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# Lessons from implementing peace agreements: what next for Colombia?

Rapid literature review  
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## About this report

This rapid review provides a short synthesis of literature examining peace negotiations, agreements and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. It aims to orient policymakers to the key debates and emerging issues. It was prepared for the European Commission's Instrument for Stability, © European Union 2013. The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of GSDRC, its partner agencies or the European Commission.

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# 1. Overview

**Conflict in Colombia has deep roots**, with over 50 years of armed conflict between state and non-state armed forces,<sup>1</sup> more than 220,000 people estimated dead, and five million internally displaced people (ICG, 2013). Since the 1980s, there have been **many formal and informal peace negotiations** between the state and the different non-state armed groups. But no agreement to date has brought peace to the country.

In light of **current negotiations** between the Colombian government and the largest guerrilla group – the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) – this rapid review gives an overview of the evidence on lessons for international community involvement in the implementation of peace agreements and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes.

The majority of this paper focusses on Colombia; however, in accordance with the research question, this paper also examines relevant examples from the region (particularly El Salvador and Guatemala), and from other parts of the world (Burundi, Kosovo, and Bosnia). The full research question is in Appendix 1.

There is a **vast literature** examining lessons from the implementation of peace agreements; the implementation of DDR programmes; and the monitoring and verification of peace agreements. There is a wide spread of literature from different sources: academics, practitioners, and (predominantly conflict orientated) think tanks. This rapid review focusses on the most recent literature (predominantly published since 2008, with some exceptions for older literature that is either considered particularly authoritative or is documenting past events). The report examines both English and Spanish literature.

All of the literature used in this paper is qualitative, with a mix of single-country studies, multi-country studies, and some general guidance notes. As the subject area is highly political and contested, the evidence tends to be divided and interpretations are contested. Focussing on literature that details challenges and lessons for international actors means that the evidence is normative. Gender issues are detailed in the evidence.

There is a lot of literature that collates lessons from reintegration in different countries and provides general guidance for reintegration initiatives (e.g. UN, 2007; UNHCR, 2004; World Bank, 2006; EU, 2006). However, while general guidance is useful, much of the literature emphasises that lessons from peace agreements and reintegration programmes are specific to local contexts, and questions the utility of applying lessons from one context to another. Therefore, in line with the research question, and in view of the challenge of applying general lessons to unique country situations, this rapid review examines lessons and evidence from specific country examples.

**The first half of the paper focuses on Colombian experiences**, examining the lessons from previous peace negotiations, demobilisation of ex-combatants, reintegration initiatives, and the role of the international community in these areas (section 2). The **second half** of the paper examines **lessons from other countries** – examining experiences of verification and monitoring of peace agreements in different countries (section 3) and lessons from reintegration initiatives (section 4).

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<sup>1</sup> The terminology used to describe the different actors in the Colombian conflict is politicised. For neutrality this rapid review uses the term ‘non-state armed actors’ and ‘state actors’; and ‘guerrillas’ and ‘paramilitaries’ when distinguishing between the different types of non-state armed actors.

Lessons from **peace processes and negotiations and DDR** in Colombia include:

- Colombian peace processes and negotiations and DDR initiatives have been undermined by the failure of the Colombian government to protect the **security of civilians and ex-combatants**.
- As demobilisation in Colombia has only happened with a few groups, the **cycle of violence has not stopped**. Some armed groups feel that others have had favourable treatment, despite being responsible for serious crimes.
- Some have warned that amnesty laws for combatants have **institutionalised impunity**.
- Reintegration activities have been **underfunded**. General DDR processes have focused on political dimensions, while neglecting important economic and social reintegration (such as psychosocial support).
- Almost **half** the members of Colombia's **armed groups joined the groups as children**, and therefore have specific needs during reintegration (such as education).
- Only **15 per cent of child combatants have access to DDR** programmes.

Lessons from **international community engagement** in peace and DDR activities in Colombia include:

- While Colombia has historically been reluctant to include the international community in its peace processes, there has been an **increased internationalisation of the conflict** and peace processes since 1999 – this has led to greater opportunities and demands for international community involvement.
- The international community can play a **variety of roles**, notably: a donor role; a diplomatic role; a mediation role; a verification and monitoring role; and an observer role.
- The literature emphasises that the international community can play particularly useful roles in: legitimising peace processes; monitoring and verification peace agreements or DDR initiatives; and championing human rights.
- **Key challenges** are the coordination among donors and the focus of donor activities on terrorism and drugs trafficking to the detriment of other issues that matter to achieving peace in Colombia.

Lessons from international community engagement in the **monitoring and verification of compliance** with peace agreements in other countries include:

- In regards to **actors**, the UN plays the most important role. However, the use of 'Friends Groups' for strategic coordination between third-party actors can support the successful implementation of peace agreements, if the group of countries is small, with a high degree of commitment and similar interests in the conflict. Advances in technology, globalisation and the retreat of the state have led to NGOs playing a greater role in monitoring and verification.
- A **key challenge** in evaluating lessons for the international community is being able to separate out the challenges emanating from domestic actors and those from international actors.
- Monitoring teams must be **gender-balanced, not gender-blind**.
- Case study examples provide **micro-level lessons** on verification in El Salvador, Guatemala, Kosovo and Bosnia.

Lessons from **reintegration experiences in other countries** include:

- The challenges of DDR are leading academics to search for a **‘second generation’ of DDR** programmes, with an identification of needs that is more evidence-based and that focuses on risk factors and resilience at the community level.
- Reintegration is widely recognised as a very challenging task, sometimes called the **‘forgotten R’ of DDR**.
- Evidence-based programming is a strategic priority for reintegration programmes.
- Case study examples provide **micro-level lessons** of reintegration in El Salvador and Burundi.

## 2. Lessons from Colombia’s experiences with peace agreements and DDR

**Conflict in Colombia has deep roots**, with over 50 years of armed conflict between state and non-state armed forces. Widely cited statistics estimate that more than 200,000 people have been killed, and five million displaced by the conflict (ICG, 2013). Statistics are contested and heavily politicised. Colombia is home to many small armed non-state groups. **Since the 1980s, there have been many formal and informal attempts** between the state and different groups **to negotiate peace agreements**.<sup>2</sup>

This section first gives a brief overview of two of the most significant negotiation periods, and suggests reasons why these processes failed to lead to peace. Secondly, it examines the demobilisation phase from 2005 onwards. Thirdly, it gives an overview of the different phases of reintegration in Colombia – with a focus on the M-19 process. Finally it gives an overview of the role of the international community in these initiatives, and collates challenges and lessons that have emerged from this rapid review.

The literature base for this section is large, with extensive literature detailing both the Colombian experiences, and the experiences of international actors. However, there are limited papers that collect and synthesise lessons from across this literature (with the exception of the 2004 Conciliation Resources Accord paper) (García-Durán, 2004, p.4).

### 2.1 Peace agreements in Colombia – lessons

The first **negotiations over peace**<sup>3</sup> in **1982** between the state and the FARC led to an amnesty, the demobilisation of some FARC ex-combatants, and the creation of FARC’s political party – *Unión Patriótica* (UP). However, the Colombian state was unable to assure the security of the demobilised ex-combatants, and paramilitary groups later assassinated around 3,000 UP members (Theidon, 2009; UCL Institute of the Americas, 2012). This led to a breakdown in the peace agreement. Gomez-Suarez and Newman (2013, p. 824) suggest that the lack of verification mechanism to monitor the demobilised UP members is

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<sup>2</sup> An in-depth historic overview and a typology of the different negotiations and accords until 2004 can be found in the 2004 Conciliation Resources publication – from page 80 onwards <http://www.c-r.org/accord/colombia>

<sup>3</sup> ‘Peace agreements are formal agreements aimed at ending violent conflict and creating the conditions for durable peace. They include ceasefire agreements, interim or preliminary agreements, comprehensive and framework agreements, and implementation agreements,’ GSDRC topic guide. See – <http://www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=68CFDA84-14C2-620A-27C12606FECE6EAE>

one factor that created a blurry line between combatant and ex-combatant, and paramilitaries argued that they were fighting the FARC, rather than the UP.

**Peace negotiations in 1999** between the state and the FARC led to the establishment of a demilitarized negotiation zone (known as '*El Caguán*').<sup>4</sup> Violent outbursts led to the end of these negotiations in 2002. Analysts present various arguments about the breakdown of these negotiations.

- In a joint report, Bouvier, Chernick, Rettberg, García-Durán and Sarmiento (2012) argue that *El Caguán* failed to establish clear rules for the demilitarized zone, or mechanisms for the verification of compliance with the agreement; lacked a national policy linking the negotiation to the general construction of peace in society; and ignored civil society actors despite their prior role in the legitimation of the peace talks.
- Some argue that the root causes of conflict in Colombia were not discussed in *El Caguán*, such as the behaviour of political and economic elites, the criminal behaviour of elements within the state and the private sector, corruption, privatisation, and the weakness of political parties (Conciliation Resources & INDEPAZ, 2004). Instead, the talks focused on the organisation of a peace agenda and discussions around the humanitarian exchange of citizens kidnapped by FARC during many years of conflict.

**Current day peace negotiations between the government and the FARC** started officially in November 2012, and **are ongoing** at the time of the writing of this report.<sup>5</sup> Notably, the guerrilla group the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) refused to participate in the current negotiations. The agenda has been restricted to select areas: rural development; political participation of the FARC; the end of the conflict; and drug trafficking and victims' rights (Gomez-Suarez & Newman, 2013).

In regards to the current peace talks, Gomez-Suarez and Newman (2013, p. 820) argue that academics agree on a number of lessons from previous negotiations:

- *Substance*: talks should start with the central issue of land.
- *Process*: the parties should hold preliminary meetings before the main peace talks; the parties should explore key concession areas in private; talks should be located in a neutral place; and there should be clear objectives for the talks.

It is too early to draw lessons from this phase of negotiations, however Combs and Heine (2013, p. 3) identify a number of improvements to this peace negotiation, including: a smaller 'more manageable agenda' of issues; holding negotiations abroad; the establishment of ground rules (protocol and evaluation mechanisms); and no demilitarised zone.

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<sup>4</sup> For a timeline of these negotiations, see <http://www.lafm.com.co/noticias/colombia/04-09-12/cronologia-de-los-procesos-de--12>

<sup>5</sup> For a timeline of the current peace negotiations, see <http://www.eltiempo.com/Multimedia/especiales/proceso-de-paz-colombia/>

## 2.2 Dismantling guerrilla and paramilitary groups post-2005 – lessons

The **demobilisation<sup>6</sup> of the paramilitary group the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)*** began with the adoption of the two ‘Justice and Peace Laws’.<sup>7</sup> The literature reviewed details many challenges and lessons, and not so many successes of the programme. That aside, the fact that, during the period 2003 to 2006, more than 30,000 AUC members were demobilised and a significant number of ex-combatants from other groups demobilised individually, is impressive (Thorsell, 2012). This makes up the largest number of demobilised ex-combatants in Colombia.

### ***Security threats against former combatants***

Perhaps the key challenge has been to manage the threats to the security of the demobilised ex-combatants – many have faced threats, and others have been pressurised to return to combat (UN, 2009b; Morgenstein, 2008). This has parallels to the processes that involved the UP and the guerrilla group 19 April Movement (known as ‘M-19’).

### ***Limited funding and the need for psychosocial funding***

The stipend for ex-combatants (a monthly allowance of US\$160 for 18 months) was insufficient for many ex-combatants. Many therefore had to generate additional sources of income rather than attend classes such as psychosocial support sessions (Morgenstein, 2008). Furthermore, Morgenstein (2008) notes that the psychosocial support was sometimes insufficient to deal with serious mental health issues that ex-combatants had. The UN (2009) recognises psycho-social counselling as a key task that needs further development in the DDR process in Colombia.

### ***Underusing key resources***

The Centres for Demobilised Combatants (CRO), funded by USAID and operated by International Migration Office, were underused (Morgenstein, 2008). For example, the CRO had a computer-based database that government officials did not have access to, and was therefore underused (Morgenstein, 2008). There was also a lack of understanding about their support activities by both CRO staff and demobilised combatants.

### ***Problems with vocational training***

Morgenstein (2008) reports that the use of the National Learning Service as a mechanism to provide vocational training for ex-combatants was problematic, as it was not prepared to accept demobilised ex-combatants in its courses. In some cases teachers and students refused to allow the former paramilitaries to join the class (Morgenstein, 2008).

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<sup>6</sup> The UN defines demobilization as ‘the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants’. See – <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml>

<sup>7</sup> This includes Law 782, allowing the president to pardon political crimes, but not serious human rights violations committed by AUC members; and Law 975, offering reduced sentences to paramilitaries in exchange for information about crimes.

### ***Institutionalising impunity***

Bouvier (2007) notes that the Justice and Peace Law has been accused of institutionalising impunity by dramatically reducing the sentences for demobilised paramilitaries. The author identifies a number of challenges that have emerged through the process, including: overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities for victims' claims; difficulties in tracking down missing persons; difficulties in identifying bodies found in mass graves; and the high vulnerability of victims, investigators and prosecutors.

### ***Different treatment for different groups***

Escola de Cultura de Pau (2008) notes that, as demobilisation in Colombia has only happened with a few armed groups, the cycle of violence has not stopped. Some non-state armed groups feel that other groups have had favourable treatment, despite serious crimes. The paper notes that this complicates individuals' understanding of pardon and amnesty.

## **2.3 Reintegration<sup>8</sup> initiatives in Colombia – lessons**

Colombia has had various DDR initiatives. Some were conducted without external assistance (in 1953, and 1984-2002); the current phase has included some external assistance since 2002-2003 (Schulhofer-Wohl & Nicholas Sambanis, 2010, p. 44-8). 95 per cent of the funds for reintegration are provided by the national government; the international community provides some technical and financial support (Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, 2013, p. 2).

### ***The M-19 reintegration process***

The M-19 movement emerged in the 1970s in reaction to perceived electoral fraud, and then later initiated a process of demobilisation in 1989, and then became a political party participating in elections at the local and national level. The M-19 process was not a peace negotiation or agreement, but a demobilisation process linked to the introduction of Law 35, which created an amnesty for all guerrilla organisations in exchange for peace and stability (Theidon, 2009, p.10).

Neither the FARC nor the ELN decided to participate in this process. Bouvier (2006, p.7) claims this is because 'FARC is unlikely to enter into serious negotiations without addressing some of the broad structural issues they claim are at the root of the Colombian violence'. The ELN has historically expressed a similar position (Bouvier, 2006).

Garcia, Grabe and Patiño (2008) identify the following key achievements of the M-19 experience:

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<sup>8</sup> The UN defines reintegration as 'the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.' Reintegration usually focusses on ex-combatants, but increasingly includes programmes for the local community and for the dependents of ex-combatants (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2009; EU, 2006). The concept of reintegration can include activities in the following areas: reinsertion; social and economic reintegration; resettlement; rehabilitation; and reconciliation. EU 'reintegration' activities can include providing: 'shelter, food, vocational training, education, tools, micro-credits, employment opportunities, and addressing psychosocial and physical needs' (EU, 2006, p.20). The Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (2013) establishes reconciliation as a basic principle of its DDR process.

- The M-19 process allowed the creation of new peace processes with other armed groups (Manuel Quintin Lame, EPL and PRT groups) and influenced negotiation efforts with FARC and ELN.
- The M-19 process shows that designing a fast and flexible amnesty can provide an easy entry for ex-combatants into politics, while still allowing space for reconciliation.

They also identify the following challenges:

- The DDR process focused too much on the political component of the agreements, neglecting economic and social reintegration. Inexperience on both sides also led to errors in the implementation of health, education and productive projects.
- 160 M-19 members were assassinated after demobilisation, despite organised security schemes. This indicates the problems in assuring the safety of ex-combatants – this is similar to the UP's experience, although on a smaller scale.
- Transitioning from a military structure to a political party was a very difficult task, and the M-19 did not adapt quickly, leading to a loss of cohesion within the group, and some doubts about its management structure.

The amnesty for M-19 ex-combatants and Law 35 has also been criticised as a 'broad statement that left much room for interpretation – and for manipulation... [as] ex-combatants enjoyed complete amnesty' (Theidon, 2009, p.10).

### ***Funding limitations for general reintegration programmes***

Guaqueta (2007) notes that the government focused on demobilising ex-combatants, and as some of the former M-19 members turned to politics, other reintegration programmes were neglected. 'Almost every small project failed due to the lack of financing, training or education of its participants and because of insufficient technical assistance and monitoring of the ex-combatants projects,' highlights Koth (2005, p. 14). At the same time, while the international community welcomed the reforms, internal approval did not translate into an effective assistance or collaboration with the DDR process and particularly with the reintegration programme (Guaqueta, 2007). Meanwhile, the UN (2009, p. 52) identifies that Colombia's psycho-social programming – led and funded at sub-national level – has been limited as funding did not extend to individual counselling, and coverage was limited to urban areas.

### ***Reintegration for children, and young adults***

Almost half the members of Colombia's armed groups joined the groups as children, therefore while they might not still be children when they demobilise, they still have specific needs during reintegration (such as education) (Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, n.d.). UNICEF (2009, p. 11) highlights that an estimated 11,000 to 14,000 children in Colombia are estimated to have served in armed groups. However, only 15 per cent of these children have access to demobilization and reintegration programmes (UNICEF, 2009, p. 11).

### ***Aligning aid with existing power structures***

Elwahary (2008) argues that aid distributed through the state, and aligned with its development policies, has become problematic as the demobilisation of paramilitary groups has not translated into the dismantling of their social, economic and political power. She warns that 'supporting economic development as a means of peace-building without understanding the specific dynamics of change that emerged from the violence are likely to have distorted outcomes' (p. 97).

## 2.4 International community engagement in peace and DDR activities – roles and lessons

Colombia has historically been ‘reluctant’ to include the international community in its peace processes, however Ramírez Ocampo (2004, p. 76-77) identifies the **internationalisation of the conflict and peace process began during the 1999-2002** negotiations. From 1999, international actors provided technical and financial support to negotiations, and also made critical public announcements of the armed actors, thus applying public pressure (Ramírez Ocampo, 2004). Following separate agreements with the FARC and the ELN, two respective Group of Friends were established. In 2000/1 the US government and Colombia launched ‘Plan Colombia’. While the EU supported human rights and humanitarian activities (Ramírez Ocampo, 2004).

### *Roles of the international community*

Ramírez Ocampo (2004) argues that a solution to Colombia’s conflict is ‘unlikely’ without the international community’s involvement. In regards to peace negotiations, agreements and DDR programmes, **the international community can play a variety of roles** including:

- A donor role (providing financial aid or loans, technical support, etc).
- A diplomatic role (carrying out private or public activities to incentivise and pressure actors, making alliances with actors, etc).
- A mediation role.
- A verification and monitoring role.
- And/or an observer role.

### *Legitimising peace processes*

Bayer (2010), reviewing the historical role of the international community in peace negotiations in Colombia, argues that, overall, the international community has played an active and positive role in supporting peace accords (at Madrid and Magunz), and an important facilitator role in the El Caguán process. Bayer (2010) notes that, while the Colombian government saw the international community’s involvement as an opportunity to legitimise its peace process, it restricted the role of international actors to that of ‘problem solvers’.

### *Monitoring and verification*

Bouvier (2007, p. 38) highlights the importance of third parties in peace processes, and particularly notes that the international community can continue to support peace initiatives by helping with the **monitoring and verification** of DDR processes. The Colombian government’s reintegration policy document particularly identifies the Organisation of American States as playing a key role in the monitoring and evaluation of the disarmament of the AUC in Colombia (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2008).

### *Offering DDR experience from other contexts*

The Colombian government’s reintegration policy document notes that the international community offers political, technical and financial support – it particularly highlights the role of the international community in being able to draw on experiences of reintegration in other contexts around the world (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2008). Bouvier (2006) suggests a role for the EU in providing

technical assistance to peace-making operations (giving guidance, sharing lessons and promoting good practice).

### ***Championing human rights***

Bayer (2010) identifies that the international community has particularly helped put human rights on the national agenda in Colombia. Government officials noted the EU's contribution in providing assistance to, and promoting the rights of internally displaced people, victims of the armed conflict, and demobilized groups (Bouchier et al., 2012). Colombian civil society organisations as well as UNHCR and UNHCHR officials emphasised "political importance" of the EU's work on human and victims' rights (p. 69). Bouvier (2006) identifies that EU could be involved in peace initiatives in Colombia, by supporting human rights monitoring, early warning systems and human rights advocacy; and to facilitate alliances between social actors and national authorities.

### ***Coordination challenges***

At times, too many countries became involved with divergent, uncoordinated views, and this has weakened negotiations (Bayer, 2010). This is particularly true in regards to diverging views about Plan Colombia (Bayer, 2010). An ECDPM publication by Sherriff, Hauck, and Rocca (2013, p.v) echoes this perspective and identifies one of four key objectives for the EU as the 'active engagement of the EU institutions and the Member States', in recognition of the coordination challenges between EU Institutions and the Member States.

### ***The challenge of a terrorism approach to the Colombian conflict***

The increasing role of the international community in Colombia was influenced by the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, with an increased international focus on terrorism and drugs trafficking (Montaña, 2009). Some international actors approach the Colombian conflict as an issue of terrorism, while others approach it as an armed conflict caused by development issues. This has introduced various challenges for engagement – for example, by classifying the FARC, AUC and ELN as terrorist groups, the EU was unable to engage in direct negotiations with the groups.

In view of these different positions, Montaña (2009) identifies **three scenarios for international involvement** in Colombia's peace processes: (1) international action is limited to responding to Washington's policy towards the region: fighting terrorism and drug trafficking via Plan Colombia and intensifying the efforts for war; (2) left-wing Latin American governments create opportunities for peace negotiations in opposition to the Colombian agenda for 'democratic security'; (3) politically neutral countries – that have good relations with the Colombian government and are trusted by FARC (e.g. Brazil, Sweden and Norway) – help to open up talks abroad.

### ***Specific lessons for the EU***

A report by Gündüz and Herbolzheimer (2010, p. 7-8), published by Initiative for Peacebuilding, argues that for the EU to 'increase its performance and impact, there is a need to draw more systematically from lessons of coordinated efforts in support of peace processes, notably the EU's own wealth of experience'. It makes the following recommendations (p. 7-8):

- 'Ensure that third-party coordination efforts are part of wider peace process support strategies, and make these a central element of the European External Action Service (EEAS);
- Choose a role for the EU that complements that of others, and does not duplicate efforts;
- Take a principled approach to participating in coalitions for peace;

- Ensure inclusion and effectiveness of coordination efforts;
- Systematically assess different options for EU peace process support, in each case, including where it will be in the lead and where it will follow the lead of others;
- Promote interest-based and transformative approaches to mediation;
- Promote balanced approaches to peace process support to avoid bias;
- Habitually assess the impact of EU-backed peace process support, and regularly adapt policy and practice accordingly;
- Continue to raise awareness about mediation as a process, and sensitise heads of EU delegations, Special Envoys and relevant parts of the EEAS to the need for coordination and complementarity in peace process support; and
- Systematise the accumulated experience in support to peace processes.'

### 3. Lessons from monitoring and verification of compliance with peace agreements

#### 3.1 Roles of different actors in verification and monitoring activities

**The UN** is primarily responsible for monitoring and verification activities in peace-keeping or peace-enforcement missions (Boulden, 2000). Arnault (2006, p. 6) explains that if the implementation of a peace agreement is struggling, the UN has three strategies to prevent a breakdown of the process: mediation, substitution, verification.

**Groups of Friends.** A paper by the International Peace Academy argues that strategic coordination between third-party actors is critical to the successful implementation of peace agreements (Jones, 2001). Drawing on case study analyses of Guatemala, El Salvador and Mozambique, Jones (2001,) argues that 'one of the striking commonalities among cases of successful implementation is the use of a "Friends Groups", or the creation of a deliberate process of bringing together key governments, to ensure a degree of focus and commonality of approaches to the peace process' (p. 21).

The Group of Friends idea was pioneered in El Salvador and was, 'in this instance, an effective and flexible mechanism to ensure the leverage of countries friendly to El Salvador but not aligned to its conflict (Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela) could be used to further the [UN] secretary-general's efforts' (Whitfield, 2001, p. 34).

Jones (2001) identifies two key lessons that limit its applicability to other contexts. First, the number of international or regional organisations directly involved in the negotiations should be small for effective coordination (p. 4). Second, there should be a 'high degree of international commitment and a rough correspondence of interests of the major powers' (p. 4).

**NGOs.** Advances in technology, globalisation and the retreat of the state have led to NGOs playing a greater role in monitoring and verification (UNDIR, 2003). UNDIR (2003, p. 23) recognises benefits and challenges to this: 'compared to States or international verification organizations, NGOs are less constrained by questions of diplomacy or bureaucracy. They are able to publicize information

immediately. On the other hand, since NGOs rely almost entirely on open sources their information may be inaccurate or incomplete.’

## 3.2 General principles

There are 16 principles for verification, which were developed by the UN Disarmament Commission, and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1988 (UN, 2008). These set out process oriented principles; for example, principle 11 notes that: ‘Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties’ (UN, 2008) (see Appendix 2 for the full list of principles).

In 2008, a Panel of Government Experts published 21 recommendations for effective verification (UN, 2008). The recommendations provide a more strategic form of guidance; for example, recommendation 9 notes that: ‘Private donors, foundations, non-governmental organizations and international organizations could assist States in ensuring that civil society is aware of its obligations [in verification activities]’ (See Appendix 3 for a full list of the recommendations).

## 3.3 Key challenges for the international community

### *New methods and technologies*

With technological advances, the methods of verification and monitoring have changed significantly, introducing a number of opportunities and challenges (UN, 2008). Capacities for data gathering, processing, storing, sorting and dissemination have improved significantly (p. 10). More actors are now able to access data, and more data is available. However, the volume and quality of this information is variable (p. 9).

GPS and mobile phone technologies now allow communication with, and monitoring of, remote areas, in less intrusive ways. While this increasing the ability of effective monitoring, it also risks violations of privacy (Boulden, 2000).

### *Gender*

Peace agreement and DDR process can often exclude women. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence Margot Wallström recognised this arguing that ‘Monitoring teams must be gender balanced, not gender blind. But, to date, just three ceasefire agreements have included sexual violence.’<sup>9</sup>

### *Non-compliance – who is at fault?*

Stanley and Holiday (2002) recognise the difficulties of monitoring roles noting that when parties do not comply with agreements, it is difficult to separate out the causes of non-compliance – e.g. is it due to local factors? Or is the verification team at fault? Arnault (2006, p. 3-6) identifies three types of weaknesses that can undermine the momentum of implementation: capabilities, political constraints,

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<sup>9</sup> In February 2012 – see [http://www.peacewomen.org/security\\_council\\_monitor/debate-watch/all-debates/43/security-council-open-debate-on-women-and-peace-and-security-sexual-violence](http://www.peacewomen.org/security_council_monitor/debate-watch/all-debates/43/security-council-open-debate-on-women-and-peace-and-security-sexual-violence)

and vital concerns. In terms of lessons, Arnault (2006, p.3) notes that 'that the UN should not unthinkingly accept responsibility for the implementation of any peace agreement is perhaps the main lesson to emerge from the critical appraisal of failures that occurred in the 90s'.

### 3.4 Case studies

#### *MINUGUA – UN Mission in Guatemala*

In a widely cited book chapter, Stanley and Holiday (2002, p. 26-7) note that, while the UN played a 'crucial role' in the Guatemalan peace agreement, its role in verifying the agreement has been 'controversial' and it is 'less clear' if it has been 'as effective as it might have been'. They underline two key dilemmas the UN faced: 'how much room for action does the [UN] mission actually have? How strongly can it criticize the government without creating a counterproductive backlash either against itself, or against the peace process more broadly?' (Stanley & Holiday, 2002, p. 26-7). The authors also highlight the difficulties of assessing the impact of the UN's role, compared to factors such as the weak accords and the limited domestic implementation capacity (Stanley & Holiday, 2002).

Stanley and Holiday (2002) lay out the following challenges from the MINUGUA:

- 'When MINUGUA took over a broader verification mandate...its tasks multiplied, and it had to work with much less concrete benchmarks' (p. 28).
- Its broader verification role was 'further complicated by a lack of understanding by most Guatemalans regarding the mission's mandate and functions' (p. 28).
- The existence of a strong challenge to the ruling party from a party opposing the peace accord 'constrained the United Nations in criticizing the government and made international donors reluctant to support the present government, despite shortfalls in implementation' – a decision that was criticised by observers (p. 28).
- MINUGUA was 'unable to overcome the damage already done to its public image in the early stages of the comprehensive verification mandate' despite a 'belatedly improved' public information strategy (p. 28).
- 'It might have been more effective to have selected a different chief of mission' as the leadership of the verification mission was the same as the leadership of the mission that monitored the signing of the peace agreement. Some observers question if this meant the leader had 'too strong a personal stake in defending the peace accords' (p.29).
- 'International donors have not always worked together to apply pressure on the government to comply with the accords' (p. 29).

In terms of successes, the article notes that 'excellent coordination within the UN system, and good cooperation' with international financial institutions 'contributed to a greater understanding on their part of the financial requirements of the peace process' (p. 29).

In the conclusion, Stanley and Holiday (2002) draw out two broad lessons for verification of peace agreements from the Guatemala example. First, vaguely designed accords will not lead to substantial change and are more difficult to effectively verify (p. 47). Second, further consultation during the implementation phase has costs – as it can slow implementation and 'risk distributing responsibility so broadly that it is difficult for international verifiers to apply pressure to get things done' (p. 48).

While lack of funding for comprehensive, long-term DDR programmes can be problematic, the Guatemala example is often heralded as a successful case where negotiations over the budget for implementation and a division of responsibilities were made before the peace agreement was signed (Gleichmann et al., 2004; Whitfield, 2001).

### ***ONUSAL – UN Mission in El Salvador***

A widely cited journal article by Holiday and Stanley (1993) evaluates the UN mission to El Salvador – ONUSAL. The role of the UN in El Salvador changed over time from observer of the peace negotiations, to an active mediator, and then to verifier of the accords (p. 2). The authors recognise the ‘vital’ role of the UN in this process (p.2), and specifically that its mediation and verification helped to avert implementation crises. Whitfield (2001) recognises that the early deployment of ONUSAL under its initial mandate (to verify compliance with human rights standards) led to “an almost immediate decline in the level of grievous human rights abuse; the building of confidence in the process as a whole; and the indelible association of the presence of the United Nations in El Salvador with the promotion of human rights’ (p. 36).

Holiday and Stanley (1993) also identify a number of ‘pitfalls’, including the system of verification (p. 7). Specifically they lament that ONUSAL ‘has not always made effective or prompt use of its moral authority and status as an objective interpreter of the accords’ and point out that the mission ‘avoided making public criticisms of the government on human rights’. They argue that ‘forceful public representations could serve to generate pressure within El Salvador for official accountability and, eventually, for structural changes’ (p. 12). They also raise concerns about overreliance on international actors – and the unintentional displacement of human rights activities led by NGOs and churches.

Holiday and Stanley (1993) outline the following lessons for the UN from its activities in El Salvador:

- Recognise hazards and limitations – particularly that extensive UN involvement in institution building could encourage dependency on aid and external solutions to local problems (p. 19).
- Develop a body of experts in peace-building – especially ensure continuity of senior staff from the peace negotiations stage, to the verification stage.
- Prepare for issues that fall outside of the mandate – ‘The early creation and staffing of a political division within ONUSAL to monitor and mediate the various issues that fell outside the realm of the human rights, police and military divisions would have greatly facilitated ONUSAL’s verification efforts’ (p. 20).
- When the UN acts as both a mediator and a verifier, ‘it should explore the possibility of making different sections of a mission accountable to distinct U.N. bodies, thereby deflecting criticism of the U.N. effort as a whole’ (p. 20).
- The mandate should clearly define the ‘responsibilities of the parties to the verifying agencies and the roles of the verification personnel’ (p. 20).

Whitfield (2001, p. 35) notes that implantation suffered from a lack of funding. This was a substantial oversight by the UN, as it did not clarify where funds for implementation would be sourced from during the negotiation process. Whitfield (2001) notes it is much easier to secure donor funding before an agreement is signed – this opportunity was missed in El Salvador, as opposed to Guatemala. In addition, a lack of coordination and dialogue with the international financial institutions threatened contradictions between the economic programmes pursued and the peace agreement (Whitfield, 2001, p. 35).

### ***Kosovo's Verification Mission (KVM)***

In 1998, the KVM was established to monitor and report violations of ceasefire agreements and human rights to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Security Council and the government of the former Yugoslavia. An ICG briefing (2004, p. 3-5) argues that the KVM in Kosovo has been a 'failure' as:

- 'The mission had the consent of only one of the two parties to the conflict' (p. 4).
- There wasn't a genuine ceasefire to verify, and both the Serb army and the guerrillas continued to attack and displace civilians.
- The KVM had no physical means for enforcement as it was an unarmed organisation – this weakened their ability to prevent violations, and therefore weakened their credibility.
- KVM had limited sanctions at its disposal.
- KVM was 'not seen as an independent and important actor in the wider political scene' nationally (p. 5).

### ***Bosnia's Office of the High Representative (OHR)***

In 1998, the Office for the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia was mandated to sanction the violations of the 1995 peace agreement and the rules of the Provisional Election Commission that individuals or political parties would commit. While an ICG (2004, p. 3) briefing describes this case as 'relatively successful', it also details the following lessons:

- No legal criteria or process was established to regulate OHR sanctions. This has given the OHR extensive, effective powers (p.7). This allowed the OHR to establish 'definite standards of behaviour' (p. 7), but was criticised by some as being undemocratic, lacking transparency and undermining the credibility of the OHR (p. 5-6).
- Without armed forces, the OHR cannot enforce sanctions (p. 6).

## **4. Lessons from reintegration experiences in other countries**

Reintegration is widely recognised as an extremely challenging task – McFate (2010) names it the 'forgotten R' of DDR. A GSDRC literature review notes that many DDR programmes have been judged unsuccessful (Scott, 2010, p. 1)., Many authors underline that the lessons from one context are not necessarily relevant to another context (Scott, 2010, p. 1). The literature base in this area is mixed – some countries have extensive literature documenting reintegration activities (e.g. El Salvador), while others have a much smaller amount of literature publically available (e.g. Guatemala). This section focuses on three in-depth country case studies.<sup>10</sup> Much of the authoritative literature in this area is older, reflecting the period of time when these reintegration initiatives were established.

### ***Evidence based programming as a strategic priority***

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<sup>10</sup> Limited relevant and robust information was available on Peru.

While there is extensive evidence in this area, a report published by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNDIR) notes that the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has found that ‘reintegration programming is not as effective as it could or should be’ (Miller & Rudnick, 2012, p. 11). The IAWG has therefore made evidence-based programming in reintegration programmes a ‘strategic priority area’ (Miller & Rudnick, 2012, p. 11).

The UNDIR currently runs a programme<sup>11</sup> examining how to design evidence-based reintegration programmes. The concept note identifies a ‘gap’ between ‘research findings and their use in programme design’ (UNDIR, n.d., p. 1). The programme note recognises that: ‘The complex nature of reintegration requires designers to strike a balance between policy goals (i.e. the ideal) and the many kinds of sociocultural, practical, and material features that characterize a given programming context (i.e. the real)’ (p. 1).

## 4.1 Case studies

### *El Salvador*

Following the 1992 end to the civil war in El Salvador, the country adopted a DDR programme. McFate (2010) notes that reintegration was less successful than the disarmament and demobilisation stages, and reintegration fell behind on the timelines established in the peace agreement. Despite this, ‘with respect to negotiated conflict settlements and police-military reforms’ El Salvador was viewed ‘as a major success story’ by UN and other actors (Kincaid, 2000, p. 47).

McFate (2010) draws a number of **lessons** from the experience (p. 10):

- Both the armed group (FMLN) and the national armed forces (FAES) were ‘widely victimised and shunned in communities’ (p. 10).
- FMLN combatants were reintegrated into the political system, however the FAES were not.
- The distinct needs of male, female and child combatants were not recognised - and they were treated in the same way by the programme.

Córdova Macías (2001, p. 28-29) notes that, overall, **economic support** for ex-combatants during the **disarmament and demobilisation** processes ‘**contributed significantly to the political stability** necessary for the implementation of the peace accords’. However, the author also notes that the ‘reinsertion’ programmes have had ‘uneven progress’. In particular, the programmes provided only limited economic support and were not developed as part of a broader development plan for El Salvador (Córdova Macías, 2001).

Whitfield (2001) asks if the ‘**post-war crime wave**’ (p. 40) could have been avoided had former-army combatants been prioritised higher in the reintegration programmes. Kincaid (2000) recognises criminal activity and non-political crime is the principal problem affecting security in El Salvador.

**Demobilisation left many combatants unemployed and maladjusted.** The reintegration programmes didn’t address the underlying social and economic problems facing combatants, who therefore continued to cause public insecurity and political instability (p. 32). Chávez (2008) echoes this finding, noting that while DDR was key to maintaining peace in El Salvador, reintegration ‘failed to provide the majority of

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<sup>11</sup> See <http://www.unidir.org/research-and-development-on-evidence-based-programme-design-for-reintegration-phase-ii>

former combatants sufficient socioeconomic support to build dignified lives' (p. 13). Kincaid (2000) notes that 'rapid demobilisation' left ex-combatants without 'adequate provisions for productively reintegrating them into society' (p. 45).

Moreover, a key feature of reintegration – the land reform programme (PTT) – suffered from logistical problems, bureaucratic challenges and a lack of political will in the country (Whitfield, 2001, p. 37).

### ***Burundi***

The World Bank's Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) largely funded Burundi's reintegration programme from 2004 onwards. In a paper published by the Clingendael Institute, Douma argues that the programme has been a 'dismal failure' (2009, p. 30). According to the paper, reintegration 'largely failed' (p.7) in urban contexts, as the target groups lacked basic skills to be able to successfully reintegrate. Reintegration was "slightly more successful" (p.8) in the rural context as ex-combatants were able to return to family and former livelihoods.

Douma (2009, p. 5-8) explains this failure as due to a number of challenges, including political issues slowing the demobilisation of police officers and soldiers, a 15-month delay in starting the programme, only around half of the budget having been disbursed, and problems in the collaboration between the implementing international agencies and the national mechanism.

The paper offers the following recommendations (p. 9-10):

- Design a follow-up DDR programme that allows for security sector reform.
- Map high-risk groups and make an inventory of economic opportunities.
- Develop a long-term macro-economic perspective for Burundi.
- Design and apply appropriate screening methods to distinguish between genuine fighters and opportunistic recruits.
- Identify and train soldiers before demobilisation.
- Develop community-based reintegration programmes centred on transitional justice and focused on local demand.
- Develop an appropriate vocational training structure in Burundi.
- Include appropriate monitoring and supervision structures in DDR programmes.

In a meta-review of DDR for the Swedish government's Folke Bernadotte Academy, Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2014) also identify the **transition** of the non-state armed group the National Liberation Front (**FLN**) into a **political party** during DDR as an example of how DDR can 'transform armed groups into entities that can participate non-militarily in the political and social life of the country' (p. 14). The authors recognise this as an important step to bring 'opposing groups into the political system' (p. 14) and to channel conflicts through the political system.

### ***Guatemala***<sup>12</sup>

1994-1996 Guatemalan peace agreement led to an agreement on DDR in 1998, and the demobilization of the armed group *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (URNG). A progress report published

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<sup>12</sup> A limited amount of robust evidence on reintegration lessons in Guatemala was found during this rapid review.

in 1999 by MINUGUA notes that the initiation of the reintegration programme had ‘a positive impact’ but that ‘the integration process as a whole is still weak’.<sup>13</sup>

Kincaid (2000) recognises the challenge of reintegration in Guatemala and El Salvador with such few job prospects. Gleichmann, et al. (2004) argue that international assistance should focus on ‘funding new micro- and small-scale businesses set up through an open reintegration fund’ (p. 86) in Guatemala, and other countries such as El Salvador, Mozambique and Ethiopia.

The utility of **maintaining links with armed groups**, following demobilisation, is highlighted in some of the literature. Patel et al. (2009) notes that recent studies highlight positive effects on female ex-combatants’ reintegration when using support networks, peer assistance, and self-help groups based on former group alliances. The paper refers to Guatemalan female ex-combatants who following demobilisation continued to play political and social activism roles. Meanwhile, Gleichmann, et al. (2004) notes that in Guatemala and El Salvador, the establishment of formal organisations for ex-combatants – like veterans’ associations – fostered direct links between ex-combatants, the government and UN agencies working on the reintegration programmes.

## 4.2 Roles and lessons for the international community

A widely cited journal article by Colletta and Muggah (2009, p. 443) argues that challenges and lessons from DDR initiatives are leading academics to search for ‘second generation’ DDR programmes, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. Such programmes tend to be led more by evidence, based on the identification of country needs, focussed on local risk factors and resilience at the community levels (p. 444). This approach shifts from ‘top-down interventions designed by outsiders to more community-designed and executed approaches’ (p. 444).

### *Lessons for the EU*

The EU’s guidance note on DDR (2006) outlines the following recommendations for its support to DDR activities:

- **Defining ex-combatants and criteria for eligibility** (p. 9). It is inherently difficult to identify ex-combatants – there can be incentives to enlarge or reduce the actual number. Therefore ‘the eligibility criteria need to be tightly defined and expectations need to be carefully managed from the outset’.
- **Gender** (p. 9) – An ‘equalised gender approach’ should ‘offer equal benefits to men and women ex-combatants’. The definition of an ex-combatant should not just include those with arms, but non-fighting ex-combatants that may be more likely to be women.
- **Children** (p. 9-10) – DDR activities should be sensitive to the special needs of child combatants, such as reuniting with their families, needs for education and life skills, and healing from trauma. The paper advises that ‘immediate support should be offered to children to reintegrate into society, through community-based approaches’, and this should be funded through humanitarian budgets, if a formal DDR process has not been initiated.
- **Funding** (p. 10) – ‘Providing sufficient funds for reintegration has many times been a problem as often not enough money has been earmarked for this part of the process and reintegration

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<sup>13</sup> See [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/MINUGUA\\_-\\_Fourth\\_report](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/MINUGUA_-_Fourth_report) . This appears to be the only publicly available progress report online.

phases have not always been complemented by other programmes, like more extensive, follow-on community development activities. The international donor community needs to make long-term commitments and sequence support in such a way that it can ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to the entire process.'

- **Aid modalities** (p. 10) – 'Serious consideration should be given to channelling DDR funding through a multi-donor Trust Fund Mechanism with pre-committed financing.' Two 'different windows for different components of the DDR process' could be used, 'one for long-term reintegration of ex-combatants and one for support to affected communities'.

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## Key websites

- Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (ACR)  
<http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/>
- United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml>
- Conciliation Resources, Alternatives to war: Colombia's peace processes  
<http://www.c-r.org/accord/colombia>
- Conciliation Resources, Colombia (general profile)  
<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/colombia>
- International Crisis Group (ICG), Colombia  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia.aspx>

## 6. Appendices

### Appendix 1 – Full question

#### Guiding question:

What lessons learned are there from international community involvement in the implementation of peace agreements that are relevant to Colombia's forthcoming peace agreement and its following implementation?

#### Subsections:

1. Lessons learned from reintegration experiences:
  - a. How have the international (donor) community been involved in the reintegration of ex-combatants during the implementation of peace agreements in: (a) the Latin America region (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru); and (b) elsewhere (e.g. Northern-Ireland, Burundi, etc.)?
  - b. What were the challenges, successes and failures of these experiences?
  - c. What worked? What went wrong? What were the missed opportunities?
  - d. What are the lessons learned for international (donor) community involvement?
2. Lessons learned from monitoring and verification of compliance with peace agreements:
  - a. Provide examples of successful and unsuccessful cases of monitoring and verification of compliance with peace agreements.
  - b. Include mechanisms such as civil society platforms or Groups of Friends.
  - c. Include case study examples, and general principles.
  - d. What are the lessons learned for international (donor) community involvement?
3. Lessons learned from Colombia's experiences with peace agreements:
  - a. Why did previous attempts to achieve a peace agreement in Colombia fail? (general reasons)
  - b. What were the challenges, successes and failures in the M-19 reintegration process?
  - c. How were the international (donor) community involved, what opportunities were missed?
  - d. What are the lessons learned for international (donor) community involvement?
4. Lessons learned from dismantling rebel and paramilitary groups in Colombia's partial DDR (post-2005):
  - a. What were the challenges, successes and failures of dismantling rebel and paramilitary groups during Colombia's partial DDR process (post 2005)? (general reasons)
  - b. How were the international (donor) community involved?
  - c. Why did so many paramilitaries fail to be reintegrated properly?
  - d. What are the lessons learned for international (donor) community involvement?

## Appendix 2 – The 16 principles for verification

These 16 principles for verification were adopted in 1990 by the United Nations Disarmament Commission and recommended by the General Assembly in resolution A/43/78 A (see section 3).<sup>14</sup>

1. Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.
2. Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements.
3. Verification should promote the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament measures, build confidence among States and ensure that agreements are being observed by all parties.
4. Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections.
5. Verification in the arms limitation and disarmament process will benefit from greater openness.
6. Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to interfere with the agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification, when these are operating in a manner consistent with the provisions of the agreement and generally recognized principles of international law.
7. Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the agreement
8. To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the verification system, an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames for such reviews should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment.
9. Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific arms limitation and disarmament agreements.
10. All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties.
11. Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties.
12. Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and acceptability of specific methods and arrangements intended to verify compliance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement can only be made within the context of that agreement.
13. Verification of compliance with the obligations imposed by an arms limitation and disarmament agreement is an activity conducted by the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement or by an organization at the request and with the explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression of the sovereign right of States to enter into such arrangements.
14. Requests for inspections or information in accordance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should be considered as a normal component of the verification process. Such requests should be used only for the purposes of the determination of compliance, care being taken to avoid abuses.

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<sup>14</sup> See p.25-27, [http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/DSS\\_32.pdf](http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/DSS_32.pdf)

15. Verification arrangements should be implemented without discrimination, and, in accomplishing their purpose, avoid unduly interfering with the internal affairs of State parties or other States, or jeopardizing their economic, technological and social development.
16. To be adequate and effective, a verification regime for an agreement must cover all relevant weapons, facilities, locations, installations and activities are found in the 1978 Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, and the 1988 United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) agreed on 16 Principles of Verification (UNDIR, 2003, p.5).

### **Appendix 3 – The 21 recommendations for verification**

These 21 recommendations for verification were published in 2008 in the report of the UN Panel of Government Experts on verification (see section 3).<sup>15</sup>

#### Recommendation 1

24. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaties, agreements and commitments, when and if appropriate to the circumstances, should be defined in a way such that they can be subject to effective verification.

#### Recommendation 2

25. Verification approaches should be designed to enable the parties to an agreement to monitor compliance, and detect and collect evidence of possible non-compliance, before that non-compliance threatens the core security objectives of the agreement. To the extent that these objectives can be achieved, it is therefore preferable that treaties, agreements and commitments be supported by an appropriately elaborated set of verification procedures and means that take full account of the nature of the agreement and the relationship among the potential parties.

#### Recommendation 3

26. If it is determined by States that verification cannot be achieved with confidence in this fashion, States may wish to consider proceeding with the agreement using other appropriate means.

#### Recommendation 4

27. Analysis could be undertaken of the capability of existing and possible new verification methods to detect significant, deliberate non-compliance or a pattern of non-compliance with obligations.

#### Recommendation 5

28. Further consideration could be given to responses to withdrawal from treaties where the withdrawing party has misused its technology and technology transfers for peaceful purposes to pursue prohibited weapons-related activities, with specific reference to non-compliance, continuing verification and denying violators the benefits of their violations.

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<sup>15</sup> See – p.14-22 [http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/DSS\\_32.pdf](http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/DSS_32.pdf)

#### Recommendation 6

36. Those in a position to do so might consider assisting relevant States and regional groups in developing the legal, institutional and operational capacity to implement their obligations under Security Council embargoes and sanctions. In this regard, the utilization and continued development of effective, low-tech monitoring technologies and methodologies should be fostered, as well as the strengthening of States' tracking of illegal arms flows and enhanced national controls on imports, exports, financial transactions and brokering relating to illicit arms transfers.

#### Recommendation 7

37. The United Nations could encourage improved coordination among Member States and regional organizations and help affected States to participate actively in monitoring and verifying compliance with arms embargoes and sanctions.

#### Recommendation 8

38. States Members of the United Nations, in line with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), should consider the kind of practical assistance they can provide, particularly in the areas of reporting and capacity-building, to help States implement their non-proliferation obligations.

#### Recommendation 9

39. Private donors, foundations, non-governmental organizations and international organizations could assist States in ensuring that civil society is aware of its obligations.

#### Recommendation 10

40. Partnerships between or among States, the United Nations, other international organizations and civil society to help build capacity for national implementation of States' obligations, including through research and identification of appropriate legislative models and best practices, might be further encouraged, where appropriate.

#### Recommendation 11

53. States might usefully examine the lessons learned from past verification experiences, including, the use of inspections, interviews, data mining, multidisciplinary approaches, teams and training.

#### Recommendation 12

54. States should consider practically how they might go about handling challenge inspections at sensitive sites in order to manage access in a way that builds confidence that the process can demonstrate compliance, while preventing disclosure of confidential information and data not related to the obligation at hand. This could be done for examples through training or table-top exercises and mock inspections with or without involvement of international organizations or other States parties.

#### Recommendation 13

55. There may be scope for further cooperation between and among States and standing verification mechanisms of relevant international organizations to identify potential synergies and collaborative possibilities.

#### Recommendation 14

56. Changes in the international security environment can have implications for what States need in their verification toolbox. The creation of new or expanded obligations may require different or new methodologies and techniques (such as, for example, environmental sampling, open-source analysis, interviewing personnel and informal monitoring by civil society). States in a position to do so should continue to research new verification methods and technologies to meet today's challenges and obligations.

#### Recommendation 15

57. States in a position to do so may wish to consider how best to assist other States in identifying, acquiring and using those verification and monitoring techniques, technologies and methodologies, in particular low-tech, that are best suited to their particular security needs. This could be particularly useful in the area of the illicit transfer of conventional weapons.

#### Recommendation 16

66. In the context of General Assembly resolutions 42/37 C and 45/57 C, States could consider ways in which they could contribute to making the Secretary-General's mechanism to investigate alleged use of chemical or biological weapons more operational and cost-effective through national measures.

#### Recommendation 17

67. Consideration should be given to strengthening ties and establishing appropriate standing arrangements with international organizations, including OPCW, States and regional bodies, so as to build upon and make use of their relevant investigative capabilities and make the mechanism more operational and cost-effective.

#### Recommendation 18

68. States that have not done so should consider providing the names of experts and/or laboratories to facilitate the updating of the relevant lists.

#### Recommendation 19

69. States could continue to explore the synergies that may exist in the area of techniques and methodologies of monitoring and verification and in addressing situations relating to compliance and non-compliance.

#### Recommendation 20

70. International organizations mandated to collect information from States in support of monitoring States' compliance with obligations might consider ways and means of alleviating or mitigating the overlap, as well as of improving the ways in which data are collected and disseminated to States.

#### Recommendation 21

71. Bilateral and regional arrangements could be encouraged to play a role, where appropriate, in promoting compliance, building confidence and detecting, assessing and responding to non-compliance.