

Adult Civic Education in Developing Democracies:
Policy Implications from a Three-Country Study

Christopher Sabatini
National Endowment for Democracy
Chriss@ned.org

Steven E. Finkel
Department of Politics
University of Virginia
sef@virginia.edu

Paper presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Boston, Massachusetts, August 28-September 1, 2002

Draft. Not for citation.

Adult Civic Education in Developing Democracies: Policy Implications from a Three-Country Study

Introduction

For the past several decades, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and many other development organizations have spent tens of millions of dollars annually on civic education programs as part of their efforts to support democracy abroad.¹ According to USAID's budget data, the government's chief development agency invested approximately 30 million dollars throughout the 1990s for "civic education programs," which range from the adoption of new curricula in primary and secondary schools to teach young people about democracy, to programs that provide instruction about the social and political rights of women, to voter education programs, to neighborhood problem-solving programs that bring individuals in contact with local authorities for purposes of promoting collective action to benefit local communities. The agency's strategic framework states explicitly that it seeks, through its civil society programs such as civic education, to "strengthen democratic political culture," to promote "acceptance by both citizens and political elites of a shared system of democratic norms and values," and to encourage citizens "to obtain knowledge about their system of government and act upon their values by participating in the political and policy process" (USAID Democracy Strategic Framework, 1998).

These optimistic hopes about the desirability and effectiveness of civic education in developing democracies are not, however, shared by many policy-makers and scholars of the democratization process. Recent literature on international democratization assistance has mounted a series of arguments critiquing both the idea and the implementation of donor-supported civic education programs abroad. Carothers (1999; 2002), for example, argues that civic education tends to be part of the "institutional checklist" that fit into what he refers to as the

¹ Based on data provided to the authors by the USAID Budget Office, October 1995.

misguided “transition paradigm” that has served as a framework for donor assistance to support democracy. Such programs, he argues, fail to focus on the key political patterns in the distribution of power in individual countries. Moreover, civic education programs in countries such as Zambia and Guatemala allegedly had little impact because they focused on teaching abstract notions of political rights and democracy “too removed from the daily lives” of many of the supposed beneficiaries (Carothers 1999, 232). Such programs, it is argued, have been too formal, with little understanding of local conditions and demands, and often presenting a vision of democracy which is in stark contrast to the corrupt, inefficient and often conflict-ridden practice of politics that many citizens experience in developing democracies. Carothers (1999) and other critics argue that, unlike in authoritarian systems when these comparisons may inspire democratic change, in fledgling democracies they amount to trying to sell democracy to an already disillusioned populace.

Another line of criticism of international democratization programs has focused on the groups that conduct civic education programs in the field. Donor assistance for civic education is often through local or national civil society organizations that receive funding to develop curricula (sometimes, though not always, in collaboration with an international partner), mobilize participants and conduct the actual seminars to teach participants. Part of the donor rationale for funding civic education is to strengthen the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the host countries that conduct such programs. Strengthening of these NGOs is understood as important for increasing participation (Macdonald 1997, 19-22) and generating secondary associations that bring individuals together in cooperative ventures—in much the way described by Robert Putnam (Putnam 1993)—to foster civic values such as compromise, cooperation and trust.

A number of observers, however, have questioned whether the groups that receive donor assistance under the rubric of civil society—including those that conduct civic education—are “genuine” civil society organizations (Carothers 1999; Isaacs 1999; Ottoway and Chung 1999; MacDonald 1997). Many of these authors contend that international assistance has tended to

focus on elite-dominated groups with limited support in society. Both Ottoway and Chung (1999) and Carothers (1999), for example, argue that foreign donors, particularly U.S. funders, tend to concentrate on advocacy groups that represent only a narrow slice of the civil society of a country, instead of more homegrown groups that have sprung up from locally defined interests or demands such as church groups, cultural or hobby groups, and other non-political associations (Carothers 1999, 212 and Ottoway and Chung 1999). Edwards and Hulme (1996a, 966), Bebbington and Theile (1993, 57) and Ottoway and Chung (1999) contend that the availability of foreign funding has fostered “opportunistic NGOs” that have sprung up around the promise of donor money and for which there is no natural constituency in their local societies. This process of unnatural selection of civil society groups has created an international civil society elite more connected to donors and the international conference circles than their own countries (Shifter 1999; Isaacs 1999; Ottoway and Chung 1999). In the hands of elite-dominated advocacy NGOs, Ottoway and Chung (1999) assert that civic education NGOs focus on delivering “the knowledge that leaders believe others need” (Ottoway and Chung 1999, 107), the implication being that the strategy and function of these donor-generated and dependent civic education advocacy NGOs is based on the simplistic and elitist notion of the need to educate the masses and instill a democratic culture, rather than reflecting and responding to the basic demands and interests of the population.

The conclusion that many of the writers draw is that these internationally supported groups are different from the civil society groups that have been described as so crucial to democracy. Instead, these groups represent something in between: elite dominated non-governmental organizations that often have limited roots in society and are somewhat removed from the more basic demands of a broad segment of society, and therefore have little of the impact or perform few of the functions that many democracy policy makers have traditionally attributed to (idealized) civil society groups.

Also problematic is the political nature of the civil society organizations and how this

affects their civic education and other democratization programs. Advocacy groups that receive donor funding tend to be engaged in more political or even partisan activities than the traditional secondary associations described by Putnam. Many of the groups that receive donor support to work in areas such as judicial reform, human rights, and civic education are more along the lines of what Foley and Edwards term Civil Society II groups. (Foley and Edwards 1996) Their argument is that in contrast to the apolitical society that Putnam describes (Civil Society I) Civil Society II groups are “more political mobilized social actors” (1996, 42). While these more political groups may foster greater bonds of trust and cooperation among their members, their political agenda and their political and narrow orientation will tend to make these groups more contentious. The role they play depends on the complex political environment in which they operate, such as state capacity, political polarization, and the tolerance of the regime (Foley and Edwards 1996, 48).

Despite these wide-ranging critiques of civic education programs and the more general democratization strategies within which they are embedded, there have been surprisingly few efforts made to assess the actual impact of civic education on individuals who experience democracy training. There is a growing literature on the effectiveness of school-based civics education among children and young adults in developing democracies (e.g. Morduchowicz, Catterberg, Niemi and Bell 1996; Slomczynski and Shabad 1999; Torney-Purta *et al* 2001). Among adult programs, however, nearly all evaluations of civic education in developing democracies have looked exclusively at implementation and management issues such as the numbers of people trained, the quality of teachers and trainers, the quality of materials and whether the programs achieved their stated organizational goals (see Brilliant 2000). Aside from the work we describe in this paper, there has been only one previous study that has attempted to evaluate whether adult civic education programs affected the democratic orientations or behaviors of ordinary individuals (Bratton *et al.* 1999). The study, which compared a treatment group of individuals who had participated in civic education programs in Zambia with a national control

sample, concluded that “civic education’s effects are marginal, partly contradictory, and socially selective” (Bratton et al. 1999, 822) Thus the current view of civic education, from both policy and the empirical or evaluation perspectives, appears to be one of deep skepticism about the extent to which democratic orientations and behaviors can be “engineered” through civics training, as well as skepticism about the desirability of funding local or national NGOs to conduct such training as part of an overall democratization strategy.²

In this paper, we report the results of the most comprehensive evaluation effort conducted to date of civic education in developing democracies, an ongoing study commissioned in 1997 by USAID to assess the effectiveness of civic education programs in the Dominican Republic, Poland, and South Africa. Based on these results, we discuss their implications for the implementation of civic education programs as well as for the role of civic education programs in supporting democratization in different political contexts in the future. We show that both the empirical effects and policy implications are more nuanced than has previously been recognized. Civic education **can** influence democratic behaviors and attitudes, but only when conducted frequently with certain kinds of participatory teaching methodologies. Moreover, the NGOs that conduct civic education **do** have their own political and organizational agendas, but they appear nevertheless to be able to mobilize ordinary individuals into the democratic process by working together with more traditional civil society organizations and supplementing those group’s political mobilization processes. The policy implications are relatively clear: civic education should be implemented **only** if it can be conducted “correctly” in a given political and economic context, and only if the political stance of the implementing NGOs and their relationships with

² Such skepticism about the effectiveness of civic education resonates as well with the substantial body of academic literature that asserts that changes in democratic political culture occur slowly in response to structural factors and long-term political socialization, with little potential effect from short-term interventions. (e.g. Lipset 1959 Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton 1994; Inglehart 1990; Weil 1989; 1993). As Dalton writes, “democratic norms are not learned through formal education and indoctrination but through experience with the democratic process.” (Dalton 1994, 490).

traditional civil society groups are conducive for the development of democratic attitudes and behaviors among program participants.

The USAID Civic Education Evaluation Project

The USAID Civic Education Evaluation Project was initiated in 1997, encompassing an assessment of civic education programs in two countries, the Dominican Republic and Poland. After the success of this initial investigation (summarized in Sabatini, Bevis and Finkel 1998), USAID funded a follow-on study in South Africa, with data collection completed before the June 1999 elections (see Finkel and Stumbras 2000). In each country, three to four USAID-funded civic education programs were selected for evaluation, ranging from a program conducted by the Dominican group ADOPEM that trained women in human rights and democratic values, to a program in community problem-solving and self-governance sponsored by the Polish group Foundation for Support of Local Democracy (FSLD), to a program conducted by the South African group Lawyers for Human Rights that trained individuals in constitutional awareness and democratic rights. (A description of these programs can be found in the Appendix). Professional survey companies were employed in each country to administer questionnaires to a randomly-selected sample of individuals trained in each program. The impact of civic education was ascertained by comparing the responses of individuals who had undergone civic education training (what we call the “treatment group”) to the responses of similar individuals who had not been trained (what we call the “control group”). A total of 5675 interviews were conducted altogether, 2087 in the Dominican Republic, 2038 in Poland, and 1550 in South Africa. Further amplification and clarification of the quantitative findings were provided through qualitative interviews with civic education trainers, and with focus group interviews with selected adults and students who had received civic education instruction.

The study has sought to assess the impact of civic education on a variety of orientations and behaviors long acknowledged by political scientists as essential components of democratic citizenship. One set of orientations encompasses the individual’s “civic competence,” following

the long-standing presumption that political knowledge, civic skills, and perceptions of political influence or efficacy constitute important resources for meaningful democratic participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Another set encompasses the individual's adherence to a set of democratic values and norms such as: political tolerance, or the extent to which citizens are willing to extend procedural democratic liberties to individuals and groups with whom they may disagree; institutional trust, where citizens should support basic social and political institutions, though not without some degree of healthy skepticism and willingness to hold elites and the system as a whole to account; and support for the rule of law, or the extent to which the individual believes that all citizens must obey legitimate authority as well the extent to which the individual believes that citizens have rights against the state (see Gibson et al. 1992, 332; Finkel et al. 1999).

These potential effects of civic education on democratic skills and values are shown in Figure 1, with the path from civic education to civic competence labeled as path 'a' and to democratic values and norms as path 'b.' As civic education also attempts to encourage individuals to take part in democratic politics, participation at both the national and local levels are included as additional outcomes, with the potential effects of civic education operating either indirectly through civic competence and values (paths 'd' and 'e'), or as the result of direct mobilization efforts by the groups that conduct the civic education training (path 'c'). Our goals in this project, then, have been to evaluate the impact of civic education programs by estimating and interpreting the effects of these programs on the individual's civic competence and support for democratic values, and the direct and indirect effects of the programs on individual participation in the political process.³

(Figure 1 goes here)

³ It is also possible that civic education-induced participation may affect subsequent levels of civic competence and democratic values in a process of reciprocal influence, though we cannot evaluate this process with the data from this study (Finkel 1987).

The effect of civic education on each democratic orientation and behavior was estimated via regression models that attempt to control for the selection biases that are inherent in the civic education programs examined in the three countries. In the absence of a pre-test and/or randomized assignment of individuals to civic education “treatments,” we cannot rule out the possibility that individuals who were trained in civic education workshops **already** possessed those attributes, such as education, group memberships, political interest, and the like, that correlate with democratic orientations --- indeed, these may be exactly those factors that led individuals to attend civic education workshops in the first place. Thus any observed difference between civic education participants and the control group on participation may be due to pre-existing differences on these other variables, and it is essential to include these factors in the statistical models. Hence the models presented here are the results of multiple regression analyses which estimate the effect of the treatment on participation after taking into account the differences between the treatment and the control groups on all other variables included in the model.⁴

Summary of Major Findings

The project thus far has yielded numerous empirical findings regarding the extent to which civic education influences democratic orientations and behaviors, as well as the conditions

⁴ For several of these orientations, more complex statistical models were also estimated that attempt to control for *unmeasured* factors related to the individual’s self-selection into the civic education “treatment.” For example, individuals who decide to attend civic education workshops may differ from other individuals not only in terms of observed characteristics such as group memberships, educational attainment, and political interest, but also in terms of unobserved variables such as their intrinsic predisposition toward democracy, their motivation to succeed in a democratic society, their need for sociability, and the like. If these factors related to self-selection are also positively (or negatively) related to participation, then estimates of the treatment effect of civic education will be biased, as the estimated regression coefficient for attending civic education would include some of the effect of these unmeasured variables as well. To correct this problem Heckman (e.g. 1992) has proposed a two-step procedure, also discussed at length in Achen (1986), where the selection decision (i.e. the decision to attend a civic education workshop) is modeled via probit analysis, and the “generalized probit residuals” are then entered as a separate independent variable into the equations predicting the democratic orientations. We are currently continuing our estimation of these models, but the initial results for participation (Finkel 2002, forthcoming) and political tolerance (Finkel 2000) show that, despite the existence of some self-selection biases in the basic multiple regression results, there are no important differences in the main substantive conclusions that we draw below.

under which democracy training has stronger and weaker effects. We will present the more important policy-relevant findings here; interested readers are referred to the project's previous publications, presentations and USAID reports for more elaboration and more extensive analyses on dependent variables not considered here (Sabatini, Bevis and Finkel 1998, Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 1998; 2000; Finkel, 2000; 2002; Finkel and Stumbras 2000; Blair 2000; Finkel and Ernst, 2001).

1. A Hierarchy of Effects: Participation, Civic Competence, and Democratic Values

By far the largest effects of civic education in each country were found for political participation, especially at the local level, with smaller though substantively meaningful effects of civic education on civic skills and political efficacy, and the weakest effects being exhibited for democratic values such as tolerance and trust. These findings are summarized in Tables 1-5, which show the effects of attending civic education either infrequently (one-two sessions) or more often (three or more sessions) on each of five dependent variables --- local participation, knowledge, efficacy, tolerance, and trust --- controlling for independent variables such as interest, media exposure, group membership, race, and place of residence. The Unstandardized regression coefficients and their t-values are shown, along with the standardized beta coefficient, which expresses the effect of the independent variables in standard deviation terms and can therefore be used to make rough comparisons regarding the relative magnitude of effects within particular models.

(Tables 1 through 5 here)

As can be seen from Table 1, individuals who were exposed to one or two civic education workshops in South Africa, for example, score on average .25 higher on the participation scale than the control group, with this figure rising to .59 for individuals who attended three or more sessions. The effects in the Dominican Republic were of roughly similar magnitude, and those in Poland even stronger, as individuals trained in civic education participated on average between .48 and 1.03 local political behaviors more than the control group. As can be seen from the beta

coefficients, all of these effects are substantively meaningful, as the impact of civic education rivals such traditional predictors of political participation as secondary group memberships, education and political interest in importance.

Tables 2 and 3 show the effects of civic education on the competence measures of political knowledge and political efficacy, while Tables 3 and 4 show the corresponding effects on two democratic values, political tolerance and institutional trust. It can be seen that generally, the effects on these variables are smaller in standard deviation terms than the effects on political participation in Table 1. Some effects for all of these variables are in fact statistically insignificant, indicating that civic education in some contexts has negligible influence on these orientations. In general, it appears that the effects on competence measures are slightly greater than those for democratic values.

Taken together, the findings indicate that the most important effect of civic education is as a *direct* mobilizing agent for political participation, and only secondarily as an influence on democratic orientations, attitudes, or skills. In a related analysis (Finkel 2002), we argue that such a pattern reflects the intimate relationship of civic education in developing democracies with processes of group political mobilization, as advocacy NGOs utilize civic education as a means for stimulating individuals to participate in group activities, strengthening their membership base, and furthering the group's political goals. While we do not present the disaggregated results for the individual programs, we note an important distinction between programs that amplifies this point: programs (such as GAD in the Dominican Republic, and FSLD and Dialog in Poland) that directly focused on providing the motivation (through problem identification and solution), advocacy skills and techniques, and fora and structures to participate demonstrated the greatest impact in promoting behavior change among participants. Thus, the civic education process itself is a type of political mobilization, and the heightened political participation seen by individuals who are trained in democracy workshops reflects the goals, priorities, and group-related dynamics

of the implementing NGOs. We shall return to this point below when we discuss the findings' policy implications.

We also note one interesting difference across the three countries in the effects of civic education on institutional trust: exposure to civic education produced significantly *higher* levels of political trust in South Africa and significantly higher levels of *distrust* in the Dominican Republic. Again, these patterns point to the crucial importance of the implementing NGOs in the civic education process, as the results can be seen as reflecting these groups' political agendas and orientations toward the state. In the Dominican Republic the groups conducting civic education were undeniably antagonistic to the government at the time, which recently had stolen the 1994 election. This opposition posture can be seen clearly in the training materials used in the program, which focused on mobilizing citizens around their frustrations with the government and demand for reform (Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis 2000). By contrast, the South Africa programs were carried out after the transition to a post-apartheid society where power was held by the ANC and affiliated groups. In this context, fundamental political change had already occurred and they were attempting to educate citizens about their new rights in the system and how best to protect them. Moreover, many of the groups that were implementing civic education in the South African context were those involved in the struggle against apartheid only a few years before. The differential effects of civic education on institutional trust in these contexts, then, appears to reflect very well the orientations of the implementing NGOs vis-à-vis the current government. Again, we shall return to the policy implications of this point below.

2. The Importance of Frequent Civic Education Exposure, Participatory Teaching Methodologies, and High Quality Instruction

Equally important, the study has found consistent evidence that the effects of civic education vary dramatically, depending on the nature and frequency of the individual's experience with democracy training. Specifically, we have found that civic education is more effective:

- When individuals attend three or more workshops. Less frequent exposure to civic education often has no impact whatsoever; that is, individuals who do not attend at least three democracy training workshops are often indistinguishable on many democratic orientations from the control group.
- When workshops are conducted with more participatory methodologies, such as role playing, simulations, mock elections, and the like. Lecture-based civic education has negligible impact on democratic orientations.
- When trainers are perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interesting by the participants. Trainers who do not engage the participants have little success in transmitting democratic knowledge, values, or participatory inclinations.

The observation of what we call "threshold effects" of civic education, where the training must pass certain thresholds in terms of frequency, methodology, and trainer quality in order to impact individual attitudes, is one of the core findings of the overall project. It is not enough for individuals simply to be exposed to civic education for democratic orientations to be affected. What matters is the frequency and quality of the training that the individual receives.

The threshold effect of civic education exposure can be seen, for example, in Tables 2-5 most clearly (that is, for all dependent variables aside from political participation). In the cases of knowledge in South Africa (.23*), efficacy in South Africa (.29*), tolerance in South Africa (.21*), Poland (.12*) and the Dominican Republic (.13*), and institutional trust in South Africa (.44*), civic education only had a significant effect when the individual had participated in three or more sessions. That is, attending one or two workshops led to no differential changes on any of these orientations in these contexts compared to the control groups.

(Figures 2 through 4 go here)

Similar threshold effects of civic education exist for the use of participatory methods, such as dramatization, role-playing, problem solving, and simulations in civic education training sessions. As discussed above concerning participation, such direct efforts at providing participants with the skills and tools for political participation generated the greatest impact on actual behavior. But a similar effect can be noted in the other variables, indicating that such efforts at group discussion and interaction also affect democratic attitudes and values. In Figures

2 to 4, we present the differential effects of the use of 1 to 3 participatory methods in the workshops to which the individual was exposed (few participatory methods) and 4 or more participatory methods (many participatory methods) in the workshop on the dependent variables of participation, efficacy and tolerance. For comparison purposes, we have included in the graphs the results for the control group. In the case of the impact on local participation (Figure 2), there was a notable step effect with greater effects for civic education with the use of more participatory methods, with the greatest effect for the programs that incorporated four or more participatory methods into their pedagogy. A similar pattern is evident for political efficacy in Figure 3. In South Africa, the effect of civic education on efficacy was **only** significant when the program incorporated three or more methods. The same is true for tolerance in Figure 4; in both South Africa and Poland, there was little to no statistically significant difference between the control group and the treatment group that had only reported the use of fewer than three participatory methods. In these countries there was only an impact when the programs incorporated more than four participatory methods.

(Figures 5 and 6 go here)

Similarly, we found significant differences in the effects of civic education, depending on whether the participant perceived the workshop instructor to be “knowledgeable,” “inspiring” and “competent,” or what may be referred to as high instructor “quality.” Figures 4 to 6 present the interaction effects of participants’ perceptions of teacher quality on efficacy and tolerance in South Africa, the only country where detailed information exists on participants’ perceptions of their instructors. In both of these cases, there was only a significant difference between the treatment group and the control group when the instructor was perceived as “high quality.” In the case of tolerance, this reinforces the notion that even orientations traditionally thought to be relatively impervious to change in the short-term may be influenced by civic education *under the right conditions*.

The importance of what we call “good quality civic education” – frequent exposures with knowledgeable instructors using highly participatory teaching methods --- in affecting democratic behaviors and attitudes is undeniable in all three of the contexts that we have studied. Yet it must also be noted that in many cases, achieving “good quality civic education” is notoriously difficult. When we examine the number of participants that had been trained frequently and that reported that the sessions used highly participatory methods, we found in many instances the numbers were surprisingly low. In South Africa, for example, only 29% of civic education respondents reported taking part in three or more workshops, and only 16% reported taking part in three or more workshops **and** being exposed to 4 or more participatory teaching methods. The corresponding figures in the two other countries are larger, but even there, less than one half (48%) of Dominican civic education respondents and just under two-thirds (63%) of Polish civic education respondents experienced “high quality” treatments of frequent exposure with highly participatory methodologies. These results indicate a relatively large gap between the *potential* of civic education to influence democratic attitudes and behaviors, as shown from the regression effects of Tables 1-5, and the *actual* impact among people who were exposed to democracy training in the three countries. This suggests that there are serious obstacles to the successful implementation of many civic education programs, a point to which we shall return in the policy discussion below.

3. *The Differential Impact of Civic Education on Different Kinds of Individuals*

The impact of civic education also depended on the individual characteristics of the participants, such as membership in voluntary associations, gender, educational level, and many of these differential effects were also augmented by the quality of the civic education and the frequency of its delivery. For ease of discussion, we focus here on the differential effects on local political participation, though many of these patterns exist for other dependent variables. In Table 6 we show the effects of infrequent and frequent civic education exposure on the participation of individuals with different levels of associational membership (0-1 versus 2 or

more), educational attainment (less than high school degree versus high school), and men and women. The results show clearly that civic education tends to have greater effects on individuals with higher levels of prior participatory resources.

(Table 6 goes here)

A strong difference, for example, can be seen among individuals who were more fully integrated into pre-existing civil society groups than among more socially isolated individuals. That is, individuals who already belong to voluntary associations, such as peasant associations, community groups, and church groups appear to gain more from civic education than did their counterparts who did not belong to extensive social networks. In South Africa, for example, individuals who reported participating in two or fewer civil society organizations registered an effect of frequent civic education exposure of .47, while the effects were nearly half again as large for more socially integrated individuals (.67). The corresponding differences in Poland (1.00 to 1.25) and the Dominican Republic (.35 to .48) are consistent with this pattern as well. This finding again resonates with our earlier discussion of political mobilization through civic education, as the “normal” appeals of civics training to participate in politics are augmented and amplified by group-related mobilization dynamics in other civil society organizations.

In some cases, gender appears to play a significant role in the effects of civic education. Men not only start out at higher levels on virtually every measure of democratic participation, political efficacy and tolerance, but in Poland and the Dominican Republic they also appear to gain more from civic education programs than women. This was less true in South Africa. Women’s democratic behavior and values increased at roughly the same rate as men, but not sufficiently to correct the pre-existing gender impact. Concerning tolerance, in South Africa civic education had a positive, significant effect on tolerance for women, but a negative (albeit statistically insignificant) negative effect on men.

In terms of the effect of civic education on the participation of women, in South Africa more frequent civics training had a relatively greater impact on women than on men, though the

differences are not particularly large. In Poland and especially in the Dominican Republic, however, civic education appears to have greater effect on the political participation of men. Civic education serves to mobilize those with fewer social resources (women) to some degree, but greater effects are seen for those whose resources can facilitate the translation of mobilization messages into actual behavior.

Civic education tended to reinforce existing differences in participation between educational levels in all three countries. Those with more formal education (in this case high school education or more) were more participatory than participants with less education in both South Africa and Poland, and their participation was even greater among individuals with frequent exposure to civic education. In the Dominican Republic, however, those with a high school education and higher tended to be *less* participatory, and these individuals were also *less* influenced by civic education.⁵ What appears to be the case, then, is that civic education reinforces the resource-disparities that exist for political participation otherwise. That is, variables such as gender (male) and group memberships are positively related overall to political participation in the Dominican Republic and elsewhere, and the interaction of civic education and these resources on participation is therefore positive. Education in the D.R. is negatively related to participation, and the negative interaction of civic education with education reinforces this effect as well. This pattern of a reinforcement effect of civic education on resource-based disparities in participation, again, is fully consistent with a view of civics training as deeply embedded in the “normal” group mobilization dynamics of developing democracies.

Policy Implications for the Implementation of Civic Education

Our findings point to several important policy recommendations for donors, both for the implementation of civic education and for the decision making process of whether to support

⁵ Thus it is not always the case that educational attainment is positively associated with political participation in developing democracies, as Bratton’s (1999) results in Zambia also make clear.

civic education in a specific political context. First, civic education, if done well, can serve as an effective tool for popular mobilization. This should be seen as perhaps the primary goal of civic education. Affecting attitudes and values should be seen as a secondary goal that will require longer-term efforts. Rather than focus on the much more difficult task of value change, donors need recognize that the most likely effect of civic education is on participation and see civic education, primarily, as a tool of social mobilization—under the right conditions. With this in mind, civic education can serve as a means to generate citizen participation in the political system towards specific goals.

Programs with the greatest impact were those that sought to organize participants around specific problems and issues, impart skills to address those concerns, and provide an outlet for participation, either through direct contact with authorities or through existing or newly created associational networks. Civic education programs should seek as their focus themes that are immediately relevant to people's daily lives. Rather than seeing civic education as an effort to impart the knowledge or attitudes that people should have (Ottoway and Chung 1999), civic education should reflect at its core their basic demands. In practice this should require work with communities prior to the design of civic education programs to identify local demands and interests. Such a previous effort—either through surveys or focus groups—can help to identify demands and specific themes that can be incorporated into the program and avoid the “top-down” method sniffed at by Ottoway and others. Designing and organizing civic education around concrete demands and community problem-solving also helps to ensure that participants will feel a stronger incentive to participate more frequently .

This in turn also means that donors, and in cases of host governments genuinely attempting to reform, should work to ensure that opportunities for participation exist both in civil society and in state. At the level of civil society, membership in voluntary associations was the best predictor of participation and the impact of the programs that worked with them. In implementing civic education, designers and programs need to emphasize the creation or

provision of channels of participation or working through existing networks to promote participation. At the level of government, when appropriate donors should work with governments to open up opportunities for channeling and responding to increased participation. Civic education, as it did in the Dominican Republic, can be an effective tool for mobilizing participation around regime change, but in democratizing regimes, there may be an important opportunity to work with governments to ensure that they can adapt and reform to the demands arising from political mobilization. One pessimistic conclusion from our results concerning the effect on political participation and the weak effects on democratic values is that in the absence of significant reform and change in the government, training could potentially be used by groups to mobilize individuals to engage in less desirable, anti-democratic behaviors as well.

Second, donors need to be aware of the potential tradeoffs between numbers of people reached and effectiveness. Our results demonstrate that civic education is only effective when civic education programs repeatedly train participants, the civic education program incorporates creative participatory methods and the teachers are perceived to be engaging and inspiring. Unfortunately, we found that many programs did meet these criteria. Developing effective civic education programs requires addressing the weaknesses and follow-up and pedagogy. Programs need to build into their design ways to ensure that participants will attend repeatedly. This should include an analysis into the obstacles to repeated participation, incentives for repeat attendance (travel costs, for example), and—as discussed above—an emphasis on concrete problems and concerns, beyond broad issues of values, the constitution, etc. Again this points to the need for a pre-survey or focus group to identify social demands and interests and the potential incentives to repeat attendance that can be incorporated into a program.

Third, donors need to place greater emphasis as well on the delivery of civic education. Programs need to stress participatory methods and teacher quality. Both are strongly correlated with impact across most of the dependent variables. One recommendation is to include a strong emphasis on training of trainers and the development of a very clear, participatory methodology

that includes classroom techniques that foster the type of behavior and attitudes which the program is intended to convey. This implies, again, more emphasis on the design and preparation phase of civic education. While it may be tempting to shift directly to program implementation (especially when such general themes such as democratic participation and values appear appealing to donors), effective civic education requires more of an up-front investment in the group to develop its pedagogical tools and capacity. One possible way to do this is to develop a manual that contains these lessons and then close work with the local NGO in developing and refining its strategy.

Fourth, given the weak results of programs that did not possess these characteristics of good, quality civic education, it is worth considering whether civic education is a worthy investment at all if it cannot ensure these qualities. Donors often see civic education as a safe, generalized tool for fostering broad cultural change in a developing democracy. However, our results indicate that unless the conditions of frequency and quality are met no effects are likely to be observed on most democratic behaviors and attitudes. Meeting these characteristics, though, implies significantly more effort and resources than are typically invested in civic education programs. Given the costs and efforts of good, effective programs, civic education should be seen as a more targeted intervention. Rather than generating wide and shallow change, civic education, if done well, should be seen as a means to create pockets of democratic support. In many democratizing countries today this may represent an important contribution, if pursued effectively. As policy makers currently worry over “democratic backsliding” or the “dominant power systems” (Carothers 2002) in countries like Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Venezuela, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia to name a few, civic education can serve an important function in creating and maintaining committed democrats who defend key democratic rights and reforms. In such hard cases, institutional reform or broader change may be impossible under an autocratic leader; the best that can be done is to work to preserve the political space and rights that exist. Our results demonstrate that civic education, by successfully affecting democratic orientations such as

political participation, efficacy and tolerance can help create pockets of democratic support even when democracy is threatened. Indeed, Gibson's finding (1997) that individuals who embraced democratic principles were more likely to resist the attempted coup in Moscow in 1991 suggests that increasing the democratic orientations of pockets of, even a limited but well positioned, individuals can be instrumental in the defense of fledgling democratic regimes.

Fifth, programs need to take into account the differential impact of civic education on beneficiaries when deciding on its target audience. This is particularly important as it relates to the levels of education of the intended participants. As we found, those with lower educational levels in all three countries started from a lower point in terms of democratic dispositions than their more educated counterparts, and civic education has a greater impact on those with a high school education or higher. (The exception to this was for participation in the Dominican Republic.) These differences raise importance choices: is it better to concentrate on mobilizing an elite group who are already disposed to democratic orientations and which may be well placed in a society to affect change or is it better to target less interested, socially isolated sectors of the population? Certainly, focusing on individuals with higher levels of education can offer a more immediate and direct impact towards political reform and sustaining a democratic elite. Nevertheless, given that the less educated start out at lower levels on virtually every measure of democratic participation, political efficacy and tolerance, it is worth considering if a better strategy is to focus on the "democratically disadvantaged." Clearly in developing countries doing so presents logistical hurdles, and as our results demonstrated, may deliver a weaker impact dollar for dollar—but in a potentially more strategic strata of the population. In many backsliding or dominant authority systems these sectors are often most prone to anti-democratic and plebiscitarian appeals.

Sixth, if donors decide to focus on civic education programs on women and the less educated, the program methodology and implementation should specifically seek to address the extant resource, institutional and cultural reasons for low levels of democratic participation and

orientation. One-size-fits-all programs will have a significantly weaker effect on the less educated and women. Programs will need to be tailored specifically to these sectors, in particular seeking to emphasize greater frequency and follow-up, and designing programs to incorporate the specific demands and interests of potential participants. Programs targeting less educated sectors and women should also seek to include, parallel to the education effort, the creation of or support for associational groups representing the poor and less educated. (We return to this point below.) This is particularly true for civic education programs with women. Programs that address women's deeper barriers to participation may be required over and above civic education to reduce the gap between men and women. The effort to address the inequalities from education and gender will require a more focused and expensive endeavor, but may also yield important benefits both in correcting gender inequalities and in developing pockets of democratic support in potentially less democratic sectors of the population.

Seventh, donors need to ensure that civic education NGOs collaborate and work through or with associational groups. Our results demonstrate the importance of associational membership for the impact of civic education on democratic participation. With this in mind, donors should view civic education NGOs as a means to mobilize and orient individuals to larger political goals of democracy, but their capacity to fulfill this function depends on the network of voluntary and mass-based organizations that exist and that can channel political participation. This point also relates to designing and developing targeted programs for the less educated and women. In these cases, donors should seek to combine educational programs that focus on these groups with efforts to support or assist in the formation of grassroots groups that can organize their membership to represent demands and provide a more regular channel for their participation.

Support for civic education NGOs should be seen as a complement to support for more grassroots associational organizations not as a sub optimal or artificial alternative. Our results, in contrast to the criticism of donor-created advocacy/civic education NGOs, suggest that the advocacy NGOs and other groups that conduct civic education training can be highly effective

mobilizing agents for citizen participation and an important referent for democratic orientations. Unlike more sectoral or particularistic associational groups lauded by writers such as Carothers, Ottoway and others, civic education groups are directly and specifically focused on democratic participation and democratic support. In contrast, associational groups tend to be more narrow and particularistic in their orientation and function, and their behavioral cues for political participation more muted. Moreover, the fact that advocacy NGOs draw many of the participants for civic education training from existing civil society associations, and the fact that civic education appears to have greater effects among individuals who are already members of other secondary groups, suggests that advocacy groups are able to use existing civil society groups to further their own aims. To this extent, the strategy of funding explicitly political organizations to mobilize and integrate individuals into emerging democratic systems makes a good deal of sense, provided the organizations themselves are oriented toward democratic goals and practices.

(Finkel 2002, forthcoming)

Last, donors need to recognize, however, that civic education NGOs often come with their own agenda. Unlike voluntary organizations, advocacy and civic education NGOs are often more explicitly politically oriented, and training can often impart their bias. Many of the local groups that conduct civic education are more along the lines of what Foley and Edwards term Civil Society II. (Foley and Edwards 1996) Such groups are often acting in their own political context and, through civic education programs, will often transmit these political views. The noted negative effects on institutional trust in the Dominican Republic and positive effects on institutional trust South Africa demonstrate the potential impact of these orientations. In the case of the Dominican Republic and South Africa, donor sponsored civic education programs had two different effects, that while in these cases may have been desirable may also have been unforeseen. In certain cases it may not be desirable to build trust to a government or, conversely, distrust. The conclusion is that donors need to recognize the complex political environment and orientations of the groups that conduct civic education, paying particular

attention to the levels of political polarization, the capacity of a struggling democratic state to respond to increase demands, and the often subtle messages conveyed by the groups. For this reason, donors should attempt to define clearly the goals of the civic education program relative to the political situation in the country.

Our study of civic education represents an effort to apply empirical analyses to larger policy questions and decisions. By systematically measuring the impact of civic education on a variety of democratic orientations and behaviors and the interaction of different characteristics of civic education (its frequency, the use of participatory methods and the perceived quality of the instructor) with its effects on democratic orientations and behaviors we have been able to come to a nuanced understanding of its real and potential impact, if done well. Moreover, our analyses of its differential effects on different kinds of individuals have yielded important conclusions about how civic education may reinforce extant biases in democratic orientations and suggestions about how civic education programs can be better tailored to address democratic deficits in terms of participation and orientations of specific groupings of individuals. Based on these findings we have a more positive and refined impression of the effectiveness of civic education as a donor tool to promote democratization. The effect of civic education, as we demonstrated, is strongly conditioned on how it is conducted with the greatest effects of civic education on a variety of variables occurring only when the programs were conducted frequently and with the liberal use of participatory methods. Unfortunately, civic education is not meeting its potential, requiring that donors need to pay greater attention to how civic education is conducted and focused. The political nature of the groups that conduct civic education also warrants some caution for donors. Civic education NGOs can play an important role in mobilizing participation and as a referent for democratic values, particularly when conducted in conjunction with traditional networks of associations and grassroots groups. However, donors need to be aware of the complex political environment in which civic education is conducted and the real political and even partisan biases of the implementing groups.

Appendix

Description of Programs Studied

Dominican Republic

Participación Ciudadana (PC): PC is a national NGO that trained youth and adults to serve as election observers in 1996. The project first trained a group of core community leaders (in Santo Domingo). These leaders then returned to their communities and recruited new members of PC whom they also trained. Training included general democratic values education as well as instruction in elections monitoring, mostly through seminars and materials distribution. For the 1996 elections, trainees were selected to serve as election observers and to help in the quick count. This program ran from 1995 to mid-1996. PC activities have continued into 1997, still focused on elections. This program may be classified as both voter education and civil society creation/mobilization.

Grupo Accion por la Democracia (GAD): A civil society creation/mobilization program, GAD implemented a two-step civic education program. The first phase educated people on basic rights and obligations in a democracy, primarily through a lecture format. The second phase brought these people together to hold a series of national and local issues fora to discuss problems and solutions in the areas of justice, health, education, etc. The two phases were intended to create a national NGO with a network of local branches outside of Santo Domingo and to mobilize citizens to participate in these new structures. The civic education phase ran from November 1995 to October 1996, with the "national agenda" phase extending until December 1996.

Asociación Dominicana para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ADOPEM): ADOPEM is a local women's NGO that trained women community leaders in women's rights, democratic values, democracy in the family, and self-esteem, using a classroom/workshop format and emphasizing knowledge. This program ran from January 1996 to January 1997. It is primarily a rights knowledge program, although it also sought to instill general democratic values.

Radio Santa María (RSM): A general civic knowledge, values and skills program, this project, through a central NGO affiliated with Radio Santa Maria, trained intermediaries (typically leaders of rural towns) who then conducted civic education in their local communities. The subject matter focused on civic knowledge and values, such as rights and duties in a democracy, the importance of participation, and democracy in the family. For the direct participants (trainers) the program used materials distribution, lectures, forums and dramatizations; for indirect participants the program relied on lectures and materials distribution. RSM ran two consecutive projects, from 1994 to 1995 and from 1995 to December 1996.

Poland

The team identified four programs that reflect interesting differences in objectives and implementation approaches. Three of the projects are concerned with community problem-solving and encouraging cooperation among citizens and government, a popular approach to democratic development in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. Very generally speaking, they follow a similar pattern: problem identification, meetings for residents, identification of leaders, the formation of (informal or formal) groups of community members, and efforts to solve the problem.

Foundation for Support of Local Democracy (FSLD): FSLD's mission is to promote local self-governance, primarily through training for local government officials. The Civic Participation Project, a community/group problem-solving project, was implemented in 22 relatively small towns, beginning in 1994 and ending in 1995. The objective was to "enhance civic education and encourage citizens to act for the benefit of their local communities." After initial surveys of barriers to participation and local problems, FSLD chose project leaders in each site. They received training in practical knowledge and skills necessary for participation, such as team building, negotiation, and how government works. These "leaders" then brought together citizens in their communities (informally or in formal groups) to work on solving particular local problems.

DIALOG Project (also run by FSLD centers): A community/group problem-solving project, the Dialog program was implemented in seven large towns, beginning in the first site in 1991, with the most recent site becoming active in 1995. The objectives are to encourage the activity of citizens and increase their influence on local issues, and to encourage cooperation among citizens and local government. DIALOG staff identified a key problem in each site, for example, public safety, and conducted information campaigns on the problem. DIALOG then invited citizens and government officials to workshops dealing with the issue. These workshops also taught such skills as team building, communication, and working with government, and included such techniques as role-playing. "Leaders" who emerged from these workshops then returned to their communities to organize citizen groups to deal with the problem.

Lublin Neighborhood Revitalization Program: A community/group problem-solving project begun in 1991, the Lublin Neighborhood Revitalization Program is on-going in two lower-income neighborhoods in Lublin. The objective is to engage residents in the rehabilitation and development of their neighborhoods and to build a working relationship between residents and city officials, and thus to build a sense of responsibility and trust. The city provides significant funding for infrastructure improvement, but citizens must set priorities and contribute to the renovations. Regularly scheduled public meetings were held (but not training *per se*), and motivated residents along each street became contact persons, organizers and representatives to link residents with the city as planning and rehabilitation proceeded.

South Africa

National Institute for Public Interest Law and Research (NIPILAR): According to USAID, "NIPILAR is the lead organization of a Consortium operating at the national level in the field of public interest law, rights education with emphasis on women and children's rights, as well as the Constitution and Bill of Rights education. The activities aim to promote the 1) respect, practice and fulfillment of human, legal, and civil rights; 2) respect for the rights of women and children and 3) a widespread awareness of human rights and democracy" (USAID/Pretoria Activity Summary 1998). One of the main civic education programs conducted by NIPILAR over the past several years was its Women's Rights program, designed to promote awareness of the United Nations Women and Children's Rights Convention.

Community Law Centre-Durban (CLC): CLC is part of the Consortium described above, and thus has many of the same goals and activities as NIPILAR. CLC operates almost exclusively within the province of KwaZulu Natal, where NIPILAR does not operate. Its primary activities are to coordinate approximately 30 rural legal advice offices in the province. The advice offices provide assistance to community members on legal and human rights issues. Democracy and civic education workshops are also conducted through the advice centers.

Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR): LHR is a national organization that aims to increase the awareness of human and democratic rights in South Africa. The organization conducts an extensive series of workshops yearly on democracy and human rights issues, with different aspects of democracy receiving particular emphasis in different years. Workshops in the last two years have emphasized the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and participation in politics, respectively.

Bibliography

- Almond, G. and Verba, S. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes in Five Nations*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Berk, Richard A., and Subhash C. Ray. 1982. Selection Biases in Sociological Data. *Social Science Research* 11: 352-398.
- Bebbington, Anthony and Thiele G. 1993. *NGOs and the State in Latin America: Rethinking Roles in Sustainable Agricultural Development*, London: Routledge.
- Blair, Harr. 2000. Can Democracy Be Taught? Civic Education in Three Countries. U.S.A.I.D. Report: Global Bureau, Center for Democracy & Governance.
- Blair, Harry. 1997. Donors, Democratisation and Civil Society: Relating Theory to Practice. In D. Hulme and M. Edwards (eds.), *NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Booth, John, and Patricia Richard. 1998. Civil Society, Social Capital and Democratization in Central America. *Journal of Politics* 60(August): 780-801.
- Brady, Henry E., Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba. 1999. Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists. *American Political Science Review*. 93(March):153-169.
- Bratton, Michael. 1999. Political Participation in a New Democracy: Institutional Consideration from Zambia. *Comparative Political Studies* 32(August):549-588.
- Bratton, Michael and Philip Alderfer, with Georgia Bowser and Joseph Temba. 1999. The Effects of Civic Education on Political Culture: Evidence from Zambia. *World Development* 27(May):807-824.
- Breen, Richard. 1996. *Regression Models: Censored, Sample-Selected, or Truncated Data*. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications.
- Brehm, John, and Wendy Rahn. 1997. Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital. *American Journal of Political Science* 41(July): 999-1023.
- Brilliant, Franca. 2000. *Civic Education Programming Since 1990: A Case Study Based Analysis*. Report prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development, Contract No. AEP-I-00-96-90012-00, Task Order No. 10. Management Systems International, Inc.
- Carothers, Thomas. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January): 5-21.
- Carothers, Thomas. 1999. *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Dalton, Russell. 1994. Communists and Democrats: Democratic Attitudes in the Two Germanies. *British Journal of Political Science* 24(October): 469-493.

- Diamond, Larry. 1995. *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives*. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York.
- Diamond, Larry. 1994. Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (July): 4-17.
- Edwards, Michael and Hulme, D. 1996. Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations. *World Development*, 24 (6): 961-973.
- Edwards, Michael and Hulme, D. 1996. *Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World*, Westford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Eckstein, H. 1988. A Culturalist Theory of Political Change. *American Political Science Review* 82(September): 789-804.
- Evans, G. and Whitefield, S. 1995. The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transitional Societies. *British Journal of Political Science* 25(October): 485-514.
- Finkel, Steven E. and Howard R. Ernst. N.D. Civic Education and the Development of Political Knowledge and Democratic Orientations in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Political Psychology* (forthcoming).
- Finkel, Steven E. 2002. Civic Education and the Mobilization of Participation in Developing Democracies. *Journal of Politics*, (forthcoming).
- Finkel, Steven E. 2000. Can Tolerance be Taught: Adult Civic Education and the Development of Democratic Values. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 31-September 3, 2000.
- Finkel, Steven E., Lee Sigelman and Stan Humphries. 1999. Democratic Values and Political Tolerance. Chapter 5 in Robinson, John P., Philip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S. Wrightman, *Measures of Political Attitudes*. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Finkel, Steven E. 1987. The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support: Evidence from a West German Panel. *Journal of Politics* 49 (May): 441-464.
- Finkel, Steven E. and Karl-Dieter Opp. 1991. Party Identification and Participation in Collective Political Action. *Journal of Politics* 53(May):339-371.
- Finkel, Steven E., Christopher A. Sabatini, and Gwendolyn G. Bevis. 2000. Civic Education, Civil Society, and Political Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic. *World Development* 28(November): 1851-1874.
- Finkel, Steven E. and Sheryl Stumbras. 2000. Civic Education in South Africa: The Impact of Adult and School Programs on Democratic Attitudes and Participation. U.S.A.I.D. Report: MSI, Inc.
- Fishbein, Martin and Icek Ajzen. 1975. *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

- Foley, Michael and Edwards, B. 1996. The Paradox of Civil Society. *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (July): 38-52.
- Gibson, James L. 2001. Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(January): 51-68.
- Gibson, James L. and Amanda Gouws. 2001. Making Tolerance Judgments: The Effects of Context, Local and National. *Journal of Politics* 63(November): 1067-1090.
- Gibson, James L. and Amanda Gouws. 2000. Social Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages Within the South African Mass Public. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(April): 278-292.
- Gibson, James L., Raymond Duch, and Kent Tedin. 1992. Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union. *Journal of Politics* 54(May): 329-371.
- Greene, William. 1993. *Econometric Analysis*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Heckman, James J. 1992. Selection Bias and Self-Selection. In Eatwell, John, Murraray Milgate, and Peter Newman (eds.), *The New Palgrave Econometrics*. London: MacMillan.
- Heckman, James J. and Richard Robb. 1985. Alternative Methods for Evaluating the Impact of Interventions. In Heckman, James J., and Burton Singer (eds), *Longitudinal Analysis of Labor Market Data*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Isaacs, Anita. 2000. International Assistance for Democracy: A Cautionary Tale. In Dominguez, Jorge (ed.) *The Future of Inter-American Affairs*. New York: Routledge.
- Jennings, M. Kent, J. Van Deth *et al.* (eds). 1990. *Continuities in Political Action*. New York: de Gruyter.
- Knoke, David. 1990. Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction. *Social Forces* 68(June): 1041-1063.
- Lasota, Irena. 1999. Sometimes Less is More (Response to Ottaway and Chung). *Journal of Democracy* 10(October): 125-128.
- Leighley, Jan. 1996. Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation. *Journal of Politics* 58(May):447-463.
- Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. Some Social Requisites for Democracy. *American Political Science Review* 53(March): 69-105
- Mattes, Robert, and Hermann Thiel. 1998. Consolidation and Public Opinion in South Africa. *Journal of Democracy* 9 (January): 95-110.

- McAdam, Doug and Ronnelle Paulsen. 1993. Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism. *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (November):640-667.
- Macdonald, Laura. 1997. *Supporting Civil Society: The Political Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Central America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- McDonough, Peter, Doh C. Shin and Jose Alvaro Moises. 1988. Democratization and Participation: Comparing Spain, Brazil, and Korea. *Journal of Politics* 60(November):919-921.
- Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1997. Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies. *Journal of Politics* 59 (May): 418-451.
- Morduchowicz, Roxana, Edgardo Catterberg, Richard G. Niemi, and Frank Bell. 1996. Teaching Political Information and Democratic Values in a New Democracy: An Argentine Experiment. *Comparative Politics* 28(July): 465-476.
- Niemi, R.G., and Junn, J. 1998. *Civic Education: What Makes Students Learn*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ottaway, Marina and Theresa Chung. 1999. Toward a New Paradigm. *Journal of Democracy* 10 (October): 99-113.
- Pollack, Philip H. III. 1982. Organizations as Agents of Mobilization: How Does Group Activity Affect Political Participation? *American Journal of Political Science* 26(August):485-503.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Quigley, Kevin F.F. 1997. Political scientists and assisting democracy: too tenuous links. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 30(September): 564-568.
- Rose, Richard, and William Mishler. 1994. Mass Reaction to Regime Change in Eastern Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards? *British Journal of Political Science* 24(April): 159-82.
- Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company.
- Sabatini, Christopher. 2002. Whom Do International Donors Support in the Name of Civil Society? *Development in Practice* 12 (February): 7-19.
- Sabatini, Christopher, Gwen Bevis and Steven Finkel. 1998. The Impact of Civic Education Programs on Political Participation and Democratic Attitudes. U.S.A.I.D. Report: MSI, Inc.
- Shifter, Michael. 2000. Latin American Democratization: The Civil Society Puzzle. In Ottaway, Marina and Thomas Carothers (eds.), *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

- Slomczynski, K.M., and G. Shabad, 1998. "Can Support for Democracy and the Market Be Learned in School? A Natural Experiment in Post-Communist Poland." *Political Psychology* 19(4): 749-779.
- Torney-Purta, Judith, Rainer Lehmann, Hans Oswald, and Wolfram Schulz. 2001. *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen*. Amsterdam: IEA.
- Van Rooy, Alison, (ed.). 1998. *Civil Society and the Aid Industry*, London: Earthscan Publications Limited.
- Vella, Francis. 1998. Estimating Models with Sample Selection Bias: A Survey. *The Journal of Human Resources* 33(1): 127-169.
- Verba, Sidney and Norman Nie. 1972. *Participation in America*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Weil, F. D. 1989. The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A Consolidated Model Tested with Time-Series Data in Six Countries Since World War II. *American Sociological Review* 54(October): 682-706.
- Weil, F.D. 1993. The Development of Democratic Attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany in a Comparative Perspective. *Research on Democracy and Society* 1: 195-225.
- Winship, Christopher, and Stephen L. Morgan. 1999. The Estimation of Causal Effects from Observational Data. *Annual Review of Sociology* 25: 659-706.

TABLE 1
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON
LOCAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (0-4 SCALE)

	SOUTH AFRICA			POLAND			DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		
	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t
CIVIC EDUCATION									
1-2 SESSIONS	0.25	0.09	3.24	0.48	0.09	4.61	0.32	0.10	4.67
3 OR MORE SESSIONS	0.59	0.16	5.42	1.03	0.34	13.29	0.35	0.13	5.65
CONTROL VARIABLES									
GROUP MEMBERSHIPS	1.33	0.25	8.18	3.96	0.32	15.06	2.54	0.29	13.15
AGE	0.16	0.14	4.50	0.01	0.01	0.41	0.04	0.03	1.49
MALE	0.32	0.12	4.05	0.03	0.01	0.57	0.38	0.15	7.37
EDUCATION	0.16	0.17	5.00	0.09	0.09	4.03	-0.04	-0.05	-2.12
INCOME	0.05	0.04	1.31	0.10	0.08	4.33	0.03	0.02	1.01
TIME IN COMMUNITY	0.00	0.01	0.34	0.00	0.02	1.07	0.00	-0.02	-0.78
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	-0.05	-0.05	-1.59	-0.04	-0.04	-2.25	-0.03	-0.04	-1.80
CITY	0.26	0.09	2.70	-0.45	-0.16	-7.35	-0.32	-0.10	-4.18
TOWN	0.21	0.07	2.38	-0.23	-0.07	-3.36	0.06	0.03	1.05
INTEREST	0.30	0.16	5.12	0.27	0.12	5.80	0.22	0.14	6.51
MEDIA	0.14	0.09	2.37	0.11	0.06	2.66	0.25	0.19	7.89
RACE	0.18	0.04	1.50	0.13	0.04	1.59	-0.07	-0.02	-0.89
(Constant)	-1.97		-8,03	-0,82		-4,95	-0,86		-6.53
R-Squared	0.34			0,57			0,32		

Source: USAID Civic Education Evaluation Project. Number of Cases: South Africa 965; Poland 2038; Dominican Republic 2087

TABLE 2
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE (0-4 SCALE)

	SOUTH AFRICA			POLAND			DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		
	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	T
CIVIC EDUCATION									
1-2 SESSIONS	0.05	0.02	0.78	0.17	0.04	1.59	0.19	0.06	2.77
3 OR MORE SESSIONS	0.23	0.08	2.70	0.12	0.05	1.58	0.29	0.11	4.82
CONTROL VARIABLES									
GROUP MEMBERSHIPS	0.56	0.14	4.37	0.49	0.05	1.82	0.35	0.04	1.84
AGE	0.16	0.18	5.52	0.07	0.08	2.96	0.06	0.06	2.59
MALE	0.29	0.14	4.62	0.10	0.05	2.02	0.54	0.21	10.64
EDUCATION	0.26	0.36	10.22	0.12	0.15	5.21	0.18	0.24	10.00
INCOME	0.02	0.02	0.79	0.03	0.03	1.20	0.05	0.04	1.92
TIME IN COMMUNITY	0.00	-0.03	-0.90	0.00	-0.03	-1.21	0.00	0.05	2.41
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	-0.06	-0.07	-2.33	0.04	0.05	2.01	-0.04	-0.06	-3.04
CITY	0.18	0.08	2.41	-0.30	-0.14	-4.74	0.38	0.12	5.05
TOWN	0.18	0.08	2.52	-0.03	-0.01	-0.45	0.34	0.13	5.59
INTEREST	0.15	0.10	3.19	0.22	0.14	4.76	0.14	0.09	4.48
MEDIA	0.10	0.08	2.16	0.29	0.20	6.91	0.26	0.19	8.15
RACE	-0.04	-0.01	-0.38	-0.04	-0.01	-0.46	-0.11	-0.03	-1.52
							-0.02	-0.01	-0.33
(Constant)	-1.62		-8.36	-0.37		-2.21	-0.34		-2.68
R-Squared	0.31			0.22			0.37		

Source: USAID Civic Education Evaluation Project. Number of Cases: South Africa 965; Poland 2038; Dominican Republic 2087

TABLE 3
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON
POLITICAL EFFICACY (1-4 SCALE)

	SOUTH AFRICA			POLAND			DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		
	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	T
CIVIC EDUCATION									
1-2 SESSIONS	0.05	0.03	1.18	0.25	0.07	3.10	0.11	0.06	2.73
3 OR MORE SESSIONS	0.29	0.13	4.43	0.23	0.2	3.86	0.10	0.06	2.66
CONTROL VARIABLES									
GROUP MEMBERSHIPS	0.28	0.09	2.92	0.75	0.10	3.73	0.20	0.04	1.72
AGE	0.04	0.06	1.85	-0.11	-0.15	-6.07	-0.03	-0.05	-2.22
MALE	0.11	0.07	2.34	0.03	0.02	0.84	0.10	0.06	3.18
EDUCATION	0.10	0.19	5.30	0.16	0.24	9.12	0.08	0.19	7.44
INCOME	-0.01	-0.02	-0.48	-0.01	-0.01	-0.32	0.07	0.10	4.36
TIME IN COMMUNITY	0.00	-0.02	-0.66	0.00	0.01	0.26	0.00	-0.02	-0.77
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	0.02	0.03	1.09	-0.06	-0.09	-4.24	-0.01	-0.02	-0.86
CITY	-0.05	-0.03	-0.84	0.05	0.03	1.04	0.02	0.01	0.46
TOWN	-0.04	-0.02	-0.74	0.00	0.00	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.63
INTEREST	0.32	0.30	9.15	0.21	0.16	6.05	0.21	0.23	10.74
MEDIA	0.10	0.11	2.97	0.13	0.11	4.23	0.11	0.14	5.55
RACE	0.10	0.04	1.40	0.08	0.04	1.29	-0.02	-0.01	-0.38
							0.05	0.02	1.22
(Constant)	0.43		3.00	0.80		6.30	1.33		17.09
R-Squared	0.29			0.34			0.3		

Source: USAID Civic Education Evaluation Project. Number of Cases: South Africa 965; Poland 2038; Dominican Republic 2087

TABLE 4
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON
POLITICAL TOLERANCE (1-4 SCALE)

	SOUTH AFRICA			POLAND			DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		
	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	T
CIVIC EDUCATION									
1-2 SESSIONS	0.02	0.01	0.38	0.02	0.01	0.28	0.04	0.02	0.87
3 OR MORE SESSIONS	0.21	0.09	2.48	0.12	0.08	2.40	0.13	0.08	3.07
CONTROL VARIABLES									
GROUP MEMBERSHIPS	-0.11	-0.03	-0.85	0.30	0.05	1.75	0.16	0.03	1.24
AGE	0.05	0.07	1.75	-0.10	-0.17	-6.14	0.03	0.04	1.68
MALE	0.05	0.03	0.88	-0.03	-0.02	-0.95	-0.01	-0.01	-0.27
EDUCATION	0.05	0.08	1.99	0.09	0.18	6.06	0.10	0.23	8.17
INCOME	0.00	0.00	-0.12	0.04	0.06	2.40	0.02	0.03	1.29
TIME IN COMMUNITY	0.00	-0.02	-0.53	0.00	0.04	1.49	0.00	-0.05	-1.99
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	-0.01	-0.01	-0.22	-0.11	-0.20	-8.36	-0.02	-0.05	-2.13
CITY	0.06	0.03	0.77	0.09	0.07	2.17	0.13	0.07	2.54
TOWN	0.04	0.02	0.55	0.09	0.06	2.02	0.08	0.05	1.89
INTEREST	-0.02	-0.01	-0.33	0.01	0.01	0.41	0.01	0.01	0.52
MEDIA	0.06	0.06	1.27	0.07	0.07	2.52	0.08	0.10	3.52
RACE	-0.48	-0.18	-5.11	0.01	0.01	0.21	0.08	0.03	1.47
(Constant)	2.36		12.27	2.50		23.33	1.81		20.45
R-Squared	0.04			0.19			0.14		

Source: USAID Civic Education Evaluation Project. Number of Cases: South Africa 965; Poland 2038; Dominican Republic 2087

TABLE 5
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST (0-7 SCALE)

	SOUTH AFRICA			POLAND			DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		
	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	t	B	Beta	T
CIVIC EDUCATION									
1-2 SESSIONS	0.20	0.05	1.51	0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.58	-0.12	-4.73
3 OR MORE SESSIONS	0.44	0.08	2.32	-0.14	-0.03	-0.74	-0.68	-0.16	-6.08
CONTROL VARIABLES									
GROUP MEMBERSHIPS	-0.21	-0.03	-0.73	0.84	0.04	1.30	-0.42	-0.03	-1.22
AGE	0.12	0.07	1.94	0.06	0.03	0.98	0.05	0.03	1.10
MALE	-0.14	-0.03	-1.02	-0.06	-0.01	-0.51	0.36	0.09	3.89
EDUCATION	0.15	0.11	2.66	-0.06	-0.03	-1.07	-0.23	-0.20	-7.14
INCOME	-0.01	0.00	-0.10	0.11	0.05	1.83	-0.06	-0.03	-1.28
TIME IN COMMUNITY	0.00	0.01	0.27	0.00	0.01	0.38	0.00	-0.01	-0.23
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	0.06	0.04	1.10	-0.01	0.00	-0.13	0.02	0.01	0.62
CITY	0.18	0.04	1.09	-0.49	-0.11	-3.27	-0.18	-0.04	-1.28
TOWN	0.18	0.04	1.17	-0.48	-0.09	-2.91	0.02	0.00	0.14
INTEREST	0.74	0.26	7.18	-0.01	0.00	-0.12	0.04	0.02	0.66
MEDIA	0.09	0.04	0.94	0.53	0.17	5.23	0.03	0.01	0.45
RACE	0.06	0.01	0.27	-0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.09	0.01	0.64
							-0.13	-0.03	-1.20
(Constant)	1.29		3.04	2.84		7.06	2.11		9.00
R-Squared	0.11			0.03			0.1		

Source: USAID Civic Education Evaluation Project. Number of Cases: South Africa 965; Poland 2038; Dominican Republic 2087

TABLE 6
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON LOCAL PARTICIPATION
FOR DIFFERENT KINDS OF INDIVIDUALS

	SOUTH AFRICA		POLAND		DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	
	B	T	B	T	b	t
Few Group Memberships						
1- Sessions	0.18	1.55	0.56	4.29	0.28	3.07
3 or More	0.47	1.83	1.00	10.41	0.35	4.15
Many Group Memberships						
1- Sessions	0.34	3.29	0.64	3.32	0.47	4.31
3 or More	0.67	5.31	1.25	8.39	0.48	4.92
Women						
1- Sessions	0.30	3.21	0.46	0.95	0.15	1.82
3 or More	0.62	4.78	0.85	2.64	0.19	2.53
Men						
1- Sessions	0.19	1.33	0.51	3.15	0.59	4.90
3 or More	0.57	2.85	1.20	2.97	0.69	6.14
Low Education						
1- Sessions	0.21	.31	0.35	1.63	0.35	4.16
3 or More	0.62	4.36	0.88	1.72	0.47	5.80
High Education						
1- Sessions	0.26	1.78	0.51	2.96	0.33	2.85
3 or More	0.61	3.51	1.04	3.76	0.31	3.09

Figure 1
A Model of the Effects of Civic Education




Figure 2: Participatory Methods and Local Participation




Figure 3: Participatory Methods and Political Efficacy




Figure 4: Participatory Methods and Political Tolerance




Figure 5: Instructor Quality and Political Efficacy, South Africa




Figure 6: Instructor Quality and Institutional Trust, South Africa

