

TOPIC GUIDE ON

# CONFLICT

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# **CHAPTER 5:**

## **INTERVENING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS**

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# Monitoring and Evaluation of Interventions in Conflict-affected Areas

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Conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding all aim to have long-term impact in terms of sustainable peace and development. Given the time-frames and the convergence of a multitude of activities in conflict-affected areas, it may be difficult to attribute quantifiable results to specific conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities. This should not, however, be a deterrent, or an excuse for not conducting assessments.

There is consensus that many of the standard criteria for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are applicable to interventions in conflict-affected areas. In addition, the OECD-DAC provides a series of common monitoring and evaluation principles that can be applied to different types of conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions. These are: inclusiveness; the testing of underlying theories of change; the use of qualitative and quantitative methods; testing assumptions and learning; ethical standards for approaching informants and handling the reporting of findings.

The following are a selection of M&E frameworks, tools and recommendations developed by international organisations, donor agencies, academics and non-governmental organisations. They cover conflict prevention, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, stabilisation, and peacebuilding interventions.

## ***Conflict prevention and peacebuilding***

[OECD-DAC, 2007, 'Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Toward DAC Guidance', A Joint Project of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and DAC Network on Development Evaluation, Paris](#)

The past decade has seen growing numbers of governments and organisations devote resources to interventions intended to avert or end conflict. How can these be evaluated? This represents a step in the development of practical evaluation guidance. Scope, conflict analysis, impacts, skills and tools all need to be considered. Next steps should include donor experimentation with evaluations, an annual review of evaluations and a policy review.

Scheers, G., 2008, 'Assessing Progress on the Road to Peace Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities', Issue Paper, no. 5, European Centre for Conflict Prevention

[Access full text: available online](#)

## ***Conflict resolution, conflict transformation and peacebuilding***

[Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, E., Dayton, B., and Paffenholz, T., 2009, 'Evaluation in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding', in Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, eds., D. J. D. Sandole, S. Byrne, I. Sandole-Staroste, and J. Senehi, Routledge, Oxon and New York, pp. 286-299](#)

Why is evaluation essential in conflict resolution and peacebuilding work? How can traditional evaluations be adapted for this purpose? This chapter examines the difficulties and possibilities of evaluating conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives. Renewed attention to evaluation strengthens connections between peacebuilding theory and practice.

[Lanz, D., Wählisch, M., Kirchhoff, L., and Siegfried, M., 2008, 'Evaluating Peace Mediation', Proposal of a General Framework for Evaluating International Mediation Activities, Initiative for Peacebuilding \(IfP\) - Mediation Cluster](#)

How can accountability mechanisms be established for international peace mediation given that it takes place in extremely complex contexts and its contributions are difficult to grasp? This study has developed a framework for evaluating international mediation activities that differ from standard methodologies. It proposes a series of non-suggestive evaluation questions that allow a systematic but flexible assessment of aspects of peace mediation.

[De Coning, C. and Romita, P. 2009, 'Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations' International Peace Institute, New York](#)

It is difficult to make causal linkages between inputs and outcomes due to the complex nature of conflict. Donor countries and NGOs would do better to focus instead on the contributions particular activities make towards a desired outcome. Sustainable DDR requires achievements in other areas. DDR evaluation should look across a variety of sectors and consider the political dynamics that affect DDR processes. Identifying M&E benchmarks and indicators can help reconcile competing perspectives of strategic decisions. Other suggestions to improve M&E are: a web-based database of M&E lessons learned; a network to debate M&S issues; policy discussions on M&E at high profile discussion-making forums; and mechanisms to ensure that M&E results are incorporated into decision-making processes.

Church, C., and Rogers, M. M., 2006, 'Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs', Search for Common Ground, Washington, D.C.

[Access full text: available online](#)

### ***Stabilisation***

[Cohen, C., 2006, 'Measuring Progress in Stabilisation and Reconstruction', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

Measuring progress is essential to the success of stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. This report examines the shortcomings of current processes, including the tendency to measure implementation rather than impact. Proper assessment tools and reliable measures of progress are needed to enable policymakers to take stock of the challenges before intervening and to continuously track the progress of their efforts towards stabilisation. Political will is also essential to ensure leadership and cooperation across organisational boundaries.

## Peace and Security Architecture

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### International and regional engagement: coherence, coordination, sequencing and funding mechanisms

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#### *Coherence and coordination*

Conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding interventions involve a wide range of internal and external actors, including governments, civil society, the private sector and international and regional agencies. They also entail a broad range of activities that span security, political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and justice dimensions. There is broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programming increases the risk of duplication and inefficient spending; reduces capacity for delivery; and results in a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals, and ultimately weak outcomes on the ground.

The pursuit of coherence helps to manage interdependencies and allows for the development of an overarching strategic framework. There are four elements of coherence (De Coning 2007: 6):

- Agency coherence: consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency
- Whole-of-government coherence: consistency among the policies and actions of different government agencies of a country
- External coherence (harmonisation): consistency among the policies pursued by various external actors in a given country context
- Internal/external coherence (alignment): consistency between the policies of the internal and external actors in a given country context

Coordination is the means through which coherence is pursued. Through coordination tools, such as action plans, common needs assessments and productive division of labour, the various actors involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding can connect to the overall strategic framework. Coherence has been difficult to achieve, however, in part because of resistant organisational behaviour. Governments should give greater attention to organisational dynamics in seeking to promote all four elements of coherence.

In addition to targeted interventions in conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding, changes to other policy areas also need to be coordinated as they can impact (often negatively) on conflict dynamics. These include efforts to combat trafficking of drugs, arms and people; changes in international demand for illicit or illegal goods; and deportations of convicted felons from developed countries to developing countries.

[De Coning, C., 2007, 'Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions', NUPI Report, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo](#)

How important are coherence and coordination in United Nations peacebuilding missions? This study argues that pursuing coherence helps to manage the interdependencies that bind the peacebuilding system together. Coordination is the means through which individual peacebuilding agents can ensure that they are connected to the overall strategic framework. Unless peacebuilding agents, including the Norwegian Government, generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding strategy and operationalise the principle of local ownership, peacebuilding systems will continue to suffer from poor rates of sustainability and success.

[Lotze, W., De Carvalho, G. B., and Kasumba, Y., 2008, 'Peacebuilding Coordination in African Countries: Transitioning from Conflict Case Studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Occasional Paper, vol. 3, no. 1](#)

How can the coordination of African peacebuilding initiatives be improved? This paper includes case studies from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Liberia. There is much scope for coordination to be improved, particularly among local, internal actors who do not own their national peacebuilding frameworks. Peacebuilding coordination is currently too donor driven.

[Kent, R, 2007, 'The Governance of Global Security and Development: Convergence, Divergence and Coherence', Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 125 – 165](#)

How can we explain the lack of coherence within international conflict-handling mechanisms? This article examines the gaps in the international community's conflict-handling mechanisms from the perspective of coherence and organisational behaviour. It finds that organisational behaviour is one explanation for a lack of coherence and the various disconnects within international conflict-handling mechanisms. Ultimately, solutions to the organisational problems that inhibit coherence in international peace-building efforts will depend on political will.

Rintakoski, K. and Autti, M., eds., 2008, 'Comprehensive Approach: Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management', Seminar Publication, Ministry of Defence - Finland, Helsinki  
[Access full text: available online](#)

[OECD-DAC, 2009, 'Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development', Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee \(OECD-DAC\), Paris](#)

Integrated, comprehensive and inclusive armed violence reduction (AVR) programmes are an emerging and growing area of development practice around the world. This paper discusses the components of a multi-level AVR approach. Adopting integrated AVR programmes requires understanding of the multi-faceted, multi-level nature of armed violence, application of rigorous diagnostics of local situations and incorporation of local ownership at all levels of programme design and implementation.

For discussion and resources on the UN coherence and coordination, see 'United Nations' in the [international peace and security architecture](#) section of this guide.

For further resources on coherence and coordination, see [whole of government approaches](#) in the GSDRC's fragile states guide.

### **Sequencing**

One of most debated issues with respect to post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding is how to prioritise and sequence the range of necessary interventions. There is consensus among

academics, policy makers and practitioners that in post-conflict situations, the immediate need for security is paramount. Without security, all other interventions are likely to fail. Beyond this, the consensus seems to dissipate. Some advocate that governance and economic stabilisation should take precedence over service delivery and large-scale infrastructure. Others stress that service delivery should be prominent early on to address pressing needs and to provide a 'peace dividend'. Others argue infrastructure projects should begin early in the process both as a base for development and to provide necessary employment.

Sequencing is contextual and should be tailored to the specific needs and requirements of each country. Job creation and income-generation will be more important in some contexts than others. In divided post-conflict societies, repairing fractured social relations is also often an immediate priority. Regardless of how activities are sequenced, it is important to recognise that interventions cannot be rushed. In order to succeed in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, donors may need to remain engaged for a large number of years.

[Timilsina, A., 2006, 'Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritisation and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries', Chapter 9 - 'Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations', RAND dissertation, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, CA](#)

How should policies be prioritised in post-conflict countries and how should they be sequenced? This chapter uses case studies from post-conflict countries to identify a framework to help policymakers better navigate the complexities and challenges of prioritisation and sequencing. It argues that in the early stages of post-conflict security should be prioritised, along with humanitarian and relief efforts; governance and democratisation; economic stabilisation and reforms; and large-scale infrastructure and long-term development. Sequencing should be non-linear, context-dependent and specific to the needs and requirements of each country.

[Chand, S. and Coffman, R., 2008, 'How Soon Can Donors Exit From Post-Conflict States?', Working Paper no. 141, Centre for Global Development, Washington, DC](#)

When can donors successfully exit from post-conflict states? The answer, according to this analysis, is in decades. In Liberia, Mozambique, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste, the best case scenario for successful exit ranges from 15 to 27 years. Successful exit entails the creation of sufficient fiscal space to fund the recurrent budget from internally generated revenues. Extended donor presence provides space for the creation and maturation of institutions capable of preventing the state from rolling back into failure.

[Suhrke, A., Buckmaster, J., 2006, 'Aid, Growth and Peace: A Comparative Analysis', Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 337 – 363](#)

What factors shape the sequencing of post-war aid? What effect do aid patterns have on the long- and short-term stability of peace? This article maps patterns of post-war aid in order to identify patterns of sequencing and magnitude. It finds that contrary to other studies and conventional wisdom, post-war aid is not always front-loaded immediately after peace and then rapidly phased out. Instead, post-war aid has followed a variety of patterns, influenced by the political contexts of donation and implementation.

### **Financing**

Financing in post-conflict situations impacts the choice of interventions, the power and responsibility of different groups, and the balance of meeting short-term needs with long-term development. Financing shortfalls can be difficult to estimate as they are rarely based on needs assessments.

There are also debates concerning the sequencing of financing. Some scholars and practitioners argue that aid should be concentrated in earlier phases when the demands for multiple recovery programmes are greatest as well as the need to quickly provide jobs and protection to ‘at risk’ groups. They also assert that investment in capacity building is required upfront. Others argue that the absence of absorptive capacity in the immediate post-conflict period means that aid should peak a few years after a crisis in order to be used effectively.

Trust funds are a form of financing that allows aid to be collected upfront but dispersed gradually. Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) have been adopted in recent years in order to improve donor coordination. They are established ideally in close connection with a comprehensive needs assessment, with extensive involvement of donors, aid agencies and local authorities. This allows for a shared understanding of the pressing needs and methods of addressing them. It is also advocated that MDTFs are linked to recipient country budgets so that a balance can be struck between immediate post-conflict priorities and long-term institutional development.

It is also important that local organisations and NGOs are not by-passed in recovery and peacebuilding programming and financing; they are often the only ones capable of implementing activities on the ground.

[Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010 ‘Transition Financing: Building a Better Response’ OECD, Paris](#)

Aid modalities have been working poorly in post-conflict or ‘transition’ situation and must be more effective, rapid and flexible. Aid architecture should respond to the long-term, non-linear nature of transition rather than be compartmentalised into humanitarian and development modalities with their corresponding constraints. Pooled funding such as MDTFs have been shown to be useful tools especially when they are based on proper needs assessments. Sometimes they have been slow to operate and inadequately responsive to needs. This has occasionally led to a proliferation of other instruments without sufficient clarity and co-ordination between them. A funding “mix” may best release funds responsively and handle the inherent trade-offs between quick delivery and capacity building.

[Schiavo-Campo, S., 2003, ‘Financing and Aid Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations’, World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

What does the international experience with post-conflict reconstruction tell us about financing modalities and aid arrangements in post-conflict situations? Are there a series of recommendations that emerge from the experiences of post conflict countries? This paper looks at the experience of aid funds in four post-conflict environments. In a general sense a pre-requisite for post-conflict reconstruction and effective financing, is the establishment and maintenance of peace.

[GSDRC, 2007, ‘Post-conflict Recovery: Financing and Coordination Instruments’, Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

There has been a push in recent years towards greater coordination and pooled financing mechanisms to promote sustainable post-conflict recovery. Donor coordination is facilitated through negotiated strategic frameworks, which articulate a shared vision, action plan and productive division of labour; and through common needs assessments. Pledging conferences, (the more common form of financing recovery in the past) have been criticised for non-delivery or late delivery of funds and a donor-driven agenda. Pooled funds can correct for these shortcomings and foster greater coordination. They come in the form of Post-Conflict Funds (small grants for flexible, smaller scale interventions), Multi-Donor Trust Funds (for large scale collaborative programmes) and the proposed Strategic Post-Conflict Recovery Facility (a flexible fund that would

bridge the gap after emergency relief tapers). These un-earmarked funds would also allow financing to be channelled through the local government.

Cutillo, A., 2006, 'International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict. A Review of Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding', Policy Paper, International Peace Academy, New York

[Access full text: available online](#)

### **Case Studies**

[IDA, 2007, 'Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Reconstruction to Development', International Development Association \(IDA\) at Work, World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

This brief stresses that such strong engagement early on was critical since the financial package offered the prospect of reconstruction and return to normalcy, which helped to secure the peace deal. In the first few post-war years, financing was made under simplified procedures due to BiH's initial weak absorptive and managing capacity. The brief also emphasises that repairing fractured social relations should be an immediate post-war priority. This can be assisted through community development initiatives, such as small infrastructure projects, micro-finance for new local businesses, and grants to NGOs to strengthen civil society and protect vulnerable groups. Longer-term goals include developing a market economy, reforming the public sector and building state capacity so that it can provide a social safety net; as well as constructing larger infrastructure, such as a motorway linking BiH to neighbouring European countries.

[IDA, 2007, 'Sierra Leone: Recovering from Years of Conflict', International Development Association \(IDA\) at Work, World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

In 1997, the World Bank administered a multi-donor trust fund for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The basic security that this DDR programme provided paved the way for reconstruction and economic recovery, critical for a transition to peace. In subsequent years, IDA worked with other donors to support government efforts to rehabilitate schools, clinics, markets and roads; and NGO training and employment programmes – all of which promoted the return of internally displaced persons, refugees and former combatants. In 2003, donors greatly enhanced their coordination of public financial management reforms; they provided multi-donor budget support that underpinned a full poverty reduction strategy, as opposed to funding select reforms. One of the key lessons learned is that significant up-front investment in capacity building of implementing agencies is crucial.

## **International peace and security architecture**

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Peace and security architecture refers to the collection of organisations, mechanisms, and relationships through which the international, regional and local communities manage conflict, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

This section focuses on the United Nations, which remains the key institution in charge of international peace and security; and international financial institutions.

### **United Nations**

The United Nations has sought to implement a number of organisational reforms in recent years. Among them is the adoption of an integrated mission concept that aims to engage the various capabilities within the UN system in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. This is to be achieved through the establishment of a common strategic objective and comprehensive operational approach among the various agencies of the UN. The goal is to maximise UN contributions in countries emerging from conflict. Such reforms have been hindered, however, by the absence of adequate organisational change and accompanying incentives and mechanisms to encourage UN agencies to pool resources, consolidate rules and procedures, and invest in collaborative efforts.

The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, mandated in 2005, is an attempt to provide coherence to and coordination of peacebuilding missions. The mandate of the Commission is: to bring together all relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, and troop contributing countries; to marshal resources and predictable financing; to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; and where appropriate, to highlight any gaps that threaten to undermine peace. Recent evaluation of the Commission indicates that it has managed to create linkages between political, security, development and financial actors and to promote long-term attention to recovery and peacebuilding processes. Difficulties with coordination persist, however.

Hybrid operations are another possible mechanism for cooperation and coordination. Most have thus far consisted of either *ad hoc* short-term military support to a UN operation or the deployment of the UN in a long-term mission that takes over from a short-term regional intervention. The joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, launched in 2007, is the first time that a comprehensive hybrid operation has been adopted. The hybrid operation in this case was designed in large part because of the rejection by the Sudanese government of a UN presence. The way in which hybrid operations have been carried out has been critiqued, however, for attempting to match capacities from different organisations without providing the necessary mechanisms or political arrangements for coordination. There have been concerns about command and control mechanisms and methods of accountability.

United Nations, 2009, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict', Report, no. A/63/881-S/2009/304, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, New York

[Access full text: available online](#)

[Campbell, S. P. and Kaspersen, A. T., 2008, 'The UN's Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers', \*International Peacekeeping\*, vol. 15, no. 4, pp 470-485](#)

Have the UN integration reforms introduced between 1997 and 2007 increased efficiency and effectiveness in multidimensional peace operations? What are the barriers to better integration between UN agencies? This article argues that the reforms have largely ignored the barriers to their implementation – such as the fragmentation of the UN structure and the complexity of war-to-peace transitions. Reform impact has been greatly diminished by the absence of accompanying incentives or effective organisational change backed by long-term political engagement and support.

[CIC/IPI, 2008, 'Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission' Centre on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute, New York](#)

How successful is the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)? This paper commissioned three years after the creation of the PBC assesses progress made and makes suggestions for

enhanced impact. Continued focus on performance by all stakeholders will be necessary if the PBC is to (a) consolidate its positive impact on cases undertaken to date, and (b) extend its reach to new cases. In selecting new cases, the PBC should consider the potential to solidify its role as the central international meeting ground of political/security and financial/development actors.

[Andersen, L., 2007, 'UN Peace Operations in the 21st Century: State-building and Hybridity', Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen](#)

How have global peace operations evolved in the past decade? What challenges do these trends create? This paper maps recent United Nations led and delegated peace operations. It identifies two major trends in policy and practice: State-building interventions and hybrid operations. While these may be seen as pragmatic solutions to political problems, they also raise serious questions about accountability.

For further discussion and resources on the United Nations architecture, see the [peacekeeping](#) section of this guide. For resources on the UN Peacebuilding Commission in particular, see the [peacebuilding](#) sections of this guide.

### ***International Financial Institutions***

The international trend toward greater inter-agency cooperation and harmonisation in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction has extended to the international financial institutions (IFIs). The World Bank has traditionally distanced itself from matters related to conflict due to its non-political mandate. The increasing calls for World Bank participation and a growing recognition of the linkages between security and development have resulted in greater engagement by the World Bank in conflict contexts. The Bank has since emerged as a key player in coordinating and administering international support for post-conflict recovery.

The IFIs have also increasingly recognised that their policies must be adapted in conflict-affected countries and that conventional economic goals and activities will not automatically result in peacebuilding, and in some cases may be contrary to securing the peace. Instead new innovations may be required, for example, incorporating horizontal equity impact assessments into policy formulation and project appraisal; and rethinking the push for macroeconomic stabilisation, in particular cuts in government spending and potential tradeoffs with political stabilisation.

[Boyce, J.K., 2004, 'The International Financial Institutions: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Capacities', Paper prepared for the Centre on International Cooperation, Seminar on 'Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management', 8-9 June, Copenhagen](#)

Do the international financial institutions (IFIs) have the capacity to respond effectively in the planning and implementation of the civilian components of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding? This study suggests that the World Bank has gone further than other IFIs in addressing the distinctive challenges posed by engagement in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. However, there are areas where capacity building could enhance the effectiveness of their contributions. To respond effectively, the IFIs cannot stick to the same policies they would follow if a country has never had a civil war.

[Lie, J. H. S., 2008, 'The World Bank and Conflicts: From Narrow Rules to Broader Principles', NUPI Report, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo](#)

What is the relevance of the World Bank (WB) to conflicts, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction? This study argues that the WB's new operational policies promote a stronger inclination for the Bank to engage in conflict situations. Full participation in a Comprehensive Approach involving civil and military actors is still difficult. However, the WB is important to such

an approach and it should be consulted and listened to on matters of reconstruction and development.

Bell, E., 2008, 'The World Bank in Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries: "How", Not "How Much"', International Alert, London

[Access full text: available online](#)

## Regional peace and security architecture

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Violent conflicts often involve regional causes, dynamics and impacts, such as insecurity and poor governance in neighbouring countries, the presence of cross-border rebel groups, regional illicit trading networks in arms and high-value resources, refugee flows, destruction of cross-border infrastructure and other humanitarian and development spill-over effects.

Regional organisations have increasingly begun to work to promote peace and security. They may be considered more effective and legitimate external actors for conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding than the United Nations and other international actors. They are also more likely to have an interest in preventing, containing or resolving conflicts in their region. Their approaches range from diplomacy, to peacekeeping, to regional cooperation over infrastructure and regional public goods. The level of engagement and effectiveness varies, however, across regions and among regional and sub-regional organisations. Literature on regional organisations document that the rise in assertiveness, self-assurance and capacity of the leading regional peace and security bodies in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has not been paralleled in the rest of Asia or in the Middle East. In addition, effectiveness is often not determinable by official organisational mandates. Economic organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for example, have developed effective peacemaking capacities.

Despite the rise in prominence of regional bodies, research highlights that in practice, they can, similar to the UN, suffer from internal divisions, a lack of common values (with the exception of the European Union) and inflexibility. In addition, many lack adequate institutions, procedures and capacity and can serve purely to legitimate regional policies of their member states or to lock out or lock in selected states during the negotiation processes.

The rise of strong regional actors has also resulted in innovative coalitions in the South, with the inauguration of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum in 2003. IBSA could play a crucial role – within the framework of South-South cooperation – in addressing conventional non-traditional security threats in the contemporary global order, such as terrorism, drugs and drug-related crimes, transnational organised crime, illegal weapons traffic, and threats to public health, in particular HIV/AIDS.

[Wulf, H., 2009, 'The Role of Regional Organisations in Conflict Prevention and Resolution' in Still Under Construction: Regional Organisations' Capacities for Conflict Prevention', ed. H. Wulf, INEF Report 97, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, pp. 5-19](#)

What role do regional organisations have in conflict prevention and resolution? Due to an overburdened UN system, the international community has increasingly tasked regional organisations with conflict prevention and peacekeeping. This chapter outlines why regional organisations have played such a marginal role in the past. There are still weaknesses in regional organisations' conflict prevention and management functions which will limit their future role.

[Soko, M., 2007, 'IBSA Regional Security Dimensions: The South African Perspective', Policy: Issues and Actors, vol. 20, no. 6, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg](#)

In response to the high level of conflict and insecurity across the continent, African countries now seek to broaden the security issue by emphasising non-military security threats. However, this new paradigm poses the challenge of reconciling national sovereignty and non-interference with the more assertive security agenda championed by regional and sub-regional formations.

For further resources on regional peace and security architecture, see responsibility to protect in the [peacekeeping](#) section of this guide.

## **Africa**

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2002 was an important step in developing a new African peace and security architecture. In comparison to its predecessor, which was hamstrung by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of its member states, the AU is more proactive and has adopted principles and norms that relate to the responsibility to protect. In addition, there is an increasing recognition and codification of a broader notion of security that encompasses non-military aspects. The NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) initiative has been instrumental in emphasising the links between development, peace and security. Regional Economic Communities (e.g. ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa) have also been incorporated into the African peace and security architecture – and have varied experience and efficacy in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts hampered by a lack of effective crisis response structures. Failure of progress by regional and sub-regional organisations has, by some, been attributed to an entrenched political culture that endorses the use of force and mutual intervention by states in each other's conflicts and domestic affairs.

The new peace and security architecture in Africa under the direction of the AU includes the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Stand-By Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Panel of the Wise and the African Peace Facility (APF).

The PSC has had a mixed record since its launch in 2004. The PSC has played significant roles in conflict management in Burundi and Comoros and was quick to expel Mauritania and Togo following their *coups d'états*. However the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia was ignored despite this intervention lacking a mandate and Sudan has successfully obstructed several deliberations on Darfur.

Future objectives are to strengthen the mediation and conflict prevention aspects of PSC; institutionalise this mediation expertise and experience in the PSC and AU; and to form a unit within the PSC to monitor and evaluate the evolving dynamics of a conflict.

The ASF, which was scheduled to be operational by 2010, seeks to act as a rapid response force. It will be available for activities ranging from preventative deployments and observer missions to peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and post-conflict activities. The ASF when ready could be adopted for hybrid operations, in which the AU deploys first followed by the UN. There are concerns, however that the ASF has focused too much on the military components and that more attention is required to develop the civilian dimension, including child protection, gender issues, human rights, civil affairs, economic recovery and HIV/AIDS issues.

Together with regional early warning systems, the CEWS is set to anticipate and prevent conflicts in Africa through collecting data and information. This is to support PSC decision-making and to guide ASF deployment. The Panel of the Wise acts as a consultative body to the PSC on peace and security issues and is deployed in preventative diplomacy. The aim of the APF is to cover conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation as well as to accelerate decision-making and coordination processes.

The literature on Africa's peace and security architecture finds that progress has been made in creating a sound architecture that can act effectively to protect regional peace and security. This is evident for example in the AU's ability to act at the political level to mandate peacekeeping missions and the steps it has taken to establish the ASF. Key challenges remain, however – for example, the lack of political will to intervene in the affairs of sovereign countries; as well as the lack of adequate financial resources to meet demands, and the inability displayed thus far by African organisations to mobilise such resources. External support is essential – and donors have become increasingly involved in helping to develop the regional architecture. Donor involvement has centred on capacity-building for the political and administrative structures; support for early warning systems; and enhancing military capacities.

[Klingebliel, S. et al., 2008, 'Donor Contributions to the Strengthening of the African Peace and Security Architecture', German Development Institute, Bonn](#)

How can the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) be strengthened? What is the role of external support? This analyses how external support for the new APSA is changing. African reform dynamics, the emerging international security agenda and the complex relationship between security approaches and development policy have led external actors to search for new approaches across foreign, security and development policy areas.

[Williams, P., 2009, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating an Embryonic International Institution' The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 603-626](#)

How has the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union helped promote peace, security and stability on the African continent? This paper evaluates the PSC in terms of the significance of PSC deliberations and official statements; its political relevance; its efficiency and productivity; and the extent to which it should be considered the best placed institution to deal with Africa's security challenges. It concludes that the PSC has had mixed results and its future will hinge on whether more AU members will devote it greater resources.

[Aning, K. and Atuobi, S., 2009, 'Responsibility to Protect in Africa: An Analysis of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture', Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 90-113](#)

What is the best way to develop 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) norms in Africa? This article from the journal Global Responsibility to Protect argues that collaborative ventures between the African Union (AU) at the continental level, the regional economic communities (RECs) at the sub-regional level and the UN at the global level are the best options for deepening R2P norms. The AU's attempt to solve the continent's problems will continue to be thwarted by its lack of political will and the weakening of its norms and principles by some member states.

Dersso, S. A., 2010, 'The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture', ISS Paper no. 209, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

[Access full text: available online](#)

El Abdellaoui, J., 2009, 'The Panel of the Wise. A Comprehensive Introduction to a Critical Pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture,' ISS Paper 193, Institute for Security Studies,

[Access full text: available online](#)

[Healy, S., 2009, 'Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security', Paper no. 59 \(series 2\), Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London](#)

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organisation of seven East African countries, aiming to achieve regional peace, prosperity and integration. When member states fuel military action even while participating in peace talks, however, what can IGAD achieve? This paper assesses IGAD's development and contribution to two major peace processes, in Sudan and Somalia. Despite a significant influence on the outcomes, IGAD is undermined by weak institutional systems and an entrenched political culture of military aggression across the region.

[van Jaarsveld, S. and Mottiar, S., 2009, 'Mediating Peace in Africa: Securing Conflict Prevention - Strengthening the Mediation and Conflict Prevention Aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture' African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes \(ACCORD\) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland](#)

How can the African Union's mediation and conflict prevention mechanisms be strengthened? This seminar report assesses the evolving African peace and security architecture and presents five key recommendations for its future development. It argues that the AU's partnerships should be strengthened, mediation work institutionalised, early warning systems established, lesson-learning institutionalised and that civil society should become more involved in mediation processes.

For additional discussion and resources on the African peace and security architecture, see the [peacekeeping](#) and [third party mediation](#) sections of this guide.

## **Asia**

As noted in the outset, apart from Southeast Asia – and its Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), there are few prominent regional organisations in the rest of Asia involved in peace and security.

In contrast to most regions, the peace and security architecture in Asia has primarily involved informal mechanisms. The ASEAN approach has focused on 'softer' aspects, such as regional understanding, trust and long term relationships, as methods of conflict prevention and conflict management.

The absence of comprehensive Charter provisions addressing conflict prevention and management has not hindered ASEAN's recent movement into conflict prevention and management, in particular its ceasefire monitoring in Aceh and conflict prevention efforts in Cambodia and Burma. ASEAN continues, however, to place primacy on sovereignty and non-interference.

[Swanström, N., 2005, 'Regional Cooperation and Conflict Prevention', Chapter 4 in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia, ed. N. Swanström, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Washington, DC and Nacka, Sweden, pp. 71-101](#)

What is the future of regional cooperation and conflict prevention? This chapter discusses the links between regional cooperation and conflict prevention. Conflicts often have regional implications, dimensions and connections that necessitate a multilateral approach to conflict prevention. Effective regional cultures of prevention are needed, and these require agreement on core values and increased trust between member states. Regional, national and international actors need to engage in a process to redirect norms and values towards prevention and long term strategies.

## **Europe**

Although the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are structured very differently, there are functional crossovers in the fields of diplomacy, civilian crisis management, and more generally in areas such as the promotion of democracy and human rights. The two organisations have cooperated in the past, for example, in efforts to promote conflict prevention and political and economic stability in Southeast Europe. Joint efforts could also be beneficial for conflict prevention activities in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Cooperation in the field may not always contribute to long-term conflict prevention, however. The EU's acceptance of Estonia and Latvia as EU candidates and later as members, for example, undermined the OSCE's efforts to persuade governments of the two countries to protect minority rights.

[Stewart, E., 2008, 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', \*Contemporary Security Policy\*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 266-284](#)

Is cooperation with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) important to the European Union (EU)? Could an EU-OSCE partnership end OSCE's current crisis? This paper examines EU-OSCE relations, outlining modes of co-operation and overlap in objectives. The OSCE, with its inclusive membership and consensus-based approach, remains a relevant and essential actor in European security. Its current political crisis should not jeopardise EU commitment to cooperation.

## **Latin America and the Caribbean**

Latin America and the Caribbean are considered to be among the more peaceful regions in the world. With the exception of Columbia, there are no ongoing violent conflicts or imminent threats of violent conflict. There are concerns, however, that weak states and unresolved structural tensions have the possibility to eventually evolve into violent confrontations. The region's security agenda focuses mainly on non-traditional security threats, such as illegal drug trafficking and money laundering, the illicit trafficking of firearms, corruption, transnational organised crime, the consequences of global warming as well as HIV/AIDS.

The Organisation of American States (OAS) is the region's primary peace and security organisation. The focus of the OAS agenda has historically been on peaceful resolution of inter-state conflicts, but the OAS has in the 1980s and 1990s also engaged in conflict prevention. Successful cases include interventions in Central America, where special peace programmes were set up with the participation of the political leadership and grassroots civil society organisations. Similar to other regional organisations, key challenges faced by the OAS include strongly embedded principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and a lack of political will and difficulties in building consensus among its member states. Efforts to increase civil society involvement in the activities of the OAS, has been blocked in large part by a lack of political will among several member states.

[Jácome, F., 2009, 'Violent Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean' in \*Still Under Construction: Regional Organisations' Capacities for Conflict Prevention\*, ed. H. Wulf, INEF Report, no. 97, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, pp. 20-39](#)

This case study analyses the main conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean and examines the mechanisms that have been developed to prevent or resolve them. The paradigms that guide debates on the prevention of violent conflict in the region need to be changed. The causes of conflict are cumulative and so prevention should take into account the three interrelated aspects of development, governance and the promotion of a culture of peace.

Serbin, A., 2008, 'The Organisation of American States and Conflict Prevention', Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, New York  
[Access full text: available online](#)

## **Other actors: the private sector**

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Much of the research about the private sector in conflict zones highlights 'war economies' – illicit and semi-illicit natural resource exploitation, trade as a means of financing wars, and how profit-seeking business activities contribute to the perpetuation of violence (see the [resource and environmental factors](#) section of this guide). Less attention has been given to the role of the private sector in peacebuilding.

Private sector actors have various motivations to engage in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Violent conflict and instability have a big negative impact on the private sector through decreased investment and access to markets, damaged infrastructure, direct attack, loss of employees, and general costs related to the unpredictability of operating in a conflict environment. In addition to this economic rationale, there is a moral imperative for local business. They form part of the social fabric of a conflict context and experience the trauma and destruction it brings to their own families and communities.

There are multiple ways in which private sector actors can contribute to peacebuilding. These may relate to economic dimensions (e.g. job creation, addressing socioeconomic exclusion); security (e.g. participation in DDR processes; negotiating security with armed groups); reconciliation (participation in dialogue initiatives; joint economic activities across conflict-divides); and political dimensions (e.g. peace advocacy and lobbying; participation in multi-stakeholder political peace-processes).

In order to maximise these potential contributions, there needs to be a more balanced portrayal of the role of the private sector; greater exploration of the various positive roles that private sector actors can play; and better two-way engagement and learning between the NGO community and the corporate sector.

[International Alert, 2006, 'Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector', International Alert, London](#)

What role can the domestic private sector play in peacebuilding? This report assembles evidence from case studies to demonstrate that local businesses can contribute to peacebuilding. It argues that the international community should embrace the potential of this 'peace entrepreneurship' to provide necessary resources and skills for the promotion of sustainable peace.

[Rettberg, A., 2004, 'Business-Led Peacebuilding in Colombia: Fad or Future of a Country in Crisis?', Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London](#)

The private sector has often been accused of fuelling armed conflict, but what motivates business-led peace building? What explains business preferences for peaceful solutions at the local level? This paper examines four business initiatives in Colombia that are leading peacebuilding initiatives and mitigating the effects of conflict. It asks what motivated them to become involved in business-led peacebuilding with a view to understanding the wider prospects for business to partner in peace building, while also pointing out potential limits and obstacles.

[Killick, N., et al., 2005, 'The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

What peacebuilding role can local business play? Who can partner with business in the interest of peace? This paper explores how to engage local business and with whom it is likely to succeed. Awareness-raising, further research to identify peacebuilding roles and implementation of practical initiatives would strengthen the use of local business as peacebuilders.

[Zandvliet, L., 2005, 'Opportunities for Synergy - Conflict Transformation and the Corporate Agenda', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

What is the role of business within conflict transformation? Why do companies and conflict transformation advocates have difficulty hearing each other within this debate? This paper argues that there is significant overlap between the corporate and conflict transformation community. However, both parties focus on their differences, rather than mutual interests. Collaboration is required between stakeholders; the obstacles impeding constructive dialogue must be removed.

For further resources on the role of the private sector, see the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section of this guide.

### **Other actors: the media**

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Similarly to the case of the private sector, much of the research about the role of media in conflict zones highlights negative aspects – its use as a tool to spread propaganda, indoctrinate, dehumanise and mobilise populations into acts of violence, including collective violence. Yet, in recent years, there has been increasing attention to the positive role that media can play in conflict contexts. This has been matched by increasing donor and NGO interventions in conflict-affected societies to promote the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media to foster long-term peace and stability. Media strategies have included: raising the profile of moderate voices; creating peaceful channels through which differences can be resolved non-violently; and creating a robust media culture that allows citizens to hold government accountable. Activities have ranged from training to provision of equipment; from launching media regulation initiatives to enhancing professional associations; and from supporting individual media to transforming former state radios into public service broadcasters.

It is important to distinguish between support for independent mass media in their role of providing society with a full account of relevant topics, including background and context, and the communication efforts done by peace promoters via the media amongst other channels. Support to mass media has to ensure that the media does not follow any hidden agenda as this is the main source of their credibility, whereas communication activities can target media with tailored information.

Thus, there are various ways the media can play a role in conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding. Various media channels can act as peace promoters, for example, at the start of negotiations in order to build confidence and create a climate conducive to negotiation. The media might also mobilise public support for peace agreements when media reporting is done in a balanced and comprehensive way. Media may have the potential to contribute to conflict transformation and peacebuilding as well by countering stereotypes and misconceptions, promoting empathy and depolarising attitudes by portraying similarities with the 'other', and facilitating dialogue and understanding.

More research is required to determine what is required for media to make a sustainable positive contribution. There should also be greater collaboration between the media and peace professionals. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding professionals can use the media in conjunction with their other programming – and need assistance in determining how they can combine these interventions to have the biggest impact. Media professionals also need to learn about why and when their work can contribute to preventing violent conflict and building peace between groups.

[Bajraktari, Y. and Hsu, E., 2007, 'Developing Media in Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

What strategies, tool and methods work best in the development of post-war media institutions? In war-torn societies, the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media is critical to fostering long-term peace and stability. This report provides guidance by drawing on best practices from past and present post-war media development efforts. A permanent, indigenous mechanism dedicated to monitoring media development is critical to fostering a healthy, independent media sector. It is particularly important to monitor hate speech.

[Spurk, C., 2002, 'Media and Peacebuilding: Concepts, Actors and Challenges', Swisspeace, Bern](#)

How can media support peacebuilding? Media have played a destructive role in many conflicts; but media programming can also play a positive role, particularly when integrated into an overarching peacebuilding strategy. Free and independent media can also foster democracy. This report summarises concepts of media and peacebuilding and looks at trends and challenges. Media can contribute to peacebuilding through indirect activities (providing non-partisan, balanced information and accountability) and through direct conflict-related programmes.

[Bratic V., and Schirch, L., 2008, 'Why and When to Use the Media for Peacebuilding', GPPAC Issue Paper, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict](#)

How can civil society organisations working in conflict prevention and peacebuilding improve their interactions with the media? Why and when should they use the media? This paper argues that different types of media can bring about different types of change. Information programming can encourage cognitive change by increasing knowledge and framing public discussion. Entertainment programming and advertising encourage attitudinal change. The media rarely directly affects behaviour, but it influences attitudes and opinions that shape behaviour. Behavioural change happens through the cumulative impact of the media and other social institutions; an integrated strategy is important.

James, B., ed., 2004, 'Media: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction', The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Paris

[Access full text: available online](#)

Bratic, V., 2009, 'Examining Peace-Oriented Media in Areas of Violent Conflict', Search for Common Ground

[Access full text: available online](#)

### **Case Studies**

Bajraktari, Y. and Parajon, C., 2008, 'Media and Conflict: Afghanistan as a Relative Success Story', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC

[Access full text: available online](#)

Acayo, C. and Mnjama, N., 2004, 'The Print Media and Conflict Resolution in Northern Uganda', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp.27-44

[Access full text: available online](#)

Paluck, E. L., 2009, 'Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict with the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 96, no. 3, pp. 574-587

[Access full text: available online](#)

Šajkaš, M., 2007, 'Transitional Justice and the Role of the Media in the Balkans' Discussion Paper prepared for the International Centre for Transitional Justice

[Access full text: available online](#)

Tripathee, S. R., 2007, 'Monitoring a Moving Target: Peace Building Soap Opera in Nepal', Paper presented at the 3rd Symposium Forum Media and Development: Measuring Change in Media Development, September, Bonn

[Access full text: available online](#)