<td>Horizontal inequalities i.e. between groups in society. Most strongly linked to conflict where political, social and economic exclusion overlap. May be exacerbated by human rights abuses, corruption, and failure to deliver services.</td>
<td>Identity groups facing discrimination, and suffering effects of poor governance are easier to mobilise for violence than disparate individuals. States with organised discrimination have a higher probability of instability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities</td>
<td>Youth unemployment, low incomes, and access to rents can increase incentives to engage in violence. Weak governance systems allow political leaders to pursue ideological goals and seek power through violence and oppression.</td>
<td>Unemployment lowers the opportunity cost for individuals to participate in violence. War economies are often able to provide viable livelihoods. Political leadership is often focused on accumulation of power and wealth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>Low growth, weak central government and security forces. Availability of light weapons and high-value natural resources can all increase feasibility.</td>
<td>Government unable to crush rebellion or buy off rebels; access to weapons and funds to buy them makes rebellion easier.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47. As well as factors directly causing conflict, there are conditions for positive peace which should be supported as part of peace-building approaches. International Alert identifies the distribution of power, the rule of law and access to justice, personal safety, physical and mental well-being, and people’s incomes and assets as the “web of factors which gain and sustain peace”. Programming responses should focus on addressing the critical weaknesses in peace conditions.

48. As with other aspects of peace-building, civil society can play an important role in addressing causes of conflict. Recent research identifies seven broad functions which civil society performs in conflict: protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, facilitation and service delivery. The relevance of each varies with the phase of conflict, with protection, facilitation and monitoring being most important during violence, and service delivery and social cohesion being more relevant post-conflict.

49. Addressing the effects of violent conflict is also essential to prevent a recurrence, and development actors can play a major role. Post-conflict societies are left with a range of after-effects: divided communities, traumatised children and adults, destroyed livelihoods, unaddressed human rights abuses and gender-based violence – these can all lead to further insecurity or feed new sources of grievance.

23 Frances Stewart stresses the importance of grievances arising from horizontal inequalities, Paul Collier the need to raise the opportunity cost of conflict, and James Fearon the need to address the feasibility of war.
24 Political Instability Task Force (PITF)
26 Paffenholz, T., “Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project”, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (2009)
3. An Integrated Approach to State-building and Peace-building

50. DFID’s integrated approach brings together **four objectives**, which we will support through our development partners in situations of conflict and fragility:

- Support inclusive political settlements
- Address causes of conflict and build resolution mechanisms
- Develop state survival functions
- Respond to public expectations

51. Inclusive political settlements are at the **centre** of the integrated approach to peace-building and state-building, as illustrated above. It is the platform upon which progress towards the other three objectives can be made, and must be considered at the outset (see below on priorities and sequencing). Over time, the other three objectives can help to reinforce and shape the political settlement. They are inter-related (*not* sequential), and they form a virtuous circle, helping to maintain a balance and positive state-building and peace-building dynamic.

52. **Bringing the two perspectives together adds value to our analysis and programming.** The peace-building “lens” highlights the need for state-building approaches to pay sufficient attention to the causes of conflict and fragility, the conditions for peace, both formal and informal conflict resolution mechanisms. The state-building “lens” reminds us that peace agreements and peace-building must facilitate, and not undermine, long-term efforts to build state capacity and legitimacy.

53. **There are important commonalities.** As above, state-building and peace-building are both fundamentally linked to the political settlement. They also depend on achieving a minimum level of security. Both aim for resilience and broad-based legitimacy, whereby the political settlement adapts to the changing demands and expectations of society, and resolves tensions without resorting to violence. The
integrated approach reinforces the importance of working at the interface between the state and all groups in society, and strengthening the ability of civil society to engage with the state.

54. A focus on developing effective markets and promoting job creation goes hand in hand with an integrated approach. Economic growth in post-conflict countries helps to significantly reduce the risk of conflict recurring, and provides a sustainable basis for state functions to operate.27 Where conditions for investment improve, this allows for expansion of the private sector and employment, creating opportunities for taxation. This strengthens the state’s ability to respond to expectations and address grievances, including through inclusive service delivery.

55. **But there can also be tensions between state-building and peace-building.** State-building may not always enhance prospects for peace, and historically it has often been violent and fraught with tensions, as illustrated by the 500 or so European conflicts between the Middle Ages and World War 1.28 Changes to relationships between elites and societal groups that emerge from the state-building process can cause instability and violence; partial or fragile democracies are the most unstable regime type.29 It is inevitable that state-building will generate “losers”, even where it is broadly responsive – for example, in Afghanistan counter-narcotics activity is an important part of creating a more formal, licit economy that will increase public revenues through taxation, but it inevitably threatens the livelihoods of many farmers.

56. Our integrated approach must therefore seek to address legitimate grievances that can lead to violent conflict and demands for a new political settlement, but also find solutions to “spoilers” who aim to undermine peace for illegitimate reasons and maintain the status quo for their own benefit. Such “spoilers” will often co-opt those with legitimate grievances for their own ends. Judgements about the legitimacy of grievances can often be highly political - this points to the importance of bringing development and diplomacy together within the approach.

57. Other tensions include:

- **Bargains for peace v. state-building:** deals brokered with elites and power-sharing arrangements that secure peace initially can result in compromised or inefficient governance systems (such as Liberia’s national Transitional Government from 2003-06), or may undermine dimensions of state-building, such as the rule of law.

- **Political settlements v. economic growth:** economic rents for elites secured through informal arrangements, allocation of natural resources or public expenditure may stabilise the political settlement initially, but may undermine the economic viability of the state in the longer term.30

- **Immediate service delivery v. state-building:** where state capacity is very weak, the impetus is to deliver services quickly, both to meet urgent needs and to maintain stability; but this has implications for long-term capacity-building, and the degree to which services help to build legitimacy of the state.

30 Crisis States Research Centre, Summary of Policy-relevant Findings (2009)
Security and stability v. equity and rights: where certain groups pose a threat to stability (e.g. political elites, rebel groups or unemployed youth), there is a tendency to prioritise them over excluded groups; this can lead to inequalities that are of concern from a rights perspective.

Peace v. justice: political deals brokered to achieve a cessation of conflict may undermine the rule of law by ensuring immunity from prosecution for political leaders. Conversely, the threat of prosecution (e.g. by the International Criminal Court) can disincentive military and political leaders from relinquishing power and negotiating peace.

58. Further work will be taken forward to develop the integrated approach and its implications for DFID, including new research and guidance on political settlements, tensions and trade-offs, priorities and sequencing, and the role of service delivery.

4. Operational Implications

59. This section sets out the practical implications of a state-building and peace-building approach for DFID. This section illustrates how DFID’s experience and practice is evolving. Some elements of the approach are not entirely new for DFID - the challenge is to move towards a more consistent application across our country programmes and engagement with other Whitehall departments and our development partners. Briefing Paper 6 on Coordination provides further detail on working with our multilateral and other international partners.

60. The integrated approach can be applied in all types of fragile states, including post-conflict situations where its application is most obvious. In deteriorating governance situations (e.g. Yemen, Kenya), it can highlight ways of mitigating the risks of violent conflict, and encouraging a more positive state-building dynamic (e.g. by improving the accountability of survival functions, or meeting urgent public expectations). In protracted crises (e.g. Somalia, Burma), it can help identify opportunities to support the emergence of a more inclusive political settlement.

61. The main operational implications of the approach are:
   - Prioritise and sequence
   - Design interventions to support the four objectives
   - Stay engaged for the long-term
   - Think and work politically
   - Take a regional approach
   - Adapt aid instruments
   - Measure progress and learn lessons

i) Prioritise and Sequence

62. Choosing appropriate priorities and sequencing will always be context-specific. Identifying the most critical risks of instability can be a useful way to start. Some research suggests that political governance should be the highest priority, so that the political settlement can emerge and provide a stable foundation for dialogue between
state and society. Other research also highlights the importance of security. Evidence also suggests that rule of law assistance will in almost all circumstances be appropriate for intensive engagement.

63. It is DFID’s view that the political settlement is essential to underpin progress in all other areas, and this should inform our approach to priorities and sequencing. In some contexts, controlling the security space will be necessary to open up space for political dialogue, but in the longer-term, maintaining stability will depend on the political settlement, an accommodation between all groups that have a stake in the way power is shared, and the state having a representative function. DFID is also improving its capacity to engage in the security and justice sector, recognising this as a high priority.

64. There are some examples of DFID country plans that are framed around state-building and peace-building objectives and priorities, such as in Nepal. These can help DFID move towards a more consistent, rigorous application of the integrated approach.

**Aligning with state building and peace-building objectives in Nepal**

In 2006, when a peace agreement was signed, Nepal emerged from a 10-year conflict driven by decades of poverty, exclusion and an unresponsive state. Key challenges for the country included securing a robust political settlement, and re-negotiating the relationship between citizens and the state, as part of peace building, state transformation and development.

Building on previous work to address the core causes of conflict and fragility, including exclusion of large numbers of people in Nepal - DFID increased its political and financial resources to support critical elements of a peace and state building agenda. These are in line with the integrated approach outlined above, and include:

- Support to the **peace process** through the Nepali Peace Trust Fund and the UN Peace Fund in order to implement outstanding areas of the peace agreement; and through building national and local capacity to engage in and support the process.
- Work to foster an **inclusive political settlement** by: supporting poor and excluded groups to articulate their needs and views; bringing new political leaders and voices, working with the old and new political elite; supporting successful elections and launch of the Constituent Assembly; and facilitating dialogue among the parties on the management of political tensions across the country;
- Support to strengthening the core **functions of the state** - including public security, public financial management, more inclusive and accountable central and local state institutions, and planning and monitoring functions;
- Strengthening **service delivery** capacity and supporting **growth and job creation** strategies in order to deliver stability and a ‘peace dividend’ through development.
- Producing up-to-date **political economy and peace analysis** to inform DFID internal planning processes and debates on critical issues such as federalism and local governance.

Focusing on the state building and peace building agenda has meant less DFID attention to other areas, including part of the sector portfolio (e.g. education, HIV/AIDS) where other donors

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31. PITF’s work also identifies three factors that have a critical influence on the level of instability: (i) replacement of the executive; (ii) constraints on executive power; (iii) relations between contending political groups (factual or non-factual) – all of these relate to political governance.


35. DFID Nepal, Participatory Governance Assessment (2007)
are providing support. DFID has prioritised areas with a higher potential for a “peace dividend”, such as growth and employment. Our experience suggests that such choices must be informed by a careful analysis of on-going and emerging opportunities for sustaining the peace and state building effort, and must take account of the potential harm that dis-engaging from a sector or an activity might have on people and communities.

65. The degree to which delivery of basic services and growth strategies should be prioritised will depend on an assessment of needs, and on their contribution to state-building and peace-building objectives. Service delivery can be a critical dimension of state legitimacy (even where the state is not a direct provider) and of responding to public expectations. Successful growth strategies are fundamental to job creation and strengthening the legitimacy of the state in fostering development. In Sierra Leone, priority was initially given to security and rule of law, with a later shift towards basic service delivery:

**Difficult choices: Peace, security and state-building in Sierra Leone**

In 2001, following a nine-year civil war, Sierra Leone was confronted with serious challenges that needed to be addressed to consolidate peace and transform it into a democratic and effective modern state. DFID’s political economy and conflict analysis concluded that security and restoration of the rule of law were pre-conditions for progress in other areas; it also found that building the state and transforming formal and informal power-sharing mechanisms were critical to the peace building process.

DFID and donor partners took difficult choices about what to prioritise, and how to manage the tensions between between short-term and long-term objectives. It was agreed that in the first few years, DFID would invest in: (i) building the key capacities of the state; and (ii) supporting progress on security, to sustain the peace. Service delivery and growth promotion were seen as second generation reform areas, with budget support the main delivery mechanism. Between 2000-2007, just over half of DFID’s total financial commitment was for good governance, peace and security, with human development and pro-poor growth at 10% and 6% respectively.

Part of the rationale for limiting support to service delivery initially was that other development partners would cover this sufficiently. The recent Country Programme Evaluation found that this did not hold true, highlighting the importance of continually re-assessing priorities and monitoring assumptions. By 2007 DFID had increased its support to service delivery and civil society (reflected in a new joint EC/DFID strategy) and started to shift the focus away from security. The 2008 Issues and Choices paper for DFID Sierra Leone divided the country portfolio along two lines – building an effective and accountable state (State Building) and ensuring an improvement to people’s lives through increased access to basic services (Human Development).

The evaluation concluded that DFID has made a significant contribution to the restoration of peace and stability in Sierra Leone. This suggests that the difficult choices taken by DFID have proved to be valid. Human security has improved since the end of the conflict, but Sierra Leone remains fragile. Questions remain about whether a stronger focus on service delivery at an earlier stage should have accompanied the focus on security and state-building. However, adding substantial, early support to service delivery to the portfolio would have required a much larger aid framework, or reducing other areas of the programme.

66. Our approach to state-building and peace-building does not necessarily imply privileging one domain over another, such as survival functions over responding to public expectations. DFID’s choices will depend on various factors including our analysis of context, where other donors are already providing support, and our
comparative advantage. Assumptions that underpin our decisions and priorities should be re-visited regularly, to ensure they are robust. In DRC, DFID has prioritised within the domains, and has selected priorities on the basis of preventing a return to conflict:

**Priorities to prevent a return to conflict in DRC**

The DRC is in transition from years of violent conflict which caused immense human suffering, and severely eroded the capacity and legitimacy of a state that has historically been predatory and exploitative. Some recent political and economic developments are positive, but the situation remains fragile and reversible, particularly in the East.

DFID DRC decided that preventing a return to violent conflict should be the key focus of its programme; this was a key factor in determining priorities. It has adopted the goal of “sustaining peace and reducing poverty” and has three strategic objectives for the 2008-2010 country programme - these map onto DFID’s integrated state building and peace-building approach:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace-building and State building approach</th>
<th>DRC country plan objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive political settlement</td>
<td>i) Capable and accountable state (Democracy and accountability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening state survival functions with accountability</td>
<td>i) Capable and accountable state (Security sector accountability, governance of mineral resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responding to public expectations</td>
<td>ii) Peace dividend for poor people – access to services and growth strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing causes and effects of conflict</td>
<td>iii) Reducing violent conflict and its impact (humanitarian assistance and community recovery)</td>
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</table>

DFID DRC has prioritised interventions within the three objectives (rather than between them), defining clear priorities and secondary funding areas. The strategy aims to ensure a balance between working at the central level and the community level, and situates service delivery and infrastructure choices within a peace-building context. It also includes targeted programmes in Eastern DRC, a region marginalised by central government and severely affected by violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building a capable, accountable state</th>
<th>Delivering a peace dividend for poor people</th>
<th>Reducing violent conflict and its impacts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Six priorities</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Democracy and accountability</td>
<td>• Access to primary education</td>
<td>• Humanitarian assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Security sector accountability and police reform</td>
<td>• Rehabilitating roads</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Governance of minerals resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary funding areas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Public financial management</td>
<td>• Health</td>
<td>• Community reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forestry</td>
<td>• Water and sanitation</td>
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67. Sequencing issues in relation to democracy and political systems are particularly challenging. Promoting democratic institutions and processes in a context where there is a weak democratic tradition can be risky. Some research suggests that pushing for democratic institutions - including elections - too early can destabilise an already fragile situation, as public expectations are raised when the state is not yet
ready to deliver. This would imply that state functions (security, services, etc.) should reach a certain minimum level before elections take place.

68. However, if left too late, the concentration of power within the hands of an elite group, without democratic checks and balances, may bring greater risks and reinforce the causes of conflict and instability. Evidence suggests that incremental democratic reforms should be introduced gradually alongside other measures to strengthen the capacity of key state institutions. DFID supports this approach, such as in DRC:

**Post-conflict elections in DRC**

In 2006, DRC held credible national elections. They took place shortly after the end of the conflict, ignoring many of the ideal pre-conditions for elections. Despite this, a recent study concludes that they had a positive peace-building impact, drawing the following lessons:

- National elections helped allocate access to resources between the elites of rival factions as an alternative to violent conflict. Participating in elections produced a shift to groups seeking legitimacy through popular will, and weeded out those leaders at local and national level without a popular base.
- The elections produced a less equal distribution than war amongst the armed factions - and are likely to be violently contested by some. However, the electoral winner gained authority, partly through a semblance of legitimacy which matters for the international community, but mainly through the control of patronage opportunities.
- The international community was relatively successful in anticipating and taking preventative action to reduce risks and manage outbreaks of violence: for example, the AU sent a "three eminent person's panel" to DRC to monitor pre-election conflict and facilitate dialogue.
- The stability and legitimacy of the post-election settlement depends on strengthening the capability of the state: in particular, its ability to provide security and regain control over important territory, monopolise tax revenues and provide services at a local level. This will both improve the electoral winner's control over patronage and help secure popular legitimacy.

Democracy in DRC will require at least a decade of donor commitment and a focus on strengthening broad accountability mechanisms. DFID’s key governance programme (£65 million over five years), has four elements: strengthening political governance (assistance to parliament, political parties and the electoral commission); anti-corruption; decentralisation planning and implementation; improving accountability and transparency through civil society and the media.

**ii) Design interventions to support the four objectives**

69. Within the broad objectives and priorities set out in a country plan, specific interventions can be designed to support the four objectives in the integrated approach.

- **Support inclusive political settlements**

70. Understanding and supporting political settlements is an area for development in DFID. This includes analysing the dynamics of political settlements as they evolve,

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36 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes (2009)
and developing specific actions to promote a more inclusive, resilient settlement underpinned by accountability, such as DFID Nepal’s work. In situations of political crisis or conflict, we can provide support to peace processes and mediation efforts.

Kenya - Mediating the re-negotiation of the political settlement

The violence and political crisis that followed Kenya’s elections at the end of 2007 highlighted multiple failures of the governance system as both the Electoral Commission and the Courts appeared unable to deal with disputed election results. The UK government, through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), responded quickly by supporting the mediation effort of a Panel of Eminent Africa personalities, led by Kofi Annan, under the auspices of the African Union. The mediation brokered a power sharing agreement and led to the creation of a government of national unity. It also set in train the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process, to identify immediate and long term measures to prevent a recurrence of the violence.

In response to these events, in 2008 DFID Kenya initiated a project to support Drivers of Accountable Governance. The aim is to address the underlying causes of conflict and poor governance by bringing a wide range of players, including civil society and the business community, into debates currently controlled by politicians. It is intended this should elicit greater government accountability and responsiveness and set a solid basis for negotiations over economic and political reform. The ultimate objective is to contribute to the definition of a new political settlement; towards which the high-level mediation was just the first step.

71. Broadening the political settlement over the long term requires a focus on inclusion, and engagement with a wider range of stakeholders than our usual development partners. Informal systems of governance have a profound impact on state-building and peace-building dynamics. Donor approaches to state-building traditionally focus on engagement with formal state institutions, even where state legitimacy is low. Our aid delivery modalities rely heavily on channelling funds through state systems, and more innovative approaches are need to work actors such as traditional leaders, religious groups and social movements.

- Address causes of conflict and build resolution mechanisms

72. Addressing the causes and effects of conflict is “core business” for DFID. It involves a wide range of interventions which take place before, during and after conflict, with the common aim of reducing the risk and impact of violence. Examples of interventions that are already current practice in DFID include:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Stage of conflict cycle</th>
<th>Examples of interventions[^41]</th>
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</table>
| Prevention (all stages)| - Measures to reduce discrimination and exclusion
|                        | - Support reforms to strengthen checks and balances, reduce abuse of power and opportunities for private gain by elites
|                        | - Promotion of youth and women’s employment
|                        | - Support for democratic processes/free and fair elections
|                        | - Security sector reform; reduction of availability of light weapons

[^39]: This included an independent review on the conduct of elections; a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, and a longer term review of underlying issues around youth exclusion and land policy.

[^40]: These include informal or traditional systems of governance, justice and dispute resolution, service delivery and trade.

[^41]: For further examples of policy tools available at different stages of conflict see Lund, M., Preventing Violent Conflict – A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, United States Institute for Peace (2006)
| During | During humanitarian aid to save lives when populations are displaced, and livelihoods and coping mechanisms have broken down. Quick impact development work, focused on social protection, infrastructure and employment for vulnerable groups. Support for human rights monitoring and civilian protection, and measures to ensure humanitarian and development access. |
| After | After transitional justice mechanisms to address war crimes and human rights violations, including gender-based violence. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), including a focus on women and girl combatants. Community-based recovery and reconstruction. Restoration of land/property rights. |

73. A focus on prevention is particularly crucial in deteriorating governance situations. Interventions may need to be directed towards shorter term objectives, in order to demonstrate progress on a critical grievance, or prevent a potentially explosive situation getting worse.

**Yemen: Mitigating short-term risks of violent conflict**

A conflict audit was carried out in March 2008 to identify ways in which the DFID Yemen programme could help reduce the risk of conflict. It found that DFID was broadly working in the right sectors to address conflict issues. However, the focus of DFID’s work has been on addressing deep-seated, structural causes of conflict, with less attention to immediate conflict dynamics. It recommended increased support for interventions which produce rapid, tangible benefits, particularly among marginalised communities, and a greater understanding of how development assistance and government resources are targeted in relation to excluded groups. It also recommended consideration of further steps to mitigate the impact of potential conflict triggers, including food and oil price shocks, and human rights violations.

74. Political economy and conflict analysis will often identify numerous causal factors (see section 2). It is important to analyse what has changed during the conflict or crisis phase, and to understand what motivates groups and individuals to participate in violence (e.g. the search for social status by young men) and to build this into our programmes. Identifying the most critical factors that perpetuate violence can help determine priorities. In Nepal, donors responded to the human rights abuses that were exacerbating the conflict and fuelling exclusion and grievances:

**Nepal: Identifying the causes and effects of conflict**

During the Maoist conflict in Nepal (1996-2006) the key “incompatibility” was around the system of government – a constitutional monarchy versus a republic. Conflict analysis pointed towards horizontal inequalities (social, political and economic exclusion) based on ethnicity, caste, geography and gender, matched by an unresponsive and exclusionary state, as key structural causes of conflict. This led to legitimacy and support for the Maoists and their campaign of violence against the state and elite interests.

The state responded to Maoist violence with their own, and in the process killed, injured, detained, raped and tortured a significant number of rural poor people, many of whom had no direct connection to the Maoist movement. This generated further legitimacy and support for the Maoists, and indirectly threatened development efforts, leading to further exclusion.
From 2003, donors began to draw attention to human rights abuses committed by both Maoists and the state, and to strengthen national human rights monitoring. After the unpopular royal coup of February 2005, the international community was able to pressurise Nepal to accept international monitoring under the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). As this monitoring became effective, it created a safe space for peaceful political protest, which in April 2006 forced the King to restore Parliament, leading to a ceasefire with the Maoists. The underlying problem of social exclusion remained largely unaddressed and required long-term solutions, but the grievance was legitimised by international and national recognition, and the cycle of human rights violations and escalating violence was interrupted.

75. DFID’s work on deepening democracy is an important element of strengthening conflict resolution mechanisms. It includes engaging at the formal level with political systems, through to grassroots level work on civic education. It aims at ensuring the relationship between the state and societal groups is mediated in a peaceful way through the democratic process. Our approach is to provide long-term support to a broad range of political institutions and processes. These include parliaments, the judiciary, the media, civil society, political parties and human rights bodies, as well as elections and the electoral cycle.

76. DFID is starting to gain experience of engaging with non-state conflict resolution mechanisms, such as informal justice systems. We should recognise that they may have a legitimate role to play, and where we engage, we should seek to improve their responsiveness and accountability. Tensions may exist between cultural norms that underpin the way informal systems function, and international standards such as human rights (e.g. discrimination against women). Detailed analysis is required to understand informal systems, and identify suitable entry points and partnerships.

Engaging with informal justice systems

Over 80% of poor people in developing countries access justice through non-state systems. Tribal and traditional justice systems can often offer faster and more accessible justice than state systems, particularly when dealing with lower level disputes, e.g. over land or water rights. However, the risk is that such systems may be unfair or discriminatory, particularly against excluded groups and women. They also need to complement state systems, uphold norms and standards, and be able to pass on cases which exceed their competence.

DFID programmes are supporting informal or non-state justice systems. In Nigeria, DFID has supported the training of traditional rulers and customary court judges in the use of simplified procedural guidelines, including basic record keeping, that help guarantee fair hearing. In Malawi, DFID is supporting a programme to improve traditional, community-level justice. The programme introduces human rights norms to traditional justice and has a strong gender focus. In Bangladesh, DFID is working to improve access to Community Legal Services, providing alternative dispute resolution, legal aid and legal education for up to 10 million poor and vulnerable people.

77. A new form of “early warning” programme is also emerging, whereby local civil society actors are involved in detecting potential conflict and responding with appropriate interventions. This may be particularly useful where the state is a conflict party, or has limited reach. For example, in Sri Lanka in 2005, the Foundation for Coexistence (FCE), with support from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, was instrumental in identifying and resolving an emerging conflict between Tamil and Singhala communities in Seruvila, Eastern Province. Kenya provides a further example:
Support for conflict resolution in Kenya

Funded by the Conflict Prevention Pools, Saferworld responded to the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya by supporting the organisation Kenyan Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP). This sought to prevent the spread of violent conflict, to link community-level and national-level prevention and peace-building processes, and establish reconciliation structures. Known as the “Nairobi Peace Zones” (NPZ) initiative, Saferworld and CCP conducted participatory, local-level conflict analysis and established peace committees in Nairobi that brought together local administration, civil society and community representatives.

- Develop state survival functions

78. Security and Justice: This sector cuts across all four objectives in the integrated approach, and is of critical importance. DFID works in a balanced way with state and non-state actors to build capacity for poor people’s safety, security and access to justice. Our aim is to build state institutions that provide security (army, police and intelligence services) in an accountable way under civilian leadership, and to ensure that the judiciary is sufficiently independent and responds to the needs of the poor.

Security and Justice in Sierra Leone

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has highlighted how weaknesses in the justice system contributed to the civil war in Sierra Leone. There was a need for the post-war transition to make progress towards re-establishing the rule of law and making justice accessible. DFID’s longstanding support to security and justice reform has helped to create stability and increased public confidence in security services, facilitating free and fair national and local elections (2007-8).

The government of Sierra Leone’s 2004 Security Sector Review recognised that sustainable development could not be achieved without a safe and secure enabling environment. In supporting security sector reform (SSR), DFID has collaborated closely with MOD and FCO. The UK has supported the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) which embraces a wide range of state and non-state institutions including the Office of National Security, intelligence, defence, police, internal affairs and accountability institutions (parliament, civil society, media and academia). The Office of National Security has become one of the most effective government agencies. Local ownership of reform has been transferred to the Sierra Leone MOD where principles of accountability, civilian leadership and good management are being adopted.

Implementation of the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) began in 2005, with a view to moving from support to police and judiciary to a coordinated sector-wide approach. Its purpose is to support an effective and accountable justice sector that meets the needs and interests of the people of Sierra Leone, especially the vulnerable and marginalised. There has been a significant shift in government commitment to reform, improved infrastructure and conditions for parts of the prisons service, Sierra Leone police and judiciary, and improved case management. A police survey in 2007 suggested that 20% of people felt safer than in the previous year, and a JSDP pilot in the provincial town of Moyamba showed positive results for poor and vulnerable groups. The 2009 Annual Review of JSDP noted, however, that reform of the police (particularly independent oversight by the statutory agencies – Ministry of Internal Affairs) remained a critical priority for the remaining two years of the programme.

79. Revenue and taxation: The state’s taxation capacity is linked to its survival, and to extending the political settlement to the wider population. Sequencing issues need careful consideration, as tax collection without sufficient capacity to deliver services is likely to increase instability. Accountable use of taxes collected is critical, with public
awareness and acceptance of how the revenue is used, as illustrated in Rwanda. As with elections and democracy, DFID’s support should strike the right balance between developing taxation capacity and enabling the state to respond to public expectations.

Rwanda Revenue Authority: Strengthening Taxation

The Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) was established in 1997 as a semi-autonomous executive agency. With substantial financial and technical support from DFID, and driven by high-level political commitment to change on the part of Rwanda’s leadership, the RRA has helped raise revenue collection from 8.5% of GDP to over 15% of GDP.

The success of the RRA has been built through a state-building approach to establishing its legitimacy, underlined by its slogan of ‘Taxes for Growth and Development’. Setting out to overcome the legacy of civil war and genocide, it has focused on building the social contract with taxpayers by offering an effective administration with a strong commitment to a credible and stable tax system that seeks to promote economic growth and political stability.

From the outset, the RRA has been able to count on the personal support of the President, who has played a major part in the campaign to change public attitudes towards paying taxes and related challenges such as corruption. The president has underlined the importance of the RRA as enabling the country to finance poverty reduction expenditure, and to reduce its dependence on outside assistance. In addition, the principle of the ‘fiscal contract’ has been well understood by Rwanda’s political leadership, so the RRA has been seen to be contributing to developing a culture of participation and citizenship as part of a wider process of establishing the norms and practices of democratic governance, and of bringing government closer to the people.

- Respond to public expectations

80. Identifying the causes and effects of conflict and fragility can shed light on past and potential grievances, and thus help to prioritise the expected functions and actions which are of greatest importance to reduce the risk of violence. This may require addressing political exclusion or corruption as much as delivering basic services such as health and education. Some studies have shown that to Africans, the rule of law is the most important determinant of a state’s legitimacy to its citizens.

81. It is important not to make assumptions about the expectations of different groups in society (including women and men). The international community has expectations of how states should perform, as expressed in international treaties – e.g. on human rights. It is important to balance consistent support for global norms with an approach that understands local priorities and expectations.

82. DFID can support research into public expectations as a starting point. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006, DFID Nepal commissioned a series of public expectations surveys to identify priorities and people’s expectations for peace and a reformed state. The results reinforced the demand for inclusion in the political and economic life of the country, and the need for growth-supporting

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42 The Rwandan Revenue Authority Project: World Bank Note, 2006
infrastructure and basic services. The findings were influential in shaping the priorities of DFID and other donors’ strategies to support peace and state building.

83. A state-building and peace-building approach means thinking carefully about the nature of our support for delivery of basic services, including which services, how we provide support, when, and for whom. In situations where mortality rates are high, there is an imperative to deliver health services in order to save lives. This needs to be balanced with support for service delivery systems that build state capacity to regulate, monitor or deliver. We need a better understanding of the impact of different delivery models on peace and state-building objectives, including state legitimacy.

84. Political economy analysis and conflict sensitivity should be integrated with needs analysis in the design of sector programmes and can help identify entry points. Service delivery can promote human development outcomes, but it can also be a source of tension and conflict (e.g. water service provision, or the content of the education curriculum). Our approach should be a conflict-sensitive one, seeking opportunities to reduce the risk of instability and violence. Community-based approaches can be highly effective, but careful design and planning is needed to avoid elite capture of resources.

85. Political elites in fragile situations engage in service delivery for different reasons, ranging from state penetration and territorial consolidation; political visibility; buying loyalty; and promoting national cohesion. But they may not engage in equitable, pro-poor service delivery; hence the range of alternative providers to the state. This can lead to fragmentation of service delivery, resulting in tensions and unrest due to unequal access to services. Coordination structures that improve coverage and access can help to reduce this fragmentation.

**Education in Abyei, Sudan – building common interests**

Abyei is an area disputed between the governments of north and south Sudan, populated by a mix of Dinka and Misserya communities. Following the peace agreement, large numbers of IDPs were encouraged to return to the area, putting pressures on limited resources. Relief efforts focused on the groups most affected by the war, and so tended to favour the Dinka, creating resentment among Misserya. Analysis supported by DFID identified this imbalance as a potential source of conflict between the two communities.

The Integrated Strategic Plan for Abyei identified education as a key priority for both communities. In response to rising tensions and against a background of limited local capacity, DFID has supported UNICEF to develop and implement a rapid school building and education programme. This goal of the project is to reduce conflict and support the implementation of the peace agreement through the creation of 7,000 school places and basic education programmes for 500 young adolescents, serving both communities.

By creating benefits equally for both communities, the education programme has become a point of common interest. Following a conflict, development activities that create benefits across the lines of divided communities can play a significant role in building support for peace.

**iii) Stay engaged for the long-term**

86. The approach points to the need for long-term engagement by donors (over decades, not years), and continual attention to state-building and peace-building dynamics as they shift over time. Political settlements are never truly “settled”, and instability can
emerge in situations that appear stable or are otherwise on a positive development trajectory, as we know from recent events in Kenya and Ethiopia. DFID’s engagement in Mozambique over nearly two decades shows the value of a long-term partnership, and the need to continue analysing dynamics on the ground.

Mozambique: State-building and peace-building 17 years on

Mozambique emerged from 15 years of bitter civil conflict in 1992 with its infrastructure and institutions in tatters. Almost uniquely on the African continent, it has made the transition from conflict to democracy, with four successive rounds of peaceful national elections. While the ruling party, Frelimo, has remained in power ever since the war, the opposition has come to accept the electoral process as legitimate.

The 1992 peace agreement resulted from a combination of exhaustion among the population and the withdrawal of external sponsorship for the conflict following the collapse of the Soviet Union and apartheid in South Africa. Rather than a government of national reconciliation, the peace agreement provided for a winner-take-all electoral mechanism. Peace was reinforced by a formal national reconciliation process, and supported by a UN peacekeeping operation and a huge international reconstruction programme.

In many respects, post-war Mozambique has been a development success story. Fuelled by FDI and remittances from South Africa, it has enjoyed economic growth rates averaging 8% p.a. between 1996 and 2007, while the poverty headcount fell by around 15%. There have been major improvements in social indicators such as infant mortality and primary school enrolment, albeit against a very low baseline. State institutions have been re-established, macroeconomic policy is sound and Mozambique has better IRAI indicators than many of its neighbours.

However, DFID’s analysis suggests that there are limitations to the responsiveness of state-building in Mozambique, and emerging risks of instability. The governing party has consolidated its hold on political power through entrenched systems of patronage. The judiciary is politicised, and anti-corruption efforts have not checked the behaviour of the political elite. The public sector is neither transparent nor customer focused, and popular expectations of government are low. Participation in elections fell from 90% in the first election to 36% ten years later. While the media is largely free, civil society plays little role in reinforcing accountability. With the lines between the state and the ruling party increasingly blurred, there are significant doubts as to whether an opposition electoral victory would in fact lead to a peaceful transfer of power.

DFID is well aware that aid (which provides half the national budget) can harm as well as support the state-building process, by feeding patronage and making the government more accountable to donors than its own population. Budget support is at the centre of DFID’s response, as an important platform for building democracy and accountability, by giving government and parliament a pool of discretionary resources for promoting development. But this is also complemented by programming focused directly on government accountability, including a range of public sector reform programmes, anti-corruption work, and support to civil society to monitor government performance.

iv) Think and work politically

87. All donor actions have political ramifications, whether they are intended to do so or not. Financial support to strengthen state functions is not just a technical fix to improve capability - it can consolidate the position of the incumbent regime and shift the balance of power between elites. Support to enhance the voice and well-being of excluded groups is not a neutral activity – it strengthens their position in society, and has important social and political ramifications.
88. A state-building and peace-building approach means that DFID will be more closely engaged with political dynamics in our partner countries, and our partnership with FCO will need to be even closer. We need to understand the nature of the political settlement, and the implications of political systems for “winners and losers”. DFID country offices have started analysing state-building dynamics using our existing analytical tools, as illustrated in Kenya and Afghanistan. In future, these tools need to systematically build in analysis of the causes of conflict and fragility, including the incentives that drive people to participate in violent conflict.

Understanding state-building dynamics in Kenya and Afghanistan

DFID Kenya undertook a state-building analysis jointly with the FCO in September 2008. The process concluded that the state-building lens provided a useful means of identifying critical objectives, beyond the MDGs. It highlighted the fragile nature of the political settlement, the risks of a return to violence and the limited potential for reform. It identified gross failures in state survival functions, in particular state control of violence and the rule of law.

HMG has worked on judicial and police reform in the past, but impact has been limited – a renewed focus is needed with a focus on politically feasible entry points, and tackling state impunity. The analysis also identified that the DFID Kenya programme may have been neglecting or even undermining state-building through its major service-delivery programmes. Traditional DFID sectoral approaches may overlook critical sources of fragility, such as youth, exclusion, urbanisation and informal settlements. New partnerships and change agents may be able to strengthen the fragile political settlement, particularly youth, the middle class, the business sector and the media – actors that will be integrated within the new Drivers of Accountable Governance programme.

DFID Afghanistan used the state-building framework in 2008 to improve its understanding of the relationship between political, human development and governance issues. The exercise formed part of a wide-ranging context analysis process called ‘Understanding Afghanistan’, and informed the development of DFID’s approach within the HMG-wide National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) strategy for Afghanistan.

DFID used the state-building model to identify whether the key elements of the political settlement, survival functions and expected functions could account for the divergence between the realities identified by the contextual analysis and the aspirations of the HMG strategy. For example, it helped to illustrate the relationship between increased corruption and problems with the political settlement, as well as stalled progress on revenue generation and management capacity. It also demonstrated that establishing subnational government fitted the criteria for a survival function, along with anti-corruption and public administration reform, in addition to tax, security and justice. Finally, it suggested a long-term focus on state-society relations.

v) Take a regional approach

89. Weak governance in one country has a negative influence on the quality of governance in neighbouring countries; these spillovers are even more important for poor countries. Having a neighbour in conflict also significantly raises the level of conflict risk. The post-election violence in Kenya in 2008 had serious repercussions for landlocked states dependent on the port of Mombasa for imports and exports of goods; economic migrants and displaced people from Zimbabwe impact on the border towns of South Africa; cross-border movement of weapons, armed groups and conflict resources has become a permanent feature of conflict in West and Central Africa.

45 See Briefing Note on Analysis for a summary of DFID’s analytical tools and case studies showing how these have been applied in conflict-affected and fragile situations.

46 John Hudson and Paul Mosley, “Core State-Building functions and Sustainable Development"
90. This suggests that engaging with states alone is not sufficient to address state-building and peace-building, and a regional approach is required. Relying on positive spillover effects from “beacons of good governance” is unlikely to work. There is an increasing emphasis on regional approaches to security. The UK recognises the importance of regional approaches in situations of conflict and fragility, and since 2008 has reorganised its own tri-departmental (DFID, FCO, MOD) conflict prevention strategies along regional lines. The annual planning processes for the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) now take place in regional clusters to encourage a cross-country overview.

### Regional approaches to conflict in the Great Lakes and West Africa

The UK is a significant donor to the World Bank-led Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) which has demobilised around 300,000 former combatants in seven countries since 2002 – Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. The interlinked nature of the conflicts in the region provided strong justification for a multi-country approach. The programme has successfully arranged the demobilisation and return of members of foreign armed groups operating in the region, such as the Rwandan Hutu Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) based in DRC. Although not an unqualified success, it has been a major factor in improving security in the Great Lakes in recent years.

In West Africa, the UK has provided considerable support to strengthening the conflict management capacity of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). This has included both military support, to strengthen regional capacity for peace support operations and the establishment of a Standby Force, and civilian support to strengthen ECOWAS mediation capacity. The legitimacy and capacity of ECOWAS to intervene both militarily and politically to prevent and resolve conflict is regarded as critical for the future stability of the region.

### vi) Adapt aid instruments

91. Aligning the choice of aid instruments with state-building and peace-building objectives is challenging, and further guidance is set out in the Briefing Paper series. Briefing Paper 5 on Alignment provides more detail on the range of aid instruments that DFID can use to support the integrated approach; Briefing Paper 6 on Coordination provides guidance on pooled funding arrangement with other donors; and Briefing Paper 7 on Act Fast sets out options for fast, flexible engagement in transition situations.

92. There are various typologies that can help with the choice of aid instrument. These may be framed around state willingness and capacity, or correspond to situations of post-conflict/political transition, deteriorating governance, gradual improvement and protracted crisis. Typologies should not be used to provide a blueprint for aid delivery, but they do suggest a possible spectrum of instruments, from those that work through the state (where the state is responsive and capacity and risks are improving); with the state (where the situation is more mixed and risks are higher, but there are elements of responsiveness); and outside the state (in situations where the state is non-responsive and its legitimacy questioned).

93. Instruments that prioritise delivery through the state have been used in countries ranging from Sierra Leone and Rwanda (budget support) to Afghanistan (multi-donor trust fund). In an immediate post-crisis situation, delivery through the state can create macroeconomic stability, pay public sector workers, and support state survival and
expected functions. The peace-building perspective highlights the importance of complementing budget support with other instruments focused on service delivery and livelihoods.

94. In situations where central government commitment to DFID’s partnership principles is mixed, and where the governance situation is deteriorating, we can use aid instruments that work with the state and encourage more responsive state-building and peace-building. For example, the Yemen Social Fund operates in parallel to government systems, but is aligned with government policies, and is highly responsive to local priorities. It is increasingly focused on engaging local government.

95. In contexts where the legitimacy of the state is questioned, the state is entirely unresponsive or a central state is absent, it may be necessary to deliver aid outside the state to maintain basic services and structures. Alternative approaches are needed where services are delivered under contract through non-governmental or private providers - in Somalia decentralised approaches to service delivery through UN delivery channels have been used. Work with non-state actors can also support legitimate demands for change and for a more inclusive political settlement.

96. These should not be seen as exclusive categories, but as elements of an instrument mix in a changing, fragile situation. Nepal is an example of such a flexible approach:

**Nepal: A flexible mix of aid instruments**

In Nepal, DFID has adapted its aid modalities to reflect changing country conditions and programme objectives. A flexible approach is used, based on scenarios and options. A mix of instruments has been deployed since 2002 through the conflict and post-conflict phases, including:

(i) Funding from the Global Conflict Prevention Pools to support quick-impact projects and peace-building activities, many of them small in scale (less than £1 million);

(ii) Support for government-led service delivery in health and education, through SWAPs and sectoral budget support. However, this shifted into direct service provision in programming areas where government was not seen as a credible partner (such as forestry), and in geographical areas where government delivery was limited by the conflict;

(iii) Direct grants using experienced local partners, to engage in rural districts controlled by Maoist insurgents. The Community Support Programme (a £9 million programme to support livelihood security in conflict-affected rural areas) – utilised three parallel providers (a DFID team, CARE and a local NGO, Rural Reconstruction Nepal) to ensure access across the country.

In light of this flexibility, the 2007 Country Programme Evaluation noted that “The Nepal programme should be considered a key learning model for DFID’s evolving approach to working in fragile states”.

(vi) Measure progress

97. Traditional approaches to measuring results – such as frameworks based around the MDGs and related targets - are not sufficient to assess progress in conflict-affected and fragile situations. DFID’s results frameworks at country and programme/project level will need to be adapted to reflect the integrated approach. Further work is planned to review DFID’s current practice, and provide guidance for support country offices to help improve their results frameworks. M&E frameworks such as those
used to conduct DFID’s Country Programme Evaluations will also need to be adapted and improved.

98. Following the Accra High Level Forum (HLF) in 2008, an International Dialogue has been established with the aim of agreeing international objectives on state-building and peace-building which can be adapted for use at country level. The dialogue will be co-chaired by the UK and DRC, and its first meeting will be held in November 2009.

99. Examples of the types of results that DFID may seek to achieve include:

_Global / regional level:_
- a. Reduction in number of violent conflicts
- b. Increase in % of elections conducted without violence
- c. Reduction in number of displaced persons and refugees
- d. Improvement in human rights and non-discrimination / inclusion indicators

_Country level:_
- e. Improvement in public perceptions of the state
- f. Increase in levels of political, social and economic stability
- g. Increase in % of local disputes resolved fairly and peacefully
- h. Increase in accountability of state to citizens (e.g. security sector)

5. **Key Lessons**

- Consider state-building and peace-building in an integrated way from the outset. Peace-building measures must consider the long-term implications for state-building and growth; and state-building approaches must factor in the causes of conflict.

- State-building is not just about the state – it is about the relationship between state and society. Consider how to engage at the interface, including with civil society.

- Be willing to engage with the political settlement, and with different elites (old and new). Short-term, technical support (e.g. to peace negotiations or constitutions) should be combined with long-term approaches that strengthen political institutions, including parliaments and political parties.

- Recognise that support to state survival functions is not just a technical fix, but has implications for the political settlement. Focus on accountability as a cross-cutting theme when supporting state functions.

- Don’t make assumptions about the expectations of different groups in society. Research into public expectations and the sources of state legitimacy can be a valuable starting point.

- Use your understanding of the causes of conflict and fragility to help prioritise. Identify the critical dynamics that are driving instability, the incentives that are driving participation in conflict, and possible entry points.

- On priorities and sequencing, aim for a sufficient level of support across all four elements of the integrated framework, whether from DFID or other donors, to help create a positive peace and state-building dynamic.

- Tailor support to service delivery to address the causes of conflict and fragility where possible. Try to ensure that approaches do not undermine long-term state-building, while accepting there may be compromises to deliver rapid responses.